When was the war lost?

[damYankee]

I asked this question in another thread and thought it would be a good question for it's own OP.

When did the situation facing the South come to that point when surrender and the salvage of as much of it's national treasure, private property and blood of it's youth outweighed any hopes of defeating the North?

 

[Rhea Cole]

Complete agreement, Lefty. In order to actually defeat the North, the South had to have water borne weapons. The fall of New Orleans was devastating; it was the only port that was close enough to a European presence (Mexico) where the blockade could be ended and supplies could flow in. The second loss, at least as important as New Orleans, was Johnston's evacuation of Norfolk and the resulting scuttling of what warships the CSA had plus the loss of the shipbuilding and repair operations there. After this, the South could only hope to outlast the the North's will and popular support, which would be a win but not by actually defeating their opponent. It was never going to happen without those two ports.

Are you aware that the governor of northern Mexico offered to join the Confederacy. He had a well drilled & equipped standing army. His domain reached from the gulf to the Pacific? Perhaps his complexion did not stand up to Confederate standards…

 

[JerryD]

If you mean when did the Confederates understand the war was lost, I think there are two answers:
1. Those with open minds knew it when Sherman captured Savannah after his raid through eastern Georgia AND when Fort Fisher was captured and Wilmington rendered essentially useless.
2. If you mean the True Believers, they gave up after Lee (and in some cases Johnston) surrendered.

The capture of Savannah and Shermans' safe passage across Georgia is when the Brits started to believe the war was lost. They thought Sherman was going to pull a Burgoyne and be forced to surrender far from his base, and when Sherman showed he could march with impunity wherever he wished, the Brits realized the CSA was much weaker and worse off than they had realized.

 

[leftyhunter]

The capture of Savannah and Shermans' safe passage across Georgia is when the Brits started to believe the war was lost. They thought Sherman was going to pull a Burgoyne and be forced to surrender far from his base, and when Sherman showed he could march with impunity wherever he wished, the Brits realized the CSA was much weaker and worse off than they had realized.

Actually the British realized that the Confederacy was not going to win much earlier then 1864. I forgot what book it was but either Sludell or Mason was called before some high ranking British officials and asked if Missouri and Kentucky would be occupied by the Confederacy because with out those states the Confederacy would be at a disadvantage. Lincoln himself said " To loose Kentucky is to loose the game".
The British and French even after major Confederate victories didn't bother to recognize the Confederacy.
Leftyhunter

 

[Georgia Sixth]

Are you aware that the governor of northern Mexico offered to join the Confederacy. He had a well drilled & equipped standing army. His domain reached from the gulf to the Pacific? Perhaps his complexion did not stand up to Confederate standards…

Whoa, I've lived in Texas most my life and have never heard this before. I'd like to know more. Can you suggest a book or online article?

 

[archieclement]

Would agree with late to end of 1864.

 

[Rhea Cole]

Whoa, I've lived in Texas most my life and have never heard this before. I'd like to know more. Can you suggest a book or online article?

Link:

Civil War Surprises: Santiago Vidaurri’s Tempting Offer - Emerging Civil War

In 1861 the Confederacy dispatched envoys, diplomats, and agents abroad in attempts to secure foreign recognition and international prestige. The most well-known of these became the Trent affair. A far more obscure effort was that of José Augustín Quintero, a Cuban-born Texas resident. Enlisting...

emergingcivilwar.com

Link:

The Confederate of the Sierra Madre

How the South came close to annexing northern Mexico.

archive.nytimes.com

 

[JeffBrooks]

The British and French even after major Confederate victories didn't bother to recognize the Confederacy.

Well, the Confederacy never achieved a Saratoga-level victory in the war. At no point in the war did the Confederacy manage to force a major Union army to surrender.

 

[SWS]

When Sherman turned Johnston out of the ridge country in Northwest Ga. and broke into the Etowah and Chattahoochee Valleys, and when Hood later left Palmetto Station, permitting Sherman the opportunity to finally turn the Appalachians and break into the AoNV's rear and threaten its right flank via an overland route from the southwest, sever the remaining communications between the corn cribs of the lower Chattahoochee and the Richmond depot, and threaten an overwhelming concentration on the Atlantic coast and compel the evacuation of the cities on it (which Lee had forecasted as early as Dec. 1863).

Although it is understandable why the Confederate leadership banked on a Tennessee expedition, the outcome proved so terrible and strategically suboptimal that the AoT proved itself simply unable to counter the grand raids of Sherman, Stoneman, and Wilson all at once in Feb-Apr. 1865, rapidly accelerating the collapse of the Confederacy beyond anyone's expectations in only a few weeks.

And as @Wizard of Cozz said: "[Lee] only gets thinned out because he had to send troops to NC in early 65' because there was no AoT anymore. He sent Hoke's division, Kershaw's SC Brigade as well as two cavalry brigades. Nearly 10,000 troops. All because the west couldn't hold while he held the entire time..."

 

[Piedone]

Are you aware that the governor of northern Mexico offered to join the Confederacy. He had a well drilled & equipped standing army. His domain reached from the gulf to the Pacific? Perhaps his complexion did not stand up to Confederate standards…

Maybe it would be fruitful to have a closer look on Civil War surprises -
it's the same article you linked in your own post:
The article clearly shows the reasons why the Confederates didn't jump on that train -
and why this was the only sensible reaction to such an offer.

I'd also suggest to have a closer look on Vidaurri's troops - the mexican central government took them out of the game rather effortlessly in just no time….

While I am absolutely with you regarding a then deeply ingrained racism in southern culture … well…. come on… condescension towards hispanics and especially mexicans?

That was hardly a trait the Confederates had patented for themselves, the average anglo-saxon
of that time could easily "shine" at that feature….

 

[Old Soldier]

The capture of Savannah and Shermans' safe passage across Georgia is when the Brits started to believe the war was lost. They thought Sherman was going to pull a Burgoyne and be forced to surrender far from his base, and when Sherman showed he could march with impunity wherever he wished, the Brits realized the CSA was much weaker and worse off than they had realized.

The Brits. The government and Royalty never supported or recognised the Confederacy and neither did France. The Brits were never involved politically and defended their neutrality and, in any case, most of the population were not interested in the war. If there was any support for either side, it was for Abolition as even those who lost their jobs in the Lancashire cotton mills due to the Blockade supported that.

 

[JerryD]

The Brits. The government and Royalty never supported or recognised the Confederacy and neither did France. The Brits were never involved politically and defended their neutrality and, in any case, most of the population were not interested in the war. If there was any support for either side, it was for Abolition as even those who lost their jobs in the Lancashire cotton mills due to the Blockade supported that.

Certainly there were members of Parliament and the gentry who advocated for recognition, mediation, or even intervention at various times during the war, for their own reasons, but as you say the Government insisted on neutrality and most of the population supported the USA. And of course many merchants and ship builders were eager to do business with the CSA. And its well known that the Times was very pro-CSA in its reporting. The general view of the government up until the fall of Savannah was that CSA victory was inevitable, and when the USA finally recognized that fact then Great Britain would offer to help mediate on the basis of separation. They were repeatedly told by CSA reps that the CSA would never consent to re-unification and would carry on the war no matter the cost, and the Brits believed them. From what I have read they were shocked when the CSA just kind of melted away in the course of just a few months.

Am I off?

 

[JerryD]

Actually the British realized that the Confederacy was not going to win much earlier then 1864. I forgot what book it was but either Sludell or Mason was called before some high ranking British officials and asked if Missouri and Kentucky would be occupied by the Confederacy because with out those states the Confederacy would be at a disadvantage. Lincoln himself said " To loose Kentucky is to loose the game".
The British and French even after major Confederate victories didn't bother to recognize the Confederacy.
Leftyhunter

From my reading, I have to disagree. I just finished Great Britain and the American Civil War by Adams and he quotes extensively from the correspondence and papers of the leading British figures and the theme is that they believed the CSA officials who said the CSA would never consent to re-unification and would fight to the last man to avoid that. Based on these representations they thought the CSA was just too large to conquer and subdue, so division was inevitable. Basically they felt that if Great Britain could not subdue a much smaller area during the Revolution, certainly a second rate power like the USA could not subdue a much larger area like the CSA.

Even as late of Sherman's March they felt that CSA victory was inevitable. They felt that the siege of Petersburg was evidence of the difficulty of conquering the CSA in that Grant was mired in a siege that may last years, and they felt that Sherman's March was nothing but foolish and once he was far from his base he would inevitably be surrounded and forced to surrender, just like Gentlemen Johnny Burgoyne at Saratoga. The Times portrayed Sherman's march as nothing but him fleeing for the coast after foolishly getting trapped in Atlanta far from his base in a desperate and ill founded attempt to save some portion of his army. And if he survived at all he would probably pop up along the coast on some beach, trying to flag down the navy to come rescue him. But it was ridiculous to think that after such a march he would be strong enough to actually capture a fortified city like Savannah.

When Sherman did just that it came as a shock to the British and they started to realize just how weak and defenseless the CSA had become.

 

[JerryD]

When Sherman turned Johnston out of the ridge country in Northwest Ga. and broke into the Etowah and Chattahoochee Valleys, and when Hood later left Palmetto Station, permitting Sherman the opportunity to finally turn the Appalachians and break into the AoNV's rear and threaten its right flank via an overland route from the southwest, sever the remaining communications between the corn cribs of the lower Chattahoochee and the Richmond depot, and threaten an overwhelming concentration on the Atlantic coast and compel the evacuation of the cities on it (which Lee had forecasted as early as Dec. 1863).

Although it is understandable why the Confederate leadership banked on a Tennessee expedition, the outcome proved so terrible and strategically suboptimal that the AoT proved itself simply unable to counter the grand raids of Sherman, Stoneman, and Wilson all at once in Feb-Apr. 1865, rapidly accelerating the collapse of the Confederacy beyond anyone's expectations in only a few weeks.

And as @Wizard of Cozz said: "[Lee] only gets thinned out because he had to send troops to NC in early 65' because there was no AoT anymore. He sent Hoke's division, Kershaw's SC Brigade as well as two cavalry brigades. Nearly 10,000 troops. All because the west couldn't hold while he held the entire time..."

I've always looked upon Hood's Tennessee invasion as either completely foolish, or evidence of just how desperate the CSA had become. To leave open the heartland of the CSA in the hopes of invading Tennessee in winter with a poorly supplied (and ill led) army reeks of either complete stupidity or desperation. I think the only way that campaign can be justified is the CSA knew the war was all but lost, so might as well take their chances with a Hail Mary attempt. And since Lee was trapped, the only army left standing to attempt it was the AOT.

 

[Bruce Allardice]

I asked this question in another thread and thought it would be a good question for it's own OP.

When did the situation facing the South come to that point when surrender and the salvage of as much of it's national treasure, private property and blood of it's youth outweighed any hopes of defeating the North?

The war was "lost" when they fired on Fort Sumter. Because they started a war they could never win, given the disparity in population and recources. It took the south almost 4 years to realize that reality.

 

[JeffBrooks]

The war was "lost" when they fired on Fort Sumter. Because they started a war they could never win, given the disparity in population and recources. It took the south almost 4 years to realize that reality.

History is full of examples of weaker powers defeating stronger ones, particularly due to a collapse on the stronger side of the willingness to keep fighting. The South didn't need to win; it just needed to avoid losing until the North decided that victory would not be worth the cost.

 

[G Low]

Thought 'out of sight, out of mind' applied here. It was only when the war became experienced at homes, that extensive public attitudes really significantly shifted.

Agreed, it was over in Mississippi after Vicksburg, over in Tennessee after Nashville, Georgia after Atlanta and so on….

 

[archieclement]

I assumed you meant by general population, which one has take into account the fog of war, limited knowledge and no benefit of hindsight.

While by mid 1864 Lee may be starting to be pinned at Richmond, and Atlanta falling........The Confederacy had two offensives the public could still pinned hopes on, Price into Missouri and Hood to Nashville. So its not until late 1864 and both have failed that there would be little else to pinned any hopes on.

 

[G Low]

I asked this question in another thread and thought it would be a good question for it's own OP.

When did the situation facing the South come to that point when surrender and the salvage of as much of it's national treasure, private property and blood of it's youth outweighed any hopes of defeating the North?

When Atlanta surrendered nothing got saved or salvaged. Granted the rebels took or destroyed any thing of value from the city when they left. Then the Yankees burned down what was remaining.

 

[leftyhunter]

From my reading, I have to disagree. I just finished Great Britain and the American Civil War by Adams and he quotes extensively from the correspondence and papers of the leading British figures and the theme is that they believed the CSA officials who said the CSA would never consent to re-unification and would fight to the last man to avoid that. Based on these representations they thought the CSA was just too large to conquer and subdue, so division was inevitable. Basically they felt that if Great Britain could not subdue a much smaller area during the Revolution, certainly a second rate power like the USA could not subdue a much larger area like the CSA.

Even as late of Sherman's March they felt that CSA victory was inevitable. They felt that the siege of Petersburg was evidence of the difficulty of conquering the CSA in that Grant was mired in a siege that may last years, and they felt that Sherman's March was nothing but foolish and once he was far from his base he would inevitably be surrounded and forced to surrender, just like Gentlemen Johnny Burgoyne at Saratoga. The Times portrayed Sherman's march as nothing but him fleeing for the coast after foolishly getting trapped in Atlanta far from his base in a desperate and ill founded attempt to save some portion of his army. And if he survived at all he would probably pop up along the coast on some beach, trying to flag down the navy to come rescue him. But it was ridiculous to think that after such a march he would be strong enough to actually capture a fortified city like Savannah.

When Sherman did just that it came as a shock to the British and they started to realize just how weak and defenseless the CSA had become.

Yet if the British thought so highly of the Confederacy they never recognized it. The British had mitary observers on both sides so they knew who was winning or loosing.
A generaly accepted criteria of recognizing a given country is its government can control its people and territory. The Confederacy could not protect its coastline or break the Union naval blockade.
Of course there are exceptions to that rule when it comes to one nation to another ( it is well after the ACW) but even with that in mind no nation bothered to recognize the Confederacy.
Leftyhunter

 

[leftyhunter]

From my reading, I have to disagree. I just finished Great Britain and the American Civil War by Adams and he quotes extensively from the correspondence and papers of the leading British figures and the theme is that they believed the CSA officials who said the CSA would never consent to re-unification and would fight to the last man to avoid that. Based on these representations they thought the CSA was just too large to conquer and subdue, so division was inevitable. Basically they felt that if Great Britain could not subdue a much smaller area during the Revolution, certainly a second rate power like the USA could not subdue a much larger area like the CSA.

Even as late of Sherman's March they felt that CSA victory was inevitable. They felt that the siege of Petersburg was evidence of the difficulty of conquering the CSA in that Grant was mired in a siege that may last years, and they felt that Sherman's March was nothing but foolish and once he was far from his base he would inevitably be surrounded and forced to surrender, just like Gentlemen Johnny Burgoyne at Saratoga. The Times portrayed Sherman's march as nothing but him fleeing for the coast after foolishly getting trapped in Atlanta far from his base in a desperate and ill founded attempt to save some portion of his army. And if he survived at all he would probably pop up along the coast on some beach, trying to flag down the navy to come rescue him. But it was ridiculous to think that after such a march he would be strong enough to actually capture a fortified city like Savannah.

When Sherman did just that it came as a shock to the British and they started to realize just how weak and defenseless the CSA had become.

The Man Who Stopped The Rams

The Union had failed to prevent the construction of Rebel steam raiders in England. Now the U.S. consul in Liverpool detected a weapon capable of changing the course of the war. But could he prove it to the British?

www.americanheritage.com

This is a good article about the US diplomatic effort to prevent the building of and delivery of the Laird Rams to the Confedrate Navy.
If the UK had formally recognized the Confederacy vs granting mere beligerent rights the British could of openly sold the Laird Rams to the Confederacy.
Leftyhunter