Hood's Plan -- Hood's Failure

[trice]

Since we have kicked around whether Jefferson Davis really supported a movement into Tennessee from the very beginning (i.e. late Sept 1864), I thought I would add a little snippet from Richard Taylor's book Destruction and Reconstruction. ... Hood, to those who knew him best, was a decent and honest man. He got involved in a political and military game he could never win.

I like Taylor, too. I'd be fairly sure Hood was always a spy for Davis. Immediately after Polk joins the AoT, Hood associates himself with Davis old roommate. Hood writes letters direct to Richmond criticizing Johnston and Hardee (Hood lies about this later). Heck, Hood had a record for using politics to go behind his superior's back in Virginia, when he was a brigade commander. Hood is a leopard who never changes his spots.

I have no problem noting, as I already have, that Davis, Beauregard, Longstreet, and a host of others pushed about unrealistic ideas for an invasion of TN from at least the beginning of 1864. Heck, Beauregard and others saw recovering TN as a stepping-stone to KY, and had been pitching ideas for carrying the Confederate flag to the banks of the Ohio from 1861 on. Joe Johnston had been fending those hopes off from the moment he took over from Hardee -- which was one reason Joe Johnston had so many problems with Davis/Bragg/etc.

Our friend Whitworth talks a lot about logistics, and I sometimes think he pushes too hard on the subject. But in 1864 the South did not have the capacity to do this. Those early 1864 plans involve ideas like mounting Longstreet's Corps on mules to cross the mountains and the barrens of the Cumberland Plateau. In military terms, this is insanity. Where will the mules come from? Who will Longstreet's men learn to handle them? How will the mules and the men eat up there? Once they get to Middle TN and KY, how do they survive surrounded by Union troops?

You find as well that those early 1864 plans say Johnston will be strongly re-inforced (Oh, yeah? From where? They are having trouble supplying the small army Johnston has up at Rocky Face -- how will they supply a bigger one?) They say he will outnumber Sherman (REALLY?)

Now we are looking at late September of 1864. The AOT -- despite heavy reinforcements during the year -- is worn down to less than 40,000 men. Atlanta's gone. The network of track bringing supplies to Atlanta and up to the TN border is gone or in Union hands. Sgherman's Army still looks like 100,000 men or so. But with Hood starting 150 miles further South than the AoT was in January, people are still trying to fly these ideas for an invasion of TN.

So they have a meeting, and the topic is brought up. But that is not what is decided on. They are going to hit Sherman's LOC north of Atlanta, to try to draw him back, and maybe to find a chance to smash a finger of Sherman's hand if they get a shot -- because any direct battle between the main Union and Confederate forces is going to be a loser for the Confederacy. Hood heads off, September 29, and by October 5 we have the Battle of Allatoona and Hood ripping up tracks, with Sherman coming after him.

This is when everything suddenly changes. Beauregard, catching up with Hood, finds Hood is no longer following the plan. He thinks everything is going so well he can now cross the Tennessee to strike the RR between Chattanooga and Murfreesboro. This is the crossing at Gunter's Landing -- which is news to Beauregard. It would be news to Davis as well, unless it is part of some secret communication between the two.

Everything unravels from here. Hood keeps moving about and concocting new ideas (or excuses) why he has to go further and further West to cross the river. His actions from Oct 9. on are more and more bizarre in military terms. Beauregard keeps trying to arrange supply and logistics for a crossing; Hood keeps changing the crossing point and not telling Beauregard. Hood marches off to cross the river -- and forgets to bring his bridge train along. Hood issues "requests" to people he has no authority over -- and then acts outraged when things aren't done. There is no evidence of professional planning coming out of Hood -- but Hood blames everyone and everything else for failing him.

As to invading Tennessee, it is all based on the presumption Sherman will have to follow him. Hood has promised that, if Sherman does something else, Hood will turn to pursue Sherman. But then Hood places his Army 275 miles West of Sherman over bad roads, making it impossible to follow Sherman.

Comes mid-November: Sherman leaves Atlanta on the March to the Sea. Beauregard understands that the game is up; Hood can do nothing about Sherman, who will be able to do anything he wants. Beauregard divorces himself from Hood. He wires Davis -- and by November 30 Davis wants an explanation of why Beauregard has let Hood go into TN. On Dec. 6th, Beauregard replies, essentially saying what I have said, that Hood's army was so far out in left field as to be useless to the main task.

Take a look sometime at the rhetoric surrounding all this, the high-flung dreams where Hood marches victorious through TN into KY to the banks of the Ohio, then swings around to cross West Virginia and come out in Virginia to join Robert E. Lee. Heck, calculate the mileage of that march some time and try to figure how many casualties it would take to achieve it. Think about the logistics involved. In military terms, this is like someone tripping on LSD.

Yet that is Hood's Plan, or something close to it. Doomed from the start.

Tim

 

[larry_cockerham]

I have recently heard an opinion that one of the reasons Hood was way over in middle Tennessee was to protect the critical Confederate "bread basket" in Mississippi and Alabama. Hood's actions were like looking at your opponent's cards after the hand is over to see if you would have won. I personally don't believe Hood was as squirrely as he is often portrayed in this forum. He was dealing with an almost impossible support system. The other problem, which I believe to have been his major malady as a leader of men, was his hobby of playing politics, constantly messing with Jeff Davis, and in the process getting less support from his subordinates.

 

[trice]

I have recently heard an opinion that one of the reasons Hood was way over in middle Tennessee was to protect the critical Confederate "bread basket" in Mississippi and Alabama. Hood's actions were like looking at your opponent's cards after the hand is over to see if you would have won. I personally don't believe Hood was as squirrely as he is often portrayed in this forum. He was dealing with an almost impossible support system. The other problem, which I believe to have been his major malady as a leader of men, was his hobby of playing politics, constantly messing with Jeff Davis, and in the process getting less support from his subordinates.

Larry,

In September of 1864, after the fall of Atlanta, there is just about no chance that anything Hood (or anyone else) can do down there will change the fate of the Confederacy. Farragut has won at Mobile Bay in August; The city fell September 1. Sheridan is about to kick the stuffing out of Early in the Shenandoah from 3rd Winchester to Cedar Creek. In military terms, the writing is on the wall in the Deep South and everything that follows is simply an almost pre-determined victory working itself out.

That doesn't mean Hood gets a pass. He may face a desperate situation -- that doesn't mean he gets to act incompetently without responsibility for what he does.

For example, Hood's entire campaign from Tuscumbia to Nashville is meaningless to the war. Exciting, yes. Shows the courage and devotion of the Army of Tennessee, yes. Gets a lot of men shot up, yes. Interesting to follow and study, yes. But it was all for nothing, and this could reasonably be determined before he left Tuscumbia.

The Mobile and Ohio RR is not running in 1864 in this area because of destruction from raids upon it -- and in early May of 1864, the command was telling Roddey up near Tuscumbia they were going to get it back into operation. That never happened, nor did it happen later when Forrest asked for it, because the Confederacy simply didn't have the RR resources to do it. Yet Hood decides to move his Army to a crossing point where there is no RR, and there is no bridge, and there are no supplies -- and then complains about difficulties crossing the river, and bringing up supplies. Why do people think it wrong to note that Hood caused many of the problems he complained about?

As to protecting AL and MS -- those areas have already been ravaged to some extent. MS has largely been helpless for the last year, except for whatever protection Nathan Bedford Forrest gave it. Union raids have picked their way through north Alabama for a long time. If Hood attracts major Union attention to the area (i.e., if Sherman followed him), how is he protecting it?

If there is no Tuscumbia to Nashville campaign, what happens? What is different? I don't see much. I think either Thomas is sent down into AL after the first of the year sometime, or some of Thomas troops are drawn off to the East coast (just as Schofield was sent to meet Sherman in Goldsborough in NC). Other than the 10-12,000 casualties Hood took in TN not happening, how is this any worse for the Confederacy?

The problem with Hood is his own actions. The odds against him and the desperation of the situation don't enter in to it.

Tim

 

[ole]

If there is no Tuscumbia to Nashville campaign, what happens? What is different?

The only thing I can see is that there might have been an extra 20,000 men facing Sherman at Bentonville. But that's ignoring all of the previously mentioned problems of supply.

ole

 

[EricJacobson]

As to weather...Eric, you must be joking. If you're going to launch a major campaign in a given area, particularly one you've never campaigned in or are otherwise familar with (which describes Tennessee pretty well for Hood), particularly as the year heads towards winter...it would be common sense to have a good idea what kind of weather conditions to expect.

Regarding Lee and Burnside, both should have checked these things...Lee's failure to do so was not disasterous, but it was foolish. Burnside did suffer fairly seriously for ignoring this (the "Mud March" even more so.).

Not joking at all and frankly you just made my point or agreed with it. Civil War commanders didn't check ahead for potential weather problems and to suggest that they should have (like Tim said of Hood) is ludicrous. Thus the term Monday morning quarterbacking.

 

[trice]

Not joking at all and frankly you just made my point or agreed with it. Civil War commanders didn't check ahead for potential weather problems and to suggest that they should have (like Tim said of Hood) is ludicrous. Thus the term Monday morning quarterbacking.

This is inaccurate, Eric. Major decisions about campaigns always involved decisions about the weather. It had been that way for 100s of years; it remains that way today (although mechanization has made it a lot easier to act when the weather is bad.)

This is why you do not generally see major campaigns in January to April in the Civil War. Soldiers understand how difficult it is to move and supply troops in the muck and mire of bad weather, so they generally don't do it.

That is why you see Chancellorsville in May, Wilderness in May. That is why Rosecrans was waiting until June for Tullahoma (he wanted the dry roads and the crops in the fields; bad luck on the system of storms).

As a matter of fact, the only real exceptions to this among major commanders are Grant and Burnside. Burnside, of course, was in over his head and under a lot of pressure: thus Fredericksburg; thus "the Mud March"; thus Burnside no longer in command.

Grant was another matter. For one thing, Grant had been a regimental quartermaster for two years of the Mexican War and probably forgot more about managing such things than Hood ever knew. You never find Grant's troops suffering for lack of supplies -- even when Van Dorn and Forrest destroy his RR and his advance base at Holly Springs in 1862. Grant just buckles down and solves the problem.

Grant is also prone to depend on water-borne supply and transport -- so high water from rain usually means the US Navy can support him better. Belmont, Henry & Donelson are all examples of Grant basing his movement on Union control of the rivers. The campaigns around Vicksburg are all based on control of the rivers (and the only point at which Grant gets away from that shows him just how vulnerable his RR-based LOC is.) When Grant comes to VA, he again bases his LOC and supply on firm Union control of the water.

Any soldier planning a campaign based on river crossings would want to know whether or not to expect high water or low. When Union gunboats are one of the major dangers to a crossing, you need to be prepared for them. If the river is down, there are several areas on the Tennessee that the gunboats can't reach. If the river is up, they can cover almost all the way to Chattanooga. If the river is up, you might be unable to cross at all; if it is down, you might cross quickly.

Hood's campaign required him to cross the Tennessee -- a river subject to rapid and dramatic rises and falls. It also required him to cross other rivers (such as the Duck). Yet we don't find any evidence of Hood paying attention to a problem that could stop his plan dead in its tracks. What little evidence we can find indicates he barely paid attention to issues like supplies and bridging.

If he was competent at his job -- Army commander -- he has to make sure the details of that are nailed down before he commits. Asking what to expect in the way of rain and river levels is merely routine -- but it is essential. If Hood isn't doing it himself, he needs to make his staff do it -- and we don't see any evidence of that, either. What we do see are indications that Hood arrives at the river unready to cross. Then he starts pointing fingers.

Same type of thing for supplies. According to the Confederate system, Hood's supplies came from defined areas, through Hood's people. When Hood moves to AL, he moves out of his own department and into Taylor's. Hood needs to make arrangements to supply his army. That means moving his own supplies to where his Army is going to be, or requesting that supplies be diverted to him from someone else.

Hood does request supplies -- but doesn't seem to follow up on it. Beauregard and Taylor do make attempts to get the RR working and move supplies to Tuscumbia -- but when they finally can get railcars up there, they ask Hood "Where are your supplies?" so they can move them -- and as in so many things, Hood never seems to answer.

This is not the sort of thing you'll find with Grant, or R. E. Lee, or Stonewall Jackson, or Rosecrans, or Hooker, or Meade, or McClellan, or Sherman, or Thomas, or Longstreet ... Find a situation for those generals that resembles this, dig into the records, you'll find lots of routine traffic about matters like this, from the generals or their staffs. But somehow the only messages you can find in Hood's case make him look bad.

This is also what a man like Lee means when he says Hood was "careless off" the battlefield.

Tim

 

[EricJacobson]

This is inaccurate, Eric. Major decisions about campaigns always involved decisions about the weather. It had been that way for 100s of years; it remains that way today (although mechanization has made it a lot easier to act when the weather is bad.)

This is why you do not generally see major campaigns in January to April in the Civil War. Soldiers understand how difficult it is to move and supply troops in the muck and mire of bad weather, so they generally don't do it.

That is why you see Chancellorsville in May, Wilderness in May. That is why Rosecrans was waiting until June for Tullahoma (he wanted the dry roads and the crops in the fields; bad luck on the system of storms).

Tim,

Your long responses essentially show that you will not concede any point and insist that just about everyone is incorrect in their evaluations of a particular situation and only you know what the real facts are.

One last time about the weather. It's obvious to me and probably everyone on the board that Civil War armies often went into winter quarters. However, you are now shifting the discussion. You initially said Hood should have checked about the weather might be in October and November and the entire premise of your argument is to make him look like a fool for not knowing that it might or might not rain. You state campaigns generally did not occur from January thru April, but Hood's campaign begins in October and runs thru December. So what is your point really?

Both the Stones River and Fredericksburg Campaigns occurred during December and even Chattanooga was fought at the end of November. Your argument falls flat, because your only focus is to try and make it seem as if Hood was the only commander who ever moved his army late in the year and made mistakes along the way.

I think we have already agreed that Hood was in over his head and should not have been army commander. However, he did what he thought best and/or could. In the end, unfortunately for him, his record includes mistakes, many lives lost, and failure. You, however, will not let the matter drop at that and continue to pound away insisting what a total idiot Hood was.

Also, the Confederacy was dying by late 1864. Hood did not have the luxury of time you or I have from the comfort of our chairs in front of our computers. But perhaps he should have waited until April 1865 to begin moving toward Tennessee?

 

[Elennsar]

I'm a tiny bit biased in regards to Hood and his intellectual lack of stature (and his grasp on reality). I'll admit that.

But in regards to this.

It is common sense to know what kind of conditions to expect when planning a march...whether you can expect to forage or should make sure to have everything you need in the wagons, whether to bring extra pontoons or whether the "rivers" are barely creeks, whether or not you can count on the roads and/or railroads to be able to carry anything worth a d---, whether you have enough ammunition for an extended campaign and more easily available or if you have to make sure to use your supplies frugally...

The list goes on and on. Its not a joke that "amateurs discuss tactics, professionals discuss logistics."

By that measure, trained at West Point or not, Hood was an amateur. He failed very badly to plan to cover any of the situations (logistically) that went terribly wrong, and then mishandled the tactics and (military) strategy aspect, destroying what slim chance of a victory he had. How much of this (the logistics) were his personal responsibility, I'm not sure. But if he didn't handle it, his staff should have. And his staff was chosen by him, which means that their failures in judgment are a sign of his failure, just as it would be a credit to have good staff officers.

Thomas didn't beat Hood because Thomas was a great tactician (whether he was or not barely came up), Thomas beat Hood because Hood was weak and vulnerable, in no small part because of Hood's bad decisions.

Was Hood a moron? No. But unlike Burnside, who recognized he was unfit for army command, Hood felt that he was fit and took on a not uncommon but terrible flaw...that everyone else is wrong and I, the leader, am right.

Simply moving late in the year was not a blunder. Moving late in the year without being prepared to deal with the various ways nature would become as much of a problem as the Federals was a blunder.

If going on a long post about how Hood was a blunderer is a sign of rabid antiHood bias, then I must ask for someone to prove that Hood handled preparing for any of the logistics issues that faced in him this invasion with even a mediocre level of ability. If that cannot be demonstrated, then I request that the charge be dropped as invalid.

Elennsar

 

[EricJacobson]

Was Hood a moron? No. But unlike Burnside, who recognized he was unfit for army command, Hood felt that he was fit and took on a not uncommon but terrible flaw...that everyone else is wrong and I, the leader, am right.

Simply moving late in the year was not a blunder. Moving late in the year without being prepared to deal with the various ways nature would become as much of a problem as the Federals was a blunder.

If going on a long post about how Hood was a blunderer is a sign of rabid antiHood bias, then I must ask for someone to prove that Hood handled preparing for any of the logistics issues that faced in him this invasion with even a mediocre level of ability. If that cannot be demonstrated, then I request that the charge be dropped as invalid.

Elennsar

Thank you offering a reasoned response. I should add that even Hood eventually saw the writng on the wall and resigned. No doubt his official report and memoirs are flawed and he does a great deal of finger pointing.

I am certain some will disagree with me, but I would say that Hood did perform at a mediocre level regarding logistics. It is easy to second guess and say what he should have done, but it's not so easy to have actually been him. First and foremost, time is of the essence, thus moving late in the year.

Second, supplies and etc are a difficult and limited commodity anywhere in the South by late 1864 and transportation for them was problematic. He did change his supply base in mid-stream, but only because his river crossing point changed. We've also flogged why he chose to cross at Florence to death. These are not excuses for Hood, but any commander would have had these problems. It is possible someone else may have done better, but Hood did not fail entirely. I think that point is being completely overlooked.

Third, what was he to do about nature? October and November are still decent months of weather in Middle Tennessee and northern Alabama and, as has been mentioned before, he certainly wasn't planning on being delayed around Florence for three weeks. Not Hood or Beauregard. So if he asked and someone told him to expect rain.....how much? How many days? Does it matter since time is of the essence and he is in a position where he feels he has to do something. Pontoon bridges for the river? He actually had those in place in early November and the swollen river and some crafty Federal troops sent those floating away. So it keeps raining and meanwhile new pontoons have to be brought up from Mississippi. The whole doggone situation is a mess, but so is the war at this point.

By the way the link below shows what the average rainfall for October is for the area of northwest Alabama where Florence and Tuscumbia are located. As you will see October is the driest month of the year. November moves up, but as I said in an earlier post the rainfull picks up around mid-Nov. Much of October and the first half of November are typically very nice. Notice the temps in Nov still average 62 degrees. But in 1864 it was snowing by mid-month. So even if Hood had asked he likely would have been told the weather will be fine. Then he starts marching and finds out it's just his luck that the weather is the worst most folks said they ever saw.

http://www.homesoftheshoals.com/Area_Information/page_1983275.html

 

[EricJacobson]

By that measure, trained at West Point or not, Hood was an amateur. He failed very badly to plan to cover any of the situations (logistically) that went terribly wrong, and then mishandled the tactics and (military) strategy aspect, destroying what slim chance of a victory he had. How much of this (the logistics) were his personal responsibility, I'm not sure. But if he didn't handle it, his staff should have. And his staff was chosen by him, which means that their failures in judgment are a sign of his failure, just as it would be a credit to have good staff officers.

In this regard Hood performed way below par. His staff choices were apparently not good and he alone is responsible. Spring Hill is a great example of simply lousy staff work and no one communicating in any reasonable fashion. This is an area where Lee had Hood begged dead on regarding carelessness off the field.

Eric

 

[Elennsar]

If you are correct, the question bcomes (in regards to the weather suddenly/unexpectedly turning bad) is what he did in response, based on the resources that could be tapped.

Or to put it another way.

Hood was not forced by destiny to continue on, even with the weather turned far worse than he was (through no fault of his own, the aspects that he should have done better with have been discussed in other posts) able to deal with the resources and supplies at his disposal.

He had the option of turning back, in other words. Would it have been good for morale? No. Would it have accomplished anything? No.

But Hood, somewhere between entering Tennessee and facing Schofield at Franklin, should have taken the time to weigh "Is any potential benefit I can gain from continuing worth the losses, and would turning back now be a greater disaster than continuing onward?"

It does not seem that Hood did that. He was going for Nashville by God and He would enable Hood to overcome the heath...Yankees. (No insult intended in making a half joking comparison of the invasion to a crusade.)

That, to me, is one of the signs that Hood was operating in the land of the highly optimistic. Let's say Hood inflicted 90% losses on Schofield, and suffering casualties equal to about a quarter of his army doing so (presumably, no disproportion losses amongst his generals, for the sake of this speculation.)

Would that be worth it? Would the gain to the Confederacy from destroying Schofield's forces be worth using up a quarter of the Army of Tennessee? Would the Army of Tennessee, after accomplishing such a victory, be in any condition for further operations (here or elsewhere)? Would Schofield's loss be a devastating blow to the Federals, locally or overall?

Unless one can answer "Yes." to most of these, Hood is throwing dice at long odds.

I wouldn't say he had a lot of good choices in autumn of 1864. That does not mean he pursued the best possible option or that he did the best job possible with the option he took, let alone both.

"All options are bad, so take a long shot option and hope it pays off." is terrible strategy, and I hope for the sake of his memory, Hood had some sounder reason.

But the evidence does not seem overly favorable to it.

 

[EricJacobson]

The Mobile and Ohio RR is not running in 1864 in this area because of destruction from raids upon it -- and in early May of 1864, the command was telling Roddey up near Tuscumbia they were going to get it back into operation. That never happened, nor did it happen later when Forrest asked for it, because the Confederacy simply didn't have the RR resources to do it. Yet Hood decides to move his Army to a crossing point where there is no RR, and there is no bridge, and there are no supplies -- and then complains about difficulties crossing the river, and bringing up supplies. Why do people think it wrong to note that Hood caused many of the problems he complained about?

Tim,

I just want to make sure we're on the same page. You say the Mobile & Ohio was not running "in this area..." Are you referring to north of Corinth? When Hood was at Tuscumbia, the Mobile & Ohio tracks were in use to the south of Corinth. As I'm sure you know supplies were then sent via the Memphis & Charleston to Cherokee Station. From there they were hauled overland to Tuscumbia.

Eric

 

[EricJacobson]

But Hood, somewhere between entering Tennessee and facing Schofield at Franklin, should have taken the time to weigh "Is any potential benefit I can gain from continuing worth the losses, and would turning back now be a greater disaster than continuing onward?"

It does not seem that Hood did that. He was going for Nashville by God and He would enable Hood to overcome the heath...Yankees. (No insult intended in making a half joking comparison of the invasion to a crusade.)

That, to me, is one of the signs that Hood was operating in the land of the highly optimistic. Let's say Hood inflicted 90% losses on Schofield, and suffering casualties equal to about a quarter of his army doing so (presumably, no disproportion losses amongst his generals, for the sake of this speculation.)

Would that be worth it? Would the gain to the Confederacy from destroying Schofield's forces be worth using up a quarter of the Army of Tennessee? Would the Army of Tennessee, after accomplishing such a victory, be in any condition for further operations (here or elsewhere)? Would Schofield's loss be a devastating blow to the Federals, locally or overall?

Unless one can answer "Yes." to most of these, Hood is throwing dice at long odds.

I wouldn't say he had a lot of good choices in autumn of 1864. That does not mean he pursued the best possible option or that he did the best job possible with the option he took, let alone both.

"All options are bad, so take a long shot option and hope it pays off." is terrible strategy, and I hope for the sake of his memory, Hood had some sounder reason.

But the evidence does not seem overly favorable to it.

I think you just put it all together quite well. Nothing Hood does is going to change the outcome of the war. But does he, or Lee, or Davis, or many in the ranks either feel the war is truly lost or even more importantly....are they ready to give up? We see it so clearly today, but did they? Apparently not, because they all couldn't be brain dead zombies.

That's what makes Franklin so compelling to me. Indomitable spirit on both sides. The war just wasn't over yet and perhaps its greatest tragedy, and other wars as well, is the losing side doesn't quit or know to quit until they have nearly been ground to bits.

The same spirit, I think, which kept 33,000 Confederates fighting in Tennessee in late 1864 with no pay, lousy food, crummy clothing, bad weather, death, disease, Lincoln's reelection, etc etc is something of the same spirit which drove Hood. MAYBE MAYBE MAYBE we can win. But we may also die trying.

Eric

 

[Elennsar]

Magnficient fighting spirit...but inexcusably bad leadership.

Fighting to the last man is heroic and noble when it somehow makes a difference. Fighting to the last man because you're too proud to surrender is purely dumb.

This has much of the latter. Even assuming a magnificently successful campaign, up to and including taking Nashville and capturing/killing Thomas, would just not be able to swing the tide of the war around overall, and the odds of achieving even that as a "local" success are staggeringly long.

Still, if it is purely dumb, the charge of "stupid" has to be directed at Davis for believing that the war was worth continuing despite every sign that it was going to end in an unfavorable way before accusing Hood of it.

In my opinion (if that's the right word), the stupidity on Hood's part is in regards to this particular operation and its details, the stupidity on Davis's is continuing the war.

Lee...I don't know. He wasn't truly first among equals (Seniority #3 of the full generals, I believe, someone correct me if I'm wrong. This does not include being effectively bumped up a step by Albert Sidney Johnston dying.) in any formal or official sense, so what he could have done that he didn't do on this level is something I'm unsure of.

All things being said and done, it doesn't make it one bit less interesting or worthy of study. A foolish, delusional blunder it may have been, but a determined attempt it was as well...anyone who thinks history is boring has obviously read too many meaningless statistics and not enough epics.

The Civil War, and this campaign in particular, deserves to be considered an epic. An epic tragedy, but an epic.

 

[M E Wolf]

Dear Elennsar and List Members;

I have done some researching on the Atlanta Campaign and how Hood figures into it all; going by Official Records of the Rebellion .

I found this to be 'telling'--
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXXVIII/5 [S# 76]
CONFEDERATE CORRESPONDENCE, ORDERS, AND RETURNS RELATING TO OPERATIONS IN THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN, FROM JULY 1, 1864, TO SEPTEMBER 8, 1864.--#2
RICHMOND, July 17, 1864.
General J. E. JOHNSTON:
Lieut. Gen. J. B. Hood has been commissioned to the temporary rank of general under the late law of Congress. I am directed by the Secretary of War to inform you that as you have failed to arrest the advance of the enemy to the vicinity of Atlanta, far in the interior of Georgia, and express no confidence that you can defeat or repel him, you are hereby relieved from the command of the Army and Department of Tennessee, which you will immediately turn over to General Hood.
S. COOPER,
Adjutant and Inspector General.
[Indorsement.]
Received night of July 17, 1864. Headquarters three miles from Atlanta, at Nelson's house, on Marietta road.
-----
RICHMOND, July 17, 1864.
General JOHN B. HOOD:
You are charged with a great trust. You will, I know, test to the utmost your capacities to discharge it. Be wary no less than bold. It may yet be practicable to cut the communication of the enemy or find or make an opportunity of equal encounter whether he moves east or west. God be with you.
JAMES A. SEDDON.
-----------------------------------------------
GENERAL ORDERS No. 4.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
July 17, 1864.
In obedience to orders of the War Department, I turn over to General Hood the command of the Army and Department of Tennessee. I cannot leave this noble army without expressing my admiration of the high military qualities it has displayed. A long and arduous campaign has made conspicuous every soldierly virtue, endurance of toil, obedience to orders, brilliant courage. The enemy has never attacked but to be repulsed and severely punished. You, soldiers, have never argued but from your courage, and never counted your foes. No longer your leader, I will still watch your career, and will rejoice in your victories. To one and all I offer assurances of my friendship, and bid an affectionate farewell.
J. E. JOHNSTON,
General
------------------------------------------------------------------
ATLANTA, July 18, 1864.
General S. COOPER:
GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of my appointment as general of the Army of Tennessee. There is now heavy skirmishing and indications of a general advance. I deem it dangerous to change the commanders of this army at this particular time, and to be to the interest of the service that no change should be made until the fate of Atlanta is decided.
Respectfully,
J. B. HOOD,
General.
----------------------------------------------------------
----
RICHMOND, July 18, 1864.
General HOOD:
Your telegram of this date received. A change of commanders, under existing circumstances, was regarded as so objectionable that I only accepted it as the alternative of continuing in a policy which had proved so disastrous. Reluctance to make the change induced me to send a telegram of inquiry to the commanding general on the 16th instant. His reply but confirmed previous apprehensions. There can be but one question which you and I can entertain--that is, what will best promote the public good; and to each of you I confidently look for the sacrifice of every personal consideration in conflict with that object. The order has been executed, and I cannot suspend it without making the case worse than it was before the order was issued.
JEFFERSON DAVIS.
(Same to Generals Hardee and Stewart.)
-------------------------------------------------------
NEAR ATLANTA, July 18, 1864.
General S. COOPER,
Richmond:
Your dispatch of yesterday received and obeyed. Command of the Army and Department of Tennessee has been transferred to General Hood. As to the alleged cause of my removal, I assert that Sherman's army is much stronger compared with that of Tennessee than Grant's compared with that of Northern Virginia. Yet the enemy has been compelled to advance much more slowly to the vicinity of Atlanta than to that of Richmond and Petersburg, and has penetrated much deeper into Virginia than into Georgia. Confident language by a military commander is not usually regarded as evidence of competency.
J. E. JOHNSTON.
ATLANTA, July 18, 1864.
---------------------------------------------------------
JULY 18, 1864--1 a.m.
General J. E. JOHNSTON:
GENERAL: Much to my surprise I received the appointment you refer to. I accept your congratulations and without its concomitants it would have been more agreeable. I desire to have a conversation with you, and for that purpose will be over early in the morning.
Respectfully,
J. B. HOOD.
--------------------------------------------------------
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
In the Field, July 18, 1864.
SOLDIERS: In obedience to orders from the War Department I assume command of this army and department. I feel the weight of the responsibility so suddenly and unexpectedly devolved upon me by this position, and shall bend all my energies and employ all my skill to meet its requirements. I look with confidence to your patriotism to stand by me, and rely upon your prowess to wrest your country from the grasp of the invader, entitling yourselves to the proud distinction of being called the deliverers of an oppressed people,
Respectfully,
J. B. HOOD,
General.
-------------------------------------------------------
HEADQUARTERS STEVENS' BRIGADE,
In the Field, July 18, 1864.
General J. E. JOHNSTON, C. S. Army:
GENERAL: Your order turning over the command of this army to General Hood has been read to the troops of this brigade. The announcement that you are no longer to be our leader was received by officers and men in silence and deep sorrow. I have the fullest assurance that I express the undivided sentiment of this brigade when I say that the abiding and unlimited confidence which we have felt in the wisdom of your judgment and leadership, has sustained us in the many trying hours of our very arduous campaign. We have ever felt that the best was being done that could be, and have looked confidently forward to the day of triumph, when with you as our leader we should surely march to a glorious victory. This confidence and implicit trust has been in no way impaired, and we are to-day ready, as we ever have been, to obey your orders, whether they be to retire before a largely outnumbering foe, or to spend our last drop of blood in the fiercest conflict. We feel that in parting with you as our commanding general our loss is irreparable, and that this army and our country loses one of its ablest, most zealous, and patriotic defenders. Our most sincere well wishes will accompany you in your future career, and you carry with you the love, respect, esteem, and confidence of the officers and men of this brigade. We would hail with joy your return to command us.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
C. H. STEVENS,
Brigadier-General, Provisional Army, C. S.
--------------------------------------------------------
What is seen by me; is that President Davis was impatient and wanted to switch commanders and, I believe Hood saw this danger; perhaps knowing all too well how General Johnston's command had great affections towards Johnston. At the best of times, it takes a few weeks for troops to get used to a new commander. Clearly the wrong time to do so, is in the Atlantic Campaign. It was designed for failure--by Richmond, Virginia.

Further, the campaign was too far along on Johnston's watch and bringing Hood in, as inexperienced as he was; probably met with Johnston for help.

Now, an assumption on my part here--; If Hood was caught by surprise at this change of leadership; I would assume Hood would take a hold of Johnston's campaign plans and get Johnston's advice before moving on any ideas of my own, per se. So, should Hood have used Johnston's plans and Hood was just carrying them on, as Johnston had planned--much like General Rommel in WWII against Patton at Kasserine; Rommel no doubt planned the battle and a different commander carried the plan out--the plan was still Rommel's. It could have been in this case Johnston's plan, with Hood carrying it.

Just some thoughts.

Respectfully submitted for consideration,
M. E. Wolf



-----

 

[M E Wolf]

Dear List Members;

Further study of General Hood, immediately after assending into command of the CSA's Army of the Tennessee;

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
July 19, 1864.
Hon. JAMES A. SEDDON,
Secretary of War, Richmond, Va.:
I thank you for your kind expressions in your dispatch of the 17th. If General S. D. Lee can co-operate with me by breaking the enemy's communication, I ask that it may be done with the least possible delay. I shall at all times be glad to receive any advice or suggestions from the authorities at Richmond.
J. B. HOOD,
General.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Leading up to being given command--I see Hood as doing his best to organize his command and correct mistakes
--------------------------------------------------------------
HEADQUARTERS HOOD'S CORPS,
Dalton, March 7, 1864.
I. The attention of division and brigade commanders is called to the evil results that may follow from their officers and men having wrong impressions in regard to being flanked by the enemy; much care should be taken to instruct them in this matter.
II. A division commander occupying the extreme flank of a line of battle should, if attacked on the extreme flank, change front of such portion of his line as may be necessary to repel it and promptly notify the corps commander, that assistance may be sent him. In like manner a brigade commander, if thus attacked, should change the front of one or more of his regiments, promptly notifying the division commander, that he may make the necessary dispositions and communicate the facts to the corps commander.
III. The importance of holding all ground taken from the enemy cannot be overestimated, as to relinquish it invariably demoralizes not only the troops immediately engaged but all others cognizant of the fact, and hence troops should never retire from the field for any purpose whatever, even to replenish ammunition (much of which can be obtained from our own and the enemy's wounded and dead), without authority from the corps and division commanders; as to do so would be second only to withdrawing without having fired a shot.
IV. Firing on the enemy at long range should never be permitted, since its lack of effectiveness often gives encouragement instead of causing demoralization, as a well-directed fire at short range is certain to do. In receiving an attack the enemy should be permitted to come close enough to enable our men to select the man they fire at, and in making an attack our fire should be held until it can be delivered with deadly effect, and, if practicable, should be followed by a determined charge, as it is all-important to break the enemy's line, not merely for the encouragement it gives our men but the demoralization and confusion that it forces upon him. Every officer and man should understand that in long-range fighting the Yankees are our equals, but at close quarters we are vastly superior to them. The history of the war abundantly proves that they have never repulsed a determined and well-sustained charge.
V. Another point to be observed in making an attack is that the troops when advancing in line of battle should not be moved at the double-quick or in any way be fatigued before engaging the enemy, that they may be in the best possible condition for pressing him and improving any advantages which may be gained.
By command of Lieutenant-General Hood:
ARCHER ANDERSON,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
GENERAL ORDERS No. 38.
HEADQUARTERS HOOD'S CORPS,
Dalton, Ga., March 11, 1864.
To avoid dangerous confusion in action, each regiment and battery will be required to bear the Confederate battle-flag.
The chief quartermaster is instructed to take immediate steps to provide the command with these colors.
The lieutenant-general commanding can well understand the pride many regiments of the corps feel in other flags which they have gloriously borne in battle, but the interests of the service are imperative. He would therefore suggest that such standards be sent for safe keeping to the capitol of the States to which the troops belong, as it will be found inconvenient to have more than one flag in a regiment.
By command of Lieutenant-General Hood:
ARCHER ANDERSON,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
GENERAL ORDERS No. 41.
HEADQUARTERS HOOD'S CORPS,
Dalton, Ga., March 17, 1864.
I. Colors will never be used by sharpshooters when employed as such, nor by skirmishers, as they are too much exposed to capture to be thus risked; besides, it is often important that our sharpshooters and skirmishers should approach the enemy without attracting unnecessary attention.
II. The attention of division, brigade, and regimental commanders is called to the fact that in attacking an enemy it is all-important to break his front line promptly, as the confusion to which he is thereby subjected renders it comparatively easy to break his second and even third line, which should always be done by our first line if possible. To insure this it is absolutely necessary that our men do not become broken or scattered, which should be fully impressed upon them.
After breaking the enemy's first line, and before attacking his second, brigade commanders will invariably correct the formation and alignment of their commands, if necessary making a temporary halt for this purpose, that such an attack may be made with an unbroken front, thereby avoiding the great risk of failure to which a broken line or disorganized mass is subjected. Such attention should, however, be given to the alignment of the troops while in motion as to avoid the necessity of a halt, as a line of battle once engaged should, if possible, press on until relieved by other troops.
III. The second line should be kept well in hand by division commanders, and when it engages the enemy the first line will halt, reform, and then follow it in support.
IV. Coolness in time of battle on the part of both officers and men is essential to success, as by its exercise officers are better enabled to comprehend and perform their duties, and the men to understand orders and deliver their fire with deadly effect.
V. Official reports of wounded will be based upon the reports of the medical officers, for by including such as are so slightly wounded as to be able to remain on duty false impressions result to ourselves and much encouragement is given the enemy, both of which should be avoided.
By command of Lieutenant-General Hood:
J.P. WILSON,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
--------------------------------------------------------
GENERAL ORDERS No. 54.
HEADQUARTERS HOOD'S CORPS,
Dalton, Ga., April 20, 1864.
I. The regiments of this corps will have their battle-flags plainly marked with their numbers and the State to which they belong. This is done that in the event of the loss of colors no misunderstanding may arise as to who lost them.
II. But one stand of colors will be used by any regiment in time of battle.
By command of Lieut. Gen. J. B. Hood, commanding:
J. W. RATCHFORD,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
--------------------------------------------------------------

Interesting so many General Orders were issued to what I personally feel is common sense. So, what might be a problem with the internal discipline an army had before Hood was assigned to the corps he had before being given the entire Army of Tennessee?...interesting to say the least================================================
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXXII/3 [S# 59]
CONFEDERATE CORRESPONDENCE, ORDERS, AND RETURNS RELATING TO OPERATIONS IN KENTUCKY, SOUTHWEST VIRGINIA, TENNESSEE, MISSISSIPPI, ALABAMA, AND NORTH GEORGIA FROM MARCH 1, 1864, TO APRIL 30, 1864.--#9
DALTON, GA., April 13, 1864.
[PRIVATE.]
General BRAXTON BRAGG,
Commanding Armies of the Confederate States:
MY DEAR GENERAL: I received your letter, and am sorry to inform you that I have done all in my power to induce General Johnston to accept the proposition you made to move forward. He will not consent, as he desires the troops to be sent here and it is left to him as to what use should be made of them.
I regret this exceedingly, as my heart was fixed upon our going to the front and regaining Tennessee and Kentucky. I have also had a long talk with General Hardee. Whilst he finds many difficulties in the way of our advancing, he is at the same time ready and willing to do anything that is thought best for our general good. He has written a long letter to the President, which will explain his views, &c.
When we are to be in a better condition to drive the enemy from our country I am not able to comprehend. To regain Tennessee would be of more value to us than a half dozen victories in Virginia. I received a letter from General R. E. Lee on yesterday, and he says, "You can assist me by giving me more troops, or driving the enemy in your front to the Ohio River. If the latter is to be done, it should be executed at once." I still hope we shall yet go forward., it is for the President and yourself to decide. I well know you have to grapple with many difficulties, as the President has done from the beginning of this war. He has directed us thus far, and in him I have unbounded confidence. Should we, from the many impediments in the way, fail to move forward from this position we must not allow ourselves to be deceived as to where the enemy will make his main effort. So soon as that is discovered we should concentrate and beat them decidedly.
Since McPherson's corps has moved up from the Lower Mississippi to join the Army of the Potomac or that of the Cumberland, would it not be well for General Polk's troops to unite with this army, as we should then be in a condition to re-enforce General Lee in case it should be necessary?
Please present my kindest regards to the President.
Yours, truly,
J. B. HOOD.
------------------------------------------------------------
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXXVIII/1 [S# 72]
MAY 1-SEPTEMBER 8, 1864.--The Atlanta (Georgia) Campaign.
NO. 6.--Report of Capt. Orlando M. Poe, Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army, Chief Engineer, of operations July 1-October 31, 1864.
The rebel army in our front had been under command of Joseph E. Johnston until the 19th of July, when the command was transferred to General Hood. Johnston's policy appeared to be a purely defensive one. Hood's was decidedly offensive-defensive, as shown by the fact that three desperate and severe battles were fought within ten days after he assumed command.
================================================
Adding to the 'twists' of fate; General Johnston wished charges to be leveled against General Hood, just weeks prior to Johnston's removal from command. I am sure Johnston's staff and commanders weren't going to embrace Hood and fight in the same way; as if Johnston remained in command and over all -- I see Bragg still in charge over the entire mess. *Hood's report is lengthy and ommitted but, can be read on the web-Official Reports of the Rebellion[/B]====================================================O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXXVIII/3 [S# 74]
May 1-September 8, 1864.--THE ATLANTA (GEORGIA) CAMPAIGN
No. 598.--Report of General John B. Hood, C. S. Army, commanding Army of Tennessee, of operations July 18-September 6.
SMITHFIELD, April 1, 1865.
General S. Cooper:
I have read General Hood's report, and will prefer charges against him as soon as I can find leisure. Please inform him.
J. E. JOHNSTON.
-----
SMITHFIELD, April 4, 1865.
Lieut. Gen. J. B. HOOD:
After reading your report as submitted, I informed General Cooper by telegraph that I should prefer charges against you as soon as I have leisure to do so, and desired him to give you the information.
J. E. JOHNSTON.
------------------------------------------------
CHESTER, S.C., April 4, 1865.
General J. E JOHNSTON,
Smithfield, N. C. :
Your telegram of this date received informing me that you intended, so soon as you had leisure, to prefer charges against me. I am under orders for the Trans-Mississippi Department. I shall inquire of General Cooper whether I am to await my trial and not proceed as ordered. I will be ready to meet any charges you may prefer.
J. B. HOOD.
-----------------------------------------------------
CHESTER, April 5, 1865.
General S. COOPER:
I have the honor to request that a court of inquiry be assembled, at the earliest practicable moment, to investigate and report upon the facts and statements contained in my official report of the operations of the Army of Tennessee.
J. B. HOOD,
Lieutenant-General.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
DANVILLE, April 7, 1865.
Lieut. Gen. J. B. HOOD:
A court of inquiry cannot be convened in your case at present. Must proceed to Texas, as heretofore ordered.
S. COOPER,
Adjutant and Inspector General.

---------------------------------------------------
DANVILLE, April 5, 1865.
Lieut. Gen. J. B. HOOD:
Proceed to Texas, as heretofore ordered.
S. COOPER,
Adjutant and Inspector General.
------------------------------------------------
Now, again in my assumptions--IF, General Johnston still had a 'bone to pick' with Hood; he would not necessarily be helpful to Hood and or want him to be successful and even if he did--the question remains; how successful could Hood be? Clearly; by reports of the Union that there was a change from pure defensive to a combination of attack and defense when Hood assumed command.

Just some thoughts.

Respectfully submitted for consideration,
M. E. Wolf

 

[trice]

Your long responses essentially show that you will not concede any point and insist that just about everyone is incorrect in their evaluations of a particular situation and only you know what the real facts are.

Eric, people who take the time and make the effort to explain a difficult situation to you are trying to engage you in friendly discourse. If you look at the exchange of messages, you will find other places where I have said I agree with you. I would suggest that your attitude here is incomplete.

One last time about the weather. It's obvious to me and probably everyone on the board that Civil War armies often went into winter quarters. However, you are now shifting the discussion. You initially said Hood should have checked about the weather might be in October and November and the entire premise of your argument is to make him look like a fool for not knowing that it might or might not rain. ...

No, Eric. That is merely how you insist upon seeing it. What I did initially was simply to ask what the weather would be like at that time -- and you began by insisting I was attacking Hood. Please review the messages so that you can verify this for yourself.

... You state campaigns generally did not occur from January thru April, but Hood's campaign begins in October and runs thru December. So what is your point really?

Eric, please read what I posted. The only reason I mentioned the effects of the weather on matters like the timing of campaigns was that you had said: "Civil War commanders didn't check ahead for potential weather problems and to suggest that they should have (like Tim said of Hood) is ludicrous. Thus the term Monday morning quarterbacking."

Clearly it wasn't ludicrous. I don't see why you should object like this.

... Both the Stones River and Fredericksburg Campaigns occurred during December and even Chattanooga was fought at the end of November. Your argument falls flat, because your only focus is to try and make it seem as if Hood was the only commander who ever moved his army late in the year and made mistakes along the way.

No, Eric, that was not my argument. I am saying commanders should always understand how weather might affect their plans and take that into account. They also should understand how geography affects their plans before they make them. These are normal and routine matters handled all the time.

When Rosecrans moved from Nashville to Chattanooga, he was operating very close to a well-stocked base with solid links to supply. (The Cumberland could be unreliable based on time of year and weather, but Rosecrans delayed to make sure his RR to Louisville was functioning before moving). Compare this to Hood. He is constantly wanting to move before his RR and supply is established, over much greater distances; he shows little effort to be sound in his planning of such things.

As to Fredericksburg, supply was never a problem for the Union when they had access to rivers. There were no supply issues here to interrupt Union movement. The issue at Fredericksburg (other than having Burnside as commander) comes down to moving the bridge train. That was screwed up, and there are long arguments about who messed it up and how. Part of it is how difficult it was to move a long and heavy bridge train over muddy roads. Part of it comes down to a finger-pointing exercise between Halleck's staff and organization and Burnside's staff and organization. But you can take it as gospel that one reason the plan failed was a failure to deal with the issue of moving the trains to the crossing place properly. You'll note also that I specifically mentioned Burnside and Fredericksburg in my post as exceptions.

BTW, Burnside did have enough bridging equipment to have crossed the river and grabbed the heights before Lee got there, just not all that he could have wished for to cross his complete force. Burnside decided against it, and Lee was able to occupy the heights.

... I think we have already agreed that Hood was in over his head and should not have been army commander. However, he did what he thought best and/or could. In the end, unfortunately for him, his record includes mistakes, many lives lost, and failure. You, however, will not let the matter drop at that and continue to pound away insisting what a total idiot Hood was.

When I say Hood was an excellent brigade and division commander, am I saying he was a "total idiot"? When I say he had an excellent tactical eye and was good at moving troops fast, am I saying he was a "total idiot"? When I note that the move from Columbia to Spring Hill was very well done, am I saying he was a "total idiot"?

... Also, the Confederacy was dying by late 1864. Hood did not have the luxury of time you or I have from the comfort of our chairs in front of our computers. But perhaps he should have waited until April 1865 to begin moving toward Tennessee?

Eric, Hood abandoned Atlanta September 1. He started on his new campaign September 29. He reached Tuscumbia by October 31, and he started north towards Columbia November 21. I would presume he spent every waking moment that he could in those 12 weeks working out what he was going to do, with the aid of his staff and the benefit of his West Point eductaion and his military experience. I would also presume he had been thinking of what he might do if freed of the burden of defending Atlanta in the months before that.

My point is that the Hood of 1864 acts just like the Hood of the 1850s and the Hood of 1861, 1862, and 1863. He can be daring and fast moving -- but he shows little consistency on the things that would make him a competent independent commander. He always politicked behind his commander's back, whether it was in 1862 or 1864. He always sought political support for advancement. When R. E. Lee speaks of Hood being "careless off" the battlefield, that's the same Lee who was Lt. Col. of Hood's regiment in Texas; who Hood served under as a brigade and division commander. Hood in GA and TN is that same Hood.

I think and have repeatedly said that the invasion of TN in 1864 is a hare-brained idea, based on a bad understanding of principles and wishful thinking. It would be so no matter who was commanding the Army. The mere fact that Grant and Sherman -- back in September before Hood even moves -- have discussed the matter and are willing to essentially ignore Hood if he does move on TN tells us that.

The entire premise of Hood's invasion is that Sherman must follow him if he goes there. This is proven wrong the day Sherman starts marching for Savannah, when Hood is still sitting at Tuscumbia. Hood's actions to this point have already shown that he should not be holding this command. Hood then compounds his original error by invading TN anyway.

Bacvk in September and October, Hood had promised he would follow Sherman if Sherman moved away. Now Hood has placed himself where he cannot follow Sherman. Doesn't Hood bear responsibility for this?

Tim

 

[trice]

I just want to make sure we're on the same page. You say the Mobile & Ohio was not running "in this area..." Are you referring to north of Corinth? When Hood was at Tuscumbia, the Mobile & Ohio tracks were in use to the south of Corinth. As I'm sure you know supplies were then sent via the Memphis & Charleston to Cherokee Station. From there they were hauled overland to Tuscumbia.

The Mobile & Ohio was in terrible shape and had been for a long time. It was struck repeatedly by Federal raids throughout 1864. It suffered from a lack of maintenance and repair. It was short on rolling stock, and the Confederates were resorting to putting sections back in operation by ripping up the track from other sections.

May 1, 1864: "The Mobile and Ohio road is now in running order to Baldwyn, and will shortly be completed to Corinth. The Southern road to Jackson will be ready for travel in about two weeks, and the Central and New Orleans roads are being rapidly repaired." Report of Col. Brent to General Bragg.

June 25, 1864: " From the information I have, am clearly of the opinion that the force now moving from Memphis meditate the destruction of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad as far down as possible and then turn across to the Central railroad, destroy it and return to Memphis." Forrest to Major Elliot from Tupelo.

July 11, 1864: "I am anxious about the Montgomery railroad, which is much exposed to raids from Pensacola. I drew Maury's regiment to this side to be in place to re-enforce you, and then to guard the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, and to operate against the enemy in case of his landing at Pascagoula." Dabney Maury to S. D. Lee from Mobile.

July 17, 1864: "The manifest indisposition of the management of the Mobile and Ohio road to do anything unless aided by the army, renders it very certain that if the road is desired we shall have to furnish the labor necessary to repair it, otherwise if the troops are not drawn back to the forage our teams will necessarily be run down in hauling it to the commands, and the negroes also be required to handle it along the railroad and place it on cars to be sent forward as far as the road can carry it. As soon as the road is repaired, General Roddey, with his command, can occupy Corinth again, if it is desirable to do so." Forrest to S. D. Lee from Okolona.

October 12, 1864: "The great predominating, absorbing desire is to cut Sherman's line of communication. I did something toward accomplishing this result during my recent expedition, and I am anxious to renew the effort at some future day, but nothing can be done without a pontoon across the Tennessee River. I suggest that the railroad be repaired from Cherokee to Tus-cumbia and Florence, and that a bridge be thrown across the river. This can be accomplished without much difficulty, as the columns or piles of the old bridge will furnish ample support for ropes. I presume it is the only place on the river that a bridge can be built. The distance from Cherokee to Tuscumbia is fifteen miles. The road for several miles has been destroyed, but the iron necessary for repairs can be procured on the west end of the road between this place and in the direction of Grand Junction. If this bridge was built I could strike the Tennessee and Alabama road or the Nashville and Chattanooga road at pleasure, and return when hard pressed in safety." Forrest to Taylor from Corinth.

October 23, 1864: "First. The railroad from Jacksonville to Selma will be abandoned as a means of supplying the Army of Tennessee, the base having been transferred from Jacksonville to Tuscumbia. Henceforth the lines of communication for army supplies to that point will be the Mobile and Ohio and the Memphis and Charleston Railroads. These roads will be put forthwith in complete running order and be well supplied with rolling-stock." Beauregard's adjutant, Col. Brent, to Taylor from somewhere "In the field".

October 23, 1864: "General Hood moved on the 21st instant toward Guntersville, on the Tennessee River, and has probably by this time crossed that stream with his army. Thin movement, makes it necessary to supply the Army of Tennessee, via Corinth and Cherokee, to Tuscumbia, and, owing to the bad condition of both the Mobile and Ohio and Memphis and Charleston Railroads, involves the necessity of promptly repairing those roads, establishing water stations on road from Corinth to Cherokee, &c. I have sent all the negroes and tools I can control for the moment to work the road from Okolona to Corinth, and have directed Brigadier-General Roddey to at once impress or hire negroes and tools to repair road from Corinth to Cherokee, and, if possible, to Tuscumbia." Taylor to Forrest from Selma after receiving the order from Beauregard.

October 23, 1864: "The lieutenant-general commanding therefore directs that you immediately proceed to impress hands and tools to repair the railroad from Corinth to Cherokee, and from Cherokee to Tuscumbia. If you are unable to at once impress or hire negroes for this purpose you will put your troops to work on the railroad, beginning by clearing the track between Corinth and Cherokee of weeds and grass, putting in new cross-ties where necessary, and establishing abundance of water stations along the route. The lieutenant-general commanding has ordered all the negroes at his disposal to be sent to Okolona to work the road from there to Corinth. If you can possibly get out negroes enough to spare any for that work, the lieutenant-general commanding wishes you to turn them over to the Mobile and Ohio Railroad. These repairs are now matters of the first importance, and the lieutenant-general commanding expects you to lend all your energies and influence to their speedy completion." Taylor to Roddey in Tuscumbia.

(As noted earlier, you and I agree on Dick Taylor. This indicates one reason why: Taylor is notified he has to do something, detailed orders start flying immediately and things get done.)

October 27, 1864: "Major Whitfield, assistant quartermaster, in charge of railroad transportation, was sent several days ago, with all the negro hands which could be withdrawn from Mobile and Demopolis, for the purpose of putting in order the Mobile and Ohio Railroad and Memphis and Charleston road in accordance with the wishes and instructions of the general commanding. Major-General Gardner has been directed to have a suitable block-house erected at Corinth and other important points on the line of railroad communication within his district. At the railroad crossing of Bear Creek General Roddey had better make the necessary defenses, and he being accessible to General Hood the proper orders may be given him directly by General H. One of my staff officers has been sent to North Mississippi and Alabama for the purpose of urging forward the work on the roads. In the construction of field-works, &c., we must rely almost entirely upon the labor of captured negroes, as the section of country in which the work is to be done will afford very few hands, it being almost stripped of slaves. ... Tuscumbia until recently has been the headquarters of General Roddey. It is distant about fourteen miles from Cherokee, the railroad between those places having been entirely destroyed. ... Colonel Meriwether has been instructed to complete the railroad to Jacksonville. I had hoped, however; that the general commanding would have suspended the work of this extension. To effect the completion of the road to Jacksonville involves the necessity of taking up the iron from the branch road to Marion, which is in daily use and of considerable military as well as local importance in transportation of supplies. ... The road between Memphis and Corinth has been very effectually destroyed to within a short distance of the former place. All the bridges and the trestle-work have been burned and instructions have been given to render the destruction as complete as possible." Taylor to Brent from Selma.

Tim

 

[trice]

====================================================O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXXVIII/3 [S# 74]
May 1-September 8, 1864.--THE ATLANTA (GEORGIA) CAMPAIGN
No. 598.--Report of General John B. Hood, C. S. Army, commanding Army of Tennessee, of operations July 18-September 6.
SMITHFIELD, April 1, 1865.
General S. Cooper:
I have read General Hood's report, and will prefer charges against him as soon as I can find leisure. Please inform him.
J. E. JOHNSTON.
-----
SMITHFIELD, April 4, 1865.
Lieut. Gen. J. B. HOOD:
After reading your report as submitted, I informed General Cooper by telegraph that I should prefer charges against you as soon as I have leisure to do so, and desired him to give you the information.
J. E. JOHNSTON.
------------------------------------------------
CHESTER, S.C., April 4, 1865.
General J. E JOHNSTON,
Smithfield, N. C. :
Your telegram of this date received informing me that you intended, so soon as you had leisure, to prefer charges against me. I am under orders for the Trans-Mississippi Department. I shall inquire of General Cooper whether I am to await my trial and not proceed as ordered. I will be ready to meet any charges you may prefer.
J. B. HOOD.
-----------------------------------------------------
CHESTER, April 5, 1865.
General S. COOPER:
I have the honor to request that a court of inquiry be assembled, at the earliest practicable moment, to investigate and report upon the facts and statements contained in my official report of the operations of the Army of Tennessee.
J. B. HOOD,
Lieutenant-General.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
DANVILLE, April 7, 1865.
Lieut. Gen. J. B. HOOD:
A court of inquiry cannot be convened in your case at present. Must proceed to Texas, as heretofore ordered.
S. COOPER,
Adjutant and Inspector General.

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DANVILLE, April 5, 1865.
Lieut. Gen. J. B. HOOD:
Proceed to Texas, as heretofore ordered.
S. COOPER,
Adjutant and Inspector General.
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Now, again in my assumptions--IF, General Johnston still had a 'bone to pick' with Hood; he would not necessarily be helpful to Hood and or want him to be successful and even if he did--the question remains; how successful could Hood be? Clearly; by reports of the Union that there was a change from pure defensive to a combination of attack and defense when Hood assumed command.

Just some thoughts.

Respectfully submitted for consideration,
M. E. Wolf

These two kept picking that bone until they died. It is one of the things that makes Johnston's and Hood's memoirs suspect and unreliable even more than most of the Civil War memoirs by top generals.

Tim

 

[trice]

Tim,

I just want to make sure we're on the same page. You say the Mobile & Ohio was not running "in this area..." Are you referring to north of Corinth? When Hood was at Tuscumbia, the Mobile & Ohio tracks were in use to the south of Corinth. As I'm sure you know supplies were then sent via the Memphis & Charleston to Cherokee Station. From there they were hauled overland to Tuscumbia.

Eric

A bit more:

October 30, 1864: "I am here, and need at once twenty days' supply of breadstuffs and salt, with some forage for the supply-train animals, which will have to go to Cherokee for these supplies. Please give me all the assistance you can in obtaining them. I am very much obliged for the aid you have hitherto extended to this army. Can't the cars on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad run directly to Cherokee so as to avoid reshipment at Corinth?" Hood to Taylor from Tuscumbia

October 31, 1864: "I must have twenty days' supply of rations for this army at Cherokee with the least possible delay. Please give me all the assistance you can in transporting them to that point, and allow the trains from your road to run direct to Cherokee Station, which will avoid transshipment at Corinth; time is of the utmost importance." Hood to Superintendant of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad from Tuscumbia.

October 31, 1864: "Give me all the aid you can in transporting twenty days' supply of rations for this army to Cherokee Station at once. Time is all important. I have asked of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad to allow their trains to run direct to Cherokee to avoid reshipment at Corinth." Hood to Major Whitfield, Quartermaster at *******n, MS from Tuscumbia

November 3, 1864: "The country round about Florence has been again and again devastated during the past three years, and Beauregard must be dependent on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, which also has been broken and patched up in its whole extent." Sherman to Halleck from Kingston, GA.

November 15, 1864: "Third. To giving still greater protection to Corinth and the Mobile and Ohio Railroad to that point.
I was aware that those points had already been discussed between us, but my anxiety for the safety of the troops under your command made it incumbent on me to call again your attention to those important matters. I wish also to inform you that the third point mentioned may require greater time than was at first supposed necessary. All orders for completing the defenses of Corinth, repairing and prosecuting vigorously the work on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad to this place, and for repairing the Mobile and Ohio Railroad from Okolona to Bethel, have been given and are being carried out as rapidly as the limited means of the engineer and quartermaster departments will permit. It is at present reported that the railroads referred to will be completed in from fifteen to twenty days, but it is reasonable to suppose that the prevailing unfavorable weather will delay the work one or two weeks longer. General Taylor and myself will always be anxious to aid you in your present campaign with all the means at our control, but these being limited, ample previous notice of what may be required should be given, to enable us to make all necessary preparations. It will also give me pleasure to confer on you such powers as you may deem necessary to secure your communications, repair roads, and hasten supplies to your army whilst operating in the department of General Taylor." Beauregard to Hood from Tuscumbia.