Were Lee's orders too vague?

[Pima]

Online I have read several criticisms of Lee's generalship. According to some historians Lee was sometimes a bit too aggressive. Other experts also criticize Lee's style of command; they claim that Lee's orders were vague (a better term would probably be "discretionary").

A famous example would be Lee' s order to Ewell on July 1 1863. Cemetery Hill had to be taken "if practicable". At the end Ewell did not take that important position. I would not like to discuss Ewell's decision or if "Stonewall" Jackson would have acted differently. I am mainly interested in Lee's orders.

Was Lee used to this style of command? Were other commanders more used to it (Longstreet and "Stonewall" Jackson) ? I guess that giving more initiative and independence to some commanders could be very useful and profitable. Other commanders on the other hand may have felt differently. I would love to know how Ewell felt when he received that famous order. I feel like Lee's style could work with more experienced generals; wasn't Ewell recently promoted to the position of Lieutenant General ? Why Lee didn't change his style? If I remember correctly Ewell was first a subordinate of "Stonewall" Jackson. It must have been a bit difficult to get used to two very different styles of command. Jackson had definitively a more "hands-on" approach.

Do you know if other such orders do exist? I would love to read the full text of the various orders. Can I find them on the OR? Is there a specific section that I could read? What is the difference between a more direct approach and a more indirect one?

Thank you. I really like the ACW but I still have to find a good way to get into the subject.

 

[TerryB]

Welcome to the forum! I have family in Rome. As to Lee's orders, this has been said by many writers about the war. I tend to agree, but I am no expert. My area is the war in the West, i.e., Tennessee, Kentucky, etc.

 

[bankerpapaw]

Lee should have told Ewell to "take that hill." My opinion.

 

[thomas aagaard]

Lee is not personally at the front.

He wants the hills taken if possible but he do not want to risk a large scale battle in the dark and he have no real knowledge about how many federal troops are on the hills or coming up from the federal rear.
(true out the musket period we very very rarely have field battles during the night, and it always become a mess. Attacks at fixed positions like forts, sure, but not field battles where the attacker don't know exactly where the defender is)

With that in mind the order makes sense.

Also I would think the order was written by someone on Lee's staff?


Obviously my opinion is effected by the fact that Iam of the firm opinion that Ewell did the right thing.
I have seen no good explanation as to how the hill could have been taken, considering the exhausted state of the available csa troops, the number of federals on the Hill (including a fresh brigade that had been in position for hours) and the federal reinforcements coming up from the east.

-
Another thing to think on.
One of the things that made the Prussians and later Germans so effective at the tactical and operational level was their mission command. At the core of this, is allowing the lower ranks initiative, both to do things without orders, or go beyond orders. But at the same time also, to not carry out orders (or do something else) if they believe the situation have changed.

So to me this is simply the logical solution for Lee when he don't know the situation at the front and know that micromanaging will be way too slow.

 

[breckod]

Lee should have told Ewell to "take that hill." My opinion.

Take the hill with what, exactly?

 

[RedRover]

General Ewell's official report of July 1:

General Lee's report on the same subject (written July 31):

General Ewell did not find it practicable to carry the hill, without bringing on a general engagement.

Armistead L. Long of Gen. Lee's staff later wrote of the situation late on July 1, so far as he recalled:

Campbell Brown, of Gen. Ewell's staff, wrote a good bit on the subject. His papers were edited and published in 2001.


General Lee was inclined to make full use of the abilities of his subordinates. Gen. Longstreet stated postwar that Gen. Lee did not micromanage:

When Lee gave a corps commander a job to do, it was that officer's job to figure out how to do it, or explain why he could not.

General Lee had not the time or inclination to play corps/division/brigade commander on the field, as it was difficult enough to coordinate the whole army simultaneously (three infantry corps, reserve artillery, cavalry division, attached cavalry, army trains, ordinance, commissary, quartermaster, and medical staff, etc.)

Longstreet notes, relative to the various criticisms of him at Gettysburg, that, for example, while Gen. Lee might have intended at some point him to attack early on the morning of July 2, Longstreet never was given any such order... and to prove it, he notes that on arriving on the field, he spoke to General Lee about the attack at length, and beyond the period Longstreet's critics claim he was supposed to have attacked. Point being, if Gen. Lee intended Gen. Longstreet to attack at say, 8 A.M. or something, he would not have listened to the latter's comments at all... There would have been no discussion.

Contrast, General Hood at Franklin: no discussion at all, just direct orders to his corps commanders to DRIVE THE (fortified) ENEMY INTO THE HARPETH RIVER, regardless of consequence. Having to obey orders, they did, and the army was effectively destroyed as a fighting force.

 

[jackt62]

I would love to know how Ewell felt when he received that famous order. I feel like Lee's style could work with more experienced generals; wasn't Ewell recently promoted to the position of Lieutenant General ? Why Lee didn't change his style? If I remember correctly Ewell was first a subordinate of "Stonewall" Jackson. It must have been a bit difficult to get used to two very different styles of command. Jackson had definitively a more "hands-on" approach.

Ewell was brought up under the strict tutelage of Stonewall Jackson, who generally did not give his subordinates "discretion" to interpret his orders. For better or worse, Ewell was used to having definite orders with clearly explained tasks and objectives. So it's no wonder that Ewell, operating under Lee's more fluid instructions, would find those type of orders somewhat disconcerting. One can understand Ewell's possible confusion that if Lee wanted Ewell to carry Cemetery Hill, then Lee should have written his orders to state that in no uncertain terms. Otherwise "if practicable" left too much decision making in the hands of a commander who was not used to making those kinds of decisions.

 

[jackt62]

He wants the hills taken if possible but he do not want to risk a large scale battle in the dark and he have no real knowledge about how many federal troops are on the hills or coming up from the federal rear.
(true out the musket period we very very rarely have field battles during the night, and it always become a mess. Attacks at fixed positions like forts, sure, but not field battles where the attacker don't know exactly where the defender is)

With that in mind the order makes sense.

I agree that in Lee's mind, the order made sense. But as I noted in post #7, Ewell was brought up under a different command structure, in which definitive orders ruled. What we have here is a disconnect between 2 officers with different sets of understanding when it came to issuing orders and using a certain amount of discretion. Under ideal conditions, Lee would have had a better understanding of Ewell's mindset and might have been better served had he communicated somewhat differently with him. But maybe it doesn't really matter; Ewell probably made the correct decision after considering the formidable position that had to be carried with nightfall coming on, exhausted troops, and no support available. Either way, Ewell should not be criticized for using the discretion that Lee provided him.

 

[rpkennedy]

Ewell was brought up under the strict tutelage of Stonewall Jackson, who generally did not give his subordinates "discretion" to interpret his orders. For better or worse, Ewell was used to having definite orders with clearly explained tasks and objectives. So it's no wonder that Ewell, operating under Lee's more fluid instructions, would find those type of orders somewhat disconcerting. One can understand Ewell's possible confusion that if Lee wanted Ewell to carry Cemetery Hill, then Lee should have written his orders to state that in no uncertain terms. Otherwise "if practicable" left too much decision making in the hands of a commander who was not used to making those kinds of decisions.

In fairness to Ewell, he was willing to give it a try with what he had on hand so long as he could get support from A.P. Hill on his right. Both Lee and Hill stated that they would not support an advance and so Ewell wisely opted to wait until Johnson's Division could arrive and strengthen a potential attack. It's just unfortunate that Johnson's men were stuck behind a baggage train and didn't come onto the field until after nightfall.

Ryan

 

[Like A Stonewall]

Online I have read several criticisms of Lee's generalship. According to some historians Lee was sometimes a bit too aggressive. Other experts also criticize Lee's style of command; they claim that Lee's orders were vague (a better term would probably be "discretionary").

A famous example would be Lee' s order to Ewell on July 1 1863. Cemetery Hill had to be taken "if practicable". At the end Ewell did not take that important position. I would not like to discuss Ewell's decision or if "Stonewall" Jackson would have acted differently. I am mainly interested in Lee's orders.

Was Lee used to this style of command? Were other commanders more used to it (Longstreet and "Stonewall" Jackson) ? I guess that giving more initiative and independence to some commanders could be very useful and profitable. Other commanders on the other hand may have felt differently. I would love to know how Ewell felt when he received that famous order. I feel like Lee's style could work with more experienced generals; wasn't Ewell recently promoted to the position of Lieutenant General ? Why Lee didn't change his style? If I remember correctly Ewell was first a subordinate of "Stonewall" Jackson. It must have been a bit difficult to get used to two very different styles of command. Jackson had definitively a more "hands-on" approach.

Do you know if other such orders do exist? I would love to read the full text of the various orders. Can I find them on the OR? Is there a specific section that I could read? What is the difference between a more direct approach and a more indirect one?

Thank you. I really like the ACW but I still have to find a good way to get into the subject.

I've read that Lee learned his style of command from Winfield Scott in Mexico. He gave a general framework of orders but left it to his officers to decide how to execute them.

 

[Like A Stonewall]

Ewell was brought up under the strict tutelage of Stonewall Jackson, who generally did not give his subordinates "discretion" to interpret his orders. For better or worse, Ewell was used to having definite orders with clearly explained tasks and objectives. So it's no wonder that Ewell, operating under Lee's more fluid instructions, would find those type of orders somewhat disconcerting. One can understand Ewell's possible confusion that if Lee wanted Ewell to carry Cemetery Hill, then Lee should have written his orders to state that in no uncertain terms. Otherwise "if practicable" left too much decision making in the hands of a commander who was not used to making those kinds of decisions.

This is such a good point.

 

[breckod]

Regardless of what he may have said later, Lee's decision not to support Ewell with any of Hill's troops seems to indicate he wasn't prepared or looking to launch an all-or-nothing effort to win the battle that evening.

 

[jackt62]

In fairness to Ewell, he was willing to give it a try with what he had on hand so long as he could get support from A.P. Hill on his right.

Absolutely and for a number of reasons. As I noted, Ewell probably made the correct decision after considering the formidable position that had to be carried with nightfall coming on, exhausted troops, and no support available. Either way, Ewell should not be criticized for using the discretion that Lee provided him.

 

[Rhea Cole]

The problems with the composition of Lee's orders have been exhaustively investigated. The real problem with Lee's orders at Gettysburg is that Lee had no choice but to make them vague.

In his after action report Lee stated that ill health had prevented him from making a proper reconnaissance of the battle space. Lee's orders were vague because he did not know enough about the terrain or tactical situation to give specific orders.

Of course, Stewart wasn't there. Neither were the loyal Virginia citizens who flocked to Lee's HQ to provide intel & local guides. Lee hadn't a clue what lay on the backside of the Union position.

What was the result of Lee's ignorance? Longstreet's countermarch & failed assault speak for themselves. The question is why didn't Lee have the situational awareness necessary for making informed tactical decisions?

Lee knew that Stewart, loyal Virginians were not present. What did Lee do to make up for his habitual intel sources? What resources did Lee have? That subject, as well, has been exhaustively investigated.

The consensus of scholarship is that Lee did not avail himself of the assets available to perform tactical reconnaissance of the A of the P's position. The Signal Service is cited as an unexploited asset.

We know that Lee was in contact with Ewel via visual signals. He had informed Ewel that he was sending him a captured copy of the latest US signal code.

Signal teams consisting of four to six men were mounted & highly mobile. Scouting & observing the enemy was a routine activity. There was no reason a station of observation could not have been established on Longstreet's line of march. Both Lee & Longstreet could have had real time reports sent at the speed of light instead of wandering blind.

As we know, it was a Union signal station of observation stop Little Round Top that necessitated Longstreet's countermarch. Obviously, the A of N VA leadership knew about signal nets connected to observers. Lee ordered Stewart to hunt down the signal teams operating in his rear. Contemporaneously, it was General Rosecrans' com network that allowed him to shift his main thrust from the left to the center overnight. It was the OODA Circle principle in action.

Unlike Rosecrans, Lee had no option but to issue open ended orders. He did not know enough about the ground to do otherwise. Likewise, Even if an unexpected breakthrough like Wilder's at Hoovers Gap had occurred, Lee had no way to exploit it.

Lee ordered the assault on "the copse of trees" because that was what he could see of the Union position. As we know, it was a profound tactical mistake.

Conclusion : It wasn't the vagueness of Lee's orders, it was the content that led to the defeat at Gettysburg.

 

[jackt62]

Of course, Stewart wasn't there. Neither were the loyal Virginia citizens who flocked to Lee's HQ to provide intel & local guides. Lee hasn't a clue what lay on the backside of the Union position.

So unlike the situation at Chancellorsville, only 2 months earlier. Stuart and Fitzhugh Lee had discovered the federal right flank hanging in the air, and the local citizenry showed Jackson and Lee the way to get there.

 

[Rhea Cole]

So unlike the situation at Chancellorsville, only 2 months earlier. Stuart and Fitzhugh Lee had discovered the federal right flank hanging in the air, and the local citizenry showed Jackson and Lee the way to get there.

Even with those advantages, Lee personally led an attempt to destroy the isolated 6th Corps that failed in what is considered a prequel to the command breakdowns at Gettysburg.

From the fiasco of the 6th's successful passage of the river to the Wilderness, none of the attacks Lee ordered achieved their objectives. The same thing would happen to Hood. The tactics that Lee fought battles with in 1862 didn't produce victories in 1863-65.

 

[OpnCoronet]

It is my understanding that few communications between commanders were models of clarity, especially in the middle of a battle. or a crisis of some kind.

 

[Present Arms]

Thomas Aagaard makes a critical point: The command style of "mission command" relies on the commander communicating his intent and the subordinate achieving that mission with regards to the current situation on the ground. Compare that style to detailed orders that allow no adjustment for changing conditions. Mission command requires courage of the commander to trust subordinates, and subordinates with the courage to take initiative. The risk is that too many subordinates deviating from the central plan may produce uncoordinated chaos. It is critical that the commander's communication is clear. Grant's orders are often described as the standard of clarity, which may have been due to the skill of his staff in composing the final orders. It is also critical that in the days leading up to the engagement, the commander continuously communicates his overall concept and priorities, and distributes current intelligence of the enemy and friendly situations.

 

[Rhea Cole]

It is my understanding that few communications between commanders were models of clarity, especially in the middle of a battle. or a crisis of some kind.

I recommend investigating Grant's orders. Today, his concise, clear orders are studied at staff schools. There never was any ambiguity about what Grant wanted to happen.

Rosecrans, on the other hand, rode around the battle space shouting nonsense orders in a jackhammer stutter.

 

[Pima]

I recommend investigating Grant's orders. Today, his concise, clear orders are studied at staff schools. There never was any ambiguity about what Grant wanted to happen.

Rosecrans, on the other hand, rode around the battle space shouting nonsense orders in a jackhammer stutter.

Uao !!! I absolutely need to delve into Grant's orders now. It seems that Grant's command style was very different from that of Lee. And also to that of Rosecrans . Clarity is a rather good thing to have in a difficult environment like that of a battlefield.

The OR may do it. Any particular campaign I should check?