Chattanooga Was Atlanta important?

[wausaubob]

Sorry, they didn't offer an Atlanta label.
Either view has merit.
Some of the small cities, if they had machine shops, a turntable for engines, or a rolling mill, and a few hundred men who knew how to tear down and rebuild a locomotive, were very significant places.
On the other hand, Atlanta was still a small city in that era.
@Rhea Cole states that Georgia was helping to feed the Confederate army in Virginia. Georgia had been settled decades by then. The farm production might have been somewhat diverse.
I don't think the Confederate defeat at Atlanta put Lincoln over the top, even though McClellan repudiated the peace plank of the Democratic platform.
Its possible some type of deal occurred. President Lincoln may have made promises to the New England abolitionist part of the Republican party which was headed by Sumner from Massachusetts. Fremont quit the Presidential race, and a few days later Sheridan's combined force defeated the Confederates in the Shannondoah Valley. Most of the northeastern states had regiments in Sheridan's force. I think that put Lincoln in a good position to win the election.
I think by that time it began to sink in that the US war effort was going much better than the naysayers represented.

 

[ivanj05]

It was certainly important to the Confederates from a political standpoint. Holding Atlanta through the 1864 was the last thin reed of hope the erstwhile Confederacy was hanging on. Now, whether or not them holding it would have actually changed the outcome of the election is certainly debatable, but there's no question that they believed that it could.

 

[Sheltowee]

Always considered Atlanta to be a significant rail center- and thus, a springboard to the greater prize……Savannah.

 

[wausaubob]

Always considered Atlanta to be a significant rail center- and thus, a springboard to the greater prize……Savannah.

And Charleston.

 

[SWS]

It appears that by 1863-1864, the frontier of the northeastern Confederacy, containing the South's principal field army and its populous capital, was almost entirely dependent upon the cereal region of southwestern Georgia and Atlanta's storehouses and turntable for forage and even breadstuffs. Until September 1863, provisions could be moved to Richmond over the preferred and most direct route via Atlanta, Chattanooga, Knoxville, Bristol, and Lynchburg. Until July 1864, subsistence trains could still be reliably moved over the more 'painfully roundabout' route via Augusta and the Carolinas. The destruction of the Georgia Central in November 1864 eliminated the final interior line of communication between impoverished Va. and the granary of the Old Southwest. By that time, Lee could no longer rely on either bushels from Ga. or flour from the Shenandoah Valley for bread rations and animal feed. A retirement to the line of the Roanoke and the ample depots at Danville and in N.C. in the spring became a necessity.

Northrop and Lawton wrote plainly to Lee in March 1864 following near conditions of famine in January: "Troops in Virginia depend on corn from Georgia for bread. For months we have been living from hand to mouth, and if the last reserve of flour at Lynchburg had not been used for the army destitution must have ensued. That condition is now impending, with no apparent remedy. Over 100,000 bushels of corn demand transportation; not over one-third of what is already on the road has arrived. Unless all passenger trains are stopped the consequences may be fatal. . ."

"Appreciating fully the great importance and extreme difficulty of supplying the Army [of Northern Virginia] with food and forage, I have spared no efforts to have them promptly transported from the far South, now our almost sole reliance. Great pressure has recently been brought to bear on the main trunk railways by the stoppage of passenger trains, express cars, &c., and a very large amount of corn and commissary stores have reached Richmond in the few days that have elapsed since I had the pleasure of seeing you here. Scarcely before during this war have so many public stores been moved within the same number of days by these roads. But like 'forced marches' in an emergency, these results cannot be kept up permanently. Our efforts will not be relaxed, however, and I hope for better things in future. . .

I beg you to remember, general, that up to this time last year not a car-load of corn nor subsistence stores had been brought points beyond Raleigh for your army. Now we are feeding the soldiers and horses of that army to a great extent from Georgia. Not a bat of railroad iron nor a single locomotive has been brought into the Confederacy. . . I beg you not to expect impossibilities. I admit that we have been able to accomplish so much now in the way of transportation and to sustain life with so much less in the way of food than we dreamed of three years since that my hopes are strong for the future. The arrivals at Richmond within the last week were such that you supplies for the present will only be limited by the capacity of the [Virginia] Central Railroad. One passenger train only each day is now permitted between Richmond and Augusta, Ga., and it is hoped that this arrangement will increase our supplies here."

Most tragically, Lee could not preemptively assume the offensive in late April, 1864, owing to a dearth of forage required for an early concentration of the artillery and cavalry and an advance through a barren country.

Jubal Early wrote of the Rappahannock in 1863: "We were in a country entirely devoid of supplies and of forage, for Fredericksburg had been occupied the previous summer by a Federal army, and no crops of any consequence had been made in all that region." Edmund Ruffin provides illuminating observations and commentary on the whole issue: "But while in Virginia there has been this great diminution of the green crops of this year [1863], it is fortunate for general as well as particular interests, that in the more Southern & South-western States, grain culture had generally superseded cotton & sugar culture, & that the grain crops have had the most propitious weather. Wheat has rarely been attempted south of northern N.C., & when sown farther south, has rarely escaped great damage from the climatic disease 'rust,' which seemed a never failing attendant & destroyer of this crop. But it is a remarkable fact of this year, & no less a great blessing to the cultivators & the country in general, that throughout the South, wherever wheat had been sown (& it had been very extensively sown,) fine crops were reaped, entirely untouched by rust."

In addition, it appears Lee's army and the capital had monopoly over what Georgia (and Wilmington?) could yield. Bragg and Hood attempted to draw their own supply from the Alabama Valley and East Mississippi in consequence.

 

[wausaubob]

It appears that by 1863-1864, the frontier of the northeastern Confederacy, containing the South's principal field army and its populous capital, was almost entirely dependent upon the cereal region of southwestern Georgia and Atlanta's storehouses and turntable for forage and even breadstuffs. Until September 1863, provisions could be moved to Richmond over the preferred and most direct route via Atlanta, Chattanooga, Knoxville, Bristol, and Lynchburg. Until July 1864, subsistence trains could still be reliably moved over the more 'painfully roundabout' route via Augusta and the Carolinas. The destruction of the Georgia Central in November 1864 eliminated the final interior line of communication between impoverished Va. and the granary of the Old Southwest. By that time, Lee could no longer rely on either bushels from Ga. or flour from the Shenandoah Valley for bread rations and animal feed. A retirement to the line of the Roanoke and the ample depots at Danville and in N.C. in the spring became a necessity.

Northrop and Lawton wrote plainly to Lee in March 1864 following near conditions of famine in January: "Troops in Virginia depend on corn from Georgia for bread. For months we have been living from hand to mouth, and if the last reserve of flour at Lynchburg had not been used for the army destitution must have ensued. That condition is now impending, with no apparent remedy. Over 100,000 bushels of corn demand transportation; not over one-third of what is already on the road has arrived. Unless all passenger trains are stopped the consequences may be fatal. . ."

"Appreciating fully the great importance and extreme difficulty of supplying the Army [of Northern Virginia] with food and forage, I have spared no efforts to have them promptly transported from the far South, now our almost sole reliance. Great pressure has recently been brought to bear on the main trunk railways by the stoppage of passenger trains, express cars, &c., and a very large amount of corn and commissary stores have reached Richmond in the few days that have elapsed since I had the pleasure of seeing you here. Scarcely before during this war have so many public stores been moved within the same number of days by these roads. But like 'forced marches' in an emergency, these results cannot be kept up permanently. Our efforts will not be relaxed, however, and I hope for better things in future. . .

I beg you to remember, general, that up to this time last year not a car-load of corn nor subsistence stores had been brought points beyond Raleigh for your army. Now we are feeding the soldiers and horses of that army to a great extent from Georgia. Not a bat of railroad iron nor a single locomotive has been brought into the Confederacy. . . I beg you not to expect impossibilities. I admit that we have been able to accomplish so much now in the way of transportation and to sustain life with so much less in the way of food than we dreamed of three years since that my hopes are strong for the future. The arrivals at Richmond within the last week were such that you supplies for the present will only be limited by the capacity of the [Virginia] Central Railroad. One passenger train only each day is now permitted between Richmond and Augusta, Ga., and it is hoped that this arrangement will increase our supplies here."

Most tragically, Lee could not preemptively assume the offensive in late April, 1864, owing to a dearth of forage required for an early concentration of the artillery and cavalry and an advance through a barren country.

Jubal Early wrote of the Rappahannock in 1863: "We were in a country entirely devoid of supplies and of forage, for Fredericksburg had been occupied the previous summer by a Federal army, and no crops of any consequence had been made in all that region." Edmund Ruffin provides illuminating observations and commentary on the whole issue: "But while in Virginia there has been this great diminution of the green crops of this year [1863], it is fortunate for general as well as particular interests, that in the more Southern & South-western States, grain culture had generally superseded cotton & sugar culture, & that the grain crops have had the most propitious weather. Wheat has rarely been attempted south of northern N.C., & when sown farther south, has rarely escaped great damage from the climatic disease 'rust,' which seemed a never failing attendant & destroyer of this crop. But it is a remarkable fact of this year, & no less a great blessing to the cultivators & the country in general, that throughout the South, wherever wheat had been sown (& it had been very extensively sown,) fine crops were reaped, entirely untouched by rust."

In addition, it appears Lee's army and the capital had monopoly over what Georgia (and Wilmington?) could yield. Bragg and Hood attempted to draw their own supply from the Alabama Valley and East Mississippi in consequence.

That answers the question. And if US agents in Richmond were counting trains, General Grant probably knew the conditions in the Confederate capital. Maybe Sherman knew too, which would explain why he was satisfied when his army severed the Macon railroad.

 

[USS ALASKA]

On the other hand, Atlanta was still a small city in that era.

According to the 1860 Census, she was 99th out of 100, population wise, with 9,554.

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

 

[jackt62]

Atlanta was not the original objective of Sherman's Georgia campaign. In obedience to Grant's instructions, Sherman's major goal was to destroy the AoT as an effective fighting force and prevent the transfer of any of its force to aid Lee in Virginia. Sherman's combined armies managed to maneuver Johnston's AoT from position after position. Although Sherman favored turning movements in contrast to direct assault, Johnston was clever enough to maintain his own army intact, even though it was forced to withdraw to the outskirts of Atlanta. Sherman's frustration with his attempts to derange the AoT finally led to a change in strategy. Atlanta itself, with its important rail connections and industrial infrastructure, would become the major objective. So Sherman switched his focus to strangling the rail lines into Atlanta in the hopes of forcing that city's surrender. By the end of August 1864, Sherman had indeed succeeded in seizing Atlanta but the enticing goal of destroying the AoT was never fulfilled.

 

[Nathan Stuart]

Short answer to question posed is, 'Yes, in 1864.'

By the relatively late stage of the war (i.e. 1864), thought Atlanta was vital to the Confederacy's military effort and its ability to prolong the conflict. Not only was Atlanta the center of a rail network that connected most of the remaining Confederacy east of the Mississippi, but by this time it was also the Confederacy's main industrial , logistical and administrative base in the lower South and west.

The loss of Atlanta, with its production capacity, would cripple military supplies for the AoT, as well as severely deprive Lee's army in Virginia of food supplies from the Georgia farms that were transported via Atlanta's rail network. Perhaps most importantly, the fall of Atlanta meant that Federal forces would have a staging base for launching deeper into what little areas remained of the southern heartland.

Consider the fall of Atlanta in 1864 as one of the three key turning points in the CW.

 

[JeffBrooks]

In 1864, the outcome of the war depended entirely on public opinion, both North and South. Whether or not Atlanta was important, what mattered was that people thought it was important. That, by itself, made it important.

 

[milhistbuff1]

Just as a codicil to other intervening responses; much of this is covered in Hess' Supply/Logistics books IIRC. Thanks for sharing the Northrop/Lawton letter/info. I'm curious how Lee's Summer 1863 food/goods shipments from PA compared to N/L's expectations.

It appears that by 1863-1864, the frontier of the northeastern Confederacy, containing the South's principal field army and its populous capital, was almost entirely dependent upon the cereal region of southwestern Georgia and Atlanta's storehouses and turntable for forage and even breadstuffs. Until September 1863, provisions could be moved to Richmond over the preferred and most direct route via Atlanta, Chattanooga, Knoxville, Bristol, and Lynchburg. Until July 1864, subsistence trains could still be reliably moved over the more 'painfully roundabout' route via Augusta and the Carolinas. The destruction of the Georgia Central in November 1864 eliminated the final interior line of communication between impoverished Va. and the granary of the Old Southwest. By that time, Lee could no longer rely on either bushels from Ga. or flour from the Shenandoah Valley for bread rations and animal feed. A retirement to the line of the Roanoke and the ample depots at Danville and in N.C. in the spring became a necessity.

Northrop and Lawton wrote plainly to Lee in March 1864 following near conditions of famine in January: "Troops in Virginia depend on corn from Georgia for bread. For months we have been living from hand to mouth, and if the last reserve of flour at Lynchburg had not been used for the army destitution must have ensued. That condition is now impending, with no apparent remedy. Over 100,000 bushels of corn demand transportation; not over one-third of what is already on the road has arrived. Unless all passenger trains are stopped the consequences may be fatal. . ."

"Appreciating fully the great importance and extreme difficulty of supplying the Army [of Northern Virginia] with food and forage, I have spared no efforts to have them promptly transported from the far South, now our almost sole reliance. Great pressure has recently been brought to bear on the main trunk railways by the stoppage of passenger trains, express cars, &c., and a very large amount of corn and commissary stores have reached Richmond in the few days that have elapsed since I had the pleasure of seeing you here. Scarcely before during this war have so many public stores been moved within the same number of days by these roads. But like 'forced marches' in an emergency, these results cannot be kept up permanently. Our efforts will not be relaxed, however, and I hope for better things in future. . .

I beg you to remember, general, that up to this time last year not a car-load of corn nor subsistence stores had been brought points beyond Raleigh for your army. Now we are feeding the soldiers and horses of that army to a great extent from Georgia. Not a bat of railroad iron nor a single locomotive has been brought into the Confederacy. . . I beg you not to expect impossibilities. I admit that we have been able to accomplish so much now in the way of transportation and to sustain life with so much less in the way of food than we dreamed of three years since that my hopes are strong for the future. The arrivals at Richmond within the last week were such that you supplies for the present will only be limited by the capacity of the [Virginia] Central Railroad. One passenger train only each day is now permitted between Richmond and Augusta, Ga., and it is hoped that this arrangement will increase our supplies here."

Most tragically, Lee could not preemptively assume the offensive in late April, 1864, owing to a dearth of forage required for an early concentration of the artillery and cavalry and an advance through a barren country.

Jubal Early wrote of the Rappahannock in 1863: "We were in a country entirely devoid of supplies and of forage, for Fredericksburg had been occupied the previous summer by a Federal army, and no crops of any consequence had been made in all that region." Edmund Ruffin provides illuminating observations and commentary on the whole issue: "But while in Virginia there has been this great diminution of the green crops of this year [1863], it is fortunate for general as well as particular interests, that in the more Southern & South-western States, grain culture had generally superseded cotton & sugar culture, & that the grain crops have had the most propitious weather. Wheat has rarely been attempted south of northern N.C., & when sown farther south, has rarely escaped great damage from the climatic disease 'rust,' which seemed a never failing attendant & destroyer of this crop. But it is a remarkable fact of this year, & no less a great blessing to the cultivators & the country in general, that throughout the South, wherever wheat had been sown (& it had been very extensively sown,) fine crops were reaped, entirely untouched by rust."

In addition, it appears Lee's army and the capital had monopoly over what Georgia (and Wilmington?) could yield. Bragg and Hood attempted to draw their own supply from the Alabama Valley and East Mississippi in consequence.

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

Always considered Atlanta to be a significant rail center- and thus, a springboard to the greater prize……Savannah.

Atlanta was indeed important.

 

[wausaubob]

Atlanta was not the original objective of Sherman's Georgia campaign. In obedience to Grant's instructions, Sherman's major goal was to destroy the AoT as an effective fighting force and prevent the transfer of any of its force to aid Lee in Virginia. Sherman's combined armies managed to maneuver Johnston's AoT from position after position. Although Sherman favored turning movements in contrast to direct assault, Johnston was clever enough to maintain his own army intact, even though it was forced to withdraw to the outskirts of Atlanta. Sherman's frustration with his attempts to derange the AoT finally led to a change in strategy. Atlanta itself, with its important rail connections and industrial infrastructure, would become the major objective. So Sherman switched his focus to strangling the rail lines into Atlanta in the hopes of forcing that city's surrender. By the end of August 1864, Sherman had indeed succeeded in seizing Atlanta but the enticing goal of destroying the AoT was never fulfilled.

Was the result spun to be more important than it was? The answer above is that with the limited railroad engines left to the Confederacy by September 1864, the loss of Atlanta and the loss of route to Richmond was very important. Not all the US attacks on Confederate railroads succeeded. The Confederates defended their railroads well. But at Jonesborough the US had a big advantage in numbers and mobility.

 

[wausaubob]

It might have been that there was no other place in Georgia that had a switching yard that could store the cars full of munitions. When the munitions had to be destroyed that may have eliminated artillery as a factor to contend with for the US armies in the west.

 

[SWS]

It is my belief that the War could only be ended by destroying the railroads and facilities in Georgia connecting the Northeast and Southwest of the Confederate Cis-Mississippi's interior heartland, an object Sherman achieved in just eight months in 1864, while also succeeding in establishing a base on the Atlantic. Lee foresaw this disaster as soon as he read of Bragg's rout at Mission Ridge in December 1863, promptly advising the commander-in-chief: '. . . the enemy may penetrate Georgia and get possession of our depots of provisions and important manufactories. . . Upon the defense of the country [northern Ga.] threatened by General Grant depends the safety of the points now held by us on the Atlantic, and they are in as great danger from his successful advance as by the attacks to which they are at present directly subjected.'

Bragg is also deserving of more credit in preventing the enemy from taking Chattanooga, Tenn., and descending into Georgia a year earlier by compelling a retrograde movement by him all the way back to Louisville, Ky., in Sep. 1862, and subsequently re-establishing the battlefront in central and southeastern Tennessee until the fall of 1863, albeit at the cost of crippled wagon-borne transportation impeding yet another campaign of manuever in the aftermath of Chickamauga. He thereby accomplished the grand object of the summer campaign of 1862 in the West and suffered undue criticism and censure for it. Kentucky could only be held if Nashville had been taken with it, and Gen. Smith's selfish usage of the independent departmental army of E. Tenn. seems to have thrown that opportunity away.

'For all the criticism Bragg sustained for failing to secure the Bluegrass State, the campaign had accomplished a great deal: preserving and rebuilding the shattered army in Tupelo, sustaining civilian morale while passing through the Deep South, and the improvement and demonstration of the capacity of the Confederacy's fragile rail system. Far too easily buried in the might-have-beens in Kentucky, safeguarding Chattanooga meant safeguarding Atlanta, allowing that city and others south of it to grow into vital locales for Confederate manufacturing and thereby buying time to establish the means to conduct a longer, modern war. The Confederacy remained hard pressed along the Mississippi, but Bragg's shifting of the strategic battlefield from northern Mississippi, into Middle Tennessee, and to Kentucky enabled his troops to return to Tennessee with abundant supplies that would provide for soldiers during the coming winter. The campaign bought vital time in the Confederate heartland and allowed the young Confederate States of America another year to mature before Union troops again tried to break through the Cumberland Plateau and drive on Atlanta.' - From Corinth to Perryville: Military Movements and the Fight to Save the Confederate Nation in 1862

 

[wausaubob]

Grant and Sherman probably agreed with General Lee. The Georgia campaign was carefully planned and an enormous amount of money came pouring into Tennessee and Kentucky. Who was going to command under Sherman? The best tactician in either army, George Thomas. Then McPherson and Schofield, were probably the two brightest stars in the army's future.

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

It is my belief that the War could only be ended by destroying the railroads and facilities in Georgia connecting the Northeast and Southwest of the Confederate Cis-Mississippi's interior heartland, an object Sherman achieved in just eight months in 1864, while also succeeding in establishing a base on the Atlantic. Lee foresaw this disaster as soon as he read of Bragg's rout at Mission Ridge in December 1863, promptly advising the commander-in-chief: '. . . the enemy may penetrate Georgia and get possession of our depots of provisions and important manufactories. . . Upon the defense of the country [northern Ga.] threatened by General Grant depends the safety of the points now held by us on the Atlantic, and they are in as great danger from his successful advance as by the attacks to which they are at present directly subjected.'

Bragg is also deserving of more credit in preventing the enemy from taking Chattanooga, Tenn., and descending into Georgia a year earlier by compelling a retrograde movement by him all the way back to Louisville, Ky., in Sep. 1862, and subsequently re-establishing the battlefront in central and southeastern Tennessee until the fall of 1863, albeit at the cost of crippled wagon-borne transportation impeding yet another campaign of manuever in the aftermath of Chickamauga. He thereby accomplished the grand object of the summer campaign of 1862 in the West and suffered undue criticism and censure for it. Kentucky could only be held if Nashville had been taken with it, and Gen. Smith's selfish usage of the independent departmental army of E. Tenn. seems to have thrown that opportunity away.

'For all the criticism Bragg sustained for failing to secure the Bluegrass State, the campaign had accomplished a great deal: preserving and rebuilding the shattered army in Tupelo, sustaining civilian morale while passing through the Deep South, and the improvement and demonstration of the capacity of the Confederacy's fragile rail system. Far too easily buried in the might-have-beens in Kentucky, safeguarding Chattanooga meant safeguarding Atlanta, allowing that city and others south of it to grow into vital locales for Confederate manufacturing and thereby buying time to establish the means to conduct a longer, modern war. The Confederacy remained hard pressed along the Mississippi, but Bragg's shifting of the strategic battlefield from northern Mississippi, into Middle Tennessee, and to Kentucky enabled his troops to return to Tennessee with abundant supplies that would provide for soldiers during the coming winter. The campaign bought vital time in the Confederate heartland and allowed the young Confederate States of America another year to mature before Union troops again tried to break through the Cumberland Plateau and drive on Atlanta.' - From Corinth to Perryville: Military Movements and the Fight to Save the Confederate Nation in 1862

There are some good points, but I don't give nearly so much credit to Bragg for his noted actions.

 

[SWS]

"[Lee's] transportation had progressively declined as his dependence on it had increased. . . the exhaustion [and disruption by the enemy] of grain in Virginia and North Carolina necessitated the hauling of corn from Georgia to feed the men and horses of [his] army. . . From the winter of 1863‑1864 Lee's army had to draw its supplies from South Carolina and southern Georgia, a distance of from five hundred to a thousand miles, and it rarely had more than two or three days' supply of food ahead. No surplus could be accumulated and as time wore on the supply became scantier [rendering a defensive campaign in the Wilderness inevitable]. . . Indeed it is hard to see how Lee could have maintained his army in [Northside] Virginia for another year, even if Grant had been content to watch him peaceably from a distance. And yet Lee's army was starving not because there was no food in the Confederacy, for it was plentiful in many portions of Georgia, Alabama, and Florida, but because the railroads simply could not carry enough of it. Over and over again Lawton declares that 'transportation is scarcer than provisions'.⁠ Corn brought in Richmond twenty and twenty-five times as much as it sold for in southwest Georgia.⁠ When this region was cut off and the remnant of the feeble roads wrecked by Sherman's destructive march through Georgia and the Carolinas, the stoppage of all supplies followed, and the long struggle was over."

 

[wausaubob]

All the US army intelligence service needed was trainspotters in Richmond, Atlanta and a few other places. Travelers arranging cotton deals could also buy information.

 

[uaskme]

Lincoln needed a good headline for the Newspapers. Federals had a lot better propaganda campaign than the Confederates. Deeper invasion into the South diminished a lot of that capacity. Displaced newspapers. Run up to the election it was important. Grant had tasked Sherman to keep Johnson busy so he couldn't send troops to Lee. ATL wasn't an objective. Grant fails to destroy the ANV. Taking ATL shows military achievement. Something Grant failed to do.

Richmond was fearful Sherman would head to the Tombigbee Valley. Area where large part of agriculture went to the Armies. So tactically Sherman had other options. Longstreet proposed a plan to mount his 2 divisions and go into KY from East TN in order to disrupt and have an effect on the election. Plan fell apart because they couldn't come up with enough horses even thou Lee did started the process.