William F. Smith on Shiloh

[SeanMichaelChick]

I just read William F. Smith's account of Shiloh with his analysis. It is divided into three articles and is mostly about Union operations, but with some good notes on the Confederates.

Smith, William Farrar. "Shiloh." Magazine of American History 15, (January-June 1886): 292-304.

Smith, William Farrar. "Shiloh, The First Day's Battle, April 6." Magazine of American History 15, (January-June 1886): 382-390.

Smith, William Farrar. "Shiloh, The Second Day's Battle, April 7." Magazine of American History 15, (January-June 1886): 470-482.

Smith is a character I have run into a lot in my research. I find him shrewd at analysis. His record was spotty, but it was because he was a difficult subordinate. He ended up actively undermining Ambrose Burnside, William Rosecrans, Benjamin Butler, and George Meade. Ulysses S. Grant ended up removing him and regretting that he ever took a liking to him. However, his temperament was well suited to analysis I found his take on Shiloh among the best I have read, if perhaps too hard on Grant (no surprise given their falling out) and too nice to Don Carlos Buell (but closer to the mark than most modern scholarship). Smith gets extra points for crafting the best narrative of the Union's operations on April 7 until Timothy B. Smith.

Read them for yourself: https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015031936480&seq=7

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

I just read William F. Smith's account of Shiloh with his analysis.

I'm curious what prompted Baldy Smith to write a three-part analysis of Shiloh in the first place since his only service in the Western Theater was Oct 1863 to Mar 1864 in the Department of the Cumberland. Did he write about many other battles he didn't participate in?

 

[Belfoured]

I just read William F. Smith's account of Shiloh with his analysis. It is divided into three articles and is mostly about Union operations, but with some good notes on the Confederates.

Smith, William Farrar. "Shiloh." Magazine of American History 15, (January-June 1886): 292-304.

Smith, William Farrar. "Shiloh, The First Day's Battle, April 6." Magazine of American History 15, (January-June 1886): 382-390.

Smith, William Farrar. "Shiloh, The Second Day's Battle, April 7." Magazine of American History 15, (January-June 1886): 470-482.

Smith is a character I have run into a lot in my research. I find him shrewd at analysis. His record was spotty, but it was because he was a difficult subordinate. He ended up actively undermining Ambrose Burnside, William Rosecrans, Benjamin Butler, and George Meade. Ulysses S. Grant ended up removing him and regretting that he ever took a liking to him. However, his temperament was well suited to analysis I found his take on Shiloh among the best I have read, if perhaps too hard on Grant (no surprise given their falling out) and too nice to Don Carlos Buell (but closer to the mark than most modern scholarship). Smith gets extra points for crafting the best narrative of the Union's operations on April 7 until Timothy B. Smith.

Read them for yourself: https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015031936480&seq=7

Good finds.

As you touch on, anything written by Baldy about Grant after June 1864 needs to be taken with a large dose of salt - especially when he's writing about events he played no part in. It's similar to Lew Wallace's fiction about warning Grant on April 4 - which began to emerge at a speech by Wallace in 1886. Baldy's articles also surfaced after Grant was gone.

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

I just read William F. Smith's account of Shiloh with his analysis. It is divided into three articles and is mostly about Union operations, but with some good notes on the Confederates.

Smith, William Farrar. "Shiloh." Magazine of American History 15, (January-June 1886): 292-304.

Smith, William Farrar. "Shiloh, The First Day's Battle, April 6." Magazine of American History 15, (January-June 1886): 382-390.

Smith, William Farrar. "Shiloh, The Second Day's Battle, April 7." Magazine of American History 15, (January-June 1886): 470-482.

Smith is a character I have run into a lot in my research. I find him shrewd at analysis. His record was spotty, but it was because he was a difficult subordinate. He ended up actively undermining Ambrose Burnside, William Rosecrans, Benjamin Butler, and George Meade. Ulysses S. Grant ended up removing him and regretting that he ever took a liking to him. However, his temperament was well suited to analysis I found his take on Shiloh among the best I have read, if perhaps too hard on Grant (no surprise given their falling out) and too nice to Don Carlos Buell (but closer to the mark than most modern scholarship). Smith gets extra points for crafting the best narrative of the Union's operations on April 7 until Timothy B. Smith.

Read them for yourself: https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015031936480&seq=7

I'm surprised to hear of Baldy Smith as a good analyst. Haven't read the Shiloh articles yet, but thanks for the link.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

I'm surprised to hear of Baldy Smith as a good analyst.

He was a first-rate engineer so it seems plausible, when he doesn't let his prejudices and personal conflicts get in the way.

 

[SeanMichaelChick]

I'm curious what prompted Baldy Smith to write a three-part analysis of Shiloh in the first place since his only service in the Western Theater was Oct 1863 to Mar 1864 in the Department of the Cumberland. Did he write about many other battles he didn't participate in?

Not to my knowledge which is why I was intrigued by this.

Smith's analysis of why the Bermuda Hundred campaign failed is very good but misses the part he played in that. Which is classic Smith.

 

[SeanMichaelChick]

Good finds.

As you touch on, anything written by Baldy about Grant after June 1864 needs to be taken with a large dose of salt - especially when he's writing about events he played no part in. It's similar to Lew Wallace's fiction about warning Grant on April 4 - which began to emerge at a speech by Wallace in 1886. Baldy's articles also surfaced after Grant was gone.

Agreed, and it is the same reason I take "a large dose of salt" with what John Rawlins wrote about Lew Wallace at Shiloh. However, I am still going to consider what Rawlins wrote. Smith shows an excellent command of the terrain and the reports in his account. He is pretty fair to most, but his venom towards Grant is palpable, but he does praise his actions at Dill Branch and I do think that was Grant's best moment at Shiloh along with the Review Field charge (which Smith is ungenerous about by the way).

I do tire of the pro/anti-Grant debates as of late. I recently had a disagreement with an anti-Grant man. It seems obvious he had good and bad traits. But it seems we are doomed to repeat the old arguments from back in the war, where Grant is either a lucky bumbler or the second coming of Napoleon.

Got a source for Wallace and the April 4 warning? In the record Wallace warned Grant about Rebels at Purdy on April 4 and Grant took it seriously.

 

[DanSBHawk]

I read Baldy's analysis of the first day. He seems to claim that Grant was not around to give any orders until 2:30 or 3:00 in the afternoon. That's way off.

Baldy also completely buys into the self-serving Prentiss story about Prentiss and WHL Wallace intentionally deciding to risk sacrificing their men in order to "save" the army.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Oh brother. I read Baldy's analysis of the second day. He snipes at Grant and fawns over Buell. This is how he describes Buell:

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

Oh brother. I read Baldy's analysis of the second day. He snipes at Grant and fawns over Buell. This is how he describes Buell:

View attachment 539022

Thanks for the commentary, @DanSBHawk. "Oh brother" is right - but at least the PRESENCE of Buell's troops were critically important.

 

[Belfoured]

Agreed, and it is the same reason I take "a large dose of salt" with what John Rawlins wrote about Lew Wallace at Shiloh. However, I am still going to consider what Rawlins wrote. Smith shows an excellent command of the terrain and the reports in his account. He is pretty fair to most, but his venom towards Grant is palpable, but he does praise his actions at Dill Branch and I do think that was Grant's best moment at Shiloh along with the Review Field charge (which Smith is ungenerous about by the way).

I do tire of the pro/anti-Grant debates as of late. I recently had a disagreement with an anti-Grant man. It seems obvious he had good and bad traits. But it seems we are doomed to repeat the old arguments from back in the war, where Grant is either a lucky bumbler or the second coming of Napoleon.

Got a source for Wallace and the April 4 warning? In the record Wallace warned Grant about Rebels at Purdy on April 4 and Grant took it seriously.

I'll PM you on your question. I worked with a friend several years ago on an extremely thorough project researching the Wallace claim as made in his autobiography and debunked it. The gist of Wallace's claim is that he warned Grant of an attack at PL based on information he got from Horace Bell, one of his scouts. The claim has been questioned by some (IIRC Woodworth is one) but I don't think anybody did the work we did.

 

[SeanMichaelChick]

I think Smith's commentary on Buell is accurate, save one big thing. Buell did poorly coordinating between his divisions. Buell left McCook to his own devices. He gave orders to individual regiments, particularly in Boyle's brigade. Grant did that on the afternoon of April 6, but the circumstances were different. Grant was trying to shore up weak points when the lines were crumbling. Buell was interfering with brigades that were undertaking the offensive which led to disjointed attacks.

That said, April 7 was Buell at his best and no other Union officer received as much praise from soldiers in both armies after the battle. I do not take what soldiers said of Buell lightly; they loved him on April 7. In the end, I tire of the attempts at Shiloh (then and now) to diminish contributions made by Grant, Buell, Sherman, Prentiss, McClernand, Nelson, and Lew Wallace. Each man made errors, but each was steadfast when the shooting started and determined to win.

 

[Belfoured]

I think Smith's commentary on Buell is accurate, save one big thing. Buell did poorly coordinating between his divisions. Buell left McCook to his own devices. He gave orders to individual regiments, particularly in Boyle's brigade. Grant did that on the afternoon of April 6, but the circumstances were different. Grant was trying to shore up weak points when the lines were crumbling. Buell was interfering with brigades that were undertaking the offensive which led to disjointed attacks.

That said, April 7 was Buell at his best and no other Union officer received as much praise from soldiers in both armies after the battle. I do not take what soldiers said of Buell lightly; they loved him on April 7. In the end, I tire of the attempts at Shiloh (then and now) to diminish contributions made by Grant, Buell, Sherman, Prentiss, McClernand, Nelson, and Lew Wallace. Each man made errors, but each was steadfast when the shooting started and determined to win.

I think that's a fair overall analysis. As we know, a lot of the criticism of the various actors that still exists today had its roots in the post-battle and post-war interpersonal disputes that erupted.

 

[SeanMichaelChick]

I think that's a fair overall analysis. As we know, a lot of the criticism of the various actors that still exists today had its roots in the post-battle and post-war interpersonal disputes that erupted.

Very much so. I was just thinking the steadfast commitment to victory that all senior officers displayed at Shiloh is in contrast to Smith at Drewry's Bluff, Ware Bottom Church, and Petersburg. He simply was not by temperament able to be a good subordinate but I like him as a military historian overall.

 

[wausaubob]

I read Baldy's analysis of the first day. He seems to claim that Grant was not around to give any orders until 2:30 or 3:00 in the afternoon. That's way off.

View attachment 539019

Baldy also completely buys into the self-serving Prentiss story about Prentiss and WHL Wallace intentionally deciding to risk sacrificing their men in order to "save" the army.

View attachment 539020
View attachment 539021

Good find. But Smith wasn't there, and Grant was there. According to Grant, the tactical situation changed dramatically after he left Prentiss' command. Grant's account seems more like a battle.

 

[wausaubob]

I just read William F. Smith's account of Shiloh with his analysis. It is divided into three articles and is mostly about Union operations, but with some good notes on the Confederates.

Smith, William Farrar. "Shiloh." Magazine of American History 15, (January-June 1886): 292-304.

Smith, William Farrar. "Shiloh, The First Day's Battle, April 6." Magazine of American History 15, (January-June 1886): 382-390.

Smith, William Farrar. "Shiloh, The Second Day's Battle, April 7." Magazine of American History 15, (January-June 1886): 470-482.

Smith is a character I have run into a lot in my research. I find him shrewd at analysis. His record was spotty, but it was because he was a difficult subordinate. He ended up actively undermining Ambrose Burnside, William Rosecrans, Benjamin Butler, and George Meade. Ulysses S. Grant ended up removing him and regretting that he ever took a liking to him. However, his temperament was well suited to analysis I found his take on Shiloh among the best I have read, if perhaps too hard on Grant (no surprise given their falling out) and too nice to Don Carlos Buell (but closer to the mark than most modern scholarship). Smith gets extra points for crafting the best narrative of the Union's operations on April 7 until Timothy B. Smith.

Read them for yourself: https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015031936480&seq=7

1886? A date after Grant had died of cancer, and after the Democrats had finally won a Presidential election based on a solid south with most freedmen disenfranchised: Smith just wanted to be on the side that was winning, to quote the Dylan lyric.

 

[wausaubob]

Grant was inexperienced. He did not expect the Confederates to attack in the manner that they did. And he did not anticipate how much help his volunteer officers needed to do basics like map the roads around their force.
My memory is that Confederates successfully rebuffed the US scouts. The scouts lost contact with the Confederate army and were not able to provide accurate information. They were all green at that stage.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Grant was inexperienced. He did not expect the Confederates to attack in the manner that they did. And he did not anticipate how much help his volunteer officers needed to do basics like map the roads around their force.
My memory is that Confederates successfully rebuffed the US scouts. The scouts lost contact with the Confederate army and were not able to provide accurate information. They were all green at that stage.

I doubt there is any other Civil War battle that partisans obsess so much about criticizing the victor.

 

[tony_gunter]

Grant was inexperienced. He did not expect the Confederates to attack in the manner that they did. And he did not anticipate how much help his volunteer officers needed to do basics like map the roads around their force.
My memory is that Confederates successfully rebuffed the US scouts. The scouts lost contact with the Confederate army and were not able to provide accurate information. They were all green at that stage.

I was under the impression that the scouts were all reporting that the Confederate main body was nearby, but Grant was relying on Sherman to collate and interpret intel, and Sherman was too afraid to sound crazy to report such information,

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

I think Smith's commentary on Buell is accurate, save one big thing. Buell did poorly coordinating between his divisions. Buell left McCook to his own devices. He gave orders to individual regiments, particularly in Boyle's brigade. Grant did that on the afternoon of April 6, but the circumstances were different. Grant was trying to shore up weak points when the lines were crumbling. Buell was interfering with brigades that were undertaking the offensive which led to disjointed attacks.

That said, April 7 was Buell at his best and no other Union officer received as much praise from soldiers in both armies after the battle. I do not take what soldiers said of Buell lightly; they loved him on April 7. In the end, I tire of the attempts at Shiloh (then and now) to diminish contributions made by Grant, Buell, Sherman, Prentiss, McClernand, Nelson, and Lew Wallace. Each man made errors, but each was steadfast when the shooting started and determined to win.

The Confederates pretty much had to compliment Buell, as his forces (most of them now present, freshly on hand) overwhelmed and routed them.