Trench question

[atlantis]

Did either side make any effort to keep trench's dry. A wet trench can play heck with your feet and the effect on unit morale. Given that so many on both sides were treated as little more than cannon fodder I am curious if the engineers had pioneer details working to keep the trench bottom dry.

 

[Lost Cause]

In his three volume History of the Vicksburg Campaign Ed Bearss covers Johnston's movements & dilemmas. There is no mystery about what Johnston was up to. It is all thoroughly documented.

When Grant crossed the Mississippi River, he was greatly outnumbered by CSA forces in Mississippi. Bearss goes into great detail documenting the masterful way Grant used cavalry & the threat of landings from the river to keep CSA commanders completely wrong footed. Constant feints toward the vital rail road kept Pemberton's cavalry chasing ghosts. Not only did Grant's cavalry campaign keep their much larger opponents off balance, it kept them both occupied & unable to make mischief.

Johnston suffered from the same problem as all Grant's other opponents did. He had no idea what Grant was going to do next. Even Sherman stated explicitly that he had no confidence that the unsupported move against Vicksburg would work until it did. Grant's operations were classic examples of the OODA Circle. By the time Johnston & Pemberton realized what Grant was up to, he was already several moves into his next phase.

Both Johnston & Grant understood that it was Pemberton's Army, not Vicksburg that was the key to victory. With Pemberton's Army intact, Johnston had options; Vicksburg could have been retaken. As events unfolded, Johnston ordering Pemberton to abandon Vicksburg was the correct decision. Pemberton chose, instead, to follow Davis' meddling order to hold at all costs.

Once Pemberton ordered his army to man the Vicksburg defense & Grant reached the Mississippi upriver, it was only a matter of time. With Grant's riverine supply line absolutely secure & nowhere for Johnston to draw a relieving force from, his options were extremely limited.

On July 4th, not only was Vicksburg secured, but the Tullahoma Campaign had swept the Army of Tennessee clear out of the state & Lee permanently lost the all important initiative in VA. By late fall, Bragg would be in North Georgia & Grant's line would run from New Orleans to Cumberland Gap. Johnston's Army of relief seems a mere trifle compared to that, ¿no?

Note: in his letter to Davis laying out his plan for the Pennsylvania incursion, Lee asked Davis to concentrate 100,000 idle troops from the Carolinas under Beauregard at Culpepper VA.

While Lee's Carolina 100,000 twiddled their thumbs amongst the palmettos, by July 4th Lee, Bragg & Pemberton had been soundly defeated. The initiative in VA & strategically vital Vicksburg & Middle Tennessee were irretrievably lost. The responsibility for that colossal defeat does not lie with Johnston.

Do you have a copy of this letter concerning 100,000 troops in the Carolinas?

 

[Rhea Cole]

Last night I wanted to find out more about the 19th Louisiana Regiment. I first pulled out Smith's book on Vicksburg and it reminded me that they were part of General J. E. Johnston's "relief" army. So nothing really in those two volumes. So I pulled out his "Champion Hill: Decisive Battle for Vicksburg" which covers Grant's entire campaign from crossing the Mississippi River to Black Black River bridge. But Johnston still was not involved in any of this action.
Where was General Johnston during March - May 1863??
I have a brief history that says the 19th Louisiana Regt was in the Tullahoma campaign and finally arrived in Jackson in May.

Good question. All the answers are in Edwin Bearss three volume Vicksburg Campaign history. From what you have written, you have been reading about where the 19th Louisiana was not. The regiment was in Adams/ Gibson's brigade of the Army of Tennessee. It lost 45% at Chickamauga. A detailed history is in the National Park Soldiers & Sailors website. The 19th's service in Mississippi was during the Shiloh Campaign.

The answer to your where was Joe Johnston question is way too complex for this venue. Sensibly, Johnston concluded that Pemberton's army was more important than Vicksburg. Davis, as he always did, placed holding territory as the first strategic priority. It was Pemberton's decision to follow Davis' order to hold Vicksburg rather than follow Johnston's that was the strategic blunder that led to disaster.

Once that decision was made, Johnston's only option was to cobble together what forces he could & somehow drive Grant back to Arkansas.

I don't know if you are familiar with the OODA Circle, but Johnston was confronted by a master of its principles. He was like a chess player who made one move for every three his opponent made. The CSA commanders had no idea what Grant was going to do until he did it & had already moved on.

 

[Rhea Cole]

Do you have a copy of this letter concerning 100,000 troops in the Carolinas?

I might say that everybody can. Lee's letters to Davis / the Sec. of War & replies are a standard element of any historian's analysis of why Lee went into PA. Davis' reply was captured while Lee was in PA.

'A Critical Analysis of Robert E. Lee's Campaign Plan For a Second Northern Invasion.' By Major Heath Jamison USMC is online. His paper will answer your questions.

 

[CowCavalry]

Do you have a copy of this letter concerning 100,000 troops in the Carolinas?

I think the answer is "no". And it is not contained in the report mentioned either.

 

[Lost Cause]

I think the answer is "no". And it is not contained in the report mentioned either.

Agreed, in May 1863, Gen. Beauregard transferred 5,000 troops to Jackson Mississippi to assist Johnston. He was further asked to supply an additional 5,000 troops again which he successfully petitioned against which would have significantly diminished (by 1/3) his strength of the coastal SC and Georgia defenses.
Moreover, he suggested against Lee's invasion of Pennsylvania, instead an invasion of Tennessee and Kentucky.

In later Dec. 1863, Gen. Beauregard listed an estimated troop strength in the Carolinas, Ga., and Fl. to be 35,000.


Alfred Roman, The military operations of General Beauregard in the war between the states, 1861 to 1865
https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:2001.05.0137:chapter=6:page=82

 

[Rhea Cole]

Agreed, in May 1863, Gen. Beauregard transferred 5,000 troops to Jackson Mississippi to assist Johnston. He was further asked to supply an additional 5,000 troops again which he successfully petitioned against which would have significantly diminished (by 1/3) his strength of the coastal SC and Georgia defenses.
Moreover, he suggested against Lee's invasion of Pennsylvania, instead an invasion of Tennessee and Kentucky.

In later Dec. 1863, Gen. Beauregard listed an estimated troop strength in the Carolinas, Ga., and Fl. to be 35,000.


Alfred Roman, The military operations of General Beauregard in the war between the states, 1861 to 1865
https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:2001.05.0137:chapter=6age=82

Because Rosecrans had taken Chattanooga, they made a tour of the South. A improbable number of changes of cars were made along the way. They were spared being pinned up in Vicksburg dining on mule by Sherman's destruction of the rail nexus at Jackson.

 

[bamaman]

Because Rosecrans had taken Chattanooga, they made a tour of the South. A improbable number of changes of cars were made along the way. They were spared being pinned up in Vicksburg dining on mule by Sherman's destruction of the rail nexus at Jackson.

Obviously neither side had submersible pumps! Of course they did not have electricity yet.

 

[DixieRifles]

The answer to your where was Joe Johnston question is way too complex for this venue. Sensibly, Johnston concluded that Pemberton's army was more important than Vicksburg. Davis, as he always did, placed holding territory as the first strategic priority. It was Pemberton's decision to follow Davis' order to hold Vicksburg rather than follow Johnston's that was the strategic blunder that led to disaster.

No, that was not really what I was asking.
I just wanted to know where was Adam's Brigade and the 19th Louisiana Regiment. When they were moved to Tullahoma in April 1863, they were placed under the command of Adams. But they did fight not in the Tullahoma battle. They were sent to Jackson, MS and were under JS Johnston but I have no reference sources that tell what they did there until the siege of Jackson. I know Grant sent out some probes and Johnston made a few moves. Were they sitting at Jackson from May to mid-July or were they trying to engage the Union troops outside of Vicksburg?
I plan to search the OR's. I have a few volumes downloaded but not this period.

 

[atlantis]

Good question. All the answers are in Edwin Bearss three volume Vicksburg Campaign history. From what you have written, you have been reading about where the 19th Louisiana was not. The regiment was in Adams/ Gibson's brigade of the Army of Tennessee. It lost 45% at Chickamauga. A detailed history is in the National Park Soldiers & Sailors website. The 19th's service in Mississippi was during the Shiloh Campaign.

The answer to your where was Joe Johnston question is way too complex for this venue. Sensibly, Johnston concluded that Pemberton's army was more important than Vicksburg. Davis, as he always did, placed holding territory as the first strategic priority. It was Pemberton's decision to follow Davis' order to hold Vicksburg rather than follow Johnston's that was the strategic blunder that led to disaster.

Once that decision was made, Johnston's only option was to cobble together what forces he could & somehow drive Grant back to Arkansas.

I don't know if you are familiar with the OODA Circle, but Johnston was confronted by a master of its principles. He was like a chess player who made one move for every three his opponent made. The CSA commanders had no idea what Grant was going to do until he did it & had already moved on.

Pemberton had no choice but to obey the order of the president. Johnston was never going to be able to drive Grant into Arkansas. Johnston had the option of doing everything possible to strengthen Bragg in Tennessee and let Davis suffer the consequence of his interference in military operations. By not ordering Pemberton to obey the order from Davis, Johnston only succeeded in making himself look partly responsible for the loss of Vicksburg.

 

[Rhea Cole]

No, that was not really what I was asking.
I just wanted to know where was Adam's Brigade and the 19th Louisiana Regiment. When they were moved to Tullahoma in April 1863, they were placed under the command of Adams. But they did not in the Tullahoma battle. They were sent to Jackson, MS and were under JS Johnston but I have no reference sources that tell what they did there until the siege of Jackson. I know Grant sent out some probes and Johnston made a few moves. Were they sitting at Jackson from May to mid-July or were they trying to engage the Union troops outside of Vicksburg?
I plan to search the OR's. I have a few volumes downloaded but not this period.

That isn't in the regimental history.

 

[atlantis]

Anyone know how long it took the federals to construct the fortress at Murfreesboro and how long it took confederates to construct the works on the Tullahoma sector. I wonder what the weather conditions were like.

 

[Drumfish420]

Did either side make any effort to keep trench's dry. A wet trench can play heck with your feet and the effect on unit morale. Given that so many on both sides were treated as little more than cannon fodder I am curious if the engineers had pioneer details working to keep the trench bottom dry.

I know there are several accounts about the fighting in the trenches around the Mule Shoe at Spotsylvania in a torrential rain storm. Many men on both sides told stories about wounded men being mashed down in the mud at the bottom of the trenches and traverses and drowning. I can't even imagine. They literally had to dig the dead and wounded out of the trenches after the fighting calmed down.
"The fighting was horrible," one Mississippian said. "The breastworks were slippery with blood and rain, dead bodies lying underneath half trampled out of sight." (Chris Mackowski)
"Wounded men fell into trenches that were filled with at least a foot of bloody, muddy water. Some, unable to lift themselves back up, drowned as other wounded and dead men fell upon them. Corpses were stacked like cordwood and used as makeshift works. One dead Union soldier absorbed an estimated "five thousand" minie balls — enough to turn his body to "sponge." (Chris Mackowski)

Certain Death

Union and Confederate soldiers had endured years of privations and pitched battles, yet nothing had prepared them for the fighting in the Mule Shoe Salient...

www.battlefields.org

 

[Waterloo50]

They didn't master it in passchendaele either

Hence the use of duckboards, anything to prevent the dreaded trench foot.

 

[Rhea Cole]

Anyone know how long it took the federals to construct the fortress at Murfreesboro and how long it took confederates to construct the works on the Tullahoma sector. I wonder what the weather conditions were like.

The massive construction operation that resulted in the fortress complex that secured Nashville took about six months. Fort Grainger in Franklin was the western corner of a triangle about 45 miles on a side. 15 miles eastward, The Works at Triune are made up of 3 miles of earthworks around a ridge top that dominates the skyline. Fortress Rosecrans, the largest earthen fortress in North America, is another 15 miles. Ten miles from Rosecrans & Murfreesboro was Fort Transit on top of Pilot Knob near Readyville. The Ft Transit signal station was 60' up an enormous tree. It marked the eastern corner of the base of the triangle. From atop the Knob, in the evening, aircraft landing lights at Nashville International 40 miles away can be clearly made out. On cold, clear nights it was possible to signal directly to Fort Negley in Nashville with turpentine torches. Nashville was one of the most fortified places on earth.

To accomplish the movement of an almost inconceivable number of cubic yards of dirt. Soldiers who had joined up to get out of hard farm work were deeply annoyed when assigned to digging the sticky Tennessee clay.

72,000 slaves lived in the counties surrounding Nashville in 1860. Initially, slaves were requisitioned along with wheel barrows, tools & six days rations. The owner was paid for the work. In short order, self liberated individuals were recruited (none too gently in some cases) to do the work. Working for wages was a seismic cultural change. After the Emancipation Proclamation, these work groups became the core of USCT regiments that fought in the Battle of Nashville.

While tens of square miles of timber were being cut to feed the saw mills in Fortress Rosecrans around Murfreesboro, 20 miles south work gangs of slaves & Army of Tennessee soldiers dug miles CB of works. All the trees for roughly a quarter mile in front of the earthworks were cut to form a vast abatis. About 25 miles southward, an elaborate series of earthworks was excavated at Tullahoma. Works also blocked Hoover's Gap, one of the three entries up onto the Highland Plateau. (Today I-24 & HWY 41 pass through the gap.) Another hilltop was denuded to block Liberty Gap.

Bragg's cunning plan that could not fail was to fall back into the Tullahoma works & decimate the Army of the Cumberlander's banzai charges. Rosecrans knew everything there was to know about withstanding banzai charges. He never ordered a single one.

In June 1863 when the Army of the C advanced along a 50 mile front. Only a 500 year rain event saved Bragg from being surrounded in his Tullahoma stronghold. In danger of being cut off, Bragg ordered a precipitant retreat. Wondering Cumberlanders entered the Tullahoma works & feasted on Bragg's rations. Row upon row of brand new spotless white tents stood slashed to ribbons by disgusted Rebels. Not a single shot had been fired from behind the laboriously constructed workers.

At Shelbyville, Wheeler's troopers, armed with muzzleloaders attempted to hold off Minty's Saber battalion armed with breechloaders & Spencer Repeaters. Pennsylvania cavalry infiltrated the vast abatis & took Wheeler in the flank. The elaborate monument to futility fell in a matter of minutes. At Shelbyville Wheeler suffered one of the most lopsided drubbings of the war.

Even Hood was not demented enough to directly assault the works at Fortress Rosecrans & Nashville. They did their work by intimidating any attacker into impotence.

As to the weather… winter to spring in Middle Tennessee is a buffet of weather conditions. Swings of seventy degrees in a day or two are par for the course.

Note:
Today, Fort Negley in Nashville is the only intact element of the vast Nashville complex. An impressive curtain wall & redoubts from Fortress Rosecrans is part of Stones River NB. The works at Triune are like Mayan ruins a mile along a wide ridge. The stone faced star bastion at the highest point is very impressive. Several hundred yards of the Shelbyville works were discovered on private property not long ago. Well preserved Fort Grainger & a remarkable signal station redoubt are preserved by parks in Franklin.

 

[Rhea Cole]

Pemberton had no choice but to obey the order of the president. Johnston was never going to be able to drive Grant into Arkansas. Johnston had the option of doing everything possible to strengthen Bragg in Tennessee and let Davis suffer the consequence of his interference in military operations. By not ordering Pemberton to obey the order from Davis, Johnston only succeeded in making himself look partly responsible for the loss of Vicksburg.

Grant, on the other hand deliberately ignored Halleck's order to send troops to reinforce the Port Hudson operation. Real leaders, like Nelson, put their telescope up to their blind eye. Joe Johnston's analysis was correct. With the army, there were options. Loosing both the army & Vicksburg was an irredeemable disaster.

 

[67th Tigers]

Note: in his letter to Davis laying out his plan for the Pennsylvania incursion, Lee asked Davis to concentrate 100,000 idle troops from the Carolinas under Beauregard at Culpepper VA.

While Lee's Carolina 100,000 twiddled their thumbs amongst the palmettos, by July 4th Lee, Bragg & Pemberton had been soundly defeated. The initiative in VA & strategically vital Vicksburg & Middle Tennessee were irretrievably lost. The responsibility for that colossal defeat does not lie with Johnston.

Since NC, SC, GA and FL had about 40,000 troops PFD, I wonder where this mythical 100,000 comes from?

The troops in NC were six brigades, plus garrisons. Ransom's bde was at Drewry's Bluff. Jenkins' and Cooke's bdes were at Petersburg. Colquitt's and Martin's bdes were in Kinston district, and Clingman's was at Cape Fear.

In SC, GA & FL, essentially all the troops were in coastal garrisons. What disposable force there was (2 bdes) had already been sent to Pemberton.

The 3 bdes from NC were at Petersburg etc., because the Federals were operating from Yorktown against Richmond. The ca. 47,000 men of the future Army of the James made a series of movements, which this redeployed was to counter.

 

[Saphroneth]

Grant, on the other hand deliberately ignored Halleck's order to send troops to reinforce the Port Hudson operation. Real leaders, like Nelson, put their telescope up to their blind eye.

This is not actually the slam dunk argument which you present it as... certainly it's true that there are situations where a subordinate commander can rightly ignore the commands of his superior because that superior does not know something that the subordinate knows, at the time of the order to reinforce Port Hudson Grant wasn't in the middle of scoring a success - he'd been failing to take Vicksburg for several months.

 

[danny]

Last night I wanted to find out more about the 19th Louisiana Regiment. I first pulled out Smith's book on Vicksburg and it reminded me that they were part of General J. E. Johnston's "relief" army. So nothing really in those two volumes. So I pulled out his "Champion Hill: Decisive Battle for Vicksburg" which covers Grant's entire campaign from crossing the Mississippi River to Black Black River bridge. But Johnston still was not involved in any of this action.
Where was General Johnston during March - May 1863??
I have a brief history that says the 19th Louisiana Regt was in the Tullahoma campaign and finally arrived in Jackson in May.

5/26/63 Bragg to AG Cooper-All of McCown's Div [except one Ga Regt] Helm's, Adams' & Preston's Bgde, Breckinridge in command, Jackson's Cav Div, of Van Dorn's Corps.*

*Troops ordered to Ms.
Breckinridge Div sent to Ms
Helm's Bgde
Adams' Bgde
Preston's Bgde

Jackson's Cav Div

Louisianians in the Western Confederacy: The Adams-Gibson Brigade in the ...
By Stuart Salling
The Jackson campaign saw the highest number of desertions...
25th Oct 1863 boarding cars to return to Tennessee
Jackson Campaign pp109-114

19th Louisiana Infantry Regiment - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

The 19th Louisiana was ordered to report to the Army of Tennessee at Tullahoma, Tennessee in April 1863, where it joined the Louisiana brigade of Daniel W. Adams. With the brigade, it moved to Jackson, Mississippi in May to join General Joseph E. Johnston's army. The brigade fought in the Siege of Jackson between 5 and 25 July, with the 19th repulsing an attack on its trenches on 12 July.

Acadians in Gray

In April, 1863, the regiment received orders to report to the Army of Tennessee at Tullahoma, Tennessee. There the men became part of the Louisiana brigade commanded by General Daniel W. Adams and later by General Randall L. Gibson. The brigade moved to Jackson, Mississippi, in May and joined General Joseph E. Johnston's army. From July 5 to 25, the brigade participated in the Siege of Jackson, and the regiment repulsed an enemy attack on its trenches on July 12. Returning to the Army of Tennessee in northern Georgia, the brigade fought in the Battle of Chickamauga, September 19-20.

---

Order of Battle - Confederate - Vicksburg National Military Park (U.S. National Park Service)

www.nps.gov

ARMY OF RELIEF
Gen. Joseph E. Johnston

BRECKINRIDGE'S DIVISION
Adam's Brigade
Brig. Gen. Daniel W. Adams
19th Louisiana, Col. Wesley P. Winans

19th Louisiana Infantry Regiment

The 19th Louisiana Infantry Regiment was an infantry regiment from Louisiana that served in the Confederate States Army during the American Civil War. The future companies of the 19th Louisiana arrived at Camp Moore, established near Tangipahoa in May 1861 to provide an assembly point for...

military-history.fandom.com

The 19th Louisiana was ordered to report to the Army of Tennessee at Tullahoma, Tennessee in April 1863, where it joined the Louisiana brigade of Daniel W. Adams. With the brigade, it moved to Jackson, Mississippi in May to join General Joseph E. Johnston's army. The brigade fought in the Siege of Jackson between 5 and 25 July, with the 19th repulsing an attack on its trenches on 12 July.[3]
​

 

[DixieRifles]

---

Order of Battle - Confederate - Vicksburg National Military Park (U.S. National Park Service)

www.nps.gov

ARMY OF RELIEF
Gen. Joseph E. Johnston
​

Thanks Danny. I have found that short history. From all your posts, it seems everyone is using that same info. I liked the NPS link to the organization of the Army of Relief. That will come in handy for other uses. I found another source that mentioned their strength going into Chickamauga battle which didn't agree with the 350 number in this history. More details I'm trying to sort out.

@Rhea Cole said I was researching where the 19th Louisiana was not. Actually, I'm researching where there is no mention of where they were. They spent a long time in the Pensacola area. Haven't found any record of what they did around Tullahoma and on to the siege of Jackson. Then they missed Franklin. I haven't gotten into that last one yet, but I assume it was logistics of advancing north or they had other guard duties.

 

[Saphroneth]

In the operational sense, the role of Johnston's army of relief did not actually involve getting in any battles - after Johnston was driven away from Jackson (before most of his forces had arrived in the theatre), he was hovering around to threaten Grant and pounce on any mistakes made while also forcing Grant to keep a large covering force to protect his siege force.

Consequently, it's quite possible for a unit to have been in Johnston's Army of Relief without having fired a shot. They're there to provide threat, and as it happened there was never a sufficiently good opportunity for that threat to be activated.