What Makes A Good Commander?

[Sivart]

What makes some considered a good commander? Is it all about making the right choices according to the situation, or is it something different? How does one make a name for themself as a commander? Why were Lee and Grant so highly regarded? Why was Bragg a poor commander? To be a good commander, do you have to be popular with your troops?

 

[Stryker65]

Id take Lee to win my Battles and Grant to win my Wars.

I agree with this.

Grant, even from 1862, was essentially coordinating the majority of operations in the Western Theater, and Lee coordinating those in the Eastern Theater. But while Grant was able to move many commands around (Rosecrans's and Ord's at Iuka, for instance), I think the majority of Lee's movements were to bring as many troops to his own army, small as it was. Did Lee do better in field battles themselves? I'd say so. But Grant had the larger sense of how theater operations should work.

 

[jackt62]

Good answers all! To distill it all, a good or great commander must inspire his subordinates and have a clear strategic vision of where everbody needs to go and how to get there.

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

Some are born good leaders, some grow to become good leaders, and most have no business as leaders. You can be taught to be a better leader, but you can't be taught to be a leader if you lack the aptitude. I've seen that firsthand from a couple managers in my life and I bet anyone who has a long career in the corporate or retail world has seen it far starker.

It takes a certain balance of confidence, decisiveness, wisdom, and people skills to be a good leader. Not everyone has the same balance. I say wisdom rather than intelligence because, although no good leader is dumb, effective leadership is about maximizing the use of intelligence around them. Highly intelligent people are better utilized as trusted advisors to leaders.

I will boldly say that, relative to their wars, the biggest difference between Eisenhower and Bragg is not strategic or logistical, but that Eisenhower was a master of handling subordinates and superiors while Bragg was inept at the same task.

McClellan and Johnston were both good with their subordinates, but both had terrible relationships with their commander in chief.

Lee knew how to tactfully get rid of subordinates he didn't like.

And yes, there's luck too. It's the most important and elusive superpower in the world.

I like your stated difference between Eisenhower and Bragg.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

Grant, even from 1862, was essentially coordinating the majority of operations in the Western Theater, and Lee coordinating those in the Eastern Theater. But while Grant was able to move many commands around (Rosecrans's and Ord's at Iuka, for instance), I think the majority of Lee's movements were to bring as many troops to his own army, small as it was. Did Lee do better in field battles themselves? I'd say so. But Grant had the larger sense of how theater operations should work.

Lee ultimately had the same strategy as McClellan: give me all the troops and let me deliver a knockout blow to the enemy. Lee was just much more creative tactically, thinking like a Napoleon while the supposed "Young Napoleon" was still thinking like an engineer. Lee was one of the very few career engineers in the war who didn't have the slow, cautious engineer mindset.

Grant seemed to have a pretty good grasp of grand strategy. He wanted to move on Vicksburg and Mobile before they were given strategic priority. He put a lot of emphasis on the simultaneous offensives of May 1864 with the aim of overwhelming the Confederacy and stretching the Confederate army beyond its breaking point.

Grant also possessed remarkable tenacity, determination, and patience. His experience as a Quartermaster have him an appreciation for the importance of logistics. He hadn't been an engineer so was free of that mindset.

Grant forged a good relationship with Lincoln, cultivated talented subordinates like McPherson and Wilson, and adequately managed difficult subordinates like McClernand and Butler. Ultimately, I think Grant's biggest weaknesses as a general (and especially as a president) was that he was loyal to a fault and not a strong judge of character or talent. To reuse a term I mentioned in earlier post: he lacked wisdom. Whatever the exact reason, he failed to appreciate the talent of Rosencrans and Thomas. He was too easily impressed by Baldy Smith and Phil Sheridan. He made numerous bad cabinet choices that sullied his presidency.

A question worth asking is why Sherman was successful, other than having Grant's absolute trust. Sherman was rather self-depricating about his own ability and described a propensity to worry. Maybe it was because he had the right amount of boldness, and no illusions about war in general and the American Civil War in particular?

 

[Scott1967]

I will boldly say that, relative to their wars, the biggest difference between Eisenhower and Bragg is not strategic or logistical, but that Eisenhower was a master of handling subordinates and superiors while Bragg was inept at the same task.

Braggs subordinates had it in for him after the retreat at Perryville they wanted him replaced with Johnston even though Bragg did nothing wrong after that the situation just escalated it would be the story of Bragg issuing orders and his subordinates either failing to understand or downright not following his orders while good brave men died needlessly.

In truth I felt sorry for Bragg I think he's been made a scapegoat for many of the failures in the West but when you look more closely the hierarchy of the AoT it was rotten to the core Cheatham , Hardee , Polk , D H Hill all had egos the size of Empire state building which is precisely why Davis never promoted any of them to army command instead putting his hated rival Johnston in command and then after that Hood.

My opinion of course.

 

[rvbgrif]

This is a good question. I notice that some here have answered how the US army defines a good officer. I am going to avoid answering in that fashion.

Generals have a lot on their plate, they need to understand the strengths and weakness of their troops and the enemy troops, they need to understand the terrain and how it can advantage or hinder their efforts, they need to understand tactics and the overall strategy and how it is influenced by their inherit strengths and weaknesses, they need to scout and spy on the enemy as well as feint, demonstrate, and dupe them into making wrong moves, and they need to motivate their troops and communicate in such a way that can be understood.

But to a historian, a good commander is one that is successful or gives a later account of his successes. History is biased in favor of those who write it. To give an example, Erwin Rommel is famous, in part, because he liked to write books.

Different commanders are often good in different ways. Stonewall Jackson was good in the sense that he was well read on Napoleon and Frederick the Great, knew the importance of marching and the influence it had on European Warfare, and would march his "foot cavalry" quickly, meeting the enemy only when he had a superiority in numbers and could defeat them in detail. He understood his strengths, and utilized them effectively. Grant was also a good commander and understood his strengths, that his side was much better supplied. He would attack, the attack would fizzle out given the advantage that warfare of this era awarded the defenders, then he would maneuver his troops to force the enemy to a new battlefield and fight there. This is called a wheeling movement. Eventually this action wore out the Confederate Army.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

Stonewall Jackson was good in the sense that he was well read on Napoleon and Frederick the Great, knew the importance of marching and the influence it had on European Warfare

I've never heard before that Jackson had a greater amount of study or understanding of these generals.

 

[rvbgrif]

I've never heard before that Jackson had a greater amount of study or understanding of these generals.

I heard that he always carried two books around, the bible, and one on Napoleon.

Considering that he was a Professor at VMI... I am sure he has read his share of military history textbooks.

Fast marching was a characteristic of Fredrick the Great's Prussian Infantry, along with fast reloading.

The Battle of Chancellorsville had many tactical similarities with the Battle of Leuthen.

I can't say that Jackson was more or less influenced by Napoleon than other generals, as I am sure many were, but I think with him the influence is more obvious.

I will also tie Napoleon and Frederick together as Fredrick was Napoleon's favorite general and biggest influence.

TBH I see Napoleon having more in common with a General like Grant as both were very strategic minded. Napoleon is famous for conscription, his elite reserve the Napoleonic Guard, and his movements at a strategic level including wheeling movements and feigned retreats. Fredrick and Jackson, on the other hand, were very tactical. Fredrick was famous for fast marching, fast firing, reforming his infantry and cavalry, the oblong order, feints and surprise attacks. Napoleon preferred to use conscription to have the larger force, but would also utilize the Napoleonic guard when he needed a quality advantage at a given point, while Fredrick was a believer in a smaller, professional army and would use speed, surprise, and the oblong order to achieve an advantage in quantity at a given point.