Hood's Plan -- Hood's Failure

[trice]

Hood never had any intention of crossing near Chattanooga. The first place he considers crossing is Guntersville, which is far from Chattanooga.

Eric

By road today, Gunter's Landing is 86 miles from Chattanooga. Florence is 172 miles by road today, on the short route north of the Tennessee River, and much further away if you follow the bend on the south side of the river Hood had to use.

A crossing at Gunter's Landing is designed to immediately threaten all of Sherman's lines of communication to Chattanooga and Atlanta. It makes sense as part of the supposed plan Hood had pitched to Davis and Beauregard to compel Sheman to come after him.

A crossing near Florence does not threaten to cut the LOC to Chattanooga until you get to either Nashville or Murfreesboro. It makes no sense as part of the supposed plan Hood had pitched to Davis and Beauregard to compel Sheman to come after him. Instead, it relieves any potential pressure on Sherman, allowing him the time to prepare for his March to the Sea -- and making Hood's army trivial.

In terms of what Hood said he was trying to do, Gunter's Landing is near Chattanooga; Florence is far away.

Tim

 

[trice]

Tim,

Let's be honest with each. Hood concluded Schofield was going to retreat....and he was right. The decision to attack can be debated, but Hood knew exactly what Schofield was up to as far as evacuating Franklin. Hood knew full well the Federals were going to try and slip away under cover of darkness unless he did something.

Eric

Yes, that is what Hood guessed, and that is what Schofield ended up doing. However, it is a guess by Hood. He did not know that was what Schofield was doing. Hood did not know full well that Schofield was going to slip away; he feared and assumed it.

This is like the mentions of Hood capturing a dispatch from Thomas that gives Schofield permission to retreat from Franklin. Perhaps Hood had received such before he ordered the 4 PM attack -- but the dispatches from Thomas also carry the clear implication that Thomas would like Schofield to delay Hood at Franklin and the Harpeth River as long as possible. Generals usually try to do what their commanding officer wants, so anyone reading that dispatch would have to think Schofield would be planning at least a delaying action on the river. But Hood, being Hood, seems to have blotted out what he didn't want to see.

At Noon and 3 PM, Schofield is replying to questions from Thomas about how long he can hold Hood on the Harpeth; at 3 PM, Schofield says he may be able to do it for a day -- and an hour later Hood attacks. So pretty clearly the opinion that the Federals are running for Nashville as fast as they can isn't exactly right.

Mind you, I think the last 3 days had un-nerved Schofield a bit. I think he probably would have started pulling back that night, and other indications are he was thinking of making a stand near Brentwood on December 1-2. But there is far too much in the way of assumptions that what "Hood knew" was in fact what was going on, IMHO.

Tim

 

[trice]

In my book about Spring Hill and Franklin I think it's pretty clear, while I tried to view Hood objectively up thru his decision to attack at Franklin, his decision to try again on the morning of December 1st is desperation, plain and simple. Moreover, he hauls his army up to Nashville. That said, and to address your point/question, if the Federal army stayed in Franklin I think what was left of the Army of Tennessee would have been chewed up. But the sides were pretty evenly matched, even after the losses on December 1st, and most of S. D. Lee Corps had not been engaged. However, one Federal officer in a letter written in 1870 said "the Battle of Nashville was fought at Franklin, Tennessee." Pretty interesting opinion.

While we should never under-estimate what "strong men armed" can do, Hood's position at sunrise on December 1 would have been horrendous. Seven of his nine infantry divisions are lying along the front line, pinned down under heavy fire, having suffered some 7,000 casualties during the assault. Fifteen Confederate generals and 53 of 100 regimental commanders are dead, dying, wounded, or captured. With the Sun up, the Federals will now be able to see what they are shooting at, so things won't get any better.

Resupplying the frontline units with ammo and water will be effectively impossible until Hood wins. There will be no effective communication or communication with them, no plausible planning for their effort. All they can do -- hopefully -- is to rise up and fight where they are.

S. D. Lee has two uncommitted divisions who escaped this horror. His combat record in major commands is enough to take your breath away if you are about to follow him into an assault. First you have the botched, raggedy assault on A. J. Smith at Harrisburg in July (with even Nathan Bedford Forrest looking bad). Then you have S. D. Lee dribbling unit after unit into a meat-grinder at Ezra Church outside Atlanta the same month against Howard. He might be a good soldier, but his record says he was a lousy offensive commander.

So what Hood's plan for December 1 at Franklin would be comes down to this:
1) the chewed up units already pinned down get up and attack again
2) the two uncommitted divisions are going to assault through the tangled units in front of them, over the same open fields, in broad daylight
3) the artillery Hood has now brought up is going to fire into this mess, probably slaughtering friend and foe alike.

If it had happened, the second day at Franklin might very easily have been worse for the Confederacy and the AoT than the first day. And the first day was an unmitigated disaster -- which is what that Union officer's comment is referring to.

I'm sure you won't agree with this, but what I think it tells us about John Bell Hood is what is tells us about many Southern troops in late 1864. They were willing to die, period. Hood had given up about 25% of his body so death wasn't something he shirked from. Pat Cleburne himself said in Oct. 1864, in a speech to his troops, that if the cause to which he believed in was doomed to fail, he hoped he should fall with it. Those are the words of man is willing to die. I'm sure he didn't think Nov. 30, 1864 was the day to do it, but he did. On foot, in front of his men, recklessly charging into the smoke.

Then you'll be surprised. I understand full well that veteran troops in a losing cause can feel that way. If Lee had given the word on the following April 9th, the men of Gordon and Longstreet and the rest would have fought like lions. Look at the difference: Lee had the understanding of war and the control of himself to pull back from that inferno. Hood would not see anything else but the plunge into the fire.

As to Cleburne: yes, he was willing to die in his cause. He had also just become engaged to be married, which implies he still had a hope for a future beyond the war. Note the discrepancy about Cleburne in Hood's unrealistic account of all this. Hood paints Cleburne as enthusiastic and eager to make this assault; the soldiers who knew him best paint Cleburne as determined to do his best, but despondent about the assault. That is Hood, seeing only what will fit with what he wants; that is Hood, blotting out what he doesn't want to know.

Tim

 

[EricJacobson]

By road today, Gunter's Landing is 86 miles from Chattanooga. Florence is 172 miles by road today, on the short route north of the Tennessee River, and much further away if you follow the bend on the south side of the river Hood had to use.

A crossing at Gunter's Landing is designed to immediately threaten all of Sherman's lines of communication to Chattanooga and Atlanta. It makes sense as part of the supposed plan Hood had pitched to Davis and Beauregard to compel Sheman to come after him.

A crossing near Florence does not threaten to cut the LOC to Chattanooga until you get to either Nashville or Murfreesboro. It makes no sense as part of the supposed plan Hood had pitched to Davis and Beauregard to compel Sheman to come after him. Instead, it relieves any potential pressure on Sherman, allowing him the time to prepare for his March to the Sea -- and making Hood's army trivial.

In terms of what Hood said he was trying to do, Gunter's Landing is near Chattanooga; Florence is far away.

Tim

Except Chattanooga was held by Federal troops and so he couldn't cross the river there. He didn't cross at Guntersville because Federal troops held it as well. Same with Decatur. Would it have been a wise idea to lose a few thousand men just trying to forcefully cross the river? Hood actually tried at Decatur, but realized the cost would be too high and instead continued moving west.

Not to be trite, but plans change in war. Hood's plan is not without serious flaws, but getting across the Tennessee was not an easy task. And again, Davis knew darn well in Sept. 1864 if Sherman wasn't going to play's Hood game that Hood was cutting to cut loose and race into Middle Tennessee.

Eric

 

[EricJacobson]

Yes, that is what Hood guessed, and that is what Schofield ended up doing. However, it is a guess by Hood. He did not know that was what Schofield was doing. Hood did not know full well that Schofield was going to slip away; he feared and assumed it.

Tim

Tim,

Using this train of thought, every general who makes a decision based on visual evaluation is making a "guess" unless he had something in writing from the enemy.

Eric

 

[EricJacobson]

Mind you, I think the last 3 days had un-nerved Schofield a bit. I think he probably would have started pulling back that night, and other indications are he was thinking of making a stand near Brentwood on December 1-2. But there is far too much in the way of assumptions that what "Hood knew" was in fact what was going on, IMHO.

Tim

Tim,

I'm going to come right out and say you are incorrect on this point. The evacuation to Nashville was set to begin at 6 p.m. Also, perhaps it might be too hard to admit that Hood judged/guessed correctly what Schofield was up to?

Eric

 

[trice]

Tim,

Using this train of thought, every general who makes a decision based on visual evaluation is making a "guess" unless he had something in writing from the enemy.

Eric

Absolutely. Even then, they are guessing. That is why people who say Hood "knew" what Schofield was doing are wrong. If Hood looks at one of those messages Thomas was sending, it would be very clear Thomas wanted Schofield to hold Hood on the Harpeth. On the morning of the 30th, Thomas was asking Schofield if he thought he could do it for three days.

So it is wrong to think that the only option has Schofield scampering for Nashville as fast as he could go. The observable movements might mean that -- or they might mean that Schofield was getting his non-combat units out of the way and preparing to fight a delaying action. Thomas' dispatch allowed for either, but implied Schofield should delay as long as possible before retreating. Only a foolish commander would insist there was only one possibility here. Yet everyone says "Hood knew" Schofield was retreating that day.

I would agree that Hood thought he "knew" what was happening. I regard that as just another example of what is wrong with Hood as an independent commander.

Tim

 

[EricJacobson]

While we should never under-estimate what "strong men armed" can do, Hood's position at sunrise on December 1 would have been horrendous. Seven of his nine infantry divisions are lying along the front line, pinned down under heavy fire, having suffered some 7,000 casualties during the assault. Fifteen Confederate generals and 53 of 100 regimental commanders are dead, dying, wounded, or captured. With the Sun up, the Federals will now be able to see what they are shooting at, so things won't get any better.

Resupplying the frontline units with ammo and water will be effectively impossible until Hood wins. There will be no effective communication or communication with them, no plausible planning for their effort. All they can do -- hopefully -- is to rise up and fight where they are.

S. D. Lee has two uncommitted divisions who escaped this horror. His combat record in major commands is enough to take your breath away if you are about to follow him into an assault. First you have the botched, raggedy assault on A. J. Smith at Harrisburg in July (with even Nathan Bedford Forrest looking bad). Then you have S. D. Lee dribbling unit after unit into a meat-grinder at Ezra Church outside Atlanta the same month against Howard. He might be a good soldier, but his record says he was a lousy offensive commander.

So what Hood's plan for December 1 at Franklin would be comes down to this:
1) the chewed up units already pinned down get up and attack again
2) the two uncommitted divisions are going to assault through the tangled units in front of them, over the same open fields, in broad daylight
3) the artillery Hood has now brought up is going to fire into this mess, probably slaughtering friend and foe alike.

If it had happened, the second day at Franklin might very easily have been worse for the Confederacy and the AoT than the first day. And the first day was an unmitigated disaster -- which is what that Union officer's comment is referring to.



Then you'll be surprised. I understand full well that veteran troops in a losing cause can feel that way. If Lee had given the word on the following April 9th, the men of Gordon and Longstreet and the rest would have fought like lions. Look at the difference: Lee had the understanding of war and the control of himself to pull back from that inferno. Hood would not see anything else but the plunge into the fire.

As to Cleburne: yes, he was willing to die in his cause. He had also just become engaged to be married, which implies he still had a hope for a future beyond the war. Note the discrepancy about Cleburne in Hood's unrealistic account of all this. Hood paints Cleburne as enthusiastic and eager to make this assault; the soldiers who knew him best paint Cleburne as determined to do his best, but despondent about the assault. That is Hood, seeing only what will fit with what he wants; that is Hood, blotting out what he doesn't want to know.

Tim

Tim,

You're preaching to the choir about Dec 1st. I think my book makes it pretty clear what position Hood was in by that stage and how poor his decision was to continue the offensive.

In my opinion, you are so wrong about Lee. Also, comparing Franklin to Appomattox is like apples to oranges. But in regards to Lee, how do you justify his decision to try and break out of Petersburg just days before Appomattox? At what cost? For what? To drag his limping army west and hope to get away? Did Lee have sudden clarity? Because just a week before he was sending men to the "slaughter" which is how you described Franklin.

Moreover, don't think I'm criticizing Lee's actions. I think he did what he thought best under the circumstances. Same with Hood. I'm criticizing, if you will, those who think from the distance of 140 years that everything could have been so different or better.

And how much did Lee really want to fight on April 9th? I'm sure you know the story that he was thinking about trying to punch through the enemy lines right until the end. The only reason he surrendered was quite literally because he was surrounded. That's not pulling back from the inferno - that's called no other options.

C'mon Tim. You know your stuff and I enjoy debating with you, but your anti-Hood bias is beginning to show.

You still have not answered my question from earlier. If you were Hood, what would you have done on November 30, 1864? Not being in Tennessee isn't an answer. What would you have done that afternoon at Franklin?

 

[5fish]

Lee and Hood

Lets look at is in a different way.

Hood pushed his army to the limit of its abilities by taking the fight to his foe in TN.. It may not have been a great plan and we are using hindsight but his job is to meet and defeat the enemy and he went and did his best. At Franklin it is all hindsight and all we see is thousands of dead and some of our favorite actors perish there and we know the war will be over in just four months. We see Franklin as a disaster because we know the outcome. Franklin was a Pyrrhic victory and nothing more. Hood and the army went out in a blast of glory with pride and honor that all must admire. If Hood had played it safe his army would have vanished as Lee's army did in the winter of 1865.

Lets look at Lee he allowed his army to stayed mired in the trenches around Petersburg. He did not try to take the initiative or try some audacious move to grab the initiative. His army just stayed mired in those trenches and slowly vanished over the winter of 1865.

While Hood's AoT went out in a blast of glory, Lee's AoNV went out on a Death March and surrender no glory just capitulation. Hood's army has a storied by sad end while Lee's fable army end's with a a sad whimper...


A few thoughts.............

 

[trice]

Except Chattanooga was held by Federal troops and so he couldn't cross the river there. He didn't cross at Guntersville because Federal troops held it as well. Same with Decatur. Would it have been a wise idea to lose a few thousand men just trying to forcefully cross the river? Hood actually tried at Decatur, but realized the cost would be too high and instead continued moving west.

Eric, if Hood was trying to take Chattanooga he would have stayed on the South side of the river. He would not have been attempting to cross the river. The point of crossing the river is to completely cut all communications and supply with Nashville.

All of Sherman's supplies came through Chattanooga. Virtually all of them came through Nashville by one of three routes to that city (RR from Louisville to Nashville, Cumberland River to Nashville, Tennessee River to Johnsonville to RR to Nashville). From Nashville to Chattanooga everything travelled by the two RRs through Murfreesborough and Franklin -- but the Union used them each as one-way tracks (Northbound and Southbound) to increase traffic. If Hood crosses at Gunter's Landing, he can cut the chokepoint where both of those RRs share the track -- and all of Sherman's supplies and LOC will be cut off.

By moving West, Hood gave this up. He surely could not have expected it to be easier to cross at, say, Decatur than it would have been at Gunter's Landing. When he gets to Florence, he has to take Nashville or Murfreesboro to accomplish the same thing.

Not to be trite, but plans change in war. Hood's plan is not without serious flaws, but getting across the Tennessee was not an easy task.

Big problem here. Hood's goal is not to get "across the Tennessee". Hood says he is trying to draw Sherman back from Atlanta and fight him to advantage. If his focus is on getting across the Tennessee instead, we have another point on which he fails as an Army commander.

What you're saying is that when things didn't go as he had planned, Hood lost sight of his goal and spent all his energy on the wrong thing. This led to Sherman marching across Georgia unopposed, and Hood getting his army nearly destroyed in a meaningless campaign. Again, that's why Hood was in over his head as an Army commander.

And again, Davis knew darn well in Sept. 1864 if Sherman wasn't going to play's Hood game that Hood was cutting to cut loose and race into Middle Tennessee.

I doubt that is completely true. Virtually no one on either side thought Sherman would do what he did. Hood, Davis, and Beauregard all thought Sherman would have to react to the threat to his communications, one way or another, by going after Hood. They "knew" it. Granted, they were all wrong -- but that's what they thought.

Beauregard and Hood seem to keep thinking this way up until they get the news that Sherman has left Atlanta for Savannah. Beauregard then realizes this is all useless; Davis agrees. The only reason Beauregard lets Hood go into TN is that he realizes that he can't control Hood, and that Hood's Army is so far out of the ppicture as to be useless against Sherman.

Tim

 

[trice]

Tim,

I'm going to come right out and say you are incorrect on this point. The evacuation to Nashville was set to begin at 6 p.m. Also, perhaps it might be too hard to admit that Hood judged/guessed correctly what Schofield was up to?

Eric

Here is an exchange of messages between Thomas and Nashville and Schofield in Franklin that day.
=====
NASHVILLE, November 30, 1864--10.25 a.m.
Major-General SCHOFIELD,
Franklin:
Your dispatches of 5.30, 5.50, and Wilson's dispatch, forwarded to you, have been received. It will take Smith quite all day to disembark, but if I find there is no immediate necessity to retain him here, will send him to Franklin or Brentwood, according to circumstances. If you can prevent Hood from turning your position at Franklin, it should be held; but I do not wish you to risk too much. I send you a map of the environs of Franklin.
GEO. H. THOMAS,
Major-General, U.S. Volunteers, Commanding.
-----
FRANKLIN, November 30, 1864--11 a.m.
Major-General THOMAS:
Troops and trains in all right.
J. M. SCHOFIELD,
Major-General.
-----
FRANKLIN, November 30, 1864--12 m.
Major-General THOMAS.
Nashville :
Your dispatch of 10.25 a.m. is received. I am satisfied that I have heretofore run too much risk in trying to hold Hood in check; while so far inferior to him in both infantry and cavalry. The slightest mistake on my part, or failure of a subordinate, during the last three days might have proved disastrous. I don't want to get into so tight a place again; yet, I will cheerfully act in accordance with your views of expediency, if you think it important to hold Hood back, as long as possible. When you get all your troops together and the cavalry in effective condition, we can whip Hood easily, and, I believe, make the campaign a decisive one; before that, the most we can do is to husband our strength and increase it as much as possible. I fear the troops which were stationed on the river below Columbia will be lost. I will get my trains out of the way as soon as possible, and watch Hood carefully. Possibly I may be able to hold him here, but do not expect to be able to do so long.
J. M. SCHOFIELD,
Major-General.
-----
NASHVILLE, November 30, 1864.
Major-General SCHOFIELD,
Franklin:
General Smith reported to me this morning that one division of his troops is still behind. We must therefore try to hold Hood where he now is until those troops can get up, and the steamers return; after that we will concentrate here, reorganize our cavalry, and try Hood again. Do you think you can hold Hood at Franklin for three days longer? Answer, giving your views, and I should like to know what Wilson thinks he can do to aid you in holding Hood.
GEO. H. THOMAS,
Major-General, U. S. Volunteers, Commanding.
-----
FRANKLIN, November 30, 1864--3 p.m.
Major-General THOMAS,
Nashville:
I have just received your dispatch asking whether I can hold Hood here three days. I do not believe I can. I can doubtless hold him one day, but will hazard something in doing that. He now has a large force, probably two corps, in my front, and seems prepared(*) to cross the river above and below. I think he can effect a crossing to-morrow, in spite of all my efforts, and probably to-night, if he attempts it. A worse position than this for an inferior force could hardly be found. I will refer your question to General Wilson this evening; I think he can do very little. I have no doubt Forrest will be in my rear to-morrow, or doing some greater mischief. It appears to me that I ought to take position at Brentwood at once. If A. J. Smith's division and the Murfreesborough garrison join me there, I ought to be able to hold Hood in check for some time. I have just learned that the enemy's cavalry is already crossing three miles below.(*) I will have lively times with my trains again.
J. M. SCHOFIELD,
Major-General.
[Note: the copy at Thomas' end reads slightly different, that Hood's cavalry is preparing to cross above instead of already across below.)
=====

Now Hood's attack begins at 4 PM. At 3 PM, Schofield is still telling Thomas he might be able to hold Hood along the river for some time. ("I can doubtless hold him one day, but will hazard something in doing that."). Hood cannot know about this message when he makes his decision.

So explain how Hood "knew" what Schofield was doing when he issued orders for an attack that began at 4 PM. Even Schofield doesn't know for sure he's pulling out until after 3 PM. I would agree that Schofield wanted to go back and probably would have gone back; I agree that Thomas responded to Schofield's 3 PM message with an authorization to withdraw. But how does Hood know that?

Tim

 

[OpnDownfall]

Hood's Plan--Hood's Failure

What exactly, was Lee's reaction to the gloomy and pessimistic (one might even call defeatest) protestations of his most experienced and best corps commander at Gettysburg and what was the result of Lee's decision, concerning those protestations?
How confident were the commanders of the troops involved in attacking the center of the Union Line? It would seem that only Pickett, the unblooded, untried divisional commander, was really confident.
Everything pointed to Schofield's retreating to Nashville as fast as he could. It is unlikely that Lee in the same circumstances would Not have reached the same conclusion as Hood. If he believed that Schofield would be gone during the night and in Nashville by morning., what logically can one infer from Lee's past performances that would lead to the conclusion that he would not attack as soon as possible and concentrate on and crack the union line when Hood in fact did?
That he would most likely have failed as Hood did, would prove what exactly, after all Lee's record and he did it Malvern Hill (and failed) And Gettysburg (and failed).
Both of Lee's failed attempts were based on the same strategic rationale as hood's at Franklin.
Where is the evidence that Hood was 'in over his head' as a army commander, except for losing.
Again; It has not been even closely established that Lee would have done anything significantly different or would have been any more successful than Hood, under the exact, same circumstances.

 

[EricJacobson]

All of Sherman's supplies came through Chattanooga. Virtually all of them came through Nashville by one of three routes to that city (RR from Louisville to Nashville, Cumberland River to Nashville, Tennessee River to Johnsonville to RR to Nashville). From Nashville to Chattanooga everything travelled by the two RRs through Murfreesborough and Franklin -- but the Union used them each as one-way tracks (Northbound and Southbound) to increase traffic. If Hood crosses at Gunter's Landing, he can cut the chokepoint where both of those RRs share the track -- and all of Sherman's supplies and LOC will be cut off.

One problem with this. The railroad which ran thru Franklin had nothing to do with the one which ran from Nashville to Chattanooga. The railroad thru Franklin connected Nashville and Decatur, AL.

That said, Hood did want to cross at Gunter's. The problem is he couldn't, or didn't think it was feasible.

Eric

 

[EricJacobson]

Big problem here. Hood's goal is not to get "across the Tennessee". Hood says he is trying to draw Sherman back from Atlanta and fight him to advantage. If his focus is on getting across the Tennessee instead, we have another point on which he fails as an Army commander.

What you're saying is that when things didn't go as he had planned, Hood lost sight of his goal and spent all his energy on the wrong thing. This led to Sherman marching across Georgia unopposed, and Hood getting his army nearly destroyed in a meaningless campaign. Again, that's why Hood was in over his head as an Army commander.

Tim,

I think it's clear that Hood initially wanted to draw Sherman out, but that effort failed. It is at that point Hood opted to push into the heart of Tennessee. This is again where Davis' later claims fall short. Evidence is that Davis knew if the initial plan did not work, Hood was going to switch gears and head toward Nashville. One big problem with all of this, however, is Beauregard. Davis never gives him any real authority and Hood doesn't pay much attention to Beauregard. That doesn't speak well for either Davis or Hood.

Eric

Eric

 

[trice]

Tim,

You're preaching to the choir about Dec 1st. I think my book makes it pretty clear what position Hood was in by that stage and how poor his decision was to continue the offensive.

Good.

In my opinion, you are so wrong about Lee. Also, comparing Franklin to Appomattox is like apples to oranges. But in regards to Lee, how do you justify his decision to try and break out of Petersburg just days before Appomattox? At what cost? For what? To drag his limping army west and hope to get away? Did Lee have sudden clarity? Because just a week before he was sending men to the "slaughter" which is how you described Franklin.

At Richmond-Petersburg, Lee really has no choice. He is in the immediate presence of his Commander-in-Chief. He can ask Davis if he wants to surrender, but Lee himself would be wrong to surrender the Army then without permission. At best, if he truly felt it was the end and Davis would not surrender, he should have resigned. That may sound silly; it is the way soldiers do things. Anything else on Lee's part would be dishonorable.

By the time they get to Appomattox, all that's changed. Whatever faint hope there might have been imagined of getting to NC and joining with Johnston to prolong resistance is over. In military terms, Lee should fight on until resistance can no longer be justified as helping the rest of the Confederacy, to the point where the cost outweighs the benefit. He is also no longer in direct contact with Davis, and so entitled to decide for himself to surrender his army.

Again, it may seem silly; it is how the military does things. Even on the road to Appomattox we have that Lee-Longstreet moment ("Not yet.")

Moreover, don't think I'm criticizing Lee's actions. I think he did what he thought best under the circumstances. Same with Hood. I'm criticizing, if you will, those who think from the distance of 140 years that everything could have been so different or better.

And how much did Lee really want to fight on April 9th? I'm sure you know the story that he was thinking about trying to punch through the enemy lines right until the end. The only reason he surrendered was quite literally because he was surrounded. That's not pulling back from the inferno - that's called no other options.

C'mon Tim. You know your stuff and I enjoy debating with you, but your anti-Hood bias is beginning to show.

I am biased against Hood because Hood failed as an Army commander. I see no evidence that he was ever better than an average Corps commander. I think he was an exceptional division and brigade commander. Unfortunately, determining in advance who will make a good independent commander and who will not is a form of black magic. No one has ever been able to do it with confidence. Many men who seem perfect fail. Many men who seem unlikely to succeed do wonderfully.

Thus we have McClellan and Rosecrans and Buell, all thought to be great men who didn't quite prove out. Thus we have Grant and Sherman, thought to be failures, ending as great men. It has always been so.

By the same standards, I think Pat Cleburne was an excellent brigade and division leader, but I am unclear as to whether or not he'd make a good Corps or Army commander. It seems likely he would -- but Hardee wasn't all that eager to see him promoted and we never got the opportunity to find out what Cleburne would have done. The difference is that we see Hood producing an unremarkable record as a Corps commander, and a lousy one at Army command.

Or take Rosecrans. Personally, I think he had the ability in him to be the greatest army commander of the war. Unfortunately, I also think Rosecrans had fatal flaws that caused him to fail, like some hero in a Greek tragedy. I doubt he would have gotten as far as he did without Thomas to steady him.

You still have not answered my question from earlier. If you were Hood, what would you have done on November 30, 1864? Not being in Tennessee isn't an answer. What would you have done that afternoon at Franklin?

Actually, not being in Tennessee was a very viable answer. Hood just refused to take it, and I fault him for it.

If you are saying that I am somehow dropped out of the sky at 3 PM on November 30 and must make an immediate decision, then I do not believe I would have attacked. I would have given much more credence to Forrest's plan, and tried to get across the river above Franklin.

That might or might not have worked well. Even if successful, what this means is that there will be no major battle until December 1 -- and then it will probably be on the way to Brentwood or at that place. It isn't a very good option, but it is better than what happened. At least the fighting will be in the open field, with no established fortifications, if we can bring Schofield to bay there.

As I said, if I had been in command all along, we would not be in Tennessee in the first place. That decision by Hood is foolhardy and always was.

At the same time, if you drop me out of the sky about 3 PM on November 29 at Spring Hill, I'll gladly cut the road and Schofield's army will be toast. Then we won't have to worry about Franklin. It becomes a question whether or not Thomas will be ordered to hold Nashville or not.

And if you drop me in when the AoT is below Columbia, I doubt I'll decide to make the bold move Hood did to Spring Hill. I very much doubt I could move the troops as rapidly as he did over those roads (he was good at that), and the Forrest maneuver against Wilson is a gem. If I am in charge there, we'll never get close to Nashville.

But essentially, I regard the entire campaign of Hood as unsound, starting back somewhere around when he started pushing for Decatur. The further along it goes, the more fantastic the concept becomes. Sherman's march makes everything Hood does dreck.

Tim

 

[EricJacobson]

Here is an exchange of messages between Thomas and Nashville and Schofield in Franklin that day.
=====
NASHVILLE, November 30, 1864--10.25 a.m.
Major-General SCHOFIELD,
Franklin:
Your dispatches of 5.30, 5.50, and Wilson's dispatch, forwarded to you, have been received. It will take Smith quite all day to disembark, but if I find there is no immediate necessity to retain him here, will send him to Franklin or Brentwood, according to circumstances. If you can prevent Hood from turning your position at Franklin, it should be held; but I do not wish you to risk too much. I send you a map of the environs of Franklin.
GEO. H. THOMAS,
Major-General, U.S. Volunteers, Commanding.
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FRANKLIN, November 30, 1864--11 a.m.
Major-General THOMAS:
Troops and trains in all right.
J. M. SCHOFIELD,
Major-General.
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FRANKLIN, November 30, 1864--12 m.
Major-General THOMAS.
Nashville :
Your dispatch of 10.25 a.m. is received. I am satisfied that I have heretofore run too much risk in trying to hold Hood in check; while so far inferior to him in both infantry and cavalry. The slightest mistake on my part, or failure of a subordinate, during the last three days might have proved disastrous. I don't want to get into so tight a place again; yet, I will cheerfully act in accordance with your views of expediency, if you think it important to hold Hood back, as long as possible. When you get all your troops together and the cavalry in effective condition, we can whip Hood easily, and, I believe, make the campaign a decisive one; before that, the most we can do is to husband our strength and increase it as much as possible. I fear the troops which were stationed on the river below Columbia will be lost. I will get my trains out of the way as soon as possible, and watch Hood carefully. Possibly I may be able to hold him here, but do not expect to be able to do so long.
J. M. SCHOFIELD,
Major-General.
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NASHVILLE, November 30, 1864.
Major-General SCHOFIELD,
Franklin:
General Smith reported to me this morning that one division of his troops is still behind. We must therefore try to hold Hood where he now is until those troops can get up, and the steamers return; after that we will concentrate here, reorganize our cavalry, and try Hood again. Do you think you can hold Hood at Franklin for three days longer? Answer, giving your views, and I should like to know what Wilson thinks he can do to aid you in holding Hood.
GEO. H. THOMAS,
Major-General, U. S. Volunteers, Commanding.
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FRANKLIN, November 30, 1864--3 p.m.
Major-General THOMAS,
Nashville:
I have just received your dispatch asking whether I can hold Hood here three days. I do not believe I can. I can doubtless hold him one day, but will hazard something in doing that. He now has a large force, probably two corps, in my front, and seems prepared(*) to cross the river above and below. I think he can effect a crossing to-morrow, in spite of all my efforts, and probably to-night, if he attempts it. A worse position than this for an inferior force could hardly be found. I will refer your question to General Wilson this evening; I think he can do very little. I have no doubt Forrest will be in my rear to-morrow, or doing some greater mischief. It appears to me that I ought to take position at Brentwood at once. If A. J. Smith's division and the Murfreesborough garrison join me there, I ought to be able to hold Hood in check for some time. I have just learned that the enemy's cavalry is already crossing three miles below.(*) I will have lively times with my trains again.
J. M. SCHOFIELD,
Major-General.
[Note: the copy at Thomas' end reads slightly different, that Hood's cavalry is preparing to cross above instead of already across below.)
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Now Hood's attack begins at 4 PM. At 3 PM, Schofield is still telling Thomas he might be able to hold Hood along the river for some time. ("I can doubtless hold him one day, but will hazard something in doing that."). Hood cannot know about this message when he makes his decision.

So explain how Hood "knew" what Schofield was doing when he issued orders for an attack that began at 4 PM. Even Schofield doesn't know for sure he's pulling out until after 3 PM. I would agree that Schofield wanted to go back and probably would have gone back; I agree that Thomas responded to Schofield's 3 PM message with an authorization to withdraw. But how does Hood know that?

Tim

Tim,

These dispatches were covered in my book. You are correct that Hood did not know about the dispatches. But tell me - was Hood right or wrong about Schofield's decision to withdraw at dark? We can get bogged down in semantics regarding the word "know," but did Hood correctly infer Schofield's intent? I know he did and I think you do, too. So, what option did Hood have knowing/believing/inferring that Schofield was going to scuttle across the Harpeth River and bolt to Nashville?

Ultimately, this is what Franklin boils down to, at least in my mind. Hood is faced with daylight running out, Schofield's flanks are pretty secure, and the Federals are going to evacuate. You do nothing and the entire campaign is a failure. You launch a desperate frontal assault and the campaign may end in failure. As commander of an army representing a fledging country which is dying, what do you do?

I know this much for sure. I would NEVER want to be John Bell Hood on November 30, 1864.

Eric

 

[EricJacobson]

Actually, not being in Tennessee was a very viable answer. Hood just refused to take it, and I fault him for it.

If you are saying that I am somehow dropped out of the sky at 3 PM on November 30 and must make an immediate decision, then I do not believe I would have attacked. I would have given much more credence to Forrest's plan, and tried to get across the river above Franklin.

That might or might not have worked well. Even if successful, what this means is that there will be no major battle until December 1 -- and then it will probably be on the way to Brentwood or at that place. It isn't a very good option, but it is better than what happened. At least the fighting will be in the open field, with no established fortifications, if we can bring Schofield to bay there.

As I said, if I had been in command all along, we would not be in Tennessee in the first place. That decision by Hood is foolhardy and always was.

At the same time, if you drop me out of the sky about 3 PM on November 29 at Spring Hill, I'll gladly cut the road and Schofield's army will be toast. Then we won't have to worry about Franklin. It becomes a question whether or not Thomas will be ordered to hold Nashville or not.

And if you drop me in when the AoT is below Columbia, I doubt I'll decide to make the bold move Hood did to Spring Hill. I very much doubt I could move the troops as rapidly as he did over those roads (he was good at that), and the Forrest maneuver against Wilson is a gem. If I am in charge there, we'll never get close to Nashville.

But essentially, I regard the entire campaign of Hood as unsound, starting back somewhere around when he started pushing for Decatur. The further along it goes, the more fantastic the concept becomes. Sherman's march makes everything Hood does dreck.

Tim

Tim,

As the old saying goes, we'll have to agree to disagree. No doubt Hood could done things differently and maybe things would have ended differently.

Thanks for the exchange.

Eric

 

[trice]

One problem with this. The railroad which ran thru Franklin had nothing to do with the one which ran from Nashville to Chattanooga. The railroad thru Franklin connected Nashville and Decatur, AL.

Incorrect. This RR connects Nashville to Chattanooga along the route Nashville-Franklin-Spring Hill-Columbia-Pulaski-Athens-Decatur-Hunstville-Stevenson-Bridgeport-Chattanooga. It is a longer route, more exposed to Confederate raids from MS and AL, and one Forrest thoroughly ripped up in September (six weeks to repair). The USMRR used it for trains returning from Sherman's Army (Northbound traffic) to free the Nashville-Murfreesboro-Wartrace-Tullahoma-Cowan-Stevenson section for the heavier southbound trains carrying Sherman's supplies.

Both routes use the same track from Stevenson to Bridgeport to Chattanooga. Cut the RR there, and all of Sherman's suppplies are cut off (except for what he had in depots below there, or could forage on the countryside). Supplies include bullets, and at one point in the Atlanta Campaign Sherman had been using 200,000 rounds of small arms ammo/day.

If Hood crosses at Gunter's Landing, he is 43 miles from this crucial RR at Stevenson. That's two days hard march for fast-moving infantry; one day for cavalry. That is the point of crossing at Gunter's Landing -- and every step Hood takes West from there makes the threat to the Sherman LOC weaker and less believable.

That said, Hood did want to cross at Gunter's. The problem is he couldn't, or didn't think it was feasible.

Yes, it is true that he decided to change his plan. But I know of no person who can clearly say what caused him to make that decision. It was certainly risky, but there was no force there that could stand up to Hood's Army -- and the force in the fortifications at Decatur was stronger.

As to what Hood is doing wandering about, here's what a very frustrated Beauregard had to say:
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In pursuance of orders I repaired to the headquarters of General Hood, at Cave Spring, Ga., on or about the 9th of October, and there conferred with him in regard to his future movements. General Hood is, therefore, in error in saying that I joined the army at Gadsden, Ala. Being at the time unprovided with my staff and horses, and desirous also to confer with Lieutenant-General Taylor, I hastened thence to Jacksonville, Ala., which had then become the new base of operations, intending to return in the event a battle should become probable.

On the 19th of October, supposing that General Hood was near Alpine or Summerville, Ga., I proceeded to rejoin the Army of Tennessee. In the meantime, however, he had commenced his movement toward Middle Tennessee without advising me, and had marched as far as Gadsden--a fact which I ascertained at Round Mountain IronWorks (in advance of Center)--when, retracing my steps, I joined him on the 21st of October.
In an interview with General Hood he informed me that he was then en route to Middle Tennessee, via Gunter's Landing, on the Tennessee River. At Gadsden I had conferences during two days with him in relation to the future operations of the army, in the course of which he stated that his general plan had been submitted to and approved by General Bragg, then commanding the Armies of the Confederate States. In view of existing condition of affairs the movement then in progress met my approval also, for reasons, some of which are as follows:

First. General Hood alleged that Sherman was short of provisions and forage at Atlanta, while his wheel transportation was in wretched condition.

Second. That the destruction of the railroad near Marietta and Dalton by our forces had been so thorough it would require at least five or six weeks to repair it, during which the Army of Tennessee could be thrown into Middle Tennessee, via Gunter's Landing, distance about forty miles from Gadsden, and destroy the railroad bridges at Bridgeport and across the Elk and Duck Rivers before Sherman could finish the repairs of the road below Chattanooga, thus forcing him to return to Tennessee to protect his communications and obtain supplies.

To add to the chances of success I remained two days at Gadsden after the departure of the army, to issue the necessary orders to secure railroad communications in Mississippi and Middle Alabama for the transportation of supplies, and to direct Major-General Forrest, who was then operating in West Tennessee, to report to General Hood with his command.

While en route to Gunter's Landing I learned, casually and to my surprise, that the line of march of our forces had been changed to one in the direction of Decatur, at which point I overtook it, and where the enemy was found strongly intrenched. As it was impossible to effect a crossing without great and unnecessary sacrifice of life, it was now judged proper by General Hood to attempt a passage, first, at Lamb's Ferry, that failing, then at Bainbridge, or, finally, at Tuscumbia, which had become our base of supplies. He determined, however, soon after leaving Decatur, to undertake the passage of the river at the latter point, which he reached on the 30th of October. There and at Florence, on the opposite or north bank of the Tennessee, he remained until the 21st of November.
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Hood abandons this entire plan and spends six weeks out of touch with Sherman and his forces -- which is why Sherman has the leisure to prepare for his March to the Sea. Hood is also completely wrong about the damage he has inflicted on the RR at the start. If you study Hood's actions and decisions, you'll find they are constantly made for bad reasons and lead to further problems down the line.

Tim

 

[trice]

I think it's clear that Hood initially wanted to draw Sherman out, but that effort failed. It is at that point Hood opted to push into the heart of Tennessee.

Hmm, I don't think so. Beauregard, Hood, and Davis all seem to be thinking they are going to bring Sherman back to TN up until the moment they receive word that Sherman has left Atlanta on his way to Savannah. In the case of Hood and Beauregard, this is November 20.

How that can be is hard to understand. Partly it has to do with Hood and Beauregard being where communications stink. Partly it has to do with Wheeler falling down on the job, as he frequently did. Partly it has to do with an unrealistic appraisal of the situation.

This is again where Davis' later claims fall short. Evidence is that Davis knew if the initial plan did not work, Hood was going to switch gears and head toward Nashville. One big problem with all of this, however, is Beauregard. Davis never gives him any real authority and Hood doesn't pay much attention to Beauregard. That doesn't speak well for either Davis or Hood.

Officially, Davis gives Beauregard complete control. Anytime Beauregard wants, he can exercise control of Hood simply by being with Hood's Army.

Beauregard, Hood, and Davis are playing a dishonest game, of course. Beauregard figures it out: Hood has the President's ear. But a different man would have acted differently than Beauregard. A Napoleon, a Grant, maybe Lee, would have decided to accompany Hood and stop this nonsense as much as he could. Beauregard did not -- just as Joe Johnston never used his power over Bragg or Pemberton in 1863.

Tim

 

[trice]

These dispatches were covered in my book. You are correct that Hood did not know about the dispatches.

I'm glad we agree. Hood did not "know" Schofield was going to retreat at 6 Pm because Schofield didn't know it either when Hood was deciding to attack.

But tell me - was Hood right or wrong about Schofield's decision to withdraw at dark? We can get bogged down in semantics regarding the word "know," but did Hood correctly infer Schofield's intent? I know he did and I think you do, too.

At the point you are talking of, Schofield and Thomas are discussing the matter by telegraph. Whatever Schofield might or might not want to do, he is a soldier in immediate contact with his commander, who clearly wishes Schofield will say he can hold the line for 1-3 days. This discussion continues until after 3 PM.

The belief that Schofield had already decided to retreat when Hood decides to attack is clearly wrong. He does not receive word from Thomas that he can do that until Thomas responds to his 3 PM message.

If Hood is making his decision based on what you are saying, he has made it prematurely. Hood's attack is not based on Schofield's actions. It is based on a guess about what Schofield would do.

If you want to understand why this is important, then you need to look at Forrest's idea. If Schofield is going to try to hold the line of the Harpeth a bit, the proper plan is to outflank him and trap him against the Harpeth -- not to launch a bloody, near-suicidal frontal assault. All this "Hood knew" stuff is designed to say there was only one possible choice, when there was more than one.

So, what option did Hood have knowing/believing/inferring that Schofield was going to scuttle across the Harpeth River and bolt to Nashville?

See above. All choices carry risk, but the odds of Forrest forcing a crossing are (IMHO) better than those of a successful assault. Whether or not Hood and his men can do something worthwhile on Dec. 1 if they cross is another risk. I don't think any of these risks are really worthwhile in the first place, which is why I wouldn't be in TN. That doesn't mean Hood chose the right one, or did it for good reasons.

Ultimately, this is what Franklin boils down to, at least in my mind. Hood is faced with daylight running out, Schofield's flanks are pretty secure, and the Federals are going to evacuate. You do nothing and the entire campaign is a failure. You launch a desperate frontal assault and the campaign may end in failure. As commander of an army representing a fledging country which is dying, what do you do?

See above. Hood was a rock-head on some things. His first success of the war, the one that made him a hero, comes in leading a frontal assault on a fortified position. I think that is where the nonsense of his belief in the "Lee and Jackson School", expressed in his memoir, came from. Hood was one of those who believed the experience of fighting defensively from entrenchments showed the troops accurately how strong they were, and so should be avoided. In effect, he says, you should keep your troops dumb so they'll charge the entrenchments.

I know this much for sure. I would NEVER want to be John Bell Hood on November 30, 1864.

Neither would I. But Hood was there because Hood had driven himself and his Army there. His choices led to this decision; his admirers seem to want to absolve him of his responsibilities.

Tim