West Pointism

[atlantis]

West Points graduates brought many valuable skills to the confederate army, but none had commanded a Corp much less an army. The Mexican war experience of the graduates did it not blind them to the fact the Rebellion was going to be a conflict of a different nature, not to mention the advances in weapon technology.
So, was Davis right to rely so heavenly on West Point Graduates are should he have been more open to non-west point graduates in senior positions.

 

[JerryD]

I agree with this, but only in the early years of the war. As the war progressed, there came many reliable non-West Point officers, many of whom were not favored for promotion at all (Richard Taylor, Cleburne, etc).

Agree. Generally experience and performance should trump education. Lots of West Pointers (USA and CSA) showed by performance they were not suited to their commands, but lots of civilians also showed they had a natural talent for war and were quick learners. Gotta believe the best classroom for learning the art of war is the battlefield. But as you implied, its a total **** shoot to just put civilians in those roles at first. I think its a fair statement to say the percentage of successful generals was much higher among West Pointers than over civilians. But there were certainly exceptions.

 

[Old Soldier]

It is notable that the British purchase of commisson was abolished soon after in 1871. That system allowed anyone to BUY a commission in the army or navy without any previous experience or training. A commission was seen as advancement in social standing rather than ability to command. The Royal Navy was more circumspect about it since some knowledge - and practice - of seamanship was seen as necessary. The Great Peace of 1815 onwards (the Pax Britannia) cemented it as an 'institiution', since there was no major conflict in Europe to generate experience, most of the experience being gained 'in the colonies', particularly with the Honourable East India Company whose army was not part of the British army and where service there was counted as beneath many higher rank officers.

Rather than performance, promotion was mainly based on purchase and 'social position' which, in those days meant MONEY as well as influence. There were some outstanding generals and regimental commanders, but there were also some dismal failures. The commanders tended to be the titles -lords, earls etc, - the 'Upper Class' of society at that time. The Crimean War (1854-55) highlighted the problem of inexperienced but influential commanders but it still took another 15 years to get it abolished.

This seems to be irrelevant to the US Army, but the same principles apply. In times of peace, promotions are based on influence rather than performance. There were/are generals who had never gone to war and gained promotion on social standing, theoretical knowledge or paper qualifications.

 

[James Brenner]

"There were/are generals who had never gone to war and gained promotion on social standing, theoretical knowledge or paper qualifications."

Not sure that is true. Chaplains, lawyers, and physicians often receive direct commissions and promotions because of their professional knowledge, not because of their combat skills. Is that a bad thing if they achieve a star? I am unaware of any GOFO who gained flag rank based upon social standing. Can you give some examples, please? As for combat experience, I would agree with you for the period after VN and before DS/DD. Aside from Grenada and Panama, there were no wars for them to participate in.

 

[Belfoured]

If they had no experience, that was all they had.

No kidding. I pointed to Polk as an isolated example of an academy grad who was "working just on theory". The implication that the USMA (and other credible academy) grads who were appointed/eligible for appointment and who were "working just on theory" is meaningless without specifics. We know that Jackson wasn't ... Try this: appointing a guy with professional academy training AND experience is less of a dice roll than appointing a guy with no professional training but with experience.

 

[Belfoured]

There's more to an academy education than tactics. Intangibles such as duty, honor, integrity, discipline, leadership, adaptability, morale, esprit, etc. were (and are) important factors when transforming a civilian into a soldier - particularly in 1861.

Agree. And any suggestion that training in engineering, topography, acoustics, etc is completely irrelevant to military proficiency is dead wrong. The USMA used texts in this era that covered a variety of subjects, such as logistics as logistics. Artillery instruction covered essential information about the theory of fire, ordnance, etc.

 

[atlantis]

The confederates having to create an army from scratch while at war poses a question how to make the best use of west point graduates and men with Mexican war experience.
The fact that 4 states joined the confederacy after the army had been created did this complicate matters.

 

[35th MA InfRegt]

"There were/are generals who had never gone to war and gained promotion on social standing, theoretical knowledge or paper qualifications."

Not sure that is true. Chaplains, lawyers, and physicians often receive direct commissions and promotions because of their professional knowledge, not because of their combat skills. Is that a bad thing if they achieve a star? I am unaware of any GOFO who gained flag rank based upon social standing. Can you give some examples, please? As for combat experience, I would agree with you for the period after VN and before DS/DD. Aside from Grenada and Panama, there were no wars for them to participate in.

There was at least one British general in the Crimean War who had never gone to war and never had any combat experience. This was the infamous Major-General the Earl of Cardigan, the man who infamously led the Charge of the Light Brigade. His superior Lord Lucan had never seen more than a small skirmish or two at best, had spent years on half-pay and was completely unqualified to lead a cavalry division (at least Cardigan knew how to drill his men). The man at the top, Field-Marshal Lord Raglan had last seen combat at Waterloo while serving as an ADC to Wellington and had, despite his decades long career, never commanded even a company. So, yes, there were too many entitled louts and desk soldiers in the British Army and the Crimean War certainly seemed to bring out the worst of them.

One should also note that while it was entirely possible to become a lieutenant colonel by purchase in the British Army, virtually the only way for a non-royal to become a general officer after Waterloo was by seniority, and by seniority alone whether on full pay or half pay. Cardigan who bought his way to a lieutenant colonelcy in 1830 after only six years of service, did not become a major general until 1854. And that was the norm for this period, two decades or more to earn promotion to GO by seniority alone. In the 1850's, Britain's army was plagued by the horde of over the hill time servers the automatic promotion by seniority system threw up.

Where influence and social position played their part was a general actually getting a command position whether or not his past experience actually merited future promotion. Proximity to the Court, the politicians and the mandarins of Whitehall could be far more important in gaining command than qualifications on paper. This system was under challenge by the time the Crimean War came along, but it was a bit too late for the lads who had to do the fighting.

Now how it works in modern times, I wouldn't venture to speculate.

 

[Belfoured]

Agree. Generally experience and performance should trump education. Lots of West Pointers (USA and CSA) showed by performance they were not suited to their commands, but lots of civilians also showed they had a natural talent for war and were quick learners. Gotta believe the best classroom for learning the art of war is the battlefield. But as you implied, its a total **** shoot to just put civilians in those roles at first. I think its a fair statement to say the percentage of successful generals was much higher among West Pointers than over civilians. But there were certainly exceptions.

Those are good points. There's a reason we still vest command in academy grads. My point is simply that at the outset of the war it made sense to prefer guys with professional training. The "experience" available was from the War with Mexico and isolated western outposts - maybe the Seminole Wars. With very, very few exceptions, none of those produced guys with "experience" above small unit involvement, so anything at a higher level required a "learning curve". Command experimentation at the beginning of a war isn't a great formula for success, IMHO.

 

[35th MA InfRegt]

Agree. And any suggestion that training in engineering, topography, acoustics, etc is completely irrelevant to military proficiency is dead wrong. The USMA used texts in this era that covered a variety of subjectst, such as logistics as logistics. Artillery instruction covered essential information about the theory of fire, ordnance, etc.

All quite true, and than there is the simple fact that by far the largest military library in the United States-and one holding the most recent, up to date manuals, texts and histories in the English language-was at West Point. Much of that material simply wasn't readily available to the average citizen living outside New York, Boston or Philadelphia. Now, whether or not regular officers made the most of this opportunity is another conversation.

 

[Belfoured]

All quite true, and than there is the simple fact that by far the largest military library in the United States-and one holding the most recent, up to date manuals, texts and histories in the English language-was at West Point. Much of that material simply wasn't readily available to the average citizen living outside New York, Boston or Philadelphia. Now, whether or not regular officers made the most of this opportunity is another conversation.

That's an excellent point. It's unclear how much of that material was available even in the places you mention, or why the average citizen would go to the trouble of accessing it. In a way, it calls to mind Henry Knox. Most of his knowledge came from materials in his bookstore/talking with British customers, and drilling with his militia unit The Train. He accomplished much without professional training but it was his incompetent amateur tactical advice at Germantown that may have cost the battle.

 

[Library Lady]

From a Yankee point of view, the most lasting contribution to the world from both the Earl of Cardigan and Lord Raglan can be found in the clothing department: Cardigan sweater and Raglan sleeve or coat. If you're a Brit, your mileage may vary.

 

[Old Soldier]

From a Yankee point of view, the most lasting contribution to the world from both the Earl of Cardigan and Lord Raglan can be found in the clothing department: Cardigan sweater and Raglan sleeve or coat. If you're a Brit, your mileage may vary.

Social standing again?

 

[Old Soldier]

Those are good points. There's a reason we still vest command in academy grads. My point is simply that at the outset of the war it made sense to prefer guys with professional training. The "experience" available was from the War with Mexico and isolated western outposts - maybe the Seminole Wars. With very, very few exceptions, none of those produced guys with "experience" above small unit involvement, so anything at a higher level required a "learning curve". Command experimentation at the beginning of a war isn't a great formula for success, IMHO.

Problem is, there were not enough officers to go around - just like the available arms - and the trained regular soldiers. Some officers were VOTED in! Again, some regiments were raised by someone 'high up' who volunteered and would buy the uniform for all the men too - hence the Zouaves. They would be the Colonel - the commander of the regiment - fresh from ... the stock exchange? The office? The board room? Just how many West Pointers were employed in both armies? How far down the ranks did they go?

Then there is the point I raised earlier - orders. Who actually knew what they were supposed to do? If the brigade commander knew what he had to do, fine, but did the officers under his command know? Did the officers in those regiments know what to do? We tend to assume that if the generals had some idea, everyone else had too. What about the guys who DID know what to do under the command of a general who did not?

 

[7th Mississippi Infantry]

Some officers were VOTED in!

Yep !
Experience and qualifications rarely a factor, only popularity or wealth.

 

[Library Lady]

Yep !
Experience and qualifications rarely a factor, only popularity & wealth.

Lincoln was voted in as a militia officer (captain) for about 2-1/2 months during the Black Hawk War. He didn't see combat. On the other hand, neither did Winfield Scott. He was sent to Illinois with 1000 troops to put down this indigenous rebellion; however, many contracted cholera in New York before they left, so by the time they got to Fort Dearborn (Chicago) there were only 220 remaining to make the march to Fort Armstrong (Rock Island) and the rebellion was basically over. They brought the cholera with them and within about a week of their arrival at Fort Armstrong almost 200 people had died. All Scott had to show for it is that there is now a town in my area named for him (Winfield) and a major arterial, also in my area, called Army Trail Road. Jefferson Davis' first army combat assignment was during the Black Hawk War, but there is no evidence that he actually fought. He did, however, escort Black Hawk to Jefferson Barracks in St. Louis at the end of the war.

 

[G Low]

Lincoln was voted in as a militia officer (captain) for about 2-1/2 months during the Black Hawk War. He didn't see combat. On the other hand, neither did Winfield Scott. He was sent to Illinois with 1000 troops to put down this indigenous rebellion; however, many contracted cholera in New York before they left, so by the time they got to Fort Dearborn (Chicago) there were only 220 remaining to make the march to Fort Armstrong (Rock Island) and the rebellion was basically over. They brought the cholera with them and within about a week of their arrival at Fort Armstrong almost 200 people had died. All Scott had to show for it is that there is now a town in my area named for him (Winfield) and a major arterial, also in my area, called Army Trail Road. Jefferson Davis' first army combat assignment was during the Black Hawk War, but there is no evidence that he actually fought. He did, however, escort Black Hawk to Jefferson Barracks in St. Louis at the end of the war.

Winfield Scott also has a lake named after him that is located near Vogel State park in Georgia near where he rounded up Cherokee Indians before the trail of tears .

 

[Belfoured]

Problem is, there were not enough officers to go around - just like the available arms - and the trained regular soldiers. Some officers were VOTED in! Again, some regiments were raised by someone 'high up' who volunteered and would buy the uniform for all the men too - hence the Zouaves. They would be the Colonel - the commander of the regiment - fresh from ... the stock exchange? The office? The board room? Just how many West Pointers were employed in both armies? How far down the ranks did they go?

Then there is the point I raised earlier - orders. Who actually knew what they were supposed to do? If the brigade commander knew what he had to do, fine, but did the officers under his command know? Did the officers in those regiments know what to do? We tend to assume that if the generals had some idea, everyone else had too. What about the guys who DID know what to do under the command of a general who did not?

As I made clear, I was referring to a preference for appointments at higher levels of command at the beginning of the war. Your point is irrelevant to that. And I covered credible academies, not just USMA.

To your point, a lot of the officers lower down were rank amateurs for the reasons you note. Who do you think was capable of instructing them? As for who could instruct company officers and troops in a regiment, a good example is the 21st Illinois in 1861.

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

I believe Davis was fundamentally correct in favouring West Point graduates over civilians. When the fate of the rebellion was at stake, entrusting his army to complete amateurs would have been grossly irresponsible.

Favoring West Point graduates was wise, but that is totally separate from placing and keeping his own West Point "buddies" in senior positions regardless of their failures and demonstrations of incompetence.

 

[35th MA InfRegt]

Favoring West Point graduates was wise, but that is totally separate from placing and keeping his own West Point "buddies" in senior positions regardless of their failures and demonstrations of incompetence.

I agree. I am reminded of a quote from the not terribly well-regarded Douglas Haig when he was asked to reorganize his transportation organization. I am paraphrasing from memory here, but Haig told the London authorities he would rather have a qualified civilian expert come in and run his railroads (*) than some general or colonel who knew nothing about transportation. Davis would have done well to adopt a similar philosophy.

(*) The expert in question was railroad executive Eric Geddes. He was made a major-general straight from civilian life and quickly fixed Haig's transportation issues.

 

[Belfoured]

I agree. I am reminded of a quote from the not terribly well-regarded Douglas Haig when he was asked to reorganize his transportation organization. I am paraphrasing from memory here, but Haig told the London authorities he would rather have a qualified civilian expert come in and run his railroads (*) than some general or colonel who knew nothing about transportation. Davis would have done well to adopt a similar philosophy.

(*) The expert in question was railroad executive Eric Geddes. He was made a major-general straight from civilian life and quickly fixed Haig's transportation issues.

The best example is Herman Haupt, who performed brilliantly for the Union war effort after leaving civilian life to run the USMRR. Ironically, he disliked working with military professionals enough that he rejected a commission as Brigadier General and returned to civilian life.