Upton

[MikeyB]

Why was Emory Upton's frontal assault at the Mule Shoe a successful piercing of the defensive line versus prior frontal assaults? (Pickett, Marye's Heights, etc).

It was a salient, but so was the angle?

 

[BillO]

Weather and Ewell.

 

[Jamieva]

Why was Emory Upton's frontal assault at the Mule Shoe a successful piercing of the defensive line versus prior frontal assaults? (Pickett, Marye's Heights, etc).

It was a salient, but so was the angle?

His attacking force went forward like a column instead of line of battle.

The troops were ordered not to fire until they were inside the confederate works.

It also helped there was no artillery to fire at them as they approached

Spotsylvania Court House | Upton's Attack | May 10, 1864

The American Battlefield Trust's downloadable map of Col. Emory Upton's May 10, 1864 assault at Spotsylvania Court House, part of the Overland Campaign in Virginia.

www.battlefields.org

 

[jepridgen]

They also chose a great time to assault. It was still gray dawn which is the worst time for a defender because of a variety of factors related to the fatigue of going on and off duty all night. There was also the rainy weather that allowed his assault columns to get close and also affected Confederate powder.

Upton faced neither concentrated artillery fire over open ground in broad daylight nor a fully awake and alert enemy defensive force. A similar tactic at either Fredericksburg or the Angle would have most likely met the same ending as what happened historically.

 

[jackt62]

While the assaulting force was a successful piercing of the enemy line, the lack of support after the breach meant that Upton had to withdraw. Grant was still enthused with Upton's breakthrough concept and ordered a much larger assault on the salient by II Corps.

 

[jepridgen]

While the assaulting force was a successful piercing of the enemy line, the lack of support after the breach meant that Upton had to withdraw. Grant was still enthused with Upton's breakthrough concept and ordered a much larger assault on the salient by II Corps.

That's a common shortcoming of successful assaults in the war. It was just hard to coordinate support with couriers. A lot of successful breakthroughs failed on account of that.

 

[WScott]

Also, the distance from the tree line, where Upton started from, to the Confederate trenches is not that far. The picture shows "Uptons Monument" left of center at the end of the trail to the Wayside markers where the confederate trenches were.

 

[MikeyB]

Thanks everyone. I knew about the column formation but didn't realize there was no supporting confederate artillery and the distance. There weren't any guns on the line firing cannister?

 

[jepridgen]

Thanks everyone. I knew about the column formation but didn't realize there was no supporting confederate artillery and the distance. There weren't any guns on the line firing cannister?

I'd have to dust off a book with a good map, but I don't believe there was any cannon placed directly on the position. There were some within supporting distance. The issue was that the assault didn't give the Confederate defenders time to directly engage with artillery that was within range. Upton chose his position wisely.

 

[Jamieva]

Thanks everyone. I knew about the column formation but didn't realize there was no supporting confederate artillery and the distance. There weren't any guns on the line firing cannister?

Mikey i got my attacks mixed up. There was artillery for the upton attack. As others have pointed out the confederates would have had a very slim reaction time due to the proximity of the woods.

Gershom Motts division was to support the attack but did not and his division was dusmantled as a result and he went back to brigade command.

The assault by all of Hancocks corps, which came a day or two later, is where the confederate artillery was not there.

 

[jepridgen]

Mikey i got my attacks mixed up. There was artillery for the upton attack. As others have pointed out the confederates would have had a very slim reaction time due to the proximity of the woods.

Gershom Motts division was to support the attack but did not and his division was dusmantled as a result and he went back to brigade command.

The assault by all of Hancocks corps, which came a day or two later, is where the confederate artillery was not there.

I always get it mixed up myself. Only the first attack was "Upton's". The second just used Upton's plan.

 

[jackt62]

That's a common shortcoming of successful assaults in the war. It was just hard to coordinate support with couriers. A lot of successful breakthroughs failed on account of that.

Of which Lee's assaults on days 2 and 3 at Gettysburg are one of the most famous examples (although in those cases, the lack of supporting troops to Longstreet's attacks were beset by additional troubles and not simply with coordinating couriers).

 

[jepridgen]

Of which Lee's assaults on days 2 and 3 at Gettysburg are one of the most famous examples (although in those cases, the lack of supporting troops to Longstreet's attacks were beset by additional troubles and not simply with coordinating couriers).

I always lean second day being the biggest missed opportunity because that assault to me had the better opportunity. Like you say, it was more than couriers. Pender being wounded had a lot to do with the failure of support. Both of them definitely either failed or didn't meet their fullest potential because of lack of support.

 

[jackt62]

The assault by all of Hancocks corps, which came a day or two later, is where the confederate artillery was not there.

Which was probably one of the most important reasons why Hancock's assault succeeded in widening its bridgehead at the salient's angle and maintaining it for as long as a full day. Lee's error in judgement in removing his artillery almost cost the battle.

 

[Woods-walker]

Why was Emory Upton's frontal assault at the Mule Shoe a successful piercing of the defensive line versus prior frontal assaults? (Pickett, Marye's Heights, etc).

It was a salient, but so was the angle?

See my post August 22, 2020, "A Compressed Biography of Emory Upton."
There are some misleading replies here, where obviously folks confused Upton's attack with Hancock's asualt.
Upton carried out his attack in the afternoon, not morning like Hancock.
The rains didn't start until the afternoon/night of the 11th. Upton's attack was on the 10th
Many of the answers- troop formation, front line carried loaded weapons but not capped, surprise, ….all are fact. Other contributing factors to success were (1) the terrain allowed Upton to place his men very close to the enemy while also concealing his troops for a surprise. (2) there was a farm road used to usher his men forward (3). There was a dip in the farm road that permitted Upton to get even closer after advancing w/o detection.

 

[General JJ]

Weather and Ewell.

I don't see how Ewell was responsible.

 

[BillO]

I don't see how Ewell was responsible.

I guess it depends on which attack we are talking about. The small attack which made it to the Confederate main line and then got hammered or the larger attack on the Mule Shoe.

 

[General JJ]

I guess it depends on which attack we are talking about. The small attack which made it to the Confederate main line and then got hammered or the larger attack on the Mule Shoe.

I believe the OP was referring to the prior small attack.

My two cents: The temporary success on the 10th was due to the rapidity of the advance and usage of cover (the woods) to get relatively close to the rebel trenches. Upton's insistence on not stopping to fire was key.

When it comes to the battle on the 12th, and the resulting casualties, Lee must hold ultimate responsibility as the commander. He consented to let the Second Corps hold the salient, and he gave the order for the corps artillery to move on the night of the 11th-12th. Ewell must come in for criticism as well, but the buck stopped with Lee. He made the crucial decisions that resulted in the Battle of the Mule Shoe.

 

[Jim Heen]

General Sedwick successfully charged the stone wall at Marye's Heights as a secondary attack during Hooker's Chancellorsville campaign. After a failed flanking operation, two Federal columns attacked the stone wall. Thr right hand column of 4 regiments attacked in "columns of fours in light marching order" while the center column of 2 regiments advanced to a swale in front of the stone wall and opened fire. While the right hand column was stopped by the Confederate artillery and musketry fire, a third Union column came up on the left. These were the 5th Wisconsin in skirmish formation backed by the 31st NY & 6th Maine in line of battle, with the 23rd PA in support in a third line. The 5th Maine was told not to fire until they reached the wall. Aided on their left by a brigade of Vermont infantry threatening the southern end of the stone wall, this column breached the wall, breaking the Confederate line. Of course, this tactic only succeeded because the Confederate forces were much weaker than they were in December at Fredericksburg. Jubal Early had only 1200 infantry and 8 guns to defend Marye's Heights.

Another successful frontal assault on fortifications was Baldy Smith's attack on the Dimmock line at Petersburg in June 1864, using a heavy skirmisher formation rather than an assault column against the strongly constructed but grossly undermanned defensive position. As Coinfederate artilleryman, E. P. ALexander observed, the Confederate artillery held their fire "for the columns which they expected to see. These never appeared, but instead the cloud of skirmishers overan the works...defended by only a skirmish line of infantry." (quoted on p. 41 of N.A. Trudeau's "The Last Citadel).

 

[jackt62]

this tactic only succeeded because the Confederate forces were much weaker than they were in December at Fredericksburg. Jubal Early had only 1200 infantry and 8 guns to defend Marye's Heights.

Another successful frontal assault on fortifications was Baldy Smith's attack on the Dimmock line at Petersburg in June 1864, using a heavy skirmisher formation rather than an assault column against the strongly constructed but grossly undermanned defensive position.

These examples show that fortified positions must be manned with sufficient force density and/or artillery in order to successfully repel a frontal assault. Had this been the case at 2nd Fredericksburg and the Dimmock line, the attacker would have failed as did most such assaults on fortified positions.