Transportation Revolution

[DaveBrt]

To modify that the telegraph was not incidental to the tracks being laid; the corridors were not merely convenient for stringing telegraph lines. Rather, daily railroad operation was predicated on telegraph communication between depots; departures and arrivals. Telegraph was a pre-planned and critical component of building and running a railroad at the time.

Time was money, investments (corridor and town) and delivery contracts (esp. U.S. contracts) alike. So the money was in investments and contracts more than it was for mass communications (telegraph was client-to-client communication, not a broadcast). The on-the-ground reality of business in those days was (as Yoda would later declare on-screen a century later) "there is no try, there is only do."

Any train guys here that will verify this?

Your statements are true POST-war. Pre-war, railroads ran according to schedules, with clear rules about waiting for late trains, leaving early, etc. Many railroads added telegraphic coverage just before and during the war -- there are annual reports discussing the decision to let a telegraph company put in a line along the track and what the building and support agreements were.

Telegraph lines went from major city to major city; railroad lines went from plantation areas to ports. There was a telegraph line from Montgomery to Selma to Vicksburg, but there was no RR line for much of that route. A major consumer of the telegraphs was the newspaper industry. There were long daily digests of news stories, as well as specific stories of some length.

Telegraph operators were employees of the telegraph companies, not the railroads (though several railroads did start their own telegraph company).

 

[NH Civil War Gal]

Looking in the index for "Railroads" McPherson has in his book, it says the Union had more than twice the density of railroads per square mile as the Confederacy and several times the mileage of canals and macadamized roads. He goes on to say, "The South could produce enough food to feed itself, but the transport network , adequate at the beginning of the war to distribute this food, soon began to deteriorate because of a lack of replacement capacity. Nearly all of the rails had come from the north or from Britain (something new for me to learn); of 470 locomotives built in the United States during 1860, only 19 had been made in the South.

The South "experienced hothouse industrialization during the war, but the result was shallow-rooted and poor in yield."

 

[jackt62]

Regardless of the specifics of Longstreet's actual route and connections, it is obvious that deficinicies in the southern rail network made the transfer of his troops to Georgia from Virginia a complicated and lengthy operation.

 

[USS ALASKA]

He goes on to say, "The South could produce enough food to feed itself, but the transport network , adequate at the beginning of the war to distribute this food, soon began to deteriorate because of a lack of replacement capacity.

Please see this thread...

https://civilwartalk.com/threads/cotton-is-king-and-i-laugh.8153/page-4#post-1732012

Starting around post #64.

Edit - nevermind, I see that you already have...my bad.

HTH,
USS ALASKA

 

[Drew]

Looking in the index for "Railroads" McPherson has in his book, it says the Union had more than twice the density of railroads per square mile as the Confederacy and several times the mileage of canals and macadamized roads. He goes on to say, "The South could produce enough food to feed itself, but the transport network , adequate at the beginning of the war to distribute this food, soon began to deteriorate because of a lack of replacement capacity. Nearly all of the rails had come from the north or from Britain (something new for me to learn); of 470 locomotives built in the United States during 1860, only 19 had been made in the South.

The South "experienced hothouse industrialization during the war, but the result was shallow-rooted and poor in yield."

This seems to perpetuate Urban Legend that I think is well addressed by the material I posted at #27.

There's a lot more to the story than counting track mile or locomotives.

Regardless of the specifics of Longstreet's actual route and connections, it is obvious that deficinicies in the southern rail network made the transfer of his troops to Georgia from Virginia a complicated and lengthy operation.

It is obvious that Longstreet's Corps was moved from Virginia to Georgia in time to successfully strike the Union Lines at Chickamauga. That this success should be portrayed as happening "despite railroad deficiencies" flies in the face of the evidence and what actually happened, In My Opinion.

 

[jgoodguy]

This seems to perpetuate Urban Legend that I think is well addressed by the material I posted at #27.

There's a lot more to the story than counting track mile or locomotives.



It is obvious that Longstreet's Corps was moved from Virginia to Georgia in time to successfully strike the Union Lines at Chickamauga. That this success should be portrayed as happening "despite railroad deficiencies" flies in the face of the evidence and what actually happened, In My Opinion.

I'd like to see times and complexity of similar Union train movements.

 

[Drew]

I'd like to see times and complexity of similar Union train movements.

So would I. Surely, someone knowledgeable has studied this? (Hopefully, not an anonymous internet poster with an opinion).

 

[NH Civil War Gal]

Paging @Drew thank you for such a good read. I only had my iPad available before and for some reason I could only see bits of it. Today I have the laptop and could see there was much more. So, my takeaway from the article is that newer analysis developed since McPherson wrote his book. That's what I love about CWT - we get to challenge and see new evidence.

So it became an issue of attrition of supplies and experienced railroad men that caused the collapse of the railroad. AND I always thought Northern railroads had the same gauge. I didn't realize the North had a number of different gauges too.

And it was an issue on how the man in charge of handling all these issues wasn't allowed to report to the secretary of War directly and get what he needed in parts or men to keep the trains, etc running effectively.

"Through 1863, the railroads performed capably and helped sustain the Confederacy in a war that might otherwise have ended in quick defeat. It is no coincidence that in the years during which the railroads performed well, the Confederacy was able to hold its own militarily. The decline and ultimate collapse of the railroads paralleled the downfall of the Confederacy itself. The South's inability to sustain its railroads over time, and not the railroads themselves, proved to be a fatal flaw. The railroads died of neglect, and the Confederate States of America found itself on the rails to oblivion"

 

[USS ALASKA]

AND I always thought Northern railroads had the same gauge. I didn't realize the North had a number of different gauges too.

Please see https://civilwartalk.com/threads/flat-heavy-and-t-rails.134221/ starting at post #16. Maps on post#28 and #31.

Cheers!
USS ALASKA

 

[DaveBrt]

I'd like to see times and complexity of similar Union train movements.

Clark, Railroads in the Civil War: the Impact of Management on Victory and Defeat, LSU Press, 2001 covers both Longstreet's move and the countering Union one.

 

[DaveBrt]

Paging @Drew thank you for such a good read. I only had my iPad available before and for some reason I could only see bits of it. Today I have the laptop and could see there was much more. So, my takeaway from the article is that newer analysis developed since McPherson wrote his book. That's what I love about CWT - we get to challenge and see new evidence.

So it became an issue of attrition of supplies and experienced railroad men that caused the collapse of the railroad. AND I always thought Northern railroads had the same gauge. I didn't realize the North had a number of different gauges too.

And it was an issue on how the man in charge of handling all these issues wasn't allowed to report to the secretary of War directly and get what he needed in parts or men to keep the trains, etc running effectively.

"Through 1863, the railroads performed capably and helped sustain the Confederacy in a war that might otherwise have ended in quick defeat. It is no coincidence that in the years during which the railroads performed well, the Confederacy was able to hold its own militarily. The decline and ultimate collapse of the railroads paralleled the downfall of the Confederacy itself. The South's inability to sustain its railroads over time, and not the railroads themselves, proved to be a fatal flaw. The railroads died of neglect, and the Confederate States of America found itself on the rails to oblivion"

Confederate railroads have been the focus of my study for 20 years. My conclusion has formed that the Confederacy could have done better than it did with their railroad asset, but the root causes of the wastage of that asset was two-fold:

1st and above all else, the shortage of manpower in the Confederacy. There were not enough men to form enough armies large enough to do their job, not enough men to mine, process and produce the metals required (iron most of all), not enough men to do the thousand other jobs required to win a total war.

2nd, the well-known truth is that amateurs study battles and professionals study logistics. Despite Davis' tour of duty in the US War Department, he and all his cabinet were amateurs and could not apply the attention required to solve the logistics issues the Confederacy faced, especially in light of root cause #1.

 

[USS ALASKA]

Logistics in warfare: the significance of logistics in the Army of the Cumberland during the Tullahoma and Chickamauga Campaigns

'This is a study of the logistical system that supported the Union armies in the Civil War, focusing on the Army of the Cumberland under the command of Major General William S. Rosecrans in 1863. It begins with a description of the logistical bureaus in the War Department in Washington, D.C. and the challenges they had in developing the national logistical support structure in the first years of the war. Next, the support structure in the Department of the Cumberland is described, to include the challenges in maintaining the rail link from Nashville, Tennessee, back to Louisville, Kentucky. Finally, the performances of the commanders and logisticians in the field during the Tullahoma and Chickamauga Campaigns are explored, with an emphasis on the problems with transportation.


This study concludes that the logisticians overcame enormous problems to create a logistical system that allowed the commanders to win the war. In the Army of the Cumberland, the support was exceptional when compared to the challenges that were faced. Logistics became a limiting factor because of the senior leaderships poor planning, disregarded orders, and unrealistic expectations which doomed both the Tullahoma and Chickamauga Campaigns from achieving decisive results even before they had begun.


This study attempts to put the rarely explored, but extremely significant, field of logistics in its proper place of importance in the study of military history. Logistics is inextricably tied with strategy and tactics; without logistics, victory is not possible.'

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

 

[jgoodguy]

Confederate railroads have been the focus of my study for 20 years. My conclusion has formed that the Confederacy could have done better than it did with their railroad asset, but the root causes of the wastage of that asset was two-fold:

1st and above all else, the shortage of manpower in the Confederacy. There were not enough men to form enough armies large enough to do their job, not enough men to mine, process and produce the metals required (iron most of all), not enough men to do the thousand other jobs required to win a total war.

2nd, the well-known truth is that amateurs study battles and professionals study logistics. Despite Davis' tour of duty in the US War Department, he and all his cabinet were amateurs and could not apply the attention required to solve the logistics issues the Confederacy faced, especially in light of root cause #1.

IMHO the culture of the antebellum South contributed to both and especially #2. There was the idea that the bravery of Southern men would suffice, management of plantations did not scale to the needs of war making, the very nature of the plantation system dependent on personal relationships rather than industrial/commercial relationships did not generate the cooperation needed, railroads tended to serve the needs of the planters rather than commerce and the sense that plantations were superior to industry.

 

[jgoodguy]

Clark, Railroads in the Civil War: the Impact of Management on Victory and Defeat, LSU Press, 2001 covers both Longstreet's move and the countering Union one.

One day I may have abandon Secession and Politics for railroads.

 

[DaveBrt]

One day I may have abandon Secession and Politics for railroads.

Come join me in the study. I assure you, there are far fewer people with "strong" opinions in the RR field.

 

[NH Civil War Gal]

To me, it's a 9-day wonder I'm posting, reading and learning in this forum!

 

[DaveBrt]

To me, it's a 9-day wonder I'm posting, reading and learning in this forum!

Come visit my web site www.csa-railroads.com and find thousands of pages of information on the railroads of the time.

 

[jackt62]

This seems to perpetuate Urban Legend that I think is well addressed by the material I posted at #27.

There's a lot more to the story than counting track mile or locomotives.



It is obvious that Longstreet's Corps was moved from Virginia to Georgia in time to successfully strike the Union Lines at Chickamauga. That this success should be portrayed as happening "despite railroad deficiencies" flies in the face of the evidence and what actually happened, In My Opinion.

No doubt, the confederacy made great efforts to overcome deficincies in either railroads, or other economic and war infrastructure. But in the end, the disparity in infrastructure between north and south gave the north its winning advantage.

 

[John S. Carter]

It appears that the South had a good enough railroad system to fight a short war, but after a couple of years things just wore out without any way to replace men, material or machines.

The question I am more interested in is ,why did the South prior to the war not invest in rail as the North had done? If they had done so what effect,if any would this had upon the military strategy? Would Lee had taken advantage of them or would he have still marched troops ,as they had done prior,into battle? As I pointed out Hill was able to rescue Lee by using the rail system ,WONDER;Was that Jackson or his decision?

 

[Carronade]

The question I am more interested in is ,why did the South prior to the war not invest in rail as the North had done? If they had done so what effect,if any would this had upon the military strategy? Would Lee had taken advantage of them or would he have still marched troops ,as they had done prior,into battle? As I pointed out Hill was able to rescue Lee by using the rail system ,WONDER;Was that Jackson or his decision?

It generally wasn't entities like "the North" or "the South" or "the United States of America" building railroads; it was mainly groups of entrepreneurs seeing opportunities to connect point A to point B, or C to D, and maybe later on B to C. It wasn't like say Germany in the late 1800s where the government supported a nationwide rail system largely for military mobility. Many southern lines connected major seaports to the interior, which could make lateral routing circuitous.

The Confederate armies made good use of the rail network, and no doubt would have taken advantage if rail had been more extensive. On the other hand, there's always a point where the troops have to disembark and march into action.