Grant Grant v Lee

[leftyhunter]

I think you have to use an entirely different definition of success for the two sides. In the case of the Union, it was a war of conquest and its aim was to re-establish Federal government control of as much geography as possible. So in that case, the fall of significant cities and ports are absolutely successes.

For the Confederate side, the goal was to remain intact, defiant and to continue resistance. Even if Johnston had won at Shiloh and Pemberton had won at Vicksburg, there would have been no expansions of the Confederate territories. They would have maintained their space and remained to fight the next attempt to subdue them. Only Lee had a remote chance (in my estimation) of actually causing the fall of important cities had he won at Gettysburg, and even then, it would have been temporary.

So, in this perspective, Shiloh was actually a success for both sides. For the Union, holding the field meant Grant secured his gains in Western Tennessee. For the Secesh, their army had demonstrated a fierce fighting ability and remained a threat, as evidenced by the uproar created by Bragg when he took this army a few months later into Kentucky.

I would respectfully disagree. The Achilles heel of the Confederate economy is exporting bulky agricultural exports to Western Europe. By middle 1862 the English as well has the French have a " cotton famine" and have to layoff workers. The blockade can only grow tighter very time as the Union capture's more ports and the Union Navy grows larger. President Davis even acknowledged in a letter during the war that there are simply not enough Confederate soldiers to secure the few vital deep water ports.
Leftyhunter

 

[leftyhunter]

To all it was @GrantCottage1885 not Cash ( my bad) that posted in the Grant forum in @lurids thread "Pyrrhic Victory" that Grant did not favor an Overland Campaign and wrote to Major General Hallack ( not Lincoln per my bad) of an alternative Campaign in North Carolina to attack Richmond. Most likely Grant would of saved lives but for Lincoln insisting on an Overland Campaign.
Leftyhunter

 

[wausaubob]

I think McClellan's strategy in that was correct - after all, it's what Grant focused on, and Richmond is among other things the key to the whole state of Virginia (most populous Confederate state), the capital, and the only real source of artillery.

It may not end the war at a stroke, exactly, but it's a powerful symbol and hugely impactful on the war.

Richmond was not Paris or London. The fall of Richmond would not have ended the Confederate insurgency. It would have changed form. Richmond was the improvised capital of an aspiring nation, it was not dominant. In many ways the Confederacy was a rural insurgency. They did much of their best work as mounted raiders.

 

[leftyhunter]

Richmond was not Paris or London. The fall of Richmond would not have ended the Confederate insurgency. It would have changed form. Richmond was the improvised capital of an aspiring nation, it was not dominant. In many ways the Confederacy was a rural insurgency. They did much of their best work as mounted raiders.

Not really. Richmond was a key industrial city. Insurgents can't keep slaves from being freed and insurgents can't keep vital exports from being intercepted by the US Navy. The ACW certainly had an insurgency component but insurgency Aline was not going to win Independence for the Confederacy.
Leftyhunter

 

[Saphroneth]

Richmond was not Paris or London. The fall of Richmond would not have ended the Confederate insurgency. It would have changed form. Richmond was the improvised capital of an aspiring nation, it was not dominant. In many ways the Confederacy was a rural insurgency. They did much of their best work as mounted raiders.

It takes a pretty big city to be a capital, and Richmond was one of the only ones suitable for purpose in the CSA.
It's also got huge strategic importance:

It's the focus of the entire Virginia rail network, meaning that controlling it effectively controls the resources and manpower of Virginia.
It's a place where supplies can be unloaded from the sea, thus making it an ideal supply node for the Union.
At least as of 1862 it has the only steam hammer in the Confederacy, along with their main (possibly only) gun foundry and one of their only rifle manufactories of any volume.

And finally it's important for political reasons as well. Virginia is the link the CSA has with the Founding Fathers; their ability to defend Richmond is a major part of their claim to be a legitimate state (which they certainly wished to be).

If the capture of Richmond reduces the Confederacy to mounted raiders incapable of putting a formed army into the field, then before long they're not able to enact meaningful resistance at all.

 

[Saphroneth]

To give some scale to this, Henrico county produced the same quantity of war material as the states of Alabama, Arkansas, South Carolina, Mississippi, Florida and Texas combined. It continued producing rifles throughout the war because of the combination of the machinery from Harpers Ferry and the iron from Patrick County VA; as the blockade gets tighter that increasingly becomes the only source of gun barrels the CSA has.

 

[DanSBHawk]

The thing that we have to realize when considering the performance of a general is that whether they won or lost is controlled by the resources they had available to them, and that they can be criticized or lauded for what falls within their span of action.

I disagree that their performance is "controlled" by the amount of resources. Often, it is the ability of the general to make do with the available resources.

 

[DanSBHawk]

It takes a pretty big city to be a capital, and Richmond was one of the only ones suitable for purpose in the CSA.
It's also got huge strategic importance:

It's the focus of the entire Virginia rail network, meaning that controlling it effectively controls the resources and manpower of Virginia.
It's a place where supplies can be unloaded from the sea, thus making it an ideal supply node for the Union.
At least as of 1862 it has the only steam hammer in the Confederacy, along with their main (possibly only) gun foundry and one of their only rifle manufactories of any volume.

And finally it's important for political reasons as well. Virginia is the link the CSA has with the Founding Fathers; their ability to defend Richmond is a major part of their claim to be a legitimate state (which they certainly wished to be).

If the capture of Richmond reduces the Confederacy to mounted raiders incapable of putting a formed army into the field, then before long they're not able to enact meaningful resistance at all.

It should be remembered that the primary focus was Lee's army, not the city of Richmond.

 

[DanSBHawk]

If we use the CEVs that @Saphroneth has supplied of McCellen vs Lee during the Peninsula Campaign then no Lee is not the superior general. If we go by the results of the Peninsula Campaign then a case can be made that Lee was the superior general. On the other hand as @Saphroneth has remained us Lincoln denied McCellen troops that were promised resulting in McCellen having at best parity with Lee. The standard recommendation for a successful offense is a three to one manpower superiority ratio certainly not anything close to 1 to 1.
Leftyhunter

One good example why CEV's are misleading in judging the performance of a general, are the accounts of the fighting on the Peninsula which indicate that McClellan was absent during the actual combat. So who gets credit for the CEV?... Porter? Sumner?

 

[67th Tigers]

This work was written by Fuller as a promo-piece for his ideas about how combat should be fought. He picked Grant as an exemplar of his ideas, despite the fact that this misrepresented Grant greatly, and he picked Lee as an exemplar of the old ideas. It's worth reading Holden-Reid's Fuller analysis to place the work in context, but that's really rare (I read parts at the British Library when I live 5 mins walk from it, but have never located a reasonably priced copy).

Read Fuller's work, but be aware it is very, very biased towards Grant.

 

[67th Tigers]

Was that Lincoln ordering it or requesting it?

Halleck plainly told Grant that his plans were not approved. This was before Grant was made GinC. Essentially, it was indicated to Grant that doing what Lincoln wanted was a requirement before he was promoted Lt Gen.

If you read Grant's proposal, it is clear that he reverted to a variant of it on reaching the James.

Essentially, Grant tried things Lincoln's way upto Cold Harbor, although his movements indicate more "strategy" than Lincoln wanted. In early June, after the Republican Primary, Grant abandons Lincoln's idea, and goes with a variant of his original plan using City Point rather than Suffolk as a base of operations. It was a better idea, because Grant's original idea would not have cut the South Side RR. Indeed, Grant cut the Weldon RR right at the beginning of the Siege of Petersburg, and it didn't force Lee to abandon Richmond, as he'd predicted in Jan '64. Thus we can conclude that Grant's analysis was faulty, and the Suffolk operation would have been unsuccessful.

 

[67th Tigers]

I disagree that their performance is "controlled" by the amount of resources. Often, it is the ability of the general to make do with the available resources.

!

Please tell this to a tank commander who's been ordered to move his tank 100 miles, but only has fuel for 50. No amount of "making do" will get that tank across the distance.

One good example why CEV's are misleading in judging the performance of a general, are the accounts of the fighting on the Peninsula which indicate that McClellan was absent during the actual combat. So who gets credit for the CEV?... Porter? Sumner?

Nope, he was in command at every combat. Of course corps commanders commanded their corps, division commanders commanded their divisions etc., but McClellan commanded the army. That he was at a command post managing the commitment of reserves etc. and not waving his sword at the front is actually a good thing.

 

[CSA Today]

Richmond was not Paris or London. The fall of Richmond would not have ended the Confederate insurgency. It would have changed form. Richmond was the improvised capital of an aspiring nation, it was not dominant. In many ways the Confederacy was a rural insurgency. They did much of their best work as mounted raiders.

The Confederate government could have escaped a fall of Richmond and set up business elsewhere, but the loss of Tredegar Iron Works the largest munitions producing facility in the country would have have been devastating and most likely a fatal blow.

 

[Saphroneth]

To give an example of how the resources available to a commander shape what they can do, consider a naval battle - Monitor vs. Virginia.

If the Union commander in that engagement didn't have Monitor and he only had wooden ships, then based on the performance of the Virginia against wooden ships there's little reason to suppose he could have saved Minnesota. (Indeed, it's quite possible he wouldn't have tried.)

A commander can certainly be criticized or lauded for forming a plan within or not within the resources his state gives him, but if Lee fought Grant to a stalemate and Lee had half the troops of Grant then we can hardly blame Lee for having the smaller army - his country simply could not give him one of appropriate size.
OTOH we could criticize Lee for those occasions where his tactics were costly of men out of proportion to the possible benefits - his position meant that he should be miserly of men.

 

[wausaubob]

Getting back to Fuller, he admitted it was a once over quickly analysis. And it was written to be pro US, in the inter war period. One summer of trench warfare in Virginia did not look as bad by 1932. This was especially true because other US forces remained mobile.
One of Fuller's assertions was that Grant was always pressuring the administration to get back to strategic basics and forgo side expeditions. In the eastern theaters especially, Grant eventually got rid of all of the political generals. He did not so much create new plans, as much as made the plans of other people politically viable. By adapting to policy Grant gained strategic freedom.
General Lee had much more difficult political problem. The south had loyalty problems from the start. Substantial regions fell away from the possible 15 state Confederacy, from the beginning. And Jefferson Davis was more of a political firebrand and less of a strategic talent then Davis was willing to admit. Especially after the 1864 election Lee was unable to make Davis see reality, and instead General Lee guided events to prevent the wide outbreak of guerilla war, in the best way possible.
It was possible the Confederates could get away to the west and south, after Petersburg, but the territory left that could sustain a concentrated body of men was small. Without connection to the outside world, they would have to become insurgents and robbers.

 

[Sbc]

Hannibal lost his war but is still remembered as a great leader several thousand years later.

Yep
Anyone want to claim Napoleon was not a great general even though eventually lost to the coalitions of Europe?

 

[Saphroneth]

Napoleon's an odd one because he was also Emperor. Thus you could theoretically put in the debit column his willingness to believe he could just keep winning battles indefinitely, as this meant he kept going for a military solution even when he'd been offered a deal that would leave him on the throne of France.
The parallel here, I suppose, would be if there'd been an offer for an independent eleven-state Confederacy and Lee had argued for holding out for more.

 

[leftyhunter]

One good example why CEV's are misleading in judging the performance of a general, are the accounts of the fighting on the Peninsula which indicate that McClellan was absent during the actual combat. So who gets credit for the CEV?... Porter? Sumner?

As long as a general is following the orders of his commander and chief then the CnC gets the credit for the CEVs.
Leftyhunter

 

[Saphroneth]

To some extent it depends on who made the decisions. For example I would say you can't blame Lee for Malvern Hill because Lee did not intend to attack there - the attack there was an accident and not part of Lee's design.

OTOH you can credit Lee for Cold Harbor because he's the one who dug in there.

The Crater you could give Grant partial blame for but the blame also accrues to the twit who switched from the trained USCT at the last minute.

Grant deserves a lot of blame for Shiloh because of his decision to not entrench, and so on.

 

[Sbc]

Napoleon's an odd one because he was also Emperor. Thus you could theoretically put in the debit column his willingness to believe he could just keep winning battles indefinitely, as this meant he kept going for a military solution even when he'd been offered a deal that would leave him on the throne of France.
The parallel here, I suppose, would be if there'd been an offer for an independent eleven-state Confederacy and Lee had argued for holding out for more.

Yes he had an enormous ego but most great achievers share this trait