Hood's Plan -- Hood's Failure

[EricJacobson]

Eric, you are reaching pretty hard here. Hood himself was using the weather as an excuse for the delays in November 1864. All I did is ask what the weather in early November was likely to be like at a normal time.

Tim

Tim,

With all due respect I think you are doing the reaching. As I said, weather wasn't an excuse - it was the reality. Again, you are haggling about semantics. Since the weather sucked and Hood said it delayed his advance, does that make it an excuse? Maybe in your mind, but it sounds to me more like a "reason" why he was stuck around Florence.

Eric

 

[larry_cockerham]

Middle Tennessee Weather

Gentlemen, I'm very much enjoying your discourse. Please continue. I've been here in Nashville for 30 years now, and no, though my hair is white, I wasn't here in 1864, except for a few genes carried by three ancestors. At any rate, someone asked what is normal weather at that time of year. Usually the fall rains (I've been in construction related work for some time) start about the 15th of October to 15 November. In 1864 this meant much mud and swollen Tennessee, Elk and Duck rivers. Just prior to the battle at Nashville, the weather turned cold and nasty. Reportedly 13 below zero the weekend prior to the Nashville battle. I've experience one ice storm in Nashville back in the mid 1990s. Two inches of ice that lasted more than a week. Hard to stand up. It must have been that and worse when Hood was waiting to attack Nashville. Certainly not an excuse, but a helluva reason to cool it. (small pun intended)

 

[trice]

Tim,

With all due respect I think you are doing the reaching. As I said, weather wasn't an excuse - it was the reality. Again, you are haggling about semantics. Since the weather sucked and Hood said it delayed his advance, does that make it an excuse? Maybe in your mind, but it sounds to me more like a "reason" why he was stuck around Florence.

Eric,

I have no clue why you think a simple question from me as to what the normal weather might be is seen by you as an attack upon Hood. The only reason for the question is to see what Hood should have expected in his movement.

Tim

 

[trice]

Gentlemen, I'm very much enjoying your discourse. Please continue. I've been here in Nashville for 30 years now, and no, though my hair is white, I wasn't here in 1864, except for a few genes carried by three ancestors. At any rate, someone asked what is normal weather at that time of year. Usually the fall rains (I've been in construction related work for some time) start about the 15th of October to 15 November. In 1864 this meant much mud and swollen Tennessee, Elk and Duck rivers. Just prior to the battle at Nashville, the weather turned cold and nasty. Reportedly 13 below zero the weekend prior to the Nashville battle. I've experience one ice storm in Nashville back in the mid 1990s. Two inches of ice that lasted more than a week. Hard to stand up. It must have been that and worse when Hood was waiting to attack Nashville. Certainly not an excuse, but a helluva reason to cool it. (small pun intended)

Thanks.

Hood's crossing of the Tennessee is being delayed in exactly the period you are referring to. Hood arrives in the Florence-Tuscumbia area at the end of October (Cheatham is at Tuscumbia Oct. 31,crosses to north side Nov.13). By the 21st, the Army is across and moving north.

There is no doubt the weather was bad, and probably unusually so. Heavy rains are reported throughout the period, and when the troops finally march on the 21st, they do so in a snowstorm. Yet some accounts of the attack at Franklin describe it as a beautiful Indian-Summer day (Nov. 30)

Tim

 

[richard]

Eric, about a month ago, I listened to a talk by the interm director of the Carter House on Cavalry in Tennessee. David made or maybe I heard it incorrectly, that Forrest was camped the night of the 30th on the other side of the Harpth river. When some on asked him why he did not try to flank the Union Cavalry also camped there his answer was that his men were out of ammunition as just before he moved into that position, he was in the center of the main line.

Did I hear him incorrectly?

 

[trice]

Eric, about a month ago, I listened to a talk by the interm director of the Carter House on Cavalry in Tennessee. David made or maybe I heard it incorrectly, that Forrest was camped the night of the 30th on the other side of the Harpth river. When some on asked him why he did not try to flank the Union Cavalry also camped there his answer was that his men were out of ammunition as just before he moved into that position, he was in the center of the main line.

Did I hear him incorrectly?

Just as Hood had left most of his artillery with S. D. Lee when he left Columbia, Forrest had left his wagons behind. Parts of his cavalry ran out of ammo on the 29th, around Spring Hill. He borrowed some from the infantry so he could continue on the 30th. When he tried crossing the Harpeth late on the 30th, he again begged what ammo he could get from the infantry.

I do think Forrest had withdrawn back to the south side of the Harpeth after the Union counterattack, though.

Tim

 

[richard]

Tim, thanks. I just wish that I had a transcript of the talk that I heard. If my memory is correct, David stated that there were two groups of Confederates that camped on the other side of the river near where Wilson and Hatch were camped. I could be wrong.

 

[richard]

One thing that can be said about Hoods movement into Tennessee, the Battle of Franklin and the Battle of Nashville and that is this: The American Soldier is tough, Has a lot of Guts and for the most part gets the job done.

 

[EricJacobson]

Eric, about a month ago, I listened to a talk by the interm director of the Carter House on Cavalry in Tennessee. David made or maybe I heard it incorrectly, that Forrest was camped the night of the 30th on the other side of the Harpth river. When some on asked him why he did not try to flank the Union Cavalry also camped there his answer was that his men were out of ammunition as just before he moved into that position, he was in the center of the main line.

Did I hear him incorrectly?

You probably heard him correctly, but Forrest was definitely not camped east of the Harpeth on the night of the Nov. 30th. In fact, if I recall correctly, he used the DeGraffenried home as his headquarters, which stood about a mile due south of Carnton back then. As far as ammo, his men were likely low, because as Tim stated Forrest had to borrow from the infantry on the morning of the 30th before he left Spring Hill.

Eric

 

[EricJacobson]

Gentlemen, I'm very much enjoying your discourse. Please continue. I've been here in Nashville for 30 years now, and no, though my hair is white, I wasn't here in 1864, except for a few genes carried by three ancestors. At any rate, someone asked what is normal weather at that time of year. Usually the fall rains (I've been in construction related work for some time) start about the 15th of October to 15 November. In 1864 this meant much mud and swollen Tennessee, Elk and Duck rivers. Just prior to the battle at Nashville, the weather turned cold and nasty. Reportedly 13 below zero the weekend prior to the Nashville battle. I've experience one ice storm in Nashville back in the mid 1990s. Two inches of ice that lasted more than a week. Hard to stand up. It must have been that and worse when Hood was waiting to attack Nashville. Certainly not an excuse, but a helluva reason to cool it. (small pun intended)

Larry,

You've lived in Tennessee alot longer than I have, but during the years I've been here (and not to say weather in the 1860's wasn't slightly different), the weather I have seen in late October thru the first half of November has not been rainy. Not to say it doesn't rain, just not much of it. However, by mid-November everything seems to change and God only knows what you might get after that.

But who knows, maybe Al Gore is on to something.....

Eric

 

[EricJacobson]

Eric,

I have no clue why you think a simple question from me as to what the normal weather might be is seen by you as an attack upon Hood. The only reason for the question is to see what Hood should have expected in his movement.

Tim

Tim,

If I was out of line, I apologize, but regardless of what the weather or was supposed to be, Hood's got the cards stacked against him. The fact that the weather was awful didn't help matters. In fact, the weather may have delayed Forrest's arrival and definitely delayed Hood's advance. Every day counted and Hood lost precious days because of the weather. I just don't see that as an excuse (your word). It was the reality.

Eric

 

[EricJacobson]

One thing that can be said about Hoods movement into Tennessee, the Battle of Franklin and the Battle of Nashville and that is this: The American Soldier is tough, Has a lot of Guts and for the most part gets the job done.

Amen to that.

 

[OpnDownfall]

Hood's Plan--Hood's Failure

Once Again, Hood, had conversed personally with Beauregard and President Davisl. ALL Agreed that an invasion of Tn was a necessity.
There were two very obvious reasons for Hood to move West, first and most importantly it was part of his plan. Originally, the plan was to attack Sherman's supply line to the North, avoid a major battle and drawn him West, into the Forested Hills of Ga. where the smaller AoT might have a chance to defeat the Union Army, as opportunity presented itself, in the rough terrain. In preparation, Hood order Rail Line running from Ala. to Tuscumbia be repare to facilitate the rapid collection of needed supplies.
Wheeler's cavalry had been detached to shadow Sherman's March (i.e.,escort the Union army to the sea)
It is my understanding that Meanwhile, Forrest was to replace Wheeler, when he returned from his Middle Tn. Raid. I understand that just after Johnsonville, the withdrawing Forrest, was contacted by courier to report to Hood, immediately, which he then did and as soon as he arrived Hood, began moving north, despite the fact that Hood's request for the repair of the rail line to Tuscumbia had been ignored.
Secondly, Hood moved west trying to find fords to the storm swollen Tn River and ended up in Tuscumbia, because he was so anxious to cross the river and invade as soon as possible and was not willing to waste time waiting at any one spot, when one might be found if searched for hard enough.
That Hood was unlucky, had an almost impossible mission, badly served by his senior commanders at critical times during the campaign (and at Atlanta) and ultimately failed and ended up sacrificing his army is all true, but if those are the attributes of a army commander 'in over his head' then so were most southern generals; including Lee.

 

[trice]

Tim,

If I was out of line, I apologize, but regardless of what the weather or was supposed to be, Hood's got the cards stacked against him. The fact that the weather was awful didn't help matters. In fact, the weather may have delayed Forrest's arrival and definitely delayed Hood's advance. Every day counted and Hood lost precious days because of the weather. I just don't see that as an excuse (your word). It was the reality.

Eric, a competent commander knows what to expect on such matters before he gives orders. On the weather he can easily guess wrong -- but he would find out what to expect before he started. That is why I asked what kind of weather there would be in north Alabama at that time, and that is why Hood should have asked long before he set his troops in motion for that spot.

If he is moving to cross the Tennessee River, known for its wild gyrations, then he needs to check the weather before he starts. If early November is prone to heavy rains and floods, then his crossing scheme is not likely to work.

Hood isn't that type of commander. For example, one of the things he needs when he gets to the river is his bridge train. But back in October, Hood marched off to cross the river and forgot to order the pontoon bridge over the Coosa taken up and brought along. Beauregard had to do it for him after Hood left. This is what Lee meant when he said Hood was "careless off" the battlefield. Hood had a record for such carelessness, including an official reprimand after an inspection when he was a brigadier general, and Lee was well aware of it (having been Lt. Col. of the 2nd Cavalry while Hood served in it.)

But Forrest moved across country through those same rains, while Hood was unable to move. Forrest had a reputation as a nuts-and-bolts, detail-oriented commander. He gathers detailed intel before missions, sees to his supplies and horses, etc. Hood (like Wheeler) is much more the wing-and-a-prayer guy. And Hood is the one who excuses his difficulties by pointing to the weather.

Tim

 

[trice]

Once Again, Hood, had conversed personally with Beauregard and President Davisl. ALL Agreed that an invasion of Tn was a necessity.

This is commonly thought, but is not accurate. When Davis and Hood meet, the invasion of TN is brought up and discussed, but it is NOT the plan Davis approves. When the AoT pulls out on Sept. 29, the plan is to strike Sherman's LOC in north Ga (the RR line from Chattanooga to Atlanta).

That is where Hood goes, why he is tearing up RR track, and why we see the Battle of Allatoona on Oct.5.

AFTER that, Hood starts pushing a move across the Tennessee to strike at Sherman's LOC again (the RR from Chattanooga through Murfreesboro, according to Hood) Hood makes all the decisions from there on. Neither Beauregard nor Davis appears in on the details or all that enthusiastic about it.

There were two very obvious reasons for Hood to move West, first and most importantly it was part of his plan. Originally, the plan was to attack Sherman's supply line to the North, avoid a major battle and drawn him West, into the Forested Hills of Ga. where the smaller AoT might have a chance to defeat the Union Army, as opportunity presented itself, in the rough terrain.

Hood abandoned this somewhere after Allatoona (Oct 5) and before meeting Beauregard (Oct 9). No known reason, other than Hood says things are going so well that he should move to TN instead.

In preparation, Hood order Rail Line running from Ala. to Tuscumbia be repare to facilitate the rapid collection of needed supplies.

No, that is inaccurate. Hood had already given up the plan you described before he asked (he could not order, since it was outside his Department) for the RR to Tuscumbia to be put in order. Since the RR was in terrible shape and had been subjected to many Union raids, it was not in operation at that time. Forrest had put in a request for a bridge to be built and garrisoned there during the Summer; that wasn't acted on either.

Wheeler's cavalry had been detached to shadow Sherman's March (i.e.,escort the Union army to the sea)

No, here in October Wheeler is still under Hood's command. Beauregard insists on leaving most of Wheeler to watch Sherman -- and he had not even heard of Hood's plan to go to Tuscumbia at this point. Jackson's cavalry division will accompany Hood to Tuscumbia, while the rest of Wheeler's troops screen Hood's rear and watch Atlanta. Sherman does not leave Atlanta until the 14th-15th of November.

It is my understanding that Meanwhile, Forrest was to replace Wheeler, when he returned from his Middle Tn. Raid.

This is incorrect. Indications are that Beauregard and Hood did not know Forrest was on a raid into TN.

I understand that just after Johnsonville, the withdrawing Forrest, was contacted by courier to report to Hood, immediately, ...

No, the first message Forrest received about joining Hood was conditional. He got it Oct. 30, and was directed to finish up his current mission before moving to Hood. No "immediately" involved. Other otrders followed. By the 5th, Johnsonville and the Union gunboats were in flames and Forrest was on his way, attempting to cross the TN on the 6th (he was supposed to meet Hood over near Columbia, but Hood had not crossed).

... which he then did and as soon as he arrived Hood, began moving north, ...

Hood had been at Tuscumbia since Oct 31. Forrest arrived Nov. 14th; some 400 of his men under Rucker were already on the north side (stranded there after the crossing on the 6th) Hood did not move north until the 21st, a week after Forrest arrived.

...despite the fact that Hood's request for the repair of the rail line to Tuscumbia had been ignored.

We are talking about a Confederate RR in late 1864, one that has been worked over repeatedly by Union raiders and is not in active operation at all. Just how long do you think it will take to get the RR rolling again, and where will the needed equipment and rails come from?

Because in order to get the iron needed, Beauregard had issued orders on Oct.24 for the RR from Corinth (in Confederate hands) to Memphis (in Union hands) to be torn up and transported to open the other track.

Hood can issue all the "requests" he wants. If they are not firmly based in the realities the Confederate RR system faced, they are meaningless.

Secondly, Hood moved west trying to find fords to the storm swollen Tn River and ended up in Tuscumbia, because he was so anxious to cross the river and invade as soon as possible and was not willing to waste time waiting at any one spot, when one might be found if searched for hard enough.

So Hood ended up delaying his crossing more than a month by looking for a quick crossing?

That Hood was unlucky, had an almost impossible mission, badly served by his senior commanders at critical times during the campaign (and at Atlanta) and ultimately failed and ended up sacrificing his army is all true, but if those are the attributes of a army commander 'in over his head' then so were most southern generals; including Lee.

But Hood is largely the one defining the mission and creating his own bad luck. He is very bad at all the tasks that might have helped them, and earned every bit of what he got. Losing didn't make him a bad Army commander: being a bad army commander made him lose.

Tim

 

[EricJacobson]

Since we have kicked around whether Jefferson Davis really supported a movement into Tennessee from the very beginning (i.e. late Sept 1864), I thought I would add a little snippet from Richard Taylor's book Destruction and Reconstruction. I was aware of this passage when I wrote my book about Spring Hill and Franklin, but couldn't find a really good place to use it. Keep in mind this is obviously post-war, but Taylor is a pretty reliable fellow and it is clear even years after the fact he did not support Hood's movement into Tennessee. However, what is also abundantly clear is that ol' Jeff Davis was talking about Tennessee as the goal from the onset. Taylor advocated operating against Sherman and Davis was distressed to hear of Taylor's opinion against Tennessee. Anyway here are several lines:

"He began by saying that he had visited Hood and his army on his way to Montgomery, and was gratified to find officers and men in excellent spirits, not all despressed by recent disasters, and that he thought well of a movement north toward Nashville. I expressed surprise at his statement of the condition of Hood's army, as entirely opposed to the conclusions forced on me by all the evidence I could get, and warned him of the danger of listenting to narrators who were more disposed to tell what was agreeable than what was true. He readily admitted that persons in his position were exposed to this danger. Proceeding to discuss the movement toward Nashville, I thought it a serious matter to undertake a campaign into Tennessee in the autumn, with troops so badly equipped as were ours for the approaching winter."

Taylor, Destruction and Reconstruction, p. 204-204.

Also, remember that Taylor was Davis' brother-in-law so they could speak frankly to one another. They clearly disagreed and Taylor did not sugarcoat things to benefit Davis - he wrote plainly about what he recalled. Basically, he thought Hood's plan was flawed, but Davis not only supported the plan, but advocated it.

What is so fascinating about this, at least in my mind, is that Tim, for example, has put forth a couple of items that show Davis tried rather quickly to distance himself from the invasion of Tennessee he had initially supported. It reminds me of a meeting Hood had with former Tennessee governor Isham Harris in late Jan or early Feb 1865 in Richmond. Harris later recalled, to Campbell Brown, that he felt as if Hood had been a puppet in the hands of the Davis administration. Harris thought Hood's official report contained strong words against Joe Johnston which smelled like political jargon straight out of the Confederate White House.

Davis later trying to say he wanted Hood chasing Sherman rather than moving into Tennessee smells like buyer's remorse. Ultimately, Hood made his own bed. But as someone once said of Davis, "He is as cold as a serpent and ambitious as Lucifer." In the back of my mind I have often wondered if Hood wasn't doomed on all fronts. As army commander he was in over his head, although he tried his best, but was doomed to fail regardless. With Davis, he was going to get cut loose, and eventually did, at a moment's notice. Hood, to those who knew him best, was a decent and honest man. He got involved in a political and military game he could never win.

Eric

 

[EricJacobson]

Eric, a competent commander knows what to expect on such matters before he gives orders. On the weather he can easily guess wrong -- but he would find out what to expect before he started. That is why I asked what kind of weather there would be in north Alabama at that time, and that is why Hood should have asked long before he set his troops in motion for that spot.

If he is moving to cross the Tennessee River, known for its wild gyrations, then he needs to check the weather before he starts. If early November is prone to heavy rains and floods, then his crossing scheme is not likely to work.

Tim,

I really cannot believe you are serious about this. Army commanders checking weather ahead of time? Can you name one who actually checked the weather forecast or asked around for weather predictions or estimations? Did Lee check to see if it was going to be hot in Pennsylvania in July or was that obvious? Moreover, did Lee check the weather to see if the Potomac might be flooded during his advance and then double check to ensure it wouldn't be after he retreated from Gettysburg? How about Grant checking to see if it would hot AND humid in Mississippi in July? Grant must have thought, "What if it rains in Mississippi during the summer? What shall we do about the Mississippi River?" Maybe Rosecrans sent scouts out to see what kind of weather he might expect in Middle Tennessee in late December? Do you think Burnside asked around to see if the Virginia weather would allow him to get across the Rappahannock?

Your entire premise on this point is almost laughable. Again, your anti-Hood bias is showing.

 

[EricJacobson]

Eric,

I have no clue why you think a simple question from me as to what the normal weather might be is seen by you as an attack upon Hood. The only reason for the question is to see what Hood should have expected in his movement.

Tim

See your own response in the previous post - which is what I suspected. The entire premise of your question wasn't just about the weather. It was actually a question about whether Hood was "competent" or not. As I said, an attack.

 

[Elennsar]

There's two problems I can think of with calling Hood decent and honest.

1) Hood's Advance and Retreat blames everyone and everything else except him. This may not be surprising, but its not exactly a sign of exceptional integrity.

2) Hood seems to have talked bad about Johnston behind his back, to Davis. I'm not entirely familar with the ins and outs and how much of this was a plain-spoken my-commander-is-too-timid and how much this is trying to get his job.

Still, I wouldn't want to advance the claim that Hood was a liar without something to go on.



As to weather...Eric, you must be joking. If you're going to launch a major campaign in a given area, particularly one you've never campaigned in or are otherwise familar with (which describes Tennessee pretty well for Hood), particularly as the year heads towards winter...it would be common sense to have a good idea what kind of weather conditions to expect.

Regarding Lee and Burnside, both should have checked these things...Lee's failure to do so was not disasterous, but it was foolish. Burnside did suffer fairly seriously for ignoring this (the "Mud March" even more so.).

Basing a risky campaign on the premise that anything will go as you desire, and not making prepartions to cover the possibility of something deciding to bite you on the a** is classic military stupidity.

So either I'm missing some very subtle sarcasm or our ideas of what needs to be taken into consideration when planning a campaign are from entirely foreign perceptions.

 

[ole]

Gentlemen:

Might I suggest that y'all pull in the horns a bit? This is a fine discussion, but the heat is building.

Take a moment, reply tomorrow after you've had your coffee. Check out the sunrise. Maybe you can get the missus to run up a cruller or something. Think nice thoughts.

This is a discussion board; not a battlefield.

Think about me, for a change. It's a bit embarrassing to have to chide some of the finest minds I've ever run across. Can't we just agree to play a little tennis here? You hit it to me; I hit it back to you. You hit it back to me. Quite simple.

It is late and tomorrow I will get up grumpy. I'd very much like to see it continue as civilly as it has been (almost) so far.

Thank you.

ole