Chancellorsville This was not a slam dunk

[AA484]

Don't quite figure how Lee retreating at Chancellorsville was a smart move. That was exactly what Hooker's plan was intended to do; force Lee to withdraw from the Rappahannock line while Stoneman's cavalry cut off the ANV's line of retreat and supply. Or alternatively, catch and crush the ANV in a pincer movement at the clearing east of Chancellorsville crossroads. Instead, the wily Lee made a bold decision to confront the AotP's two-pronged assault by dividing his forces and undertaking to defeat Hooker's forces in detail. Which is exactly what happened.

Part of the reason Lee made that decision was to capitalize on Hooker halting his advance instead of continuing to push towards Fredericksburg. I don't think Lee would have made the same decision had Hooker not halted in the Wilderness.

 

[Jamieva]

No it's because Lee was very familiar with Major Sedgwick (as lee called him) and knew he would be slow, allowing Lee time to go deal with Hookers flanking force.

 

[AA484]

No it's because Lee was very familiar with Major Sedgwick (as lee called him) and knew he would be slow, allowing Lee time to go deal with Hookers flanking force.

I understand that, but I'm talking about the subsequent actions where Lee divided his force again. Certainly Hooker halting the advance of the main body and pulling back influenced Lee's decision there. Had Hooker continued to be aggressive in his advance, Sedgwick's relative inactivity would have mattered less. Lee's aggression on May 1 was probably a factor in Hooker's temerity there, but he could just have easily decided to continue pushing forward. He didn't and the rest is history.

 

[Belfoured]

Retreat---Hooker did. And he lived to fight another day. Lee was on defensive at Fredericksburg which given the evolvement of rifle at that time period gave a distinct advantage to the defender. Both times Lee went on offensive he was repulsed with heavy losses as was often the case with any Civil War general who was obliged to attack.

Great. Now Hooker is really Nathanael Greene. Another paper waiting to be eviscerated at the CGSC.

 

[New Haven]

Ah a more micro question I was thinking it was more of an overall strategy. Lee did what he had to do on day two. He was really in a pickle. For an issue like this I look to sun tzu. When on desperate ground (and I think this counts) fight

Art of War — Ch 11

Great. Now Hooker is really Nathanael Greene. Another paper waiting to be eviscerated at the CGSC.

Belfoured--Bless your little heart, and thank you for your continued encouragement. Have you been able to watch the Bonekemper C-span video yet? (is there a nickname for C-span here?)

 

[dlofting]

Belfoured--Bless your little heart, and thank you for your continued encouragement. Have you been able to watch the Bonekemper C-span video yet? (is there a nickname for C-span here?)

I haven't read Bonekemper and probably won't. He seems to have an agenda, which is the denigration of Lee and the elevation of Grant. That's fine if your research takes you there but not as a starting point.

There are a number of good researchers/ writers out there. After almost 65 years of studying the Civil War off and on, I can use their facts and opinions to develop my own opinions. I don't need the Bonekempers of the world telling me how to think.

 

[Jamieva]

Belfoured--Bless your little heart, and thank you for your continued encouragement. Have you been able to watch the Bonekemper C-span video yet? (is there a nickname for C-span here?)

Have you read anything about chancellorsville besides bonekemper?

 

[New Haven]

Have you read anything about chancellorsville besides bonekemper?

Bonekemper did not write about Chancellorsville.

 

[Jamieva]

Bonekemper did not write about Chancellorsville.

So the answer is no. Noted

 

[Belfoured]

Bonekemper did not write about Chancellorsville.

Really? You may want to check again.

 

[Kurtlg]

Just watched the CSPAN interview from 1998. Do you agree with what he said New Haven ?

 

[Kurtlg]

My takeaways from the Bonekemper lecture.
1. He called Stonewall Jackson a genius.
2. He said if Lee had been in charge of the Union army the war would have been over in 2 years.
3. He said that until Lee ran into Meade the Union generals had been incompetent.
These 3 things alone may run counter to this thread and similar ones.
He goes on about sending troops west and says only 5000 men of Longstreet's corps made it to Chickamauga to fight because of the railroads and that Bragg shouldn't have sent Longstreet to Knoxville . In a way he tries to blame this on Lee . The railroads were compromised because Knoxville had fallen because Lee should have sent troops west to protect it. Bragg is the one who sent Longstreet to Nashville. It gets rather convoluted and contradictory. For example on Vicksburg he said that there was no way to get men from Lee to Vicksburg on time but if they had made it part way it would have freed up other troops to go there. Lots of conjecture.
He does cover Lee's failures at Gettysburg which were fair.
The big issue to me is that he claims that if Lee had stayed on the defensive that Lincoln might have lost the election in 1864 and the Confederacy may have gained peace. This completely ignores the peninsula campaign. Lee suffered severe losses but his aggressiveness unnerved MacClellan and caused him to pull back. If Lee had simply stayed on the defense a siege would have resulted and Richmond would likely have fallen.

 

[rpkennedy]

My takeaways from the Bonekemper lecture.
1. He called Stonewall Jackson a genius.
2. He said if Lee had been in charge of the Union army the war would have been over in 2 years.
3. He said that until Lee ran into Meade the Union generals had been incompetent.
These 3 things alone may run counter to this thread and similar ones.
He goes on about sending troops west and says only 5000 men of Longstreet's corps made it to Chickamauga to fight because of the railroads and that Bragg shouldn't have sent Longstreet to Knoxville . In a way he tries to blame this on Lee . The railroads were compromised because Knoxville had fallen because Lee should have sent troops west to protect it. Bragg is the one who sent Longstreet to Nashville. It gets rather convoluted and contradictory. For example on Vicksburg he said that there was no way to get men from Lee to Vicksburg on time but if they had made it part way it would have freed up other troops to go there. Lots of conjecture.
He does cover Lee's failures at Gettysburg which were fair.
The big issue to me is that he claims that if Lee had stayed on the defensive that Lincoln might have lost the election in 1864 and the Confederacy may have gained peace. This completely ignores the peninsula campaign. Lee suffered severe losses but his aggressiveness unnerved MacClellan and caused him to pull back. If Lee had simply stayed on the defense a siege would have resulted and Richmond would likely have fallen.

If Lee stays exclusively on the defensive, he's basically a better version of Joseph Johnston. Johnston almost lost Richmond in 1862, wasn't aggressive enough to aid Vicksburg (not that Pemberton helped him at all), and all but lost Atlanta in 1864. If Lee doesn't take the offensive in June 1862, Richmond's fate is sealed. Once McClellan brings up his siege guns, it's over.

The problem with Lee is that he won a lot but just couldn't pull off the wins when he really needed them and when they really would have mattered. That doesn't make his strategic philosophy wrong, just unsuccessful.

Ryan

 

[Lubliner]

Ryan

I have always heard a general that fears to gamble is a lost cause (has already lost the fight).
Lubliner.

 

[Belfoured]

I have always heard a general that fears to gamble is a lost cause (has already lost the fight).
Lubliner.

Which is why in a pinch the likes of Nimitz (Midway), Eisenhower (D-Day), Washington (Trenton), Grant (Vicksburg starting May 1863), and others stand out and others, such as McClellan, do not.

 

[CowCavalry]

Which is why in a pinch the likes of Nimitz (Midway), Eisenhower (D-Day), Washington (Trenton), Grant (Vicksburg starting May 1863), and others stand out and others, such as McClellan, do not.

Add Lee to that list; gamblers often don't have the odds in their favor.

 

[Harms88]

If Lee stays exclusively on the defensive, he's basically a better version of Joseph Johnston. Johnston almost lost Richmond in 1862, wasn't aggressive enough to aid Vicksburg (not that Pemberton helped him at all), and all but lost Atlanta in 1864. If Lee doesn't take the offensive in June 1862, Richmond's fate is sealed. Once McClellan brings up his siege guns, it's over.

The problem with Lee is that he won a lot but just couldn't pull off the wins when he really needed them and when they really would have mattered. That doesn't make his strategic philosophy wrong, just unsuccessful.

Ryan

If Lee hadn't invaded Maryland and Pennsylvania in less than a years time, it's very possible that he could have worn Union resolve down by the time that the '64 Election rolled around. He loses two of the three large engagements his army fights in (South Mountain and Gettysburg) and the one he doesn't lose outright (Antietam) is strategically a defeat that allows the Emancipation Proclamation to come out.

Even in May 1863, the Davis Government was opposed to an invasion of the North and was far more eager for a strategic offensive within the borders of the Confederacy than Lee was.

There's definitely no argument that his invasions did far more to advance the cause of Confederate defeat than most things, but hindsight is a wondrous thing!

Yet that definitely doesn't mean Lee had to just remain on the defensive. We saw that shifting troops West helped knock back Rosecrans. I think had he been focused on a strategic defensive offensive that had him working on dismantling the Union forces across the Confederacy instead of throwing invasions North, we may indeed have seen Lincoln lose the Election. Yet that's a question best answered by alternative history authors.

 

[121st PA Vols]

Ah a more micro question I was thinking it was more of an overall strategy. Lee did what he had to do on day two. He was really in a pickle. For an issue like this I look to sun tzu. When on desperate ground (and I think this counts) fight

Art of War — Ch 11

Right on JackADriscoll! Now there's a good and essential read.

 

[Belfoured]

Add Lee to that list; gamblers often don't have the odds in their favor.

There are others but I think the point got made. Even when gamblers might have the odds in their favor there are still risks and they toss those aside - rather than wasting time trying to stack the odds further. The other thing they do is look at things from the opponent's perspective and understand that the opponent has risks, as well. To quote Grant from his Memoirs:

"Harris had been encamped in a creek bottom for the sake of being near water. The hills on either side of the creek extend to a considerable height, possibly more than a hundred feet. As we approached the brow of the hill from which it was expected we could see Harris' camp, and possibly find his men ready formed to meet us, my heart kept getting higher and higher until it felt to me as though it was in my throat. I would have given anything then to have been back in Illinois, but I had not the moral courage to halt and consider what to do; I kept right on. When we reached a point from which the valley below was in full view I halted. The place where Harris had been encamped a few days before was visible, but the troops were gone. My heart resumed its place. It occurred to me at once that Harris had been as much afraid of me as I had been of him. This was a view of the question I had never taken before; but it was one I never forgot afterwards. From that event to the close of the war, I never experienced trepidation upon confronting an enemy, though I always felt more or less anxiety. I never forgot that he had as much reason to fear my forces as I had his. The lesson was valuable."

 

[Lubliner]

The lesson was valuable."

When you know the opportunity will not get any better, it is time to take the risk.
Lubliner.