Grant Grant v Lee

What are the main points and counterpoints of this book? Is this book worth reading?

Was Lee truly a superior general?

https://www.amazon.com/dp/0253202884/?tag=civilwartalkc-20
I came across this older post inviting comments about Fuller's work "Grant and Lee". When on the topic of the CW, folks will often ask who the better general was and my reply is always the same -- "It depends", which in turn draws the usual disappointed sighs or "He doesn't know", and so forth. I will go on to explain that it's not an easy question as there are so many variables to consider when assessing (minus hard metrics) and evaluating (using numbers to support a point). Southern revisionist history is a difficult one to overcome but Fuller takes a stab at it in his work to lend to the more accurate view that Grant was anything but a drunk and a butcher, and that Lee, although a highly competent general officer, was not a genius nor a saint. Having studied over the years both men from many vantages, I've come to agree with Fuller by-and-large.

Having said this, if I were to select one to lead my armies to victory, given the context of the period, I would choose Grant. It doesn't necessarily mean that I think Grant was a superior general over Lee, only that given the circumstances of that time in history, Grant would have been a better choice to carry the fight through a web of ugly politics and opposition from jealous peers, to a victorious conclusion.
 
I came across this older post inviting comments about Fuller's work "Grant and Lee". When on the topic of the CW, folks will often ask who the better general was and my reply is always the same -- "It depends", which in turn draws the usual disappointed sighs or "He doesn't know", and so forth. I will go on to explain that it's not an easy question as there are so many variables to consider when assessing (minus hard metrics) and evaluating (using numbers to support a point). Southern revisionist history is a difficult one to overcome but Fuller takes a stab at it in his work to lend to the more accurate view that Grant was anything but a drunk and a butcher, and that Lee, although a highly competent general officer, was not a genius nor a saint. Having studied over the years both men from many vantages, I've come to agree with Fuller by-and-large.

Having said this, if I were to select one to lead my armies to victory, given the context of the period, I would choose Grant. It doesn't necessarily mean that I think Grant was a superior general over Lee, only that given the circumstances of that time in history, Grant would have been a better choice to carry the fight through a web of ugly politics and opposition from jealous peers, to a victorious conclusion.
From January 1863 until the fall elections in 1874, Grant was the dominant figure in a country which concluded national unification and became an industrial power equal to the European powers. There was much more than generalship involved in that story.
General Lee on the other hand, was unable to convince his political leadership that the war was lost and the only moral course was to end the slaughter. He had to become detached from this government in order to complete the surrender.
 
Having said this, if I were to select one to lead my armies to victory, given the context of the period, I would choose Grant. It doesn't necessarily mean that I think Grant was a superior general over Lee, only that given the circumstances of that time in history, Grant would have been a better choice to carry the fight through a web of ugly politics and opposition from jealous peers, to a victorious conclusion.
I think it rather depends on the size of your armies! Lee was certainly effective at convincing his government to concentrate the plurality - and later the majority - of their resources in the theatre in which decisive results could be expected on a short time scale (from either direction), and by the time he faced Grant in 1864 that army he had was no more than half the size of the army Grant could obtain (as a result of the difference in army sizes across the continent).

Swap their army sizes and situations around and you end up with Lee invading the North with twice the numbers of his opponent. I don't think Grant would do so well in that situation, or at least there is no evidence to suggest he would have done.
 
The historical evidence seems clear enough to me. Grant fought in several Military depts, West to East with several different armies and commanders..

Lee was confined(or confined himself) to a small confined area of the war for almost the entirity of the War.

Most importantly I think, Grant faced most, if not all, the best known and trained generals of the Confederacy, who could be found to face him, including Lee, and contended against all the largest armies of the confederacy and defeated them all including the ANV.

The verdict of history is to me, conclusive. It is not as if, there was no direct comparison between the two men. After all, there is plenty of historical evidence that Lee could defeat armies much larger than his own ANV
 
I came across this older post inviting comments about Fuller's work "Grant and Lee". When on the topic of the CW, folks will often ask who the better general was and my reply is always the same -- "It depends", which in turn draws the usual disappointed sighs or "He doesn't know", and so forth. I will go on to explain that it's not an easy question as there are so many variables to consider when assessing (minus hard metrics) and evaluating (using numbers to support a point). Southern revisionist history is a difficult one to overcome but Fuller takes a stab at it in his work to lend to the more accurate view that Grant was anything but a drunk and a butcher, and that Lee, although a highly competent general officer, was not a genius nor a saint. Having studied over the years both men from many vantages, I've come to agree with Fuller by-and-large.

Having said this, if I were to select one to lead my armies to victory, given the context of the period, I would choose Grant. It doesn't necessarily mean that I think Grant was a superior general over Lee, only that given the circumstances of that time in history, Grant would have been a better choice to carry the fight through a web of ugly politics and opposition from jealous peers, to a victorious conclusion.
I think it's very hard to compare how both of them fared against political influence.

Although I am not too familiar with Grant's political connections I somehow remember him being to a certain degree influenced as soon as he was transferred to the East. Wasn't there a letter from Pinkerton to McClellan where it said that Grant´s operations were closely supervised by the government? I even read that the Overland Campaign was a brainchild of the politicians and that an original plan of Grant was overruled.
(but I have to admit that it's only hearsay...)

On the other hand Lee's status of being nearly "untouchable" (at least since the fall of 1862) was not the product of his clever political acting - as he actually refrained from string-pulling most of the times. And in those rare moments where he tried to get the confederate congress to change it's attitudes he definitely wasn't successful.

Maybe both generals were (just like most of their colleagues) not that powerful especially in politics?
(But again...I just don't know enough about the quality of Grant's connections...).
Lee could have exerted more influence than he did (eg regarding the removing of Johnston) - but that was not according to his character (I think).
 
The historical evidence seems clear enough to me. Grant fought in several Military depts, West to East with several different armies and commanders..

Lee was confined(or confined himself) to a small confined area of the war for almost the entirity of the War.

Most importantly I think, Grant faced most, if not all, the best known and trained generals of the Confederacy, who could be found to face him, including Lee, and contended against all the largest armies of the confederacy and defeated them all including the ANV.

The verdict of history is to me, conclusive. It is not as if, there was no direct comparison between the two men. After all, there is plenty of historical evidence that Lee could defeat armies much larger than his own ANV
It could also be regarded how well both were able to shape their corps of officers and elicit a spirit of cooperation and confidence in them - a field where many others terribly failed.
 
What are the main points and counterpoints of this book? Is this book worth reading?

Was Lee truly a superior general?

https://www.amazon.com/dp/0253202884/?tag=civilwartalkc-20
I haven't seen this one before, but Fuller's The Generalship of Ulysses S. Grant was interesting if understandably biased toward Grant and the North, and I would presume he came to the same conclusion in your title as well. Fuller was a very important British military thinker and writer in the interwar era after having been seriously wounded as an infantry officer in the trenches. Here's a combined review I wrote about his Grant study comparing and contrasting it with one of Stonewall Jackson written slightly earlier by another former British officer Col. J. F. C. Fuller:

https://civilwartalk.com/threads/th...-stonewall-jackson-by-g-f-r-henderson.159139/
 
The verdict of history is to me, conclusive. It is not as if, there was no direct comparison between the two men. After all, there is plenty of historical evidence that Lee could defeat armies much larger than his own ANV
Perhaps so, but how often does he defeat armies literally twice his own size?

Certainly Grant comes out by this metric as better than (perhaps, depending on how you count) Ambrose Burnside and Joseph Hooker, but there's no particular evidence he's better than the Georges.
 
Fuller was writing a pro US treatment of the Civil War in the interim between the world wars. When he was writing the 9 months Grant's army spent in the trenches around Petersburg, with not very much fighting from November 1864 to April 1865 did not look as bad, in comparison to the slaughter on the western front during WWI.
Fuller criticized Grant for not solving the tactical problem of using artillery to blast the Confederate trenches. But events in both Georgia and Virginia show that both Grant and Sherman were going to use mobility to wreck what remained of the Confederate railroad system.
They had a different focus then the generals who were trying to win WWI. And the difference may have been that the Confederate armies were not big enough to form a continuous line covering all their railroads.
 
Fuller criticized Grant for not solving the tactical problem of using artillery to blast the Confederate trenches. But events in both Georgia and Virginia show that both Grant and Sherman were going to use mobility to wreck what remained of the Confederate railroad system.
They had a different focus then the generals who were trying to win WWI. And the difference may have been that the Confederate armies were not big enough to form a continuous line covering all their railroads.
Though it's worth realizing that using artillery would have absolutely been an option during 1864.
 
Though it's worth realizing that using artillery would have absolutely been an option during 1864.
Grant and Sherman had options that were not available to the French and British in WWI. The Confederate armies had flanks. If the US cavalry could reach those flanks and the infantry properly supported them, the US armies could reach the important railroads.
As for the improved artillery control that Fuller thought was possible, the US navy at Fort Fisher came closer to meeting Fuller's goal. But that was a time sensitive operation as the US wanted all the Atlantic ports closed before any vessels purchased by the Confederacy in Europe could cross the Atlantic.
My memory is that I thought Fuller was unsympathetic to Lee and the intractable problem Lee faced with respect to dealing with the Confederate government.
 
Grant and Sherman had options that were not available to the French and British in WWI. The Confederate armies had flanks. If the US cavalry could reach those flanks and the infantry properly supported them, the US armies could reach the important railroads.
Well, yes, once the Union army has the manpower to mount flanking operations it can flank the Confederates out of Petersburg in 1865.

Or, the Union could have mounted regular approaches starting in July 1864, possibly forced Early out of the Valley to help defend, and captured Petersburg by August that year.


Regular approaches are slow compared to operational manoeuvre in the open field, but they're faster than waiting several months for reinforcements.
 
Though it's worth realizing that using artillery would have absolutely been an option during 1864.
Would it? I always thought they shot roundballs respectively canister on short distances and that the time-fused explosives were set to explode in some height - which should have made it possible to construct some kind of cover. Did they have impact fuses (that worked)?
 
Would it? I always thought they shot roundballs, canister on short distances and that the time-fused explosives were set to explode in some height - which should have made it possible to construct some kind of cover. Did they have impact fuses (that worked)?
Regular approaches had worked for hundreds of years, and the trench was not exactly a brand new innovation just come up with in 1863.

The thing that has to be realized is that:
1) A lot of the benefit that the defender has in a fight in the 1860s is the defensive support of the artillery (meaning cannister) - basically dug-in artillery is a lot harder to eliminate during the fighting, so the attackers eat cannister as they close in. Notice that the attack at Spotsylvania which goes particularly well is the one where the artillery has been withdrawn.
2) To bring up light/field artillery to eliminate dug in artillery during the attack itself is likely to fail because the dug-in artillery has the protection of its works, and will thus win.
3) You therefore need your own artillery to be able to engage in counter-battery fire and overcome the enemy artillery from beyond the range at which the defending artillery can eliminate your own - thus, long ranged rifles using dominating ground. (In the Union's case this would be 6.4", 8" and 10" Parrott guns.)
4) These guns also fire big heavy shells which can tear up the parapets of the enemy by putting (timed fuze) shell into them (and having them detonate underground) or if the parapets aren't thick enough the shells can go through and burst inside the trenches themselves. Percussion fuzes are better for this, but it's not necessary (though with percussion fuze you can do it even with field artillery to some extent,like the 12lber Armstrong)

Between them, these points mean that by using heavy long-range artillery you can more-or-less remove the advantage the defensive gives, at least over the area the guns can cover. This means you can use what's basically bite-and-hold - eliminate the enemy defensive advantage in a sector, capture the sector, either fend off an enemy counterattack (for which you have the defensive advantage now) or build up your works on the captured sector, then move your heavy guns to somewhere else and repeat.

For the defender, there are two options:

(1) They can contest each attack by turning it into a fight, which means you are fighting the enemy outside the advantage of their defensive entrenchments (and can win the attritional fight)
or
(2) They can not contest each attack heavily, which means that you are gaining ground.

This is a system which is kind of "inexorable" - it's hard as all get out to stop. It's why Lee said in 1862 that "McClellan will make this a battle of Posts. He will take position from position, under cover of his heavy guns, & we cannot get at him without storming his works".

Lee was obliged to make costly attacks to force McClellan away from Richmond rather than let him conduct these regular approaches. In 1864, he doesn't have the assets or position to do such a flanking attack on Grant's supply line.
 
I haven't seen this one before, but Fuller's The Generalship of Ulysses S. Grant was interesting if understandably biased toward Grant and the North, and I would presume he came to the same conclusion in your title as well. Fuller was a very important British military thinker and writer in the interwar era after having been seriously wounded as an infantry officer in the trenches. Here's a combined review I wrote about his Grant study comparing and contrasting it with one of Stonewall Jackson written slightly earlier by another former British officer Col. J. F. C. Fuller:

https://civilwartalk.com/threads/th...-stonewall-jackson-by-g-f-r-henderson.159139/
As Prof. Brian Holden Reid noted in his book on Fuller, Fuller engaged in a lot of special pleading. As Prof. Reid notes, Liddel Hart even wrote to him that Fuller "ascribes to Grant a subtly and range of vision which is Fulleresque but which is in contrast to the very picture you paint of Grant's character."

Fuller's Grant book was essentially a sales pitch to the US Army to promote his ideas of the conduct of war. He started from his thesis, that Grant adopted Fuller's ideas 60 years before Fuller wrote them, and used special pleading to try and show it. That it was overly friendly to Grant was incidental.
 
Lee as commander must own the responsibility for failure from the May to June response to the offensive of Grant.
 
The problem for the US generals included two things that Fuller did not write about. The US victory had to be so complete that at least some of the Confederate states became ratifiers of the 13th Amendment. There had to be a real surrender, to gain at least a period of peace. And the Confederate government never did surrender or disavow the creation of insurgent movements to resist US rule.
 
Lee as commander must own the responsibility for failure from the May to June response to the offensive of Grant.
Out of interest, do you have a proposal for how he could have successfully opposed the offensive such that it would have gone better?

I have one, which is based around the initial deployment, but I think once the campaign actually starts Lee played his hand pretty well.
 
The problem for the US generals included two things that Fuller did not write about. The US victory had to be so complete that at least some of the Confederate states became ratifiers of the 13th Amendment. There had to be a real surrender, to gain at least a period of peace. And the Confederate government never did surrender or disavow the creation of insurgent movements to resist US rule.
I'm not really sure how that in some sense precludes Fuller's argument about the use of artillery?
 

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