McClellan Was George McClellan the worst general of the civil war?

[67th Tigers]

reinforcing and combining 3 divisions that previously had not operated together counts as a substantial reinforcement indeed a complete game changer from the previous role (or lack of it). As for Antietam, that was the first time and only time he ever did that. 2 brigades worth (6 regiments) does not a corps make, when 9 other regiments are deployed elsewhere and not under centralized command

Yes, at Chancellorsville and in the Overland Campaign Hooker/Grant gathered all their cavalry up into one body and sent it ineffectively into the enemy rear. In the process they blinded their main army and lost their screen. Oh that a division of cavalry was screening 11th Corps at Chancellorsville or was available to screen the movement to Spotsylvania. However if you look at the Gettysburg campaign (for example) Hooker, then Meade, learned from the mistake and had the cavalry screening their columns. If it was a "game changer" then it was a bad one for the Federals.

"In the larger picture, Sheridan's raid proved to be a costly mistake. Chasing Stuart was another side show for the campaign, which would be decided by what the armies did at Spotsylvania. By abandoning the main theater of conflict to pursue his whimsical raid south, Sheridan deprived Grant of an important resource. His victory at Yellow Tavern offered scant solace to the blue-clad soldiers hunkering in trenches above the courthouse town. Sheridan's absence hurt Grant at Spotsylvania in much the same way that Stuart's absence from Gettysburg had handicapped Lee."

- Rhea, The Battles for Spotsylvania Court House and the Road to Yellow Tavern May 7–12, 1864, pg 212

It seems to me you're fixated on the erroneous idea that cavalry should all be massed into one group and sent galavanting off without regard to screening the main force. Now such raids are not really a bad idea if you have a lot of cavalry to spare after screening the main body, although the only real example of such a raid forcing the enemy to retreat was when Grant retreated after Van Dorn's cavalry hit Holly Springs, but it is secondary. Both Hooker and Grant committed serious mistakes when they detached their cavalry, and the men paid for it in blood at Chancellorsville, Spotsylvania and Cold Harbor.

I would assume, since the entire Army was evacuated by water shortly after Malvern Hill that the same boats that took the men off, along with their wagons, artillery, mounts, draft horses etc could have also brought in food and ammunition

Seems reasonable to me

Assumption, as the saying goes, makes an *** out of you and me. You are completely wrong here, even if you think it is "reasonable". The Army of the Potomac withdrew from immediately in front of Richmond with what they could carry on their backs. The wagons carried some, but how to distribute it on the march when in constant contact with the enemy?

as to insubordination, I gave you the example....and the relevant piece of military law. You aren't allowed to talk disrespectfully about your superior officer, which in this case is the President. He did it frequently, and the old Army also had rules where if you demonstrated by deed or by failing to show the appropriate respect you are also insubordinate

I see you don't understand what insubordination is. It is not "talking disrespectfully", it is refusing to obey a lawful order.

In fact one can argue that McClellan was insubordinate once. Sears tries to pin McClellan refusal to publicly divulge his operational plans on 13th January 1862 when ordered to by Lincoln as insubordination. Of course it is not Lincoln that asks, but Chase (secy of the Treasury), McClellan replies that he will only do so if Lincoln orders him to and Lincoln sides with McClellan on this. Of course Lincoln had been corresponding daily with McClellan about his plans, some of it written and in the Lincoln papers. McClellan of course had already had a planned offensive in early November destroyed when the operational plans leaked and Johnston withdrew from Munson's and Upton's Hills, and so a high degree of OpSec was probably justified.

If you want to attack McClellan for insubordination you need to find an order of Lincoln's that McClellan disobeyed. Of course you can find instances where both Lincoln and Scott gave conflicting orders to McClellan, and McClellan always obeyed the President not the General-in-Chief, leading to the breakdown of the Scott-McClellan relationship.

However, to go back to "talking disrespectfully" - it is certainly true that McClellan became quite frustrated with Lincoln and Stanton at times when they got in the way of prosecuting the war. He certainly vented some of this frustration to his wife. This is not public, and thus not "insubordinate" in the vulgar (and incorrect) sense.

sitting in camp for 6 weeks while Lee is free to send Jackson elsewhere is hardly 'threatening Richmond"

Three weeks, and McClellan is hardly "sitting in camp" but rather preparing to go again at Richmond. Indeed at the end of July he starts crossing McCall's division to the far bank of the James, and his cavalry is probing the Petersburg defences. At the start of August McClellan advances to Malvern with several divisions to provoke a response (successfully) whilst preparing to move rapidly against Petersburg. Then the hammer comes down on the campaign.

That Lee detached Jackson (and later AP Hill) is no different to detaching Early in '64. McClellan is every bit as threatening as Grant at Petersburg and pinned Lee actually even more effectively.

As was stated the Union doesn't have much cavalry present, draft horses can be replaced, and if necessary a harder commander would have solved the Union food problem with horse meat. While ammunition could have been brought ashore in small boats... Malvern Hill is right there on the river (note the gunboats in the picture)

This reveals a stark lack of understanding of the logistics of war. The Army of the Potomac needed 500 tons of food and fodder a day. A six gun artillery battery carries 4 tons of ammunition on the limber and caisson. 30,000 rounds of artillery ammunition is 200 tons or more. Moving such large quantities by "small boats" would:

a. require vast numbers of small boats of the type that weren't available.
b. required the supplies to have been on ships on the river
c. required vast working parties at both ends to load and offload the boats
d. required the construction of a depot
etc.

The blasé attitude towards logistics is certainly in keeping with McClellan's contemporary critics, and I salute you for challenging Ben Wade. Even the most callous of McClellan's critics never suggested killing and eat horses (and the means of moving supplies etc.) - it's certainly a whole new level!

 

[DanSBHawk]

Yes, at Chancellorsville and in the Overland Campaign Hooker/Grant gathered all their cavalry up into one body and sent it ineffectively into the enemy rear. In the process they blinded their main army and lost their screen. Oh that a division of cavalry was screening 11th Corps at Chancellorsville or was available to screen the movement to Spotsylvania. However if you look at the Gettysburg campaign (for example) Hooker, then Meade, learned from the mistake and had the cavalry screening their columns. If it was a "game changer" then it was a bad one for the Federals.

"In the larger picture, Sheridan's raid proved to be a costly mistake. Chasing Stuart was another side show for the campaign, which would be decided by what the armies did at Spotsylvania. By abandoning the main theater of conflict to pursue his whimsical raid south, Sheridan deprived Grant of an important resource. His victory at Yellow Tavern offered scant solace to the blue-clad soldiers hunkering in trenches above the courthouse town. Sheridan's absence hurt Grant at Spotsylvania in much the same way that Stuart's absence from Gettysburg had handicapped Lee."

- Rhea, The Battles for Spotsylvania Court House and the Road to Yellow Tavern May 7–12, 1864, pg 212

It seems to me you're fixated on the erroneous idea that cavalry should all be massed into one group and sent galavanting off without regard to screening the main force. Now such raids are not really a bad idea if you have a lot of cavalry to spare after screening the main body, although the only real example of such a raid forcing the enemy to retreat was when Grant retreated after Van Dorn's cavalry hit Holly Springs, but it is secondary. Both Hooker and Grant committed serious mistakes when they detached their cavalry, and the men paid for it in blood at Chancellorsville, Spotsylvania and Cold Harbor.



Assumption, as the saying goes, makes an *** out of you and me. You are completely wrong here, even if you think it is "reasonable". The Army of the Potomac withdrew from immediately in front of Richmond with what they could carry on their backs. The wagons carried some, but how to distribute it on the march when in constant contact with the enemy?



I see you don't understand what insubordination is. It is not "talking disrespectfully", it is refusing to obey a lawful order.

In fact one can argue that McClellan was insubordinate once. Sears tries to pin McClellan refusal to publicly divulge his operational plans on 13th January 1862 when ordered to by Lincoln as insubordination. Of course it is not Lincoln that asks, but Chase (secy of the Treasury), McClellan replies that he will only do so if Lincoln orders him to and Lincoln sides with McClellan on this. Of course Lincoln had been corresponding daily with McClellan about his plans, some of it written and in the Lincoln papers. McClellan of course had already had a planned offensive in early November destroyed when the operational plans leaked and Johnston withdrew from Munson's and Upton's Hills, and so a high degree of OpSec was probably justified.

If you want to attack McClellan for insubordination you need to find an order of Lincoln's that McClellan disobeyed. Of course you can find instances where both Lincoln and Scott gave conflicting orders to McClellan, and McClellan always obeyed the President not the General-in-Chief, leading to the breakdown of the Scott-McClellan relationship.

However, to go back to "talking disrespectfully" - it is certainly true that McClellan became quite frustrated with Lincoln and Stanton at times when they got in the way of prosecuting the war. He certainly vented some of this frustration to his wife. This is not public, and thus not "insubordinate" in the vulgar (and incorrect) sense.



Three weeks, and McClellan is hardly "sitting in camp" but rather preparing to go again at Richmond. Indeed at the end of July he starts crossing McCall's division to the far bank of the James, and his cavalry is probing the Petersburg defences. At the start of August McClellan advances to Malvern with several divisions to provoke a response (successfully) whilst preparing to move rapidly against Petersburg. Then the hammer comes down on the campaign.

That Lee detached Jackson (and later AP Hill) is no different to detaching Early in '64. McClellan is every bit as threatening as Grant at Petersburg and pinned Lee actually even more effectively.



This reveals a stark lack of understanding of the logistics of war. The Army of the Potomac needed 500 tons of food and fodder a day. A six gun artillery battery carries 4 tons of ammunition on the limber and caisson. 30,000 rounds of artillery ammunition is 200 tons or more. Moving such large quantities by "small boats" would:

a. require vast numbers of small boats of the type that weren't available.
b. required the supplies to have been on ships on the river
c. required vast working parties at both ends to load and offload the boats
d. required the construction of a depot
etc.

The blasé attitude towards logistics is certainly in keeping with McClellan's contemporary critics, and I salute you for challenging Ben Wade. Even the most callous of McClellan's critics never suggested killing and eat horses (and the means of moving supplies etc.) - it's certainly a whole new level!

Actually, insubordination does include disrespectful language.

The link you provided includes the following:
In the U.S. military, insubordination is covered under Article 91 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.[5] It covers disobeying lawful orders as well as disrespectful language or even striking a superior.

 

[67th Tigers]

Actually, insubordination does include disrespectful language.

The link you provided includes the following:
In the U.S. military, insubordination is covered under Article 91 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.[5] It covers disobeying lawful orders as well as disrespectful language or even striking a superior.

and when did McClellan use disrespectful language to Lincoln?

 

[Gene Thorp]

The number is from Livermore's Battles and Losses. The OR reports from the rebels are available, as you note; presumably they had a reasonable idea of how many casualties they suffered, unless you think Lee's staff had a reason to intentionally submit inaccurate reports. Do you?

Linking to a newspaper column you apparently wrote is something of a self-licking ice cream cone...

I put the link in my comment so anyone can review in detail the methodology and sourcing used to determine the revised Confederate casualty figures. You appear to be quick to dismiss the numbers without even reviewing them. Do you know where the Confederate figures everyone sources come from in the first place? Have you ever read the reports? If you did, then you would know that they were never represented at the time as complete, and that there are no absolute casualty figures. No one is making the claim that Confederates intentionally submitted inaccurate reports. What they reported is what they could deduce from the information they had at the time. If it is too much trouble for you to click on the link, my sources for the Confederate losses at Antietam are the following: The Official Records of the War of the Rebellion (O.R.), Vol. 27, pages, 843, 861, 862, 888, 925, 974, 975, 983 and 1026. Please review them

So tell me, how do you reconcile the difference between the Confederate reports which total 1,674 killed, versus the Union accounts which state they buried 2,700 rebels on the Antietam battlefield. and the supporting fact that 2,468 Confederate remains were moved to Hagerstown where they lie in the Confederate cemetery today? Are you saying the Federals did not know how many Confederates they buried? Do you claim that there aren't really bodies in those graves?

How do you reconcile the Confederate reports totaling 2,292 missing with Medical Director Letterman's Federal report that states some 2,500 wounded Confederate soldiers wounded during the Antietam Campaign were in Union custody at Union hospitals, while at the same time another 2,498 Confederates captured during the Antietam Campaign were prisoners of war at Ft. Delaware and Ft. McHenry? How do you account for the documents that show those rebels were exchanged for Union POWs on Oct. 8 and Oct. 18? Are you claiming that the numerous independent records, newspaper accounts and correspondence regarding those 5,000+ Confederates are false or inaccurate? Do tell.

 

[TFSmith121]

I put the link in my comment so anyone can review in detail the methodology and sourcing used to determine the revised Confederate casualty figures. You appear to be quick to dismiss the numbers without even reviewing them. Do you know where the Confederate figures everyone sources come from in the first place? Have you ever read the reports? If you did, then you would know that they were never represented at the time as complete, and that there are no absolute casualty figures. No one is making the claim that Confederates intentionally submitted inaccurate reports. What they reported is what they could deduce from the information they had at the time. If it is too much trouble for you to click on the link, my sources for the Confederate losses at Antietam are the following: The Official Records of the War of the Rebellion (O.R.), Vol. 27, pages, 843, 861, 862, 888, 925, 974, 975, 983 and 1026. Please review them

So tell me, how do you reconcile the difference between the Confederate reports which total 1,674 killed, versus the Union accounts which state they buried 2,700 rebels on the Antietam battlefield. and the supporting fact that 2,468 Confederate remains were moved to Hagerstown where they lie in the Confederate cemetery today? Are you saying the Federals did not know how many Confederates they buried? Do you claim that there aren't really bodies in those graves?

How do you reconcile the Confederate reports totaling 2,292 missing with Medical Director Letterman's Federal report that states some 2,500 wounded Confederate soldiers wounded during the Antietam Campaign were in Union custody at Union hospitals, while at the same time another 2,498 Confederates captured during the Antietam Campaign were prisoners of war at Ft. Delaware and Ft. McHenry? How do you account for the documents that show those rebels were exchanged for Union POWs on Oct. 8 and Oct. 18? Are you claiming that the numerous independent records, newspaper accounts and correspondence regarding those 5,000+ Confederates are false or inaccurate? Do tell.

If any of your work as a graphic artist for the Post has been subject to peer review, do tell.

Sorry, I've lost track of what point you and Tiger and the rest of the McClellan admirers are trying to make. Was he the "worst" general of the Civil War? No, and I don't think anyone on this thread has suggested he was... But you all have certainly responded as if someone had, which suggests much...

Was GBM a deeply flawed individual with a decidedly mixed record as a combat commander (sorry, one lost offensive campaign at the Army level, one - sort of - won defensive campaign at the same level, and one mixed result in a smaller corps-level campaign does not a great captain make, gentlemen), who was set aside by his commander in chief for completely valid reasons?

Hell, yes.

Best,

 

[cash]

and when did McClellan use disrespectful language to Lincoln?

While I'm in general agreement with you on the substantive issues of this particular part of the conversation, insubordination includes not only disobedience and disrespectful language, but also disrespectful conduct.

The only time I can think of when McClellan committed disrespectful conduct was when Lincoln was waiting for him and instead of meeting with Lincoln he went upstairs and went to bed. One can say his telegram to Lincoln and Stanton on June 28, 1862 in which he accused the administration of doing their "best to sacrifice this army" was use of disrespectful language. Fortunately, the telegraph operator deleted the last sentence and Lincoln and Stanton didn't see it until 1864. All the rest of McClellan's communications with the administration that I've read, from what I remember, was respectful.

 

[DanSBHawk]

and when did McClellan use disrespectful language to Lincoln?

I was merely pointing out that your narrow definition of "insubordination" was wrong. The discussion is interesting, but I don't have much interest in either condemning McClellan or making excuses for him.

 

[galveston bay]

yeah, tired of condemning McClellan too.. real life has gone back into avalanche mode so I will let others explain why McClellan was far from the best general of the war

 

[67th Tigers]

The only time I can think of when McClellan committed disrespectful conduct was when Lincoln was waiting for him and instead of meeting with Lincoln he went upstairs and went to bed.

The incident of the evening of 13th November 1861 is in every McClellan book, but there is good reason to doubt the common story.

The incident itself is single source, and not reported until all the principles were dead. It comes from Hay who was writing a court history of Lincoln sponsored by Lincoln's son. Hay wrote to Nicolay "I have toiled and labored through ten chapters over him (McC). I think I have left the impression of his mutinous imbecility, and I have done it in a perfectly courteous manner.... It is of the utmost moment that we should seem fair to him, while we are destroying him.", whilst professing impartiality in their writings. There are many who believed Hay was either lying or exaggerating greatly for effect.

Hay claimed that:
"Nov. 13. I wish here to record what I consider a portent of evil to come. The President, Governor S_____ and I went over to McC______'s house to-night. The servant at the door said the General was at the wedding of Col. W_____ at Gen'l B_____'s and would soon return. We went in, and after we had waited about an hour, McC______ came in, and without paying any particular attention to the porter who told him the President was waiting to see him, went up-stairs, passing the door of the room where the President and Secretary of State were seated. They waited about half an hour, and sent once more a servant to tell the General they were there; and the answer came that the General had gone to bed.

I merely record this unparalleled insolence of epaulettes without comment. It is the first indication I have yet seen of the threatened supremacy of the military authorities.

Coming home I spoke to the President about the matter, but he seemed not to have noticed it, specially, saying it was better, at this time, not to be making points of etiquette and personal dignity."

However the strange thing is no-one else present, Lincoln, McClellan or Seward ever mentioned the incident. Some have contended it was a deliberate snub to stop meeting with Lincoln, although of course Lincoln visited again the next morning (14th November) and was warmly received by McClellan, and again on the 18th November Lincoln turned up unannounced at McClellan's and was warmly greeted. Shortly after that McClellan's wife and infant child came to live with McClellan at Washington and then meetings moved to Lincoln's.

If the incident occurred then it carried none of the insolence that Hay contends. Even in Hay's tale McClellan is probably not aware Lincoln was in his sitting room, having rushed past to his quarters and, frankly, probably to the toilet since he'd been apparently been drinking whiskey with Buell at Buell's headquarters and had then rode his horse back. The decision to appoint Buell to Kentucky (the future Army of the Ohio) had already been made (Lincoln mentioned it in his 12th November correspondence), and so McClellan and Buell had a lot to discuss (McC spent the whole day there, including reviewing Buell's division).

That authors accept Hay's interpretation without qualification, even sometimes adding details not in the primary account to further attack McClellan, I find a bit mind-boggling. I thank Thomas Rowland for pointing this out.

One can say his telegram to Lincoln and Stanton on June 28, 1862 in which he accused the administration of doing their "best to sacrifice this army" was use of disrespectful language. Fortunately, the telegraph operator deleted the last sentence and Lincoln and Stanton didn't see it until 1864. All the rest of McClellan's communications with the administration that I've read, from what I remember, was respectful.

The operator never deleted it, and Lincoln apparently commented that McClellan had been harsh on Stanton, who was busy trying to deflect blame onto Lincoln. We had a recent thread about it

 

[TFSmith121]

yeah, tired of condemning McClellan too.. real life has gone back into avalanche mode so I will let others explain why McClellan was far from the best general of the war

Except none of the criticisms are "condemnations" - simply recognizing the reality that GBM's record was mixed, to be charitable, and includes losing his brainchild of an offensive campaign and, of course, the reality that even when handed an intelligence windfall at the outset of Antietam, he still managed to - at best - "win" a mixed decision on the defensive. And all that in roughly a year in command. Couple that with his decidedly mixed record in West Virginia in 1861, and he's not a great captain in any realistic assessment.

His record as commander of the army facing Lee et al in the eastern theater is, to summarize, at best 1 win and 1 loss, which is better than Burnside and Hooker (who each only got one bite at the apple) and worse than those of Meade and/or Grant. So, of five potential contenders, he's technically right in the middle, largely because Burnside and Hooker each only got one major campaign, unlike GBM.

Which is pretty much what those critical of Little Mac have said for 15 decades, based on the historical reality. His defenders, of course, have offered a different version of events.

Even if one takes McClellan's career as somehow an example of an individual doing his best but still being set aside, that's essentially the Burnside defense absent Burnside's humility (or Hooker absent GBI); and compared to individuals who truly were victimized - Stone - or whose competence was demonstrated but who were sidelined for reasons of internal politics - Curtis - it's not like GBM lived out some sort of tragic arc...

But much ink and many pixels have been spilled over him... To what end remains opaque, other than trying - unsuccessfully, based on the judgment of his peers and history - to reverse the respect afforded to Lincoln, Grant, Meade, et al who (lest we forget) actually bested Lee, Davis, et al while McClellan was sulking in his tent.

Best,

 

[jgoodguy]

In judging Civil War generals on both sides, remember much of the incompetence was due to on the job training. McClellan not only had to fight a war, but fight with no experience for himself or his troops in a nation with no tradition of large scale warfare and no way in advance of judging competence. By the time Grand can along, he had fought 3 years of hard war and learned the lessons from that.

 

[TFSmith121]

In judging Civil War generals on both sides, remember much of the incompetence was due to on the job training. McClellan not only had to fight a war, but fight with no experience for himself or his troops in a nation with no tradition of large scale warfare and no way in advance of judging competence. By the time Grant can along, he had fought 3 years of hard war and learned the lessons from that.

Very true, although it worth pointing out that at the same time McClellan was "learning" to lead an army in the field against the rebels, so were Buell, Grant, and Pope, in their respective theaters. Yes, McClellan faced JE Johnston and Lee while the other three were facing the likes of AS Johnston and Beauregard, but still - its not like McClellan was drafted to serve as CG of the AotP, much less as general-in-chief ... and he certainly wasn't reluctant to assume the responsibilities of command; he was quite confident (early on) in fact, that he could "do it all"... didn't work out that way for him, of course, but that's typical for GBM; his plans usually failed.

Best,

 

[jgoodguy]

Very true, although it worth pointing out that at the same time McClellan was "learning" to lead an army in the field against the rebels, so were Buell, Grant, and Pope, in their respective theaters. Yes, McClellan faced JE Johnston and Lee while the other three were facing the likes of AS Johnston and Beauregard, but still - its not like McClellan was drafted to serve as CG of the AotP, much less as general-in-chief ... and he certainly wasn't reluctant to assume the responsibilities of command; he was quite confident (early on) in fact, that he could "do it all"... didn't work out that way for him, of course, but that's typical for GBM; his plans usually failed.

Best,

Very true, but it takes an ego to want to lead an army and if one don't try they don't fail either.

 

[67th Tigers]

McClellan was initially appointed as the senior Major-General in the army (ranked only by Lt Gen Scott) and commanded Department of the Ohio, and assumed direct command over the Department of Kentucky (Anderson was too ill to take command). Missouri was transferred to McClellan's command on 6th June 1861 and McClellan effectively commanded the entire western theatre.

McClellan's first action was to negotiate with the government of the state of Kentucky. On his watch he supported the suppression of the secessionist vote and the creation of a pro-Union state government in early June that ultimately declared for the Union.

With Kentucky secured McClellan took part of his command and invaded the Unionist part of western Virginia, destroying the rebel army as a fighting force, seizing all their baggage and artillery and about 1,500 prisoners. He was then called to Washington.

At Washington he assumed command of the Military Division of the Potomac, initially (25 July) comprised of the Depts of Washington and Annapolis, with Scott directly commanding the other Depts. On 17th through 24th August McClellan was assigned to command the field armies which were merged into his command and by the end of the month he commanded the new "Army of the Potomac" encompassing all eastern forces except Wool's. In August he frames his "strategy of overwhelming" and starts to build an army.

The last day of August Johnston advances his army to the outskirts of Washington (Munson's Hill, Mason's Hill, Upton's Hill etc.) and at the end of September McClellan mounts an offensive against this line only to find rebel spys have leaked his plans and Johnston withdrew the night before the dawn attack. Three weeks later the Ball's Bluff debacle occurs which precipitates the final conflict between Scott and McClellan - Scott thinks McClellan is recklessly aggressive, but Lincoln sides with McClellan and appoints him commanding general.

Sadly, at the same time Wilkes offends the British and McClellan is thrown into preparing for war with the British and sorting out the mess that has occurred in the west, and trying to get the two new western commanders (Halleck and Buell) to mount offensives in line with the plans of Lincoln. McClellan oversees the launching of three expeditionary forces (TW Sherman at Port Royal, Burnside at ultimately Norfolk via New Berne etc. and Butler at New Orleans).

In February the armies come out of winter quarters. McClellan finally gets Buell and Halleck to move, resulting in the capture of Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, the opening of the Cumberland Gap and the capture of Nashville. Halleck bargains the success of his and Buell's forces into overall command in the west.

In the east McClellan launches his Shenandoah campaign, occupies Harper's Ferry and the upper Shanandoah Valley. He also launches demonstrations on the Lower Potomac. Johnston sees his army getting turned on both flanks and withdraws from Centreville and Manassas, closely pursued by McClellan. McClellan then starts to transfer forces to the Virginia Peninsula.

On the Peninsula McClellan overcomes several very strong Confederate positions, in spite of lacking the resources he needed. He himself says that the results were "less brilliant" than they would have been with the originally designated force, but about six weeks after he landed on the Peninsula he has driven the rebels back to the defences of Richmond proper. Twice the rebels try and drive him away; firstly by an offensive south of the Chickahominy after Stanton switches McClellan's axis when he was halfway through a river crossing to attack Hanover Court House, and then north of the Chickahominy. This second offensive is successful due to Jackson's forces coming down and cutting McClellan's supply lines. McClellan moves 20 miles south to the James. A few weeks later he starts crossing to the south bank of the James to attack Petersburg and Halleck orders a general retreat.

In the north Pope screws up and is heavily defeated. McClellan is returned to command and defeats Lee's invasion of Maryland. His counterattack into the Shenandoah is forbidden by Halleck and McClellan then waits for the Potomac to rise then heads south, cutting Lee's army in two and descending on Longstreet with a heavy force. Then Lincoln relieves him.

The way I see it McClellan commanded well and the fact that greater results weren't achieved on the James, in Maryland and in the Loudoun Valley were due to Halleck overruling McClellan and ordering him to break off the offensive. McClellan is responsible for turning in his excellent performances, and Lincoln, Stanton and Halleck for overruling McClellan and calling off successful offensives mid-movement.

 

[Gene Thorp]

The incident of the evening of 13th November 1861 is in every McClellan book, but there is good reason to doubt the common story.

Good post 67th Tigers, I was going to write something similar myself. Let me just add to what you wrote. The event that McClellan allegedly attended was the wedding between Col. Frank Wheaton of the 2nd Rhode Island Infantry and Emma Twiggs Mason, descendant of the famous Mason family and stepdaughter of the Gen. Don Carlos Buell.

Here's the thing, according to the Gunston Hall web page—the organization that runs the family home of the Masons on the Potomac River—Col. Wheaton got married on Nov. 2, 1861, not Nov. 13 as Hay, claims in his diary entry. Does Hay have his date wrong? If McClellan and Buell were present, I would not be surprised if the wedding was noted in The Washington Evening Star or some other major paper, but I do not have copies at present to check. It is on my to-do list.

Another interesting tidbit is that Buell left Washington at 6 a.m. the morning of Nov. 13 to take command of the Department of the Ohio, then located in Kentucky. It would seem quite unlikely that Buell would host a wedding for his stepdaughter at his own house but not be in attendance for it.

If Hay mixed up his dates and he meant to write Nov. 2, let's look at McClellan's situation on that day. Two days earlier, Gen. Winfield Scott had retired. The day before, McClellan was promoted to the position of General-in-Chief, which immediately put a tremendous amount of work on him. At 1:30 a.m., early in the morning of the day Wheaton was married, McClellan wrote to his wife:

"I have been at work, with scarcely one minute's rest, ever since I arose yesterday morning nearly eighteen hours. I find the army just about as much disorganized as was the Army of the Potomac when I assumed command…"

The point above is that McClellan turned in very late. I do not have any information about when McClellan woke up or what he did during the day. Was he at Wheaton's wedding? Did Wheaton or Buell write anything about it? Did Elishia Hunt Rhodes write about it? (Col. Wheaton was the commander of his regiment.) If McClellan was at the wedding, we know he was back awake well before the break of dawn the following day to see off Gen. Scott, as he wrote on Nov. 3 to his wife:

"I have already been up once this morning that was at four o'clock to escort Gen. Scott to the depot. It was pitch-dark and a pouring rain; but with most of my staff and a squadron of cavalry I saw the old man off. He was very polite to me; sent various kind messages to you and the baby; so we parted."

So at a minimum, it would appear that on Nov. 2 McClellan turned in after 1:30 a.m. At some time in the morning he woke and went to Wheaton's wedding. In the evening he returned and may, or may not, have passed Lincoln in his parlor, and went to bed, only to be back up by 4 a.m. the following morning to see off Gen. Scott.

It should also be noted that McClellan had his headquarters on the SE corner of what is now H Street and Madison Pl., but his house was at the other end of the block on the NW corner of H Street and 15th Street. Although Lincoln was the President, it seems that there should be a difference between Lincoln visiting McClellan at his headquarters during the day versus Lincoln visiting McClellan at night, unannounced, at his home, and only to chat. As 67th Tigers already points out, Hay had some serious bias against McClellan and I personally am skeptical about what he supposedly wrote in his diary at the time of the event.

All this is just more food for thought on the supposed snub issue. I am curios to hear people's opinions on this. 67th Tigers , perhaps we do a new thread to discuss in more detail?

If anyone finds that I have Wheaton's wedding date wrong, please let me know.

 

[Gene Thorp]

Ugh, in the post above Hays and Hayes should be just Hay, for John Hay.

...never mind, just noticed that there is an edit button.

 

[TFSmith121]

Very true, but it takes an ego to want to lead an army and if one don't try they don't fail either.

Except the truly great captains understand their limitations and are able the calculate the risks vs. rewards equation to the point that they win with the available resources, and without trying to push too far; obvious example(s) are Nimitz et al at Midway.

GBM planned overly complex operations that failed, and given his track record and that of his enemies, presumably would have failed no matter what, which is why he lost on the Peninsula and barely managed a defensive stand in Maryland.

Grant, on the other hand, won on the offensive at Henry-Donelson, won a defensive stand at Shiloh, won on the offensive at Vicksburg; won at Chattanooga; and won in Virginia. Grant also trained his replacement, created a group of senior subordinates who trusted each other and their commander, organized his cavalry effectively as a mobile arm, built and maintained an outstanding relationship with the Navy in every threater, won campaigns of maneuver and siege and slugging it out, and - oh yeah - actually built a relationship of trust and understanding with his civilian superiors, both the secretary of war and the commander-in-chief.

In terms of the eastern commanders, GBM gets a 1-1 record because he got two bites at the apple; Grant and Meade (depending on how the question is framed) did not lose their campaign(s), so call Meade 2-0 and Grant 1-0 compared to McClellan; Burnside and Hooker both lost their single turns in the barrel, so call it 0-1 for each of them. Interestingly enough, that compares with Johnston at 1-0 (counting Manasass 1861 as a win for him, which is subjective, of course) and Lee at 3-3 (wins as the Peninsula, Fredericksburg, and Chancellorsville; losses as Antietam, Gettysburg, and Overland-Richmond.

Include Grant's western campaigns and its (arguably) Grant 5 wins, zero losses.

As far as the worst army-level commanders, US or rebel, there are some obvious candidates, but none of them are the US Big 5 or McClellan.

Best,

 

[galveston bay]

In the end it is results that matter, and a commander who fails to work successfully with his superiors and his subordinates to the point where he loses their trust cannot be kept in command. In the real world battlefield results are not enough, it is the campaigns that matter and how those campaigns bring about the successful conclusion of the war (or prolong it if you are trying not to lose). Lee, Grant, Joseph E Johnson, Sherman, Thomas, and at sea, Farragut, brought success (or held off disaster for as long as they could) for their respective governments. Which is why they are high on the pantheon of successful American commanders and McClellan, who won a single campaign decisively (West Virginia, where he had all the cards), was defeated in a major offensive, and achieved a narrow victory that was important more for its political impact than its military one, is not considered one of the great captains of American history.

 

[TFSmith121]

In the end it is results that matter, and a commander who fails to work successfully with his superiors and his subordinates to the point where he loses their trust cannot be kept in command. In the real world battlefield results are not enough, it is the campaigns that matter and how those campaigns bring about the successful conclusion of the war (or prolong it if you are trying not to lose). Lee, Grant, Joseph E Johnson, Sherman, Thomas, and at sea, Farragut, brought success (or held off disaster for as long as they could) for their respective governments. Which is why they are high on the pantheon of successful American commanders and McClellan, who won a single campaign decisively (West Virginia, where he had all the cards), was defeated in a major offensive, and achieved a narrow victory that was important more for its political impact than its military one, is not considered one of the great captains of American history.

True. "Close" only works with horseshoes and hand grenades.

As far as West Virginia goes, it's worth noting Rosecrans was in command for the US at the end, so it's not like even that one is an unqualified "win" for Little Mac.

Best,

 

[67th Tigers]

All this is just more food for thought on the supposed snub issue. I am curios to hear people's opinions on this. 67th Tigers , perhaps we do a new thread to discuss in more detail?

If anyone finds that I have Wheaton's wedding date wrong, please let me know.

A very interesting subtopic. Split off here, leaving the calvinists to themselves for a bit.