West Virginia campaign

Jamieva

Captain
Forum Host
Joined
Feb 7, 2006
Location
Midlothian, VA
I have recently started reading Rebels at the Gate by W. Hunter Lesser. I knew very little of the WV campaign and wanted to dig into it a little more. So I have a question about Rich Mountain. So the plan is Rosecrans takes his part of the force, makes a flank march and attack. The sound of his attack would prompt McClellan to hit the Confederates from the other direction. They agree it should take 2 hours, it takes over 10 to make the march.

Rosecrans attacks once in position, McClellan can hear the sounds of it, but he refuses to do his attack.

I love to bag on Little Mac as much as the next guy, but can anyone help me more fully understand why McClellan backed out of the plan as it was being executed?
 

67th Tigers

1st Lieutenant
Joined
Nov 10, 2006
I have recently started reading Rebels at the Gate by W. Hunter Lesser. I knew very little of the WV campaign and wanted to dig into it a little more. So I have a question about Rich Mountain. So the plan is Rosecrans takes his part of the force, makes a flank march and attack. The sound of his attack would prompt McClellan to hit the Confederates from the other direction. They agree it should take 2 hours, it takes over 10 to make the march.

Rosecrans attacks once in position, McClellan can hear the sounds of it, but he refuses to do his attack.

I love to bag on Little Mac as much as the next guy, but can anyone help me more fully understand why McClellan backed out of the plan as it was being executed?
Rosecrans in fact attack twice, and his first attack failed. The int supplied had no rearward position, and McClellan thought Rosecrans was going to come in on the right flank of Camp Garnett, rather than engage the enemy at the Hart House. The order of events at the Hart House (from here) is:

Phase 1 (2.30-3.30 p.m.): Skirmishers make contact and withdraw. Rosecrans takes about 45 minutes after coming forward to get 3 regiments into line below the crest of the hill and out of sight.
Phase 2 (3.30-3.50 p.m.): Rosecrans advances 3 regiments in line to the crest and initiates a firefight. It's one sided, and the rebel 6 pdr smashes the Federal lines. After 20 minutes all the Federals have fled back behind the crest of the hill and disengaged. The rebels cheer and believe they have defeated the Federals (it is this cheering McClellan and Beatty hear, as will be discussed).
Phase 3 (3.50-4.50 p.m.): Rosecrans tries to reorganise his troops to charge in column. Details are made to put a heavy fire on the 6 pdr, which is the lynchpin of the rebel defence.
Phase 4 (4.50-5.30): Skirmishers are sent forward to suppress the artillery piece, and after the crew is shot down and the caisson horses have bolted Rosecrans orders a charge. The Federals rush down the hill and the rebel commander orders a retreat down the road to Beverley. Bayonets are never crossed.

Pegram, at Camp Garnett, received a request for reinforcements at 4 p.m. All he felt he could spare was another 6 pdr and a coy (Company D (Powhatan Rifles), 20th Virginia) to escort it. As they were approaching the Hart House, around 5 p.m., Rosecrans finally charged and his left flank regiment (10th Indiana) encountered said gun and shot down the horses, who tipped it over as they fell.

Once Rosecrans overran the Hart House position at around 1730 he doesn't do as ordered and crest the hill, but rather becomes totally static and digs in a defensive position. He decided not to send a messenger to McClellan on the basis that his horses were too tired. The fact that Rosecrans' first attack was defeated had been detected in the Federal line at Roaring Creek.

Around 2.30 or 3 p.m. fire was heard from the rear of the mountain. To the newly Commissioned John Beatty it sounded like a major battle. Beatty however had little idea what a battle sounded like at this stage, and indeed his writing shows he had a rather nervous disposition. McClellan was on the skirmish line listening to the engagement. He later described the firing as "distant and stationary, and there was no indication of Rosecrans's approach. Soon after the cessation of the distant firing..." McClellan was right and Beatty wrong.

McClellan listened to the firing for several hours, and he stood the 14th and 15th Indiana into line and was ready to assault Camp Garnett with 3 regiments (9th Ohio, 14th Indiana and 15th Indiana). Rosecrans never appeared behind the camp, and between 4.30 or 5.30 p.m the firing stopped. Whilst there with his staff Poe rode down to him and indicated that he could get a battery above and behind the enemy lines that evening. It was close to 5 p.m. and there was still no sign of Rosecrans and so McClellan assented. Poe had left the 8 coys of the 3rd Ohio occupying the spur where the battery was to be placed. The 4th Ohio came back down and the 4th and 9th Ohio cut a road through the vegetation and dragged 4 6 pdrs of the Michigan battery up the ridge that evening. The rebels, aware of what was happening, blasted away into the woods trying to stop the column but to no available. As the sun set, the 3rd Ohio and 4 guns were in position overlooking the rebel camp. They called this prominence "Sugar Hill". It was the threat of this battery, not Rosecrans, that compelled the rebels to retreat. Indeed, the retreating rebels walked right past Rosecrans unmolested.

At about 1800, Pegram decided to mount a night attack on Rosecrans. As darkness fell he marched 6 coys out of the camp over the hill, picked up the Powhatan Rifles to give him 7 coys, and tried to sneak up on the Hart House. However, there was a blue-on-blue musket discharge as they got into position and Pegram concluded the element of surprise was lost, and ordered the column (under Major Tyler) to escape. They marched straight past Rosecrans' position. Pegram returned to camp and eventually the remainder also try and escape, but got lost and surrendered to McClellan the next day at Beverley.

It was Rosecrans, not McClellan, who abandoned the plan when he decided not to advance west half a mile to the crest of the hill (which at the time would have him only encounter one scattered coy) and not to send a message to McClellan that he was in the rear.
 

67th Tigers

1st Lieutenant
Joined
Nov 10, 2006
There were 20 companies (20th and 25th Va) and a battery (Va Lee Artillery) at Rich Mountain. The detailed dispositions were:

2 coys initially at the Hart House
Company G (Hampden-Sydney Boys), 20th Virginia - when there was a possible attack they were sent back to Camp Garnett.
Company A (Upshur Greys), 25th Virginia

1 coy was out picketting the right (north) of the ridge:
Company C (Augusta Lee Rifles), 25th Virginia

Detecting a possible movement to the rear, Pegram sent 3 coys at a gun to reinforce the Hart House:
Company B (Pryor Rifles), 20th Virginia
Company F (Buckingham Institute Guards), 20th Virginia
Company B (Rockbridge Guards), 25th Virginia
One 6 pdr (under Lt C.W. Statham)

Another coy was sent to the Hart House, but didn't arrive before the position was overrun:
Company D (Powhatan Rifles), 20th Virginia
One 6 pdr

The six companies pulled out at nightfall to join the Powhatan Rifles on a night attack on Rosecrans were:
Company A (Virginia Guard), 20th Virginia
Company C (Flat Lock Rifles), 20th Virginia
Company E (Lee Guards), 20th Virginia
Company F (Jeff Davis Guard), 20th Virginia
Company I (Brunswick Blues), 20th Virginia
Company K (South of Dan Rebels), 20th Virginia

Remained at Camp Garnett, led out by Pegram and surrendered at Beverly
Company G (Hampden-Syndey Boys), 20th Virginia - from Hart House
Company H (Clover Rifles), 20th Virginia
Company D (Highland Rangers), 25th Virginia
Company E (Pendleton Rifles), 25th Virginia
Company F (Franklin Guards), 25th Virginia - majority escaped
Company G (Bath Grays), 25th Virginia
Company H (Hardy Blues), 25th Virginia
Company I (Valley Rifles), 25th Virginia
Company K (South Branch Rifles), 25th Virginia
Two 6 pdrs - spiked and left at the camp

The 8 coys of the 20th Va (except G&H) and Coys A&B, 25th Va escaped under Major Tyler, joined the 44th Va who were just east of the Mountain. They marched to Huttonsvile where they met governor Letcher and the 12th Georgia (en route being joined by Coy F, 25th Va) they then marched to Staunton where they'd combine with 3 more regts (6th NC, 1st Arkansas, Maney's 1st Tennessee and a six gun battery). These 6 regts would be the core of the defence of Cheat Mountain.

The other 9 coys under Pegram surrendered 593 offrs and men to McClellan at Beverley.
 

OpnCoronet

Lt. Colonel
Joined
Feb 23, 2010
I have recently started reading Rebels at the Gate by W. Hunter Lesser. I knew very little of the WV campaign and wanted to dig into it a little more. So I have a question about Rich Mountain. So the plan is Rosecrans takes his part of the force, makes a flank march and attack. The sound of his attack would prompt McClellan to hit the Confederates from the other direction. They agree it should take 2 hours, it takes over 10 to make the march.
Rosecrans attacks once in position, McClellan can hear the sounds of it, but he refuses to do his attack.
I love to bag on Little Mac as much as the next guy, but can anyone help me more fully understand why McClellan backed out of the plan as it was being executed?



In a nutshell, your description is accurate enough. There is a military axiom which states that a plan seldom survives first contact with the enemy. An axiom that McClellan seldom recognized, or at least admitted to.

I think the battle shows McClellans basic lack of confidence shown in all his future operations. He makes a plan and when all the pieces in reality do not fit what he expects , he is surprised and hesitates and assumes the worst.

By the way, the W.V. campaign shows the flaws of Lee also. He is not comfortable with any command higher than an Army command, mainly, I believe, because he does not want any other command than an army command and is not really interested in the war beyond the Va. Tidewaters, at least insofar as to serving anywhere else.
 

leftyhunter

Brev. Brig. Gen'l
Joined
May 27, 2011
Location
los angeles ca
In a nutshell, your description is accurate enough. There is a military axiom which states that a plan seldom survives first contact with the enemy. An axiom that McClellan seldom recognized, or at least admitted to.

I think the battle shows McClellans basic lack of confidence shown in all his future operations. He makes a plan and when all the pieces in reality do not fit what he expects , he is surprised and hesitates and assumes the worst.

By the way, the W.V. campaign shows the flaws of Lee also. He is not comfortable with any command higher than an Army command, mainly, I believe, because he does not want any other command than an army command and is not really interested in the war beyond the Va. Tidewaters, at least insofar as to serving anywhere else.
My understanding per James McPherson in Battle Cry of Freedom is that Lee served as an advisor in chief and command of the Confedrate forces in North West Virginia were divided into three separate commands. Each Confedrate commander had discretion in accepting or rejecting Lee's advice.
Leftyhunter
 

67th Tigers

1st Lieutenant
Joined
Nov 10, 2006
In a nutshell, your description is accurate enough. There is a military axiom which states that a plan seldom survives first contact with the enemy. An axiom that McClellan seldom recognized, or at least admitted to.

I think the battle shows McClellans basic lack of confidence shown in all his future operations. He makes a plan and when all the pieces in reality do not fit what he expects , he is surprised and hesitates and assumes the worst.

That Rosecrans, who on the morning of Rich Mountain had 4 of McClellan's 7 regiments, had departed from McClellan's battle plan is obvious. Rosecrans did not show up on Sugar Hill, which is where McClellan told him to go, and then after he'd overcome the detachment at the Hart House on the backside of the ridge he went static and didn't crest the hill.

McClellan realised Rosecrans was seriously off course as early as 0900, and sent a messenger to Rosecrans so he could be sent in the right direction, but the messenger was shot and captured. He told the rebels Rosecrans was making a turning movement on their left, and Pegram sent reinforcements to the Hart House (with a gun under Lt Statham) and onto Stonecoal Hill (with a gun under Lt Massey).

Rosecrans went up a re-entrant about 2 miles south of the one he should have. Hence him being so late. He reached Lone Tree over an hour after he was supposed to by on top of Sugar Hill turning the enemy. He then rested his men for an hour whilst he tried to work out where he was.

By this time Lt Poe had already led the 4th Ohio and 8 coys of the 3rd Ohio up onto Sugar Hill, leaving just the 9th Ohio and 2 coys of the 4th Ohio in line at the base of the hill. Massey was already bombarding them.

Around 90 minutes later Rosecrans has started moving and contacts the Harts House position. Lt Col Beatty is commanding the 2 coys of the 3rd Ohio thrown out as skirmishers at the base of the ridge. McClellan is on the skirmish line, listening and watching. It's clear to him that the firing is "distant and stationary". The firing stops and they see a galloper riding in Camp Garnett and the rebels start cheering - Rosecrans has been repulsed.

Rosecrans would reorganise his command and make another (successful) attack late in the day. In the meantime, McClellan sends the 9th Ohio up onto Sugar Hill, and cuts a path for 4 guns of Loomis' Michigan battery to get up on the hill. The 14th and 15th Indiana had marched to Roaring Creek, and were placed in line in the early afternoon.

McClellan certainly did not hesitate. When Rosecrans failed, he adjusted his plans accordingly. It was his movement onto Sugar Hill, not Rosecrans' fight at the Hart House, which compelled the rebels to quit the field.
 

16thVA

First Sergeant
Joined
Dec 8, 2008
Location
Philadelphia
Dr. Thomas B. Camden, of Weston, Lewis County, went to Rich Mountain after the battle.

"I visited the battlefield of Rich Mountain a few days after the battle to see if my brother, Captain E.D. Camden, who I knew was near there, had been in the battle, and if [he had been] wounded. He, with a company of 120 men, had marched to Beverly from Sutton [Braxton County] to be mustered into the Confederate service a few days before and were, at the time of the battle, near Elkins, and were on their way to reinforce the Confederates at the camp at Rich Mountain.

The Federal forces, under McClellan, were camped at the foot of Rich Mountain at Rooking Creek... An old settler piloted the army around on the mountain and they came in on the flamk of the Confedertaea and fired from above on the hill, and on the flank of the fortified camp, and soo charged with bayonets, which they used unmercifully, as I saw their deadly effects on the wounded. One young soldier had four or five stabs on his body, one of which was into his abdomen, and he could not recover. He said the "Dutch" soldiers just came rushing over the breastworks and commenced sticking, and it seemed they would never let up sticking him. He knew he could not recover and asked me to write his family, but the authorities did not favor it, and I did not get his name or address.

There was an older wounded soldier lying on his back, just breathing, and he had a large bullet wound in his head, with blood and brains oozing out. Others with less dangerous wounds were in the rooms. Outside, the effects of the conflict were in evidence-dead horses and wagons, etc., were scattered about. One horse was pointed out as being the riding horse of Captain Hughes, a brother, I think, of Mrs. Frank Jenkins of Parkersburg. He was a lawyer at Beverly and rode up while the battle was in progress and supposed he was in Confederate lines and cheered for Jeff Davis. Both he and his horse were killed.

I followed the line of retreat of the poor fellows who were forced to flee, along the mountain path, where the weeds and brushes were tramped down as they hurriedly fled towards Beverly from their first battle and defeat, and I could but enter into their feelings as they fled along the trampled paths...My sympathies went out to them in their defeat.

I went on to Beverly to see the prisoners there. The town was all excitement and filled with Federal soldiers and officers and others. I got no information about my brother Edward or anyone I knew. Colonel Latham, afterwards General, was there and I was treated courteously. Rumors of another engagement higher up the river came in, which proved to be the battle of Cheat River, where General Garnett was killed."

Dr. Camden mistook an "old settler" for David Hart, who led the Federals up the mountain. Dr. Camden later found that his brother had not reached the mountain in time for the battle and was miles away with another group of soldiers.

"My Recollections and Experiences of the Civil War", but Thomas B. Camden, McClain Books, 2000.
 

Jamieva

Captain
Forum Host
Joined
Feb 7, 2006
Location
Midlothian, VA
My understanding per James McPherson in Battle Cry of Freedom is that Lee served as an advisor in chief and command of the Confedrate forces in North West Virginia were divided into three separate commands. Each Confedrate commander had discretion in accepting or rejecting Lee's advice.
Leftyhunter

Lee was not given actual direct command of the various Confederate forces. Wise and Floyd hated each other and did not want to work together in any way. Lee has to beg and plead with them to cooperate in their own best interest. These interactions helped formulate how Lee would deal with difficult subordinates when he took over the ANV
 

Joshism

2nd Lieutenant
Joined
Apr 30, 2012
Location
Jupiter, FL
By the way, the W.V. campaign shows the flaws of Lee also. He is not comfortable with any command higher than an Army command, mainly, I believe, because he does not want any other command than an army command and is not really interested in the war beyond the Va. Tidewaters, at least insofar as to serving anywhere else.

I think it's important to remember that Lee had spent most of his career as an engineer. Besides the problematic command situation others have pointed out in this thread I think it's not unreasonable to think Lee might have had some trouble early on getting his bearings. His later success with the ANV was a somewhat bumpy road and it took some time for him to figure out who he could rely on and who he wanted sent away for being unreliable. And in WV he wasn't exactly working with good subordinates.
 

OpnCoronet

Lt. Colonel
Joined
Feb 23, 2010
My understanding per James McPherson in Battle Cry of Freedom is that Lee served as an advisor in chief and command of the Confedrate forces in North West Virginia were divided into three separate commands. Each Confedrate commander had discretion in accepting or rejecting Lee's advice.
Leftyhunter


I agree that Lee had a difficult assignment. One, given the qualities of the two men Lee had to deal with, probably impossible. But, I get little impression that Lee really wanted the assignment, nor asserted what authority he did have.

I cannot help feeling that if Lee had thought the command and the area a promising one for his taking over, a few messages to Davis would have settled the issue of command.


P.S. I also believe Lees personal command style left much to be desired in dealing with the command situation.
 

OpnCoronet

Lt. Colonel
Joined
Feb 23, 2010
That Rosecrans, who on the morning of Rich Mountain had 4 of McClellan's 7 regiments, had departed from McClellan's battle plan is obvious. Rosecrans did not show up on Sugar Hill, which is where McClellan told him to go, and then after he'd overcome the detachment at the Hart House on the backside of the ridge he went static and didn't crest the hill.

McClellan realised Rosecrans was seriously off course as early as 0900, and sent a messenger to Rosecrans so he could be sent in the right direction, but the messenger was shot and captured. He told the rebels Rosecrans was making a turning movement on their left, and Pegram sent reinforcements to the Hart House (with a gun under Lt Statham) and onto Stonecoal Hill (with a gun under Lt Massey).

Rosecrans went up a re-entrant about 2 miles south of the one he should have. Hence him being so late. He reached Lone Tree over an hour after he was supposed to by on top of Sugar Hill turning the enemy. He then rested his men for an hour whilst he tried to work out where he was.

By this time Lt Poe had already led the 4th Ohio and 8 coys of the 3rd Ohio up onto Sugar Hill, leaving just the 9th Ohio and 2 coys of the 4th Ohio in line at the base of the hill. Massey was already bombarding them.

Around 90 minutes later Rosecrans has started moving and contacts the Harts House position. Lt Col Beatty is commanding the 2 coys of the 3rd Ohio thrown out as skirmishers at the base of the ridge. McClellan is on the skirmish line, listening and watching. It's clear to him that the firing is "distant and stationary". The firing stops and they see a galloper riding in Camp Garnett and the rebels start cheering - Rosecrans has been repulsed.

Rosecrans would reorganise his command and make another (successful) attack late in the day. In the meantime, McClellan sends the 9th Ohio up onto Sugar Hill, and cuts a path for 4 guns of Loomis' Michigan battery to get up on the hill. The 14th and 15th Indiana had marched to Roaring Creek, and were placed in line in the early afternoon.

McClellan certainly did not hesitate. When Rosecrans failed, he adjusted his plans accordingly. It was his movement onto Sugar Hill, not Rosecrans' fight at the Hart House, which compelled the rebels to quit the field.




As I noted, when the plan did not go as planned, the only real fighting was done by Rosecrans. While McClellan was tiding up his plan, at least Rosecrans was actually engaing the enemy.

From the OP it seems the plan was for McClellan to advance as soon as gunfire was Heard, which is what he did not do when firing was actually heaard.
 

Joshism

2nd Lieutenant
Joined
Apr 30, 2012
Location
Jupiter, FL
I cannot help feeling that if Lee had thought the command and the area a promising one for his taking over, a few messages to Davis would have settled the issue of command.

Did Lee have Davis' trust at this point? Or did that only happen when Lee was the president's military advisor before becoming ANV commander?

I also believe Lees personal command style left much to be desired in dealing with the command situation.

Lee's hands-off command style was not well-suited for weak and fractious subordinates, but the space and terrain of WV may not have been well-suited for hands-on regional command either.
 

67th Tigers

1st Lieutenant
Joined
Nov 10, 2006
As I noted, when the plan did not go as planned, the only real fighting was done by Rosecrans. While McClellan was tiding up his plan, at least Rosecrans was actually engaing the enemy.

From the OP it seems the plan was for McClellan to advance as soon as gunfire was Heard, which is what he did not do when firing was actually heaard.
McClellan, of course, initially praised Rosecrans. Then he found out the circumstances of Rosecrans fight and he outright stated (correctly) that Rosecrans failed in his mission. Rosecrans (with 1,917 men) was in contact with only 310 men in 4 coys and a single gun. The other 16 coys (so ca. 1,240 men) and 3 guns were at Camp Garnett ready to receive any assault from the 3 Federal regiments at Roaring Creek. The Federal artillery could not elevate to hit the positions on the ridge, and so were useless for the attack.

When Rosecrans failed to appear, McClellan sent 18 of his 30 infantry coys (ca. 950 men) to where Rosecrans should have been, leaving him 12 coys (ca. 630 men) at the base of the ridge.

Two newly raised Indiana regiments had force marched to Roaring Creek, and but only one arrived early afternoon (the other in the evening), giving McClellan 2.2 regiments at the base of the ridge (ca. 1,580 men) or 2,100 men at the base and on Sugar Hill combined (so ca. 4,000 in total, with Rosecrans). These were certainly terrible odds, and any assault up the mountain had no chance of success.

The plan was for Rosecrans to go up onto Sugar Hill, and work his way round for a simultaneous attack on the front and flank of Camp Garnett. Rosecrans never got within 1.5 miles of Camp Garnett. The odds would have been 7.5 regts (without arty support) vs 1.8 regts (with 4 guns), and it may have been bloody, but at 4:1 odds the camp may have been overrun.

However, ca. 1500 hrs the question is whether this attack can work with 4 regts (vs 1.6 regts and 3 guns) or odds of 2.5:1, because Rosecrans is nowhere to be seen.

Obviously, we know that McClellan thought such odds were against him (and they were) and opted to even them by bringing his artillery to a point where they could be employed.

Rosecrans may have "done some fighting", but it was not the fighting McClellan ordered him to do. By getting lost and becoming hung up on the Hart House outpost (at odds of ca. 9:1), he had thrown McClellan's plans into disarray. In Rosecrans' defence, after he finally took the Hart House he found the 44th Virginia coming up the ridge from the east, which led to him "digging in" rather than turning west to join in on an attack on Camp Garnett.
 

67th Tigers

1st Lieutenant
Joined
Nov 10, 2006
My understanding per James McPherson in Battle Cry of Freedom is that Lee served as an advisor in chief and command of the Confedrate forces in North West Virginia were divided into three separate commands. Each Confedrate commander had discretion in accepting or rejecting Lee's advice.
Leftyhunter
He was the GOC of the Virginia Forces. He did devise a scheme wherein Rosecrans would be lured into the Kanawha valley by Floyd's Brigade (5 regts) and Wise's brigade (3 inf regts) working as a division with an additional 3 regts he sent under Wise demonstrating at Gauley bridge and then strike at Cheat Mountain with part of the Army of Northwestern Virginia (6 bdes, 20 regts equiv). Floyd and Wise did not work well together and on the 20th (?) September Lee relieved Wise of his command, ordered all his forces be directly under Floyd and had Wise come to Richmond.

Lee probably had ca. 20,000 effectives in West Va. in 29 complete infantry regts, 4 Bns (each ca. a half-regiment strong), 11 batteries and about 2 regts worth of cavalry. If he'd have command directly and actually concentrated to strike Rosecrans, he could perhaps of overwhelmed him.

ANWVa
1st Bde - remained with "Allegheny" Johnston's rump ANWVa
2nd Bde - to Fredericksburg and hence to GW Smith's Grand Division
3rd Bde - broken up. The 2 TN regts to AS Johnston (fought at Shiloh) and 2 GA regts to ANV
4th and 6th Bdes (minus 6th NC) - to the Stonewall Division as Burks' Bde
5th Bde - broken up. 27th and 37th Va to Stonewall Division, 44th remained with rump ANWVa

AotK
Floyd - 22nd and 45th Va remained in the Kanawha, but the rest of the bde went to Fort Donelson...
Wise - 46th and 60th Va to ANV, 59th to Roanoke Island (mostly captured)
Reinforcements - 24th NC and 13th GA to ANV, 30th is a mystery due to renumbering April 1862...


The Orbats of the Formations were:

Army of Northwestern Virginia (Loring)

1st Bde (BG HR Jackson):

3rd Arkansas
31st Virginia
Hansbrough's Battalion (9th Va Bn) - 4 coys
(these three units were under Col Rust as a column)
12th Georgia
52nd Virginia
Danville Artillery
Maj Jackson's Cavalry

2nd Bde (BG SR Anderson)
1st Tennessee
7th Tennessee
14th Tennessee
Hampden Artillery
Capt Alexander's cavalry company

3rd Bde (BG Donelson)
8th Tennessee
16th Tennessee
1st Georgia
14th Georgia
Greenbriar Cavalry
(no arty, a section of the Hampden arty to be attached)

4th Bde (Col Wm Gilham)
21st Virginia
6th North Carolina
1st Bn of the Va Provisional Army (1st Va Bn)
Troup Artillery

5th Bde (Col. Wm B Taliaferro)
25th Virginia "Reger's battalion" (residue of regiment)
37th Virginia
(these two regiments were under Fulkerson as a column)
23rd Virginia
44th Virginia
Rice's Battery
Lee's Battery

6th Bde (Col JS Burke)
42nd Virginia
48th Virginia
Lee's Cavalry
(no arty, section of Troup Arty to be attached)
(20th Virginia had been effectively destroyed in July, and on 10th September it was formally disbanded and the remaining personnel transferred to other regts)

The 1st and 5th Bdes were used to attack Cheat Mountain.


Army of the Kanawha

Floyd's Brigade

22nd Virginia
36th Virginia
45th Virginia
50th Virginia
51st Virginia
Kanawha Militia Bn (from the 51st Va Militia)
2x coys of cavalry
2x batteries (Adam's Va Gauley Artillery and Guy's State Volunteer Artillery)

Wise's Brigade (Wise Legion)
46th Virginia
59th Virginia
60th Virginia
8th Virginia Cavalry
Wise Legion Arty Bn (4 btys)

Reinforcing Brigade (joined around the retreat from Carnifex Ferry)
14th (24th) North Carolina Volunteers (14th Vols renumbered 24th NC State in November)
13th Georgia
30th Georgia
 
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