Why did McClellan decide to attack Yorktown?

[Kenneth Almquist]

The basic idea behind the Peninsula Campaign was that McClellan's forces would land on the peninsula between the York and James rivers, march up to Richmond, and take the city. This march was halted when it encountered a defensive line set up by General Magruder. McClellan then prepared to assault Yorktown, which was on the left end of the defensive line. (The assault never actually took place because General Johnston, who had by then taken command, ordered a withdrawal from Yorktown as soon as it looked like McClellan might be ready to attack.)

It seems to me that the obvious strategy would be for McClellan to attack the defensive line at whatever he believes to be its least defensible point, which would presumably not be Yorktown. After McClellan's forces break through, the Confederates abandon Yorktown. If they don't, McClellan surrounds Yorktown, lays siege to the city, and captures all the Confederate defenders when the city falls, reducing the forces available for the eventual defense of Richmond.

So what were McClellan's reasons for going after Yorktown?

 

[Mark F. Jenkins]

I believe it was primarily a matter of geography-- the Warwick River blocked a substantial part of the Peninsula at about the level of Yorktown, funneling the Union attack towards the town. (I'm not sure how formidable an obstacle the Warwick really was, but McClellan appears to have treated it as such.)

 

[NedBaldwin]

The basic idea behind the Peninsula Campaign was that McClellan's forces would land on the peninsula between the York and James rivers, march up to Richmond, and take the city. This march was halted when it encountered a defensive line set up by General Magruder. McClellan then prepared to assault Yorktown, which was on the left end of the defensive line. (The assault never actually took place because General Johnston, who had by then taken command, ordered a withdrawal from Yorktown as soon as it looked like McClellan might be ready to attack.)

It seems to me that the obvious strategy would be for McClellan to attack the defensive line at whatever he believes to be its least defensible point, which would presumably not be Yorktown. After McClellan's forces break through, the Confederates abandon Yorktown. If they don't, McClellan surrounds Yorktown, lays siege to the city, and captures all the Confederate defenders when the city falls, reducing the forces available for the eventual defense of Richmond.

So what were McClellan's reasons for going after Yorktown?

Its my understanding that the attack he planned was going to be at Lee's Mill and Wynn's Mill which were down the Warwick river from Yorktown.

 

[67th Tigers]

You can't even get to the other side in force to attempt an assault. The Warwick was flooded half a mile wide with the far banks covered with thick layers of abatis. Against Wynn's Mill crossing the attackers have to clear a mile of open ground before reaching the swamp.

The whole area was dominated by 15 field batteries (many full 6 gun btys rather than 4 guns) concentrated on the two possible crossing points. The batteries were dug in and thus essentially impossible to counterbattery.

Here's a decent map of the position:

Its my understanding that the attack he planned was going to be at Lee's Mill and Wynn's Mill which were down the Warwick river from Yorktown.

The assault of 5th May was planned to be 6 divisions against the Red Redoubt, White Redoubt and Fort Magruder - 2 divisions for each. The remaining three divisions were on the Warwick line, ISTR with 2 held back for a pursuit and the third screening the line.

 

[ErnieMac]

The attached Plate 18 from the War of the Rebellion Atlas shows the geography of the area. The left two thirds of the plate is the map McClellan had available to him at the beginning of his campaign. To the right is a more accurate map he had drawn to accompany his reports. It's pretty obvious geography funneled him toward Yorktown as the Confederate defenses behind the Warwick gave him few opportunities for an effective attack.

 

[nextcity]

Because he thought he could end a war at Yorktown, just as George Washington did...and thus become the second greatest American of all time.

 

[rosefiend]

I believe it was primarily a matter of geography-- the Warwick River blocked a substantial part of the Peninsula at about the level of Yorktown, funneling the Union attack towards the town. (I'm not sure how formidable an obstacle the Warwick really was, but McClellan appears to have treated it as such.)

But to McClellan, EVERYTHING WAS FORMIDABLE.

 

[rosefiend]

You can't even get to the other side in force to attempt an assault. The Warwick was flooded half a mile wide with the far banks covered with thick layers of abatis. Against Wynn's Mill crossing the attackers have to clear a mile of open ground before reaching the swamp.

The whole area was dominated by 15 field batteries (many full 6 gun btys rather than 4 guns) concentrated on the two possible crossing points. The batteries were dug in and thus essentially impossible to counterbattery.

Here's a decent map of the position:

That is a beautiful map! Where did you find it? I'd put that on my desktop in a heartbeat if I could.

ETA: In fact I just did. But I'd love to have others to put on my desktop and study and enjoy in the future, if you have the links.

Who's the balloon fellow on this board, T.S. Lowe? No, @TSCLowe, that's it. I bet he'd like to see the little balloon just southwest of Yorktown.

 

[ErnieMac]

That is a beautiful map! Where did you find it? I'd put that on my desktop in a heartbeat if I could.

ETA: In fact I just did. But I'd love to have others to put on my desktop and study and enjoy in the future, if you have the links.

Who's the balloon fellow on this board, T.S. Lowe? No, @TSCLowe, that's it. I bet he'd like to see the little balloon just southwest of Yorktown.

Many more like it here courtesy of Robert Knox Sneden who drew them along with numerous other watercolors of his experiences as a soldier and POW during the War.
http://www.loc.gov/collections/civil-war-maps/?fa=contributor:sneden,+robert+knox&sb=shelf-id

 

[Carronade]

Interesting......the usual narrative is McClellan missing his opportunity when he first closed up to the Warwick-Yorktown line, largely attributed to the play-acting of Magruder's dramatically smaller force (side question, how many of those 15 batteries were in place at that point?). By the time of his planned May attack, the plan he had might have been the best one.

 

[67th Tigers]

Interesting......the usual narrative is McClellan missing his opportunity when he first closed up to the Warwick-Yorktown line, largely attributed to the play-acting of Magruder's dramatically smaller force (side question, how many of those 15 batteries were in place at that point?). By the time of his planned May attack, the plan he had might have been the best one.

Ack, I forgot the 11 reserve btys!

Strength over time is discussed on my blog here: http://67thtigers.blogspot.be/2015/07/effective-strength-of-opposing-armies.html

The chief of artillery of the right wing (Lt Col Cabell) says his dispositions on 5th April were (OR 11(1) 413-4):

Capt Young's Bty and part of Maj Roemer's at Minor's farm
1x 12 pdr (from Capt Cosnahan's bty) and 1x Parrott (from Capt Sands bty) at extreme right redoubt at Lee's Mill under Lt Ritter
Btys of Capt Cosnahan, Capt Sands (3), Capt Garrett (3) and Capt Read (3) at other positions at Lee's Mill
1 gun of Capt Nelson's bty sweeping Dam No. 1
Btys of Capts Macon (6), Maurin (6), Hudnall (3 howitzers) and part of Southall's bty at Wynn's Mill
1 piece each from Hudnall and Southall at the upper dam (Dam No. 2)
Btys of Capts Smith, Armistead, Richardson and Page, plus remainder of Hudnall and Southall at Redoubts No. 4 and 5 (Red and White Redoubts)

That's 15 named batteries on the right wing, attached to the following units in the usual orbat:

Young: McLaws Bde (Halifax Arty)
Roemer: ?
Cosnahan: McLaws Bde, later Griffith's bde (Peninsula Arty)
Sands: McLaws Bde, later Griffith's bde (Henrico Arty)
Garrett: McLaws Bde (Williamsburg Arty)
Read: McLaws Bde, later Griffith's Bde (Pulaski Arty)
Nelson: Arty Res (Hanover Arty)
Macon: Pryor's bde (Richmond Fayetteville Arty)
Maurin: Colston's bde (Donaldsonville Arty)
Hudnall: ?
Southall: Arty Res (Albemarle Arty)
Smith: Arty Res (Hampton Arty)
Armistead: listed at Gloucester Point
Richardson: Arty Res (James City Arty)
Page: Arty Res (Magruder Arty)

Stanard's bty (Wilcox's bde) arrived on the 6th and was sent to Lee's Mills and Kemper's (Kershaw's bde) a few days later.

Roemer's and Hudnall's Btys aren't under those names in the OR orbat. Anyone know?

The left wing was under the command of Lt Col Brown, and included Yorktown proper and the guns in front of that, including "19 heavy batteries" in the fort proper, and some field guns (but not many).

 

[67th Tigers]

Interesting......the usual narrative is McClellan missing his opportunity when he first closed up to the Warwick-Yorktown line, largely attributed to the play-acting of Magruder's dramatically smaller force (side question, how many of those 15 batteries were in place at that point?). By the time of his planned May attack, the plan he had might have been the best one.

McClellan's orders to both columns were emphatically to attack!

"Meanwhile, to the east, at six A.M., the same time Smith started toward Lee's Mill, McClellan and his staff headed north from headquarters at Big Bethel toward Yorktown and Porter's division. The commanding general, too, found the rain disruptive and the roads in foul condition. Both Porter and Hamilton needed to pass the road junction near Howard's Bridge before Sedgwick could turn left to his reserve position.25

McClellan joined Burns' brigade of Sedgwick's division and continued forward with Burns and Sedgwick. Rain had threatened, then covered them with mist and small showers. Now, it fell heavily, making movement impossible for artillery and trains and very difficult for troops. Burns, Sedgwick, and McClellan rode from Big Bethel to Porter's headquarters. Arriving after daybreak, they found Porter still in his breakfast tent; and his men, an hour behind the commanding general in their preparation, had barely set foot on the road.

"I thought you would be at Yorktown by this hour," said McClellan.

Porter immediately mounted his horse. McClellan added,

"Attack with all your forces as soon as you arrive."

By this time, the rain had become a downpour.26

About an hour later an aide arrived from Keyes, probably carrying the Fourth Corps commander's first report of non-performance. McClellan, the "new" McClellan, had already issued clear orders for Keyes to brush aside all resistance in his sprint to the Halfway House. At last McClellan had his magnificent army in the field moving on the enemy. The heavy deluge, Keyes' problems, and his pleas for more infantry, artillery, and ammunition would not interrupt this movement. "Ride back as fast as you can," he said to Keyes' messenger, "and tell General Keyes to attack with all his force if only with the bayonet."27

A note he probably sent with the aide sharply ordered Keyes to advance to Lee's Mill and carry it without waiting for additional ammunition. Beyond Lee's Mill, Keyes should proceed as far as he could toward Halfway House without exhausting his men. Sedgwick would come to his support from the Powers house on his right flank. "If you should learn that the enemy are in retreat from Yorktown push forward with the utmost rapidity and cut them off at all hazard," headquarters said in another note, "They should not be allowed to escape if the best exertions of our men can prevent it."28

McClellan had not complained about the appointment of Keyes to corps command, and Smith had chosen to serve under him;29 but given his own way, McClellan would never have chosen Keyes to lead one of his corps. Although Keyes had embarrassed himself by going to Washington for the March thirteenth meeting of corps commanders at Fairfax Court House, a minor annoyance McClellan would have remembered to Keyes' detriment, the failure to assault and carry the works at Lee's Mills probably cast the first severe cloud over him as a corps commander. With rare exceptions, perhaps only one, McClellan never forgave any man who compromised his plans. Keyes' failure to reach and hold the divide where it crossed the Yorktown-Williamsburg Road on April fifth, specifically the failure, contrary to clear orders, to assault and capture Lee's Mill, would become more than a mere irritation."

Beatie, Russel (2007-05-14). Army of the Potomac: McClellan's First Campaign, March - May 1862: 3 (Kindle Locations 5417-5447). Casemate Publishers. Kindle Edition.

 

[TSCLowe]

Who's the balloon fellow on this board, T.S. Lowe? No, @TSCLowe, that's it. I bet he'd like to see the little balloon just southwest of Yorktown.

Yes. I'm very fond of PVT Sneden's art. He has several that include balloons at Yorktown and other locations:

 

[Eagle eye]

You can't even get to the other side in force to attempt an assault. The Warwick was flooded half a mile wide with the far banks covered with thick layers of abatis. Against Wynn's Mill crossing the attackers have to clear a mile of open ground before reaching the swamp.

The whole area was dominated by 15 field batteries (many full 6 gun btys rather than 4 guns) concentrated on the two possible crossing points. The batteries were dug in and thus essentially impossible to counterbattery.

Here's a decent map of the position:

The assault of 5th May was planned to be 6 divisions against the Red Redoubt, White Redoubt and Fort Magruder - 2 divisions for each. The remaining three divisions were on the Warwick line, ISTR with 2 held back for a pursuit and the third screening the line.

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67th… what's the source of Heintzemans map? It's an excellent map & I'm a map nut & would love to see this map in a bigger format… are there any other maps in your source of this map? Thanks for posting it

 

[67th Tigers]

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67th… what's the source of Heintzemans map? It's an excellent map & I'm a map nut & would love to see this map in a bigger format… are there any other maps in your source of this map? Thanks for posting it

Library of Congress has a load of them. He obviously drew them postwar from sketches, as he's a tendency to get commanders wrong, and a few bits. http://www.loc.gov/search/?in=&q=sneden+robert+knox&new=true

 

[Eagle eye]

Library of Congress has a load of them. He obviously drew them postwar from sketches, as he's a tendency to get commanders wrong, and a few bits. http://www.loc.gov/search/?in=&q=sneden+robert+knox&new=true

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67th… I saw further down that this was Sneden's work ( I thought it looked familiar ) & I have a book of some of his sketches & watercolors but don't recall the map in it. That doesn't mean that it isn't wasn't there it most likely means that I'm a product of the 60's $ 70's. Heck ..$0.10 a joint I can blame it on Vietnam.
Thanks for the link tho… his work is very remarkable to my eyes. I love pouring over maps & compair them to officers reports. Or looking at a campaign reports & see what features of the landscape made/forced a commander to choose the route he did.
Once again 67th Tigers.… thanks.

 

[TSCLowe]

--Sneden's work ( I thought it looked familiar ) & I have a book of some of his sketches & watercolors

Sneden's work can be found in the books:

and