West Pointism

[atlantis]

West Points graduates brought many valuable skills to the confederate army, but none had commanded a Corp much less an army. The Mexican war experience of the graduates did it not blind them to the fact the Rebellion was going to be a conflict of a different nature, not to mention the advances in weapon technology.
So, was Davis right to rely so heavenly on West Point Graduates are should he have been more open to non-west point graduates in senior positions.

 

[Belfoured]

Thank you for correcting me. He was not a particularly good teacher however, but he had experience in the Mexican-American War and was not working on just theory. Some of the US generals also fought in that war - but not all. Did they learn anything from it?

Some did, some did not. And - other than an isolated example like Polk - how many USMA grads were "working on just theory"? That's a red herring IMHO ...

 

[G Low]

Look at the Commanders in chiefs. Perhaps the south was handicapped because Davis (a west pointer) favored west pointers and Lincoln just favored results. Lincoln would remove a west pointer from command in a minute but Davis couldn't or was slow to do so. Davis got a few good non west pointers Wade Hampton and John Gordon among others plus some bad ones from West Point, Polk and Bragg.

 

[Library Lady]

Thank you for correcting me. He was not a particularly good teacher however, but he had experience in the Mexican-American War and was not working on just theory. Some of the US generals also fought in that war - but not all. Did they learn anything from it?

I'm not sure the question "Did they learn anything from it?" is sufficient, but rather, "Did they learn anything of value from it that would still apply in the changed circumstances of the Civil War?" I've heard it said that when a new war starts, we're always ready to fight the last war. We've learned from our mistakes and we're not going to make them again, but we're no longer fighting with the same equipment or in the same circumstances. Is it possible that what we've learned from the last war will actually hold us back when applied to the new one?

 

[Stryker65]

Look at the Commanders in chiefs. Perhaps the south was handicapped because Davis (a west pointer) favored west pointers and Lincoln just favored results. Lincoln would remove a west pointer from command in a minute but Davis couldn't or was slow to do so. Davis got a few good non west pointers Wade Hampton and John Gordon among others plus some bad ones from West Point, Polk and Bragg.

Agree with this. The other side of this was that Lincoln was handicapped from immediately relieving political generals, and was forced to stick with many of them for longer than he would have wanted (Fremont, Banks, Butler, Sigel); meanwhile Davis got rid of most of his pretty quickly (L. P. Walker, Chesnut, Toombs, Cobb, etc)

 

[35th MA InfRegt]

You mean like, for example, Gideon Pillow?

Not the example I was thinking of (I had actually mentally slotted Buell for this category), but I certainly can't argue with your choice.

 

[35th MA InfRegt]

I'm not sure the question "Did they learn anything from it?" is sufficient, but rather, "Did they learn anything of value from it that would still apply in the changed circumstances of the Civil War?" I've heard it said that when a new war starts, we're always ready to fight the last war. We've learned from our mistakes and we're not going to make them again, but we're no longer fighting with the same equipment or in the same circumstances. Is it possible that what we've learned from the last war will actually hold us back when applied to the new one?

Yes, it is absolutely possible that what we've learned from the last war will hold us back in the next war. Whether or not that applied in the specific case of officers in the Civil War with Mexican War experience is open to debate. I am inclined to think it was not a significant issue in that particular conflict.

 

[atlantis]

If Davis had promoted Gideon Pillow and John Floyd to command the two main armies there would have a been a far different outcome. They understood the confederate soldier his strengths and weaknesses and they had the pulse of the people. Alas Davis was a rebel not a Revolutionary.
Bash Fremont, Banks and Sigel all you want they stepped up and filled the breech like Harold facing off with William the conqueror.
Remember the words of Napoleon at Waterloo.
.

 

[Stryker65]

If Davis had promoted Gideon Pillow and John Floyd to command the two main armies there would have a been a far different outcome. They understood the confederate soldier his strengths and weaknesses and they had the pulse of the people. Alas Davis was a rebel not a Revolutionary.
Bash Fremont, Banks and Sigel all you want they stepped up and filled the breech like Harold facing off with William the conqueror.
Remember the words of Napoleon at Waterloo.

They would have all done...really badly, you mean? Floyd nor Pillow were reliable field commanders, and both were cowards. What breech are you talking about that Fremont, Banks, and Sigel filled? Fremont accomplished next to nothing in his service, Banks neither, and Sigel even less.

 

[G Low]

If Davis had promoted Gideon Pillow and John Floyd to command the two main armies there would have a been a far different outcome. They understood the confederate soldier his strengths and weaknesses and they had the pulse of the people. Alas Davis was a rebel not a Revolutionary.
Bash Fremont, Banks and Sigel all you want they stepped up and filled the breech like Harold facing off with William the conqueror.
Remember the words of Napoleon at Waterloo.
.

I don't think Napoleon had much to say after Waterloo is that the point?

 

[gary]

There were outstanding amateurs, namely Forrest and Raccoon Rough's own John B. Gordon. However, it took time to find them. Better West Point than political appointees like John B. Floyd or Gideon, the dual heros of Fort Donelson. Not that coming from West Point ensured that you had a top notch fighter/strategian. Case in point, Henry Hopkins Sibley who is best remembered in modern American memory for the remark by the contemptuous innkeeper who saw Sibley ride by and said, "Sibley, he looks dead." Most Americans outside this forum are ignorant of Sibley but he was immortalized in Sergio Leone's flick, The Good, The Bad and The Ugly. BTW, Tuco couldn't be shouting hurrah for Lee or calling Grant a bum (correct me if I'm wrong) b/c they weren't really popular at the time Glorietta was fought.

 

[Belfoured]

There were outstanding amateurs, namely Forrest and Raccoon Rough's own John B. Gordon. However, it took time to find them. Better West Point than political appointees like John B. Floyd or Gideon, the dual heros of Fort Donelson. Not that coming from West Point ensured that you had a top notch fighter/strategian. Case in point, Henry Hopkins Sibley who is best remembered in modern American memory for the remark by the contemptuous innkeeper who saw Sibley ride by and said, "Sibley, he looks dead." Most Americans outside this forum are ignorant of Sibley but he was immortalized in Sergio Leone's flick, The Good, The Bad and The Ugly. BTW, Tuco couldn't be shouting hurrah for Lee or calling Grant a bum (correct me if I'm wrong) b/c they weren't really popular at the time Glorietta was fought.

Those are good points. Two things can be true at the same time: (1) academy training is no guarantee of success; (2) appointing somebody to high command without that professional training - especially at the beginning - is nothing more than rolling the dice.

Sibley a/k/a the Walking Whiskey Keg ...

 

[Belfoured]

They would have all done...really badly, you mean? Floyd nor Pillow were reliable field commanders, and both were cowards. What breech are you talking about that Fremont, Banks, and Sigel filled? Fremont accomplished next to nothing in his service, Banks neither, and Sigel even less.

I would contest ranking Sigel below Fremont. Sigel actually performed well at Pea Ridge - that's one more good performance than Fremont had. But then Fremont was overrated as an explorer, to boot. Ask any survivors of his disastrous 1848-49 expedition and his stupid decision to cross the San Juans in the heart of winter. I've gotten snowed on in there in August.

 

[Old Soldier]

Some did, some did not. And - other than an isolated example like Polk - how many USMA grads were "working on just theory"? That's a red herring IMHO ...

If they had no experience, that was all they had.

 

[atlantis]

If they had no experience, that was all they had.

No experience means a clean slate, instead of a closed mind they were open to new ways of doing things, like Banzai charges.

 

[atlantis]

They would have all done...really badly, you mean? Floyd nor Pillow were reliable field commanders, and both were cowards. What breech are you talking about that Fremont, Banks, and Sigel filled? Fremont accomplished next to nothing in his service, Banks neither, and Sigel even less.

In our nation's hour of peril, they answered her cry for help. As for Floyd and Pillow in their own way they helped restore the union.

 

[Stryker65]

In our nation's hour of peril, they answered her cry for help. As for Floyd and Pillow in their own way they helped restore the union.

This question goes for anyone, but does anyone else find it strange that it was the political and volunteer generals who were relied upon the most in 1861? With a few exceptions, all of the Regular Army infantry colonels (the only ones left after the generals retired or defected or were captured) were relegated to unknown posts. Of the of-age ones, Miles was put on railroad duty, Bonneville and Loomis and Morrison and Alexander were put on recruiting duty, and only Abercrombie received a field command. During the lead-up to Bull Run, the defenses of Washington were staffed by veteran officers such as Lt. Col. Charles F. Smith and Col. J. K. F. Mansfield. Could these officers have been placed in primary positions instead? The War Department clearly had no problem promoting McClellan directly to a MG USA; why not these men as leading officers instead?

I understand of course the necessity of satisfying the political machines at work, or that of the German population, but it is interesting that when career Regular colonels and lieutenant colonels DID receive generalships, they were placed far below other, less-experienced officers.

 

[James Brenner]

There's more to an academy education than tactics. Intangibles such as duty, honor, integrity, discipline, leadership, adaptability, morale, esprit, etc. were (and are) important factors when transforming a civilian into a soldier - particularly in 1861.

 

[Old Ranger]

West Points graduates brought many valuable skills to the confederate army, but none had commanded a Corp much less an army. The Mexican war experience of the graduates did it not blind them to the fact the Rebellion was going to be a conflict of a different nature, not to mention the advances in weapon technology.
So, was Davis right to rely so heavenly on West Point Graduates are should he have been more open to non-west point graduates in senior positions.

At the time, West Point was the source of professional military officers. They formed the core of an expanding army. The same as WWI and WWII. In each case, there were non Academy graduates who were exceptional leaders. Less true today, but back then, that was the case.

 

[Old Soldier]

No experience means a clean slate, instead of a closed mind they were open to new ways of doing things, like Banzai charges.

A clean slate has NOTHING on it.

 

[Old Soldier]

I'm not sure the question "Did they learn anything from it?" is sufficient, but rather, "Did they learn anything of value from it that would still apply in the changed circumstances of the Civil War?" I've heard it said that when a new war starts, we're always ready to fight the last war. We've learned from our mistakes and we're not going to make them again, but we're no longer fighting with the same equipment or in the same circumstances. Is it possible that what we've learned from the last war will actually hold us back when applied to the new one?

This was a time of technological advance. New techniques were needed, but the 'old way' was the one being taught. With the advent of the general issue rifle - a weapon that could be aimed to kill at 600 yards, the tactics used were more Napoleonic. The P53 was sighted up to 900 yards and and was graduated every 100 yards. The French M1857 had a sight setting every 100m to 1100m AND an incremental scale! The P1861 had three sight settings 100, 300 and 500.(The older M1855 had a backsight graduated to 800 yards with 100 yards increments) Most European officers were trained in range estimation for that reason as were riflemen in rifle regiments and marksmen in infantry regiments.

One of the factors for Europeans studying the civil war is how the rifle was used more like a smoothbore musket and followed similar tactics. The men were trained in that way with little emphasis on marksmanship. There also seems to be little use of company fire to produce a 'beaten zone'. The reliance was on artillery for 'long distance' fire. The Brits had noted this way back and started training infantry soldiers in the same way as the rifle regiments almost immediately. They discovered the same problems in tactics during the Crimean War although there was little opportunity to try new tactics. They even formed the National Rifle Association in 1860 to promote marksmanship among the newly formed Rifle Volunteer movement.

In the USA, Civil War veteran George Wood Wingate served with 82nd New York Volunteer Infantry Regiment, entering as a private and eventually rising to the rank of captain. In Wingate's experience, he noticed that many Union soldiers lacked basic marksmanship skills which motivated him to promote rifle proficiency among Americans. He was co-founder of the National Rifle Association of America in 1871 and was its first Secretary and later President. IOW - It took 15 years to make full use of a technological advance.