Manassas 1861
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What drill did the USMC use during the war?
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USMC Drill?
- Thread starter Manassas 1861
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An article by Major Michael G. Anderson, USA, published by the Marine Corps University in the Marine Corp University Press entitled UNDERSTANDING BATTLEFIELD PERFORMANCE OF U.S. MARINES ASHORE DURING THE CIVIL WAR says this about training:
An obvious contributing factor to performance in combat is the degree of training received. Marines were ill-prepared for the complexities of land-based tactics in formation at larger echelons. However, this was not for lack of effort and certainly did not reflect the confidence and spirit of the average Marine, even if their own officers, typically those most experienced in shore combat, expressed reservations, such as prior to the Fort Sumter raid.
A Marine at Washington Barracks who participated at Bull Run wrote to his parents prior to the fight, "We will be drilled better in one Month here than the Volunteers would be in six Months." The Navy created a provisional Marine battalion for amphibious operations in fall 1861, however, it was never used and was shortly disestablished, with the Marines returning to traditional duty. The other provisional battalion trained but was not used for the major land assault on Battery Wagner but was employed poorly on the amphibious Fort Sumter assault. This unfortunately limits solid analysis of provisional Marine battalion performance ashore in comparison to ad hoc Marine battalions, the far more common fighting Marines employed ashore. A common fear of the special amphibious battalion concept among senior Marines was its use leading to Marines being absorbed into the Army and losing their separate and naval identity, although this fear did not preclude Marines from participating regularly ashore in many small and some larger engagements, as detailed previously. New recruits recorded drills "at all hours of the day" and that they had rigorous training, although it was dominated by individual and crew drills, not collective training of larger formations. Their drills included many land-based activities, among them artillery and light infantry, as well as traditional ship battery drills. A Marine Corps history noted, "While the Army drilled, marched, and countermarched . . . some 200 Marines were assigned to the Potomac Flotilla to scour the Maryland countryside . . . in search of Confederate arms." These sorts of activities, however, did not prepare them for large maneuvers ashore, although it did provide experiences and contributions to the war effort even if at the expense of more time training for larger land engagements.
Major Reynolds trained and drilled a select Marine detachment, creating a specifically organized amphibious battalion to serve with Admiral Samuel Dupont's flotilla. Unfortunately, this special drilled amphibious force was never used for anything more than garrison duty of abandoned coastal forts, such as St. Augustine, Florida. On 25 March, Dupont released Reynolds and his amphibious battalion back to normal Marine duty across the fleet. Much as a pattern can be seen in attribution to poor organization, training, leadership, and proper equipping, so it was in re- peated experiments in forming organized amphibious battalion-size elements organized, trained, and designed for land operations never used and disbanded for the needs of the fleet.
Zeilin, one of the most experienced Marine officers in combat ashore, formed one of the provisional, semipermanently organized battalions at Marine Barracks Brooklyn comprising 12 officers, 13 sergeants, 12 corporals, 6 musicians, and 233 privates from across the various Marine barracks, stations, and naval ships. It departed New York on 13 July 1864. This composite Marine battalion drilled on Morris Island, South Carolina, for an assault on Battery Wagner but was never employed against those enemy fortifications. Zeilin requested relief from the command in a message to Rear Admiral John Dahlgren, asserting the Marines assembled were unable to accomplish the task of storming the enemy fortifications and noting, "The Marine Corps is accustomed to act in small detachments on board of ship and ashore, and opportunities rarely offer to have more than one company together." Certainly reflecting on his own experiences in previous land combat, notably at Bull Run, he continued, "It is absolutely necessary that they should have time to become organized and drilled as a battalion and to know their officers and their duties on a larger scale." He pointed out,
Many of these men are raw recruits. . . every garrison, receiving (ship), and even seagoing ships at the North, has been stripped to get these few together; and until they are exercised for some time under their present officers . . . it would be very dangerous to attempt any hazardous operations requiring coolness and promptness. . . and no duty which they could be called upon to perform requires such perfect discipline and drill as landing under fire. As few of these have ever seen an enemy . . . they would doubtless fall into great confusion despite the best efforts of their officers.
He elaborated on the difficulty of drilling in the heat on a narrow beach during the day and of darkness at night precluding training for company and larger formations.
While it is true that nearly 78 percent of the Marines available to Zeilin for the Charleston operations had previous service, service does not equate to combat experience, especially the sort needed. While this may have been true of the enlisted, 10 of the 14 Marine officers had direct combat experience either in the Mexican-American War, earlier in the Civil War, or both, such as Zeilin. Dahlgren, his faith in the Marine battalion shaken, wrote in his diary, "The Commander of Marines reports against risking his men in attacking works. Two of his officers had done the same in conversation. I said it must come from the Senior in writing. Rather hurtful. What are Marines for?" Dahlgren removed the Marines from any plans to storm Wagner and used them for security and guard duties. The following attempted assault on Fort Sumter painfully vindicated these concerns. The Marine battalion assembled on Morris Island had been the largest gathering of Marines in one formation since the Mexican-American War.
Oddly, a consistent desire for Navy squadrons along the coast was to possess a Marine battalion-size formation, but they rarely maintained these provisional, semipermanent battalions with any continuity, supported them adequately, or employed them correctly, if at all. In a hybrid manner, Captain Edward Reynolds managed a composite Marine battalion in the aftermath of the Fort Sumter debacle with the Marines remaining in the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron under Admiral Dahlgren. It was neither a semipermanent provisional battalion detached from ship duty organized for duty ashore nor was it a temporary, ad hoc immediate operation formation. Reynolds continually worked to acclimate this Marine battalion in Port Royal, South Carolina, gathering the Marines together to conduct drills twice a day. The reputation of this composite Marine battalion grew.
Dahlgren's composite fleet brigade of the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron drilled for a day and a half before embarking on the Honey Hill expedition, one of the most successful (relatively) Marine forays into land combat during the war. It comprised two battalions of sailors and one of Marines, led by the only Marine officer of the fleet, a Second Lieutenant George G. Stoddard with less than two years in the Corps. The other officer vacancies in the Marine battalion were filled by naval ensigns designated acting Marine officers and Marine NCOs filling the company leadership. Dahlgren commented after observing their training, "The officers are clever and the men zealous . . . it is very difficult to get the officers into the idea of light drill and open order. They will mass the men."Stoddard wrote, "Although sergeants make good acting officers, still, in action, they do not feel the responsibility; neither do they have that moral effect on the men that a commissioned officer does.. . .Please allow me to call your attention to the fact that with 200 Marines in this squadron there is but one officer."
As the war progressed, this exemplified how— even without an organized, cohesive doctrine—differently minded officers grasped the importance and opportunity of preparation for large-scale land operations and struggled to prepare ad hoc Marine battalions for success in them. Without this, Marine battalions courted disaster on land, as shown by the naval brigade at Fort Fisher, having never drilled together prior to the assault.
Semper Fi
An obvious contributing factor to performance in combat is the degree of training received. Marines were ill-prepared for the complexities of land-based tactics in formation at larger echelons. However, this was not for lack of effort and certainly did not reflect the confidence and spirit of the average Marine, even if their own officers, typically those most experienced in shore combat, expressed reservations, such as prior to the Fort Sumter raid.
A Marine at Washington Barracks who participated at Bull Run wrote to his parents prior to the fight, "We will be drilled better in one Month here than the Volunteers would be in six Months." The Navy created a provisional Marine battalion for amphibious operations in fall 1861, however, it was never used and was shortly disestablished, with the Marines returning to traditional duty. The other provisional battalion trained but was not used for the major land assault on Battery Wagner but was employed poorly on the amphibious Fort Sumter assault. This unfortunately limits solid analysis of provisional Marine battalion performance ashore in comparison to ad hoc Marine battalions, the far more common fighting Marines employed ashore. A common fear of the special amphibious battalion concept among senior Marines was its use leading to Marines being absorbed into the Army and losing their separate and naval identity, although this fear did not preclude Marines from participating regularly ashore in many small and some larger engagements, as detailed previously. New recruits recorded drills "at all hours of the day" and that they had rigorous training, although it was dominated by individual and crew drills, not collective training of larger formations. Their drills included many land-based activities, among them artillery and light infantry, as well as traditional ship battery drills. A Marine Corps history noted, "While the Army drilled, marched, and countermarched . . . some 200 Marines were assigned to the Potomac Flotilla to scour the Maryland countryside . . . in search of Confederate arms." These sorts of activities, however, did not prepare them for large maneuvers ashore, although it did provide experiences and contributions to the war effort even if at the expense of more time training for larger land engagements.
Major Reynolds trained and drilled a select Marine detachment, creating a specifically organized amphibious battalion to serve with Admiral Samuel Dupont's flotilla. Unfortunately, this special drilled amphibious force was never used for anything more than garrison duty of abandoned coastal forts, such as St. Augustine, Florida. On 25 March, Dupont released Reynolds and his amphibious battalion back to normal Marine duty across the fleet. Much as a pattern can be seen in attribution to poor organization, training, leadership, and proper equipping, so it was in re- peated experiments in forming organized amphibious battalion-size elements organized, trained, and designed for land operations never used and disbanded for the needs of the fleet.
Zeilin, one of the most experienced Marine officers in combat ashore, formed one of the provisional, semipermanently organized battalions at Marine Barracks Brooklyn comprising 12 officers, 13 sergeants, 12 corporals, 6 musicians, and 233 privates from across the various Marine barracks, stations, and naval ships. It departed New York on 13 July 1864. This composite Marine battalion drilled on Morris Island, South Carolina, for an assault on Battery Wagner but was never employed against those enemy fortifications. Zeilin requested relief from the command in a message to Rear Admiral John Dahlgren, asserting the Marines assembled were unable to accomplish the task of storming the enemy fortifications and noting, "The Marine Corps is accustomed to act in small detachments on board of ship and ashore, and opportunities rarely offer to have more than one company together." Certainly reflecting on his own experiences in previous land combat, notably at Bull Run, he continued, "It is absolutely necessary that they should have time to become organized and drilled as a battalion and to know their officers and their duties on a larger scale." He pointed out,
Many of these men are raw recruits. . . every garrison, receiving (ship), and even seagoing ships at the North, has been stripped to get these few together; and until they are exercised for some time under their present officers . . . it would be very dangerous to attempt any hazardous operations requiring coolness and promptness. . . and no duty which they could be called upon to perform requires such perfect discipline and drill as landing under fire. As few of these have ever seen an enemy . . . they would doubtless fall into great confusion despite the best efforts of their officers.
He elaborated on the difficulty of drilling in the heat on a narrow beach during the day and of darkness at night precluding training for company and larger formations.
While it is true that nearly 78 percent of the Marines available to Zeilin for the Charleston operations had previous service, service does not equate to combat experience, especially the sort needed. While this may have been true of the enlisted, 10 of the 14 Marine officers had direct combat experience either in the Mexican-American War, earlier in the Civil War, or both, such as Zeilin. Dahlgren, his faith in the Marine battalion shaken, wrote in his diary, "The Commander of Marines reports against risking his men in attacking works. Two of his officers had done the same in conversation. I said it must come from the Senior in writing. Rather hurtful. What are Marines for?" Dahlgren removed the Marines from any plans to storm Wagner and used them for security and guard duties. The following attempted assault on Fort Sumter painfully vindicated these concerns. The Marine battalion assembled on Morris Island had been the largest gathering of Marines in one formation since the Mexican-American War.
Oddly, a consistent desire for Navy squadrons along the coast was to possess a Marine battalion-size formation, but they rarely maintained these provisional, semipermanent battalions with any continuity, supported them adequately, or employed them correctly, if at all. In a hybrid manner, Captain Edward Reynolds managed a composite Marine battalion in the aftermath of the Fort Sumter debacle with the Marines remaining in the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron under Admiral Dahlgren. It was neither a semipermanent provisional battalion detached from ship duty organized for duty ashore nor was it a temporary, ad hoc immediate operation formation. Reynolds continually worked to acclimate this Marine battalion in Port Royal, South Carolina, gathering the Marines together to conduct drills twice a day. The reputation of this composite Marine battalion grew.
Dahlgren's composite fleet brigade of the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron drilled for a day and a half before embarking on the Honey Hill expedition, one of the most successful (relatively) Marine forays into land combat during the war. It comprised two battalions of sailors and one of Marines, led by the only Marine officer of the fleet, a Second Lieutenant George G. Stoddard with less than two years in the Corps. The other officer vacancies in the Marine battalion were filled by naval ensigns designated acting Marine officers and Marine NCOs filling the company leadership. Dahlgren commented after observing their training, "The officers are clever and the men zealous . . . it is very difficult to get the officers into the idea of light drill and open order. They will mass the men."Stoddard wrote, "Although sergeants make good acting officers, still, in action, they do not feel the responsibility; neither do they have that moral effect on the men that a commissioned officer does.. . .Please allow me to call your attention to the fact that with 200 Marines in this squadron there is but one officer."
As the war progressed, this exemplified how— even without an organized, cohesive doctrine—differently minded officers grasped the importance and opportunity of preparation for large-scale land operations and struggled to prepare ad hoc Marine battalions for success in them. Without this, Marine battalions courted disaster on land, as shown by the naval brigade at Fort Fisher, having never drilled together prior to the assault.
Semper Fi
RedRover
1st Lieutenant
- Joined
- Dec 16, 2019
The Marine Corps seemingly employed the same infantry drill as employed by the army generally. Scott's infantry tactics at the outset of the war was common for "infantry."
From 1855 all US troops acting as riflemen or light infantry were to employ Hardee's tactics.
During 1861 it was not unknown for Marine detachments afloat, to be instructed in Hardee's light infantry tactics, etc. when ashore...
And by 1862 the U.S. Naval Academy curriculum employed Hardee's light infantry tactics for infantry instruction (Marine Corps officers graduated from the Naval Academy)...
From August 11, 1862 all U.S. infantry to employ Casey's tactics... (which were a combination of Hardee's and Scotts' etc.).
And I would imagine the Marine Corps followed suit.
But the previous post quoted Admiral Dahlgren in November, 1864, that the Marines ashore seemed disinclined to master the skirmish drill... "The officers are clever and the men zealous . . . it is very difficult to get the officers into the idea of light drill and open order. They will mass the men."
The previous August, Admiral Dahlgren gave instructions regarding boat artillery and infantry service for the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron. He instructed that the drills and maneuvers given the seamen particularly should be few and "exceedingly simple...The light infantry drill will be best adapted to this service, and to the habits of the seamen."
Also, "the men should be landed occasionally for practice, especially as skirmishers." So it would appear some months later, in November, he was somewhat disappointed to see the well drilled Marines not perfect the skirmish drill, etc.
Admiral Dahlgren's orders and notices seem to have been reflected in the 1866 edition of the Navy Ordnance Instructions, which called for light infantry and skirmish drills (open order) generally for landing parties...
On shipboard, the personnel of the Marine Guard of a vessel were in some cases employed among the gun crews, in which cases they would have employed the naval gun drills. For example on the USS Richmond in March, 1863:
one of the Marine gun crews on the Richmond visible in the foreground here...
Old Soldier
2nd Lieutenant
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The USMC would probably have used the standard infantry drill drill book as the Army - but carried it out better - as they always do.
* At this time the British Royal Marines were organised as Royal Marine Light infantry (Red Marines - red jacket) and Royal Marine Artillery (Blue marines - blue jacket). it is stated the USMC was organised as Light Infantry. The reason for this was given as their deployment on no more than company-sized units as their collar badge at the time suggests:
although they did man guns on warships when required.
Good sources are https://www.usmcu.edu/Portals/218/The United States in the Civil War_1.pdf
and https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/article/us-marines-in-the-civil-war/
It would appear that the first 'expedition' to Manassas - as a small (300+) battalion - was rather fraught as the USMC was not equipped for service in the field as a line regiment - no tents, etc and, although well-drilled, were assigned as a guard unit to a MOUNTED artillery battery! They kept up. Despite being 'fresh' volunteers who retreated with the rest of the Union army during and after 1st Bull Run, they were seen to be as good as regular infantry. For the rest of the War, the USMC only had a battalion available for land battles, given it's increasing role within the Navy.
* At this time the British Royal Marines were organised as Royal Marine Light infantry (Red Marines - red jacket) and Royal Marine Artillery (Blue marines - blue jacket). it is stated the USMC was organised as Light Infantry. The reason for this was given as their deployment on no more than company-sized units as their collar badge at the time suggests:
although they did man guns on warships when required.
Good sources are https://www.usmcu.edu/Portals/218/The United States in the Civil War_1.pdf
and https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/article/us-marines-in-the-civil-war/
It would appear that the first 'expedition' to Manassas - as a small (300+) battalion - was rather fraught as the USMC was not equipped for service in the field as a line regiment - no tents, etc and, although well-drilled, were assigned as a guard unit to a MOUNTED artillery battery! They kept up. Despite being 'fresh' volunteers who retreated with the rest of the Union army during and after 1st Bull Run, they were seen to be as good as regular infantry. For the rest of the War, the USMC only had a battalion available for land battles, given it's increasing role within the Navy.
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I know that I'm old, BUT I'm not THAT old!!! But in all seriousness, in 1970 when I was being taught the MCRD version of the history of the Marine Corps; the part about the Civil War lasted maybe a minute. But I agree that Civil War Marines probably followed the Army Doctrine of light infantry with possibly a sprinkling of amphibious assault training as the need arose.
Last edited:
RedRover
1st Lieutenant
- Joined
- Dec 16, 2019
From my readings, it seems to me that tactically speaking, the closest force the Army had to the Marine Corps was the "Heavy Artillery." They were armed and equipped as infantry, and drilled as infantry, besides drilling on heavy guns. Due to the nature of their service (as garrison troops principally), their drill, etc. was superior to most. And when convenient, they were employed as infantry...
The Marines were basically naval heavy artillerymen. Those posted aboard ship frequently being assigned to the gun divisions, and occasionally, employed ashore as infantry (Manassas, Honey Hill, Fort Fisher, etc.)
The Marine guard aboard the USS Kearsarge in the battle with the CSS Alabama off Cherbourg, France, June 19, 1864:
In the Battle of Mobile Bay, August 5, 1864 a number of the Marines were distinguished for their coolness and efficiency. Many of them having managed great guns in several actions since the commencement of the war...
Here's the naval gun drill, from 1860:
Since the early 20th Century, the Marine Corps has organized much of its personnel within strictly infantry and field artillery regiments, etc. However many Marines continued to act much as their antecedents in the Civil War as garrison and naval heavy artillery (occasionally acting as infantry); like those of the shore based Defense Battalions, or those assigned to Navy Vessels who continued to man naval guns in action, like this AA gun aboard the USS Enterprise in World War II.
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