Chancellorsville This was not a slam dunk

[New Haven]

Watching a movie like 'Gods and Generals " one would believe there were not any casualties on the Confederate side and that the 11th Corps disappeared in the wind.
33rd North Carolina Infantry Regiment
The regiment brought 480 men to the field. It marched to Chancellorsville on the 2nd and that evening deployed as skirmishers on both sides of the Plank Road, coming under heavy fire from both sides. In three days of fighting they lost 4 officers and 28 enlisted men killed, 14 officers and 87 enlisted men wounded, and 2 officers and 66 enlisted men missing; a total of 201 casualties, or 42%. Their target, the 11th Corps which they so "victoriously and brilliantly routed" has a 22% casualty rate. Of the 11,000 of the 11th Corps there were 217 killed, 1,218 wounded, and 972 captured or missing. That is 22% casualty, the exact same percentage for which the entire Army of Northern Virginia suffered in the same battle. Where is the wisdom in marching 30,000 men for 12 hours only to attack the "B" team of the AOP an hour before sundown. North Carolina paid the "butcher's bill" at Chancellorsville, but every Confederate state had significant losses there. The entire bill is steep and I am not done putting all the numbers together. A lot of Confederate fans love to say "but we held Hazel Grove". I say tell that to Governor Zebulon Vance.
My source https://civilwarintheeast.com/confederate-armies/csa-may-63/anv-may-63/2nd-corps-may-63/

 

[rpkennedy]

The 33rd North Carolina didn't fight the Eleventh Corps. They were facing elements of the Third and Twelfth Corps on May 3rd.

Ryan

 

[New Haven]

The 33rd North Carolina didn't fight the Eleventh Corps. They were facing elements of the Third and Twelfth Corps on May 3rd.

Ryan

The 33rd North Carolina didn't fight the Eleventh Corps. They were facing elements of the Third and Twelfth Corps on May 3rd.

Ryan

Thank you Ryan. I did not get that right. Here are the casualties that I have found for the 2nd of May, so I am probably a bit jumbled. Here is what I have found for May 2. Some of them might be on May 3. My point here is that the 11th did not drop and run if there were so many Confed casualties on the same day. Thank you in advance for the help.

Rodes' (D.H. Hill's) Division May 2 1863

Major David Rowe (mw 5/2) 12th North Carolina Infantry
Colonel Philip Cook (w 5/2) 4th Georgia Infantry Regiment
Colonel Thomas W. Garrett (w 5/2) 5th North Carolina Infantry
Major William J. Hill (w 5/2) 5th North Carolina Infantry
Captain Speight B. West (w) 5th North Carolina Infantry
Colonel Thomas F. Toon (w 5/2) 20th North Carolina Infantry
Lieutenant Colonel Nelson Slough (w 5/2) 20th North Carolina Infantry
Major John S. Brooks (w 5/2) 20th North Carolina Infantry
Brigadier General Stephen D. Ramseur (w 5/2) 2nd North Carolina Infantry
Colonel William Cox (w 5/2) 2nd North Carolina Infantry
Colonel Edward A. O'Neal (w 5/2) 5th Alabama Infantry Regiment
Lieutenant Colonel E. Lafayette Hobson (w 5/2) 5th Alabama Infantry Regiment
Captain W. T. Renfro (mw 5/2) 5th Alabama Infantry Regiment
Lieutenant Colonel John S. Garvin (w 5/2) 26th Alabama Infantry Regiment

A.P. Hill's Division, May 2, 1863

Major General Ambrose Powell Hill (w 5/2)
Brigadier General Henry Heth (w 5/2)
Brigadier General Dorsey Pender (w 5/2)
Captain S. D. Stewart (k) 5th Alabama Infantry
Lieutenant Colonel James Aiked (w 5/2) 13th Alabama Infantry
Major John T. Smith (k 5/2) 13th Alabama Infantry
Lieutenant Colonel John A. Fite (w 5/2) 7th Tennessee Infantry
Colonel William McComb (w 5/2) 14th Tennessee Infantry
Lieutenant Colonel Fleet W. Cox (w 5/2) 40th Virginia Infantry
Colonel Francis Mallory (k 5/2) 55th Virginia Infantry
Lieutenant Colonel William S. Christian (w 5/2) 55th Virginia Infantry
Major Andrew D. Saunders (k 5/2) 55th Virginia Infantry
Colonel Edward G. Haywood (w 5/2) 7th North Carolina Infantry
Lieutenant Colonel Junius L. Hill (k 5/2) 7th North Carolina Infantry
Major William L. Davidson (w 5/2) 7th North Carolina Infantry
Colonel Thomas J. Purdie (k 5/2) 18th North Carolina Infantry
Lieutenant Colonel Forney George (w 5/2) 18th North Carolina Infantry
Colonel Mark M. Avery (w 5/2) 33rd North Carolina Infantry
Colonel William M. Barbour (w 5/2) 37th North Carolina Infantry
Brigadier General J Samuel McGowan (w 5/2)
Colonel Oliver E. Edwards (mw 5/2)
Colonel James M. Perrin (mw 5/2) 1st South Carolina Rifle
Colonel Oliver E. Edwards (mw 5/2) 13th South Carolina Infantry
Colonel Alfred M. Scales (w 5/2) 13th North Carolina Infantry
Lieutenant Colonel William A. Stowe (w 5/2) 16th North Carolina Infantry
Colonel William A. Stowe (w 5/2) 16th North Carolina Infantry
Lieutenant Colonel Christopher C. Cole (k 5/2) 22nd North Carolina Infantry
Major Laben Odell (k 5/2) 22nd North Carolina Infantry
Captain Greenlee Davidson (mw 5/2) Richmond Letcher (VA) Artillery

 

[rpkennedy]

Thank you Ryan. I did not get that right. Here are the casualties that I have found for the 2nd of May, so I am probably a bit jumbled. Here is what I have found for May 2. Some of them might be on May 3. My point here is that the 11th did not drop and run if there were so many Confed casualties on the same day. Thank you in advance for the help.

Rodes' (D.H. Hill's) Division May 2 1863

Major David Rowe (mw 5/2) 12th North Carolina Infantry
Colonel Philip Cook (w 5/2) 4th Georgia Infantry Regiment
Colonel Thomas W. Garrett (w 5/2) 5th North Carolina Infantry
Major William J. Hill (w 5/2) 5th North Carolina Infantry
Captain Speight B. West (w) 5th North Carolina Infantry
Colonel Thomas F. Toon (w 5/2) 20th North Carolina Infantry
Lieutenant Colonel Nelson Slough (w 5/2) 20th North Carolina Infantry
Major John S. Brooks (w 5/2) 20th North Carolina Infantry
Brigadier General Stephen D. Ramseur (w 5/2) 2nd North Carolina Infantry
Colonel William Cox (w 5/2) 2nd North Carolina Infantry
Colonel Edward A. O'Neal (w 5/2) 5th Alabama Infantry Regiment
Lieutenant Colonel E. Lafayette Hobson (w 5/2) 5th Alabama Infantry Regiment
Captain W. T. Renfro (mw 5/2) 5th Alabama Infantry Regiment
Lieutenant Colonel John S. Garvin (w 5/2) 26th Alabama Infantry Regiment

A.P. Hill's Division, May 2, 1863

Major General Ambrose Powell Hill (w 5/2)
Brigadier General Henry Heth (w 5/2)
Brigadier General Dorsey Pender (w 5/2)
Captain S. D. Stewart (k) 5th Alabama Infantry
Lieutenant Colonel James Aiked (w 5/2) 13th Alabama Infantry
Major John T. Smith (k 5/2) 13th Alabama Infantry
Lieutenant Colonel John A. Fite (w 5/2) 7th Tennessee Infantry
Colonel William McComb (w 5/2) 14th Tennessee Infantry
Lieutenant Colonel Fleet W. Cox (w 5/2) 40th Virginia Infantry
Colonel Francis Mallory (k 5/2) 55th Virginia Infantry
Lieutenant Colonel William S. Christian (w 5/2) 55th Virginia Infantry
Major Andrew D. Saunders (k 5/2) 55th Virginia Infantry
Colonel Edward G. Haywood (w 5/2) 7th North Carolina Infantry
Lieutenant Colonel Junius L. Hill (k 5/2) 7th North Carolina Infantry
Major William L. Davidson (w 5/2) 7th North Carolina Infantry
Colonel Thomas J. Purdie (k 5/2) 18th North Carolina Infantry
Lieutenant Colonel Forney George (w 5/2) 18th North Carolina Infantry
Colonel Mark M. Avery (w 5/2) 33rd North Carolina Infantry
Colonel William M. Barbour (w 5/2) 37th North Carolina Infantry
Brigadier General J Samuel McGowan (w 5/2)
Colonel Oliver E. Edwards (mw 5/2)
Colonel James M. Perrin (mw 5/2) 1st South Carolina Rifle
Colonel Oliver E. Edwards (mw 5/2) 13th South Carolina Infantry
Colonel Alfred M. Scales (w 5/2) 13th North Carolina Infantry
Lieutenant Colonel William A. Stowe (w 5/2) 16th North Carolina Infantry
Colonel William A. Stowe (w 5/2) 16th North Carolina Infantry
Lieutenant Colonel Christopher C. Cole (k 5/2) 22nd North Carolina Infantry
Major Laben Odell (k 5/2) 22nd North Carolina Infantry
Captain Greenlee Davidson (mw 5/2) Richmond Letcher (VA) Artillery

Some of the Eleventh Corps ran while others attempted to stand and fight. There were several lines of resistance that briefly stood but they were all rolled over and the entire Eleventh Corps retreated, whether fighting or not. Nightfall and Twelfth Corps artillery halted Jackson's advance.

And, for the record, virtually all of A.P. Hill's casualties were inflicted on the 3rd, not the 2nd. That was after the Third and Twelfth Corps stabilized the line and Hill's men had to assault this new position (part of which had breastworks). These kinds of attacks usually result in heavy casualties. And they still inflicted almost 7000 casualties on those units (4100 for the Third and 2800 for the Twelfth).

Ryan

 

[Jamieva]

Some of the Eleventh Corps ran while others attempted to stand and fight. There were several lines of resistance that briefly stood but they were all rolled over and the entire Eleventh Corps retreated, whether fighting or not. Nightfall and Twelfth Corps artillery halted Jackson's advance.

And, for the record, virtually all of A.P. Hill's casualties were inflicted on the 3rd, not the 2nd. That was after the Third and Twelfth Corps stabilized the line and Hill's men had to assault this new line (part of which had breastworks). These kinds of attacks usually result in heavy casualties. And they still inflicted almost 7000 casualties on those units (4100 for the Third and 2800 for the Twelfth).

Ryan

Correct the assault was done by divisions and hill was last in the line. In fact hill still had brigades marching when the assault kicked off.

 

[Luke Freet]

Some of the Eleventh Corps ran while others attempted to stand and fight. There were several lines of resistance that briefly stood but they were all rolled over and the entire Eleventh Corps retreated, whether fighting or not. Nightfall and Twelfth Corps artillery halted Jackson's advance.

And, for the record, virtually all of A.P. Hill's casualties were inflicted on the 3rd, not the 2nd. That was after the Third and Twelfth Corps stabilized the line and Hill's men had to assault this new position (part of which had breastworks). These kinds of attacks usually result in heavy casualties. And they still inflicted almost 7000 casualties on those units (4100 for the Third and 2800 for the Twelfth).

Ryan

I told him this when he first started these threads, apparently he doesn't listen to anything he's told.

 

[Belfoured]

Some of the Eleventh Corps ran while others attempted to stand and fight. There were several lines of resistance that briefly stood but they were all rolled over and the entire Eleventh Corps retreated, whether fighting or not. Nightfall and Twelfth Corps artillery halted Jackson's advance.

And, for the record, virtually all of A.P. Hill's casualties were inflicted on the 3rd, not the 2nd. That was after the Third and Twelfth Corps stabilized the line and Hill's men had to assault this new position (part of which had breastworks). These kinds of attacks usually result in heavy casualties. And they still inflicted almost 7000 casualties on those units (4100 for the Third and 2800 for the Twelfth).

Ryan

And - as has been stated multiple times in the various threads on this topic - the undisputed fact that a significant number of XI Corps troops did flee/run/rout is less a reflection on them than on the situation they were placed in by inept decisions at higher levels to ignore the reports coming back about a flanking movement. One can recognize that without cooking a false narrative about what happened.

 

[121st PA Vols]

Watching a movie like 'Gods and Generals " one would believe there were not any casualties on the Confederate side and that the 11th Corps disappeared in the wind.
33rd North Carolina Infantry Regiment
The regiment brought 480 men to the field. It marched to Chancellorsville on the 2nd and that evening deployed as skirmishers on both sides of the Plank Road, coming under heavy fire from both sides. In three days of fighting they lost 4 officers and 28 enlisted men killed, 14 officers and 87 enlisted men wounded, and 2 officers and 66 enlisted men missing; a total of 201 casualties, or 42%. Their target, the 11th Corps which they so "victoriously and brilliantly routed" has a 22% casualty rate. Of the 11,000 of the 11th Corps there were 217 killed, 1,218 wounded, and 972 captured or missing. That is 22% casualty, the exact same percentage for which the entire Army of Northern Virginia suffered in the same battle. Where is the wisdom in marching 30,000 men for 12 hours only to attack the "B" team of the AOP an hour before sundown. North Carolina paid the "butcher's bill" at Chancellorsville, but every Confederate state had significant losses there. The entire bill is steep and I am not done putting all the numbers together. A lot of Confederate fans love to say "but we held Hazel Grove". I say tell that to Governor Zebulon Vance.
My source https://civilwarintheeast.com/confederate-armies/csa-may-63/anv-may-63/2nd-corps-may-63/

Remember, Longstreet (Hood, Pickett...13,000) was 130 miles away, and that Hooker had Lee in a trap he had to extricate himself from. Lee can be criticized for being too aggressive (casualties, Pyrric victories) and has been. But he HAD to do something here. It was imperative he shock Hooker, knocking him off balance to regain the Operational Initiative. I simplifying but that's why he allowed Jackson's flank march. Operational Initiative.
This, is "the wisdom in marching 30000 men for 12 hours only to attack the "B" team".

 

[rpkennedy]

Could you comment on the individual names that I put up there.

In Hill's Division, everyone except for Hill himself went down in the fighting on May 3, not May 2. At least for the about 75% that I cross-checked.

Here is what Stephen Sears says in Chancellorsville (location 5477-5492 of the ebook edition):

The loss in Jackson's attacking force on May 2 was only some 800. Most discouraging for those of Howard's men with a sense of corps pride, there was no chance for redemption. For the rest of the campaign the Eleventh Corps would be posted far from harm's way.

In the footnote, he cites Eleventh Corps casualties as 248 killed, 1183 wounded, and 993 captured for a total of 2424. And counts the Confederate casualties as 814, not including the loss of the 23rd Georgia at Catherine Furnace.

As a further note, I'd want to look at the losses in Rodes and Colston's Divisions as well since they also took part in the assaults on the morning of May 3. I'd bet that a lot of those officer losses took place on the Second, Third, and Twelfth Corps fronts rather than the Eleventh's.

Ryan

 

[New Haven]

In Hill's Division, everyone except for Hill himself went down in the fighting on May 3, not May 2. At least for the about 75% that I cross-checked.

Here is what Stephen Sears says in Chancellorsville (location 5477-5492 of the ebook edition):


In the footnote, he cites Eleventh Corps casualties as 248 killed, 1183 wounded, and 993 captured for a total of 2424. And counts the Confederate casualties as 814, not including the loss of the 23rd Georgia at Catherine Furnace.

As a further note, I'd want to look at the losses in Rodes and Colston's Divisions as well since they also took part in the assaults on the morning of May 3. I'd bet that a lot of those officer losses took place on the Second, Third, and Twelfth Corps fronts rather than the Eleventh's.

Ryan

This is one of my sources--https://civilwarintheeast.com/confederate-armies/csa-may-63/anv-may-63/2nd-corps-may-63/
Thank you for this. I have not been able to match up the two sides although that is on my bucket list. I am studying Chancellorsville as if it is an FBI investigation. I am going back to Hooker's start in January 1863 . What impresses me the most so far is that he started putting bakeries in. And I don't know if they did it as dirty battle pool letting the aroma waft over to the REB side. Would you surrender to the enemy for fresh bread instead of hard tack!!! I am joking a bit, but Hooker created a lot of change. I don't mind of the pundits trounce him on this site. It just gives me more fuel for my fire.
Another curiosity of mine is Jackson's time line on May 2.
So he and Lee agree and think that the flank attack is a great idea. Did they not what if it to death. They agreed that Jackson would take 30,000 men, but was there not a discussion about start time. From what I see about Jackson he will be on the road before sunrise. The whole business of the 11th is "hanging in the air" meaning it is unprotected by any land feature. Everything I hear about the wilderness and the fact that it took Jackson 3 or four hours to position his troops yells me they were not hanging in the air. MORE---the most recent land acquisition of Dowdall's Tavern reinforces a portion of the story about how Jackson was held up by the 11th--or others

 

[rpkennedy]

They agreed that Jackson would take 30,000 men, but was there not a discussion about start time. From what I see about Jackson he will be on the road before sunrise.

That was the original concept but the plan wasn't finalized until about 0700 so Jackson couldn't really start his march until then. As is, he had his column moving within about 30 minutes which tells me he had his men ready to go as soon as he got the go-ahead from Lee.

The whole business of the 11th is "hanging in the air" meaning it is unprotected by any land feature. Everything I hear about the wilderness and the fact that it took Jackson 3 or four hours to position his troops yells me they were not hanging in the air.

While the dense foliage certainly helped delay Jackson's deployment and slowed the assault, it didn't provide much protection for the Eleventh Corps. And their flank was very much in the air. Again from Sears:

That is the textbook definition of a flank in the air.

Ryan

 

[New Haven]

That was the original concept but the plan wasn't finalized until about 0700 so Jackson couldn't really start his march until then. As is, he had his column moving within about 30 minutes which tells me he had his men ready to go as soon as he got the go-ahead from Lee.


While the dense foliage certainly helped delay Jackson's deployment and slowed the assault, it didn't provide much protection for the Eleventh Corps. And their flank was very much in the air. Again from Sears:

View attachment 502675
That is the textbook definition of a flank in the air.

Ryan

I agree that they were "in the air" but I work in 2nd and 3rd growth forests with years of blowdowns and I almost think a frontal assault might have been better. I am still working on this and I appreciate you contributions here. Ryan. thank you

 

[Jamieva]

I agree that they were "in the air" but I work in 2nd and 3rd growth forests with years of blowdowns and I almost think a frontal assault might have been better. I am still working on this and I appreciate you contributions here. Ryan. thank you

Earlier this week you said the 11th corps wasn't in the air. Pick a lane.

 

[New Haven]

Earlier this week you said the 11th corps wasn't in the air. Pick a lane.

This might help you understand where I am coming from on Chancellorsville.
After the Civil War there were a lot of Southern people manufacturing stories about what happened. They would make one think there were no Confederate casualties at Chancellorsville and they liked to say that it was "Lee's Greatest Victory", which it was not. Lee suffered a massive reduction in force from Hooker's visit and Lee himself says that the battle was worthless. That doesn't smell like victory to me.
The story tellers knew that they needed an Eastern theater hero because of the shameful Confederate performance in the Western theater, where their Generals were attacking each other with petty fights over minutia. But they didn't stop there. It was not enough for them to simply deify Lee and Jackson. No, they had to go on to play a zero sum game where they also had to demonize Grant and Sherman. None of what they said about Grant and Sherman was true. I have found in the business world when there is one lie, there are usually a pack of them hiding right behind the first ones. I was ok with them saying our guy is the greatest, Lee/Jackson cool! But I smelled a rat when they started the silly Grant is a butcher and a drunk. Grant had 3 Confederate armies surrender to him. Lee had NONE. In just under 30 months of active field command, Lee suffered 209,000 combat casualties, about 7000/month, and accomplished nothing except the slaughter and delay of the ultimate rebel defeat. In 42 months of active field command, Grant conquered huge swaths of territory, compelled the surrender of three rebel field armies, opened all the western rivers to US navigation and commerce, cut the south off from the salt, beef, hogs, mules, and grain of the west, positioned Sherman's army to fall upon Atlanta and then sweep through the rest of the southern logistical base, came east and pounded Lee's army into entrenchments, and won the war.
Jamievia ,one can understand your position, if you surrender Chancellorsville as Lee's Greatest Victory there isn't much left. Based on your definition of victory, of which I am in total disagreement, Lee went on and had more "victories" similar to Hazel Grove, where the Union Army had simply disengaged and Lee remained on a vacant battlefield. But, Jamieva, look closely at Lee's losses, and ultimately at the shameful surrender at Appomattox, where his troops were starving, ragtag, and shoeless. That is not victory and it is not noble.

 

[Belfoured]

I agree that they were "in the air" but I work in 2nd and 3rd growth forests with years of blowdowns and I almost think a frontal assault might have been better. I am still working on this and I appreciate you contributions here. Ryan. thank you

I've made a number of approaches to climbs in wilderness areas over what the USFS generously labels "unmaintained trails". Those "trails" inevitably have true blowdowns. That isn't characteristic of the type of vegetation presented in the Wilderness. Jackson hit the XI Corps on its flank and - like it or not - the result was that the Corps was driven back a good distance. How on earth would a "frontal assault" have produced a better result? Any general who foregoes a flank attack opportunity such as Howard/Devens/et al gave to Lee/Jackson needs to re-take a course at the CGSC.

 

[121st PA Vols]

New Haven, it has never been a question the 11th corps right was 'hanging in the air'. Edited here to correct a typo. The term is simple enough meaning the coprs was not connected to another line or substantial geographic feature (Gibraltar, Grand Canyon, the Alps) to protect this. Some levity N.H.

And about the time Jackson wanted to begin the flank march. To my understanding, the latest we have is to be marching by 4:00 A.M. but he was ill, delaying the march until roughly 7-7:30.

 

[Belfoured]

This might help you understand where I am coming from on Chancellorsville.
After the Civil War there were a lot of Southern people manufacturing stories about what happened. They would make one think there were no Confederate casualties at Chancellorsville and they liked to say that it was "Lee's Greatest Victory", which it was not. Lee suffered a massive reduction in force from Hooker's visit and Lee himself says that the battle was worthless. That doesn't smell like victory to me.
The story tellers knew that they needed an Eastern theater hero because of the shameful Confederate performance in the Western theater, where their Generals were attacking each other with petty fights over minutia. But they didn't stop there. It was not enough for them to simply deify Lee and Jackson. No, they had to go on to play a zero sum game where they also had to demonize Grant and Sherman. None of what they said about Grant and Sherman was true. I have found in the business world when there is one lie, there are usually a pack of them hiding right behind the first ones. I was ok with them saying our guy is the greatest, Lee/Jackson cool! But I smelled a rat when they started the silly Grant is a butcher and a drunk. Grant had 3 Confederate armies surrender to him. Lee had NONE. In just under 30 months of active field command, Lee suffered 209,000 combat casualties, about 7000/month, and accomplished nothing except the slaughter and delay of the ultimate rebel defeat. In 42 months of active field command, Grant conquered huge swaths of territory, compelled the surrender of three rebel field armies, opened all the western rivers to US navigation and commerce, cut the south off from the salt, beef, hogs, mules, and grain of the west, positioned Sherman's army to fall upon Atlanta and then sweep through the rest of the southern logistical base, came east and pounded Lee's army into entrenchments, and won the war.
Jamievia ,one can understand your position, if you surrender Chancellorsville as Lee's Greatest Victory there isn't much left. Based on your definition of victory, of which I am in total disagreement, Lee went on and had more "victories" similar to Hazel Grove, where the Union Army had simply disengaged and Lee remained on a vacant battlefield. But, Jamieva, look closely at Lee's losses, and ultimately at the shameful surrender at Appomattox, where his troops were starving, ragtag, and shoeless. That is not victory and it is not noble.

This conglomeration of events across multiple theaters and four years makes literally no sense in terms of assessing Chancelorsville. If you submitted this analysis in a paper at the CGSC you'd be politely counseled to find another career.

By the way, "Hazel Grove" is not a "battle", any more than "East Cemetary Hill", "the Hornet's Nest", or "the Miller Cornfield" are.

 

[jackt62]

From what I see about Jackson he will be on the road before sunrise. The whole business of the 11th is "hanging in the air" meaning it is unprotected by any land feature. Everything I hear about the wilderness and the fact that it took Jackson 3 or four hours to position his troops yells me they were not hanging in the air. MORE---the most recent land acquisition of Dowdall's Tavern reinforces a portion of the story about how Jackson was held up by the 11th--or others

Jackson's assault took additional time because of 2 major issues: 1) Based on preliminary information, the original route march envisioned a right turn from the Brock Road onto the Orange Plank Road. Upon reaching the intersection, it was ascertained that such a route would not hit the flank, but rather the front of XI Corps. The subsequent revised route to the Orange Turnpike added several hours but placed Jackson in the proper position for assault; 2) The narrow route march in a forested region meant that upon reaching the final jumping off point, Jackson needed to organize the brigades in line of battle formations that ranged over a mile in length.

 

[Belfoured]

New Haven, it has never been a question the 11th corps right was 'hanging in the air'. You were on it saying it was not connected to another line or substantial geographic feature (Gibraltar, Grand Canyon, the Alps) to protect this. Some levity N.H.

And about the time Jackson wanted to begin the flank march. To my understanding, the latest we have is to be marching by 4:00 A.M. but he was ill, delaying the march until roughly 7-7:30.

Actually, as pointed out in another post, the 4 AM start was Jackson's initial and optimistic assessment to Lee when they initially came up with the plan but the extension of that starting time was due to confirming the location of the proper roads, etc. It wasn't because Jackson was ill or, as the poster originally claimed, Jackson overslept.

 

[Belfoured]

Jackson's assault took additional time because of 2 major issues: 1) Based on preliminary information, the original route march envisioned a right turn from the Brock Road onto the Orange Plank Road. Upon reaching the intersection, it was ascertained that such a route would not hit the flank, but rather the front of XI Corps. The subsequent revised route to the Orange Turnpike added several hours but placed Jackson in the proper position for assault; 2) The narrow route march in a forested region meant that upon reaching the final jumping off point, Jackson needed to organize the brigades in line of battle formations that ranged over a mile in length.

Precisely.