Chancellorsville This was not a slam dunk

[CowCavalry]

Maybe it would be good for you to not read my posts -I'll be exploring Bonekempers book next and it might be too much for you. As a matter of full disclosure I should tell you that criticism is welcome and , for me needed. You inspire me. Here's where we are going next.
Here is a partial reviews of His Book "How REL Lost the Civil War". For a lot of people here this is anathema. But you ?????? have a chance here to open your ears and listen to a scholarly work that is quite contrarian to the beliefs of many on this blog. Here is one review of the book. Author Edward H. Bonekemper, III, builds a solid and succinct case for the fact that Robert E. Lee ignored the obvious strategy when outnumbered 4-to-1 and having only to defend Southern borders to win independence. Simply being outnumbered did not mean the South could not win. Instead, Lee bled his army with head-on charges, capped off by Picket's Charge at Gettysburg. By 1864 and 1865 he had destroyed his army. A simple argument proves my case that the door is not open here. Actually, I owe a debt here because I find the negativity inspiring. Thus, I must continue.

Lee's bleed rate was higher than all of the other Confederate generals combined and they were supposed to be not as bright as Lee.

Lee was heavily outnumbered and defending the border when he whipped Hooker at Chancellorsville, sustaining massive casualties in the process, as you are so fond of pointing out.

 

[121st PA Vols]

Copypasta

Ha! My wife from South Philly just said........Fa gedda aboud it.

 

[W Charles Young]

That is the textbook definition of a flank in the air.

Thanks to Sickles "pursuit" of Lee's that really isn't a flank in the air. It is a corps in the rear of the army with both flanks in the air.

 

[Lubliner]

Robert E. Lee ignored the obvious strategy when outnumbered 4-to-1 and having only to defend Southern borders to win independence.

This was the strategic outlook at the beginning of the war. There were certain factors that initiated the campaign to take the war north of the southern borders. This was not General Lee's sole decision without Jeff Davis and other confederate cabinet members pitching in. There was a political war and a popular war of propaganda arising by September of 1862. This had to be offset. I can't disagree that protecting the borders was the main objective. These armies suffered much ill-health and loss of morale by remaining stationary. The impact on any mindset is going to take affect. Maybe that is why all the braggadocio and even the Lost Cause began, to offset the morose and depressing feelings of southern pride. Much malignment went with southern losses, and much of it rubbed the wrong way. To pull faces out of the dirt and treat them with kindness goes a long way. People are not willing to grovel in the dirt when they can stand by their 'guns'. The south did the best it could with what they had available. The whole war is a paint over, and words will never admit the truth of what they encountered.
Lubliner.

 

[jackt62]

Lee bled his army with head-on charges, capped off by Picket's Charge at Gettysburg. By 1864 and 1865 he had destroyed his army.

The fact that Lee's aggressive doctrine resulted in heavy casualties that the south could not restore is well-established, not to mention the fact that it was a losing doctrine. But the alternative doctrines, such as Johnston's that attempted to preserve manpower, did not prove successful either. Regardless, the Confederacy's primary strategic problem was that it could never agree on a consistent, uniform strategy and tactical doctrine to attain its goal of independence. That would not have necessarily ensured victory, but it was an important pre-requisite to do so.

 

[rpkennedy]

Either the AOP did some damage on the ANV on May 2

They apparently didn't, at least not according to historians who study Chancellorsville. Both Bigelow and Sears state about 800 casualties on May 2.

Lee suffered a massive reduction in force from Hooker's visit and Lee himself says that the battle was worthless. That doesn't smell like victory to me.

You clearly have trouble differentiating between tactical and strategic victories. Chancellorsville was a clear Confederate tactical victory but a limited strategic win since the armies ended up pretty much where they were before Hooker began his campaign.

Ryan

 

[rpkennedy]

Author Edward H. Bonekemper, III, builds a solid and succinct case for the fact that Robert E. Lee ignored the obvious strategy when outnumbered 4-to-1 and having only to defend Southern borders to win independence. Simply being outnumbered did not mean the South could not win.

Only defending was a losing strategy for the Confederacy. The South simply did not have the manpower to fight a purely defensive attritional war. The CSA would get progressively weaker while the US armies kept rolling on at about the same strength. For example, look at the AotP and AoNV numbers from 1862-64. The AoNV was slowly shrinking while the AotP was stronger than ever in the run up to the Overland Campaign.

If Lee and the rest of the CSA didn't go out and actively win, it was only a matter of time before they were ground down to nothing.

Ryan

 

[New Haven]

They apparently didn't, at least not according to historians who study Chancellorsville. Both Bigelow and Sears state about 800 casualties on May 2.


You clearly have trouble differentiating between tactical and strategic victories. Chancellorsville was a clear Confederate tactical victory but a limited strategic win since the armies ended up pretty much where they were before Hooker began his campaign.

Ryan

Thank you Ryan . Here is a way to get you out of the thinking that doomed Lee.
There is a sense in which the number of battles won is irrelevant, if the victor in them hasn't also won the war. The US experience in Vietnam is relevant here. That said, it's not always easy to say whether a battle is a "victory". How do you judge? There are several criteria often used:

Who remained in possession of the battlefield at the end of the battle?
Which side suffered the higher casualties? By absolute numbers? Or as a percentage of forces engaged?
Which side advanced its war aims, or at least campaign objectives, by the battle?
If you focus on the first criterion, Lee scored a number of "victories" during his one good year, from June 1862 to May 1863, and even during the Overland Campaign in 1864, when there were days when Lee's defending army inflicted higher casualties on Grant's army than Lee's army suffered. More often than not, though even when Lee "won" a battle, it suffered more casualties, absolutely or by percentages, than its opponents. And Lee himself lamented that his "victories" never seemed to have any positive effect beyond the day of battle. If you go by casualties, Lee's "box score" declines steeply compared to judging solely by possession of the battlefield. If you go by whether a battle advanced war aims or campaign objectives, it could be said that Lee lost every battle he fought, though to be fair one could also say Lee's aim was to drag out the war, and at that he succeeded. If that's your argument, though, you should ask "To what end?", and no matter what the purpose, Lee didn't accomplish it.
I haven't personally tried to count wins and losses because the criteria are so debatable. I have read one historian arguing that Lee fought 26 battles and won 13. I think that gives Lee too much credit, given his horrendous casualty rate and wasted efforts, but if your goal is to praise Lee, you might seize upon any argument, however specious, that makes Lee look good.

Grant presents a different debate. With the exception of Shiloh, Grant only fought battles as part of campaigns in which he decided whether to seek battle or not, accepted a battle only when he considered it worthwhile, and even so didn't expect to win every single time. Even at Shiloh, Grant pulled out a victory on the second day, but the fight was a mistake on his part. He later regretted the attack at Cold Harbor, which accomplished nothing except great slaughter of his troops. Generally, though, Grant didn't fight battles unless he had to, and only then as parts of campaigns adapted to well-understood strategic war aims, and he never lost a campaign. He had a few days when his troops suffered more casualties than their opponents, but only a few. Grant had a better win/loss percentage than Lee by any criterion.

In just under 30 months of active field command, Lee suffered 209,000 combat casualties, about 7000/month, and accomplished nothing except slaughter and delay of the ultimate rebel defeat. In 42 months of active field command, Grant conquered huge swaths of territory, compelled the surrender of three rebel field armies, opened all the western rivers to US navigation and commerce, cut the south off from the salt, beef, hogs, mules, and grain of the west, positioned Sherman's army to fall upon Atlanta and then sweep through the rest of the southern logistical base, came east and pounded Lee's army into entrenchments, and won the war. Under the circumstances, a "box score" of battles seems rather beside the point.

 

[Kurtlg]

Thank you Ryan . Here is a way to get you out of the thinking that doomed Lee.
There is a sense in which the number of battles won is irrelevant, if the victor in them hasn't also won the war. The US experience in Vietnam is relevant here. That said, it's not always easy to say whether a battle is a "victory". How do you judge? There are several criteria often used:

Who remained in possession of the battlefield at the end of the battle?
Which side suffered the higher casualties? By absolute numbers? Or as a percentage of forces engaged?
Which side advanced its war aims, or at least campaign objectives, by the battle?
If you focus on the first criterion, Lee scored a number of "victories" during his one good year, from June 1862 to May 1863, and even during the Overland Campaign in 1864, when there were days when Lee's defending army inflicted higher casualties on Grant's army than Lee's army suffered. More often than not, though even when Lee "won" a battle, it suffered more casualties, absolutely or by percentages, than its opponents. And Lee himself lamented that his "victories" never seemed to have any positive effect beyond the day of battle. If you go by casualties, Lee's "box score" declines steeply compared to judging solely by possession of the battlefield. If you go by whether a battle advanced war aims or campaign objectives, it could be said that Lee lost every battle he fought, though to be fair one could also say Lee's aim was to drag out the war, and at that he succeeded. If that's your argument, though, you should ask "To what end?", and no matter what the purpose, Lee didn't accomplish it.
I haven't personally tried to count wins and losses because the criteria are so debatable. I have read one historian arguing that Lee fought 26 battles and won 13. I think that gives Lee too much credit, given his horrendous casualty rate and wasted efforts, but if your goal is to praise Lee, you might seize upon any argument, however specious, that makes Lee look good.

Grant presents a different debate. With the exception of Shiloh, Grant only fought battles as part of campaigns in which he decided whether to seek battle or not, accepted a battle only when he considered it worthwhile, and even so didn't expect to win every single time. Even at Shiloh, Grant pulled out a victory on the second day, but the fight was a mistake on his part. He later regretted the attack at Cold Harbor, which accomplished nothing except great slaughter of his troops. Generally, though, Grant didn't fight battles unless he had to, and only then as parts of campaigns adapted to well-understood strategic war aims, and he never lost a campaign. He had a few days when his troops suffered more casualties than their opponents, but only a few. Grant had a better win/loss percentage than Lee by any criterion.

In just under 30 months of active field command, Lee suffered 209,000 combat casualties, about 7000/month, and accomplished nothing except slaughter and delay of the ultimate rebel defeat. In 42 months of active field command, Grant conquered huge swaths of territory, compelled the surrender of three rebel field armies, opened all the western rivers to US navigation and commerce, cut the south off from the salt, beef, hogs, mules, and grain of the west, positioned Sherman's army to fall upon Atlanta and then sweep through the rest of the southern logistical base, came east and pounded Lee's army into entrenchments, and won the war. Under the circumstances, a "box score" of battles seems rather beside the point.

Out of curiosity what would you have done if you had been in Lee's place ?

 

[JackADriscoll]

Out of curiosity what would you have done if you had been in Lee's place ?

Never done it. If I had to and all I cared about was winning I never would have fought a set piece battle. Things would get dark though.

 

[major bill]

Never done it. If I had to and all I cared about was winning I never would have fought a set piece battle. Things would get dark though.

Lee had to respond to Hooker. Still day two did cause considerable Confederate causalities. Was there a better plan for day two?

 

[New Haven]

Out of curiosity what would you have done if you had been in Lee's place ?

Retreat---Hooker did. And he lived to fight another day. Lee was on defensive at Fredericksburg which given the evolvement of rifle at that time period gave a distinct advantage to the defender. Both times Lee went on offensive he was repulsed with heavy losses as was often the case with any Civil War general who was obliged to attack.

 

[JackADriscoll]

Ah a more micro question I was thinking it was more of an overall strategy. Lee did what he had to do on day two. He was really in a pickle. For an issue like this I look to sun tzu. When on desperate ground (and I think this counts) fight

Art of War — Ch 11

 

[General JJ]

Retreat---Hooker did. And he lived to fight another day. Lee wasn't smart enough, and Kenny Rogers wasn't around to sing, "know when to fold 'em" Track Lee out and how he lost so many men every time he fought. What do you think of an orderly retreat as a tactic? ?

That didn't work out so well for Joe Johnston

 

[Jamieva]

Lee had to respond to Hooker. Still day two did cause considerable Confederate causalities. Was there a better plan for day two?

Probably not. At the start of day 2, I assume you mean May 3, there is a gap between Jackson's right flank and lees keft that you can drive a sizable force between them. They have to fight to reconnect their line. Lees 2 division force is in an island before the. And extremely vulnerable to an alert enemy commander that had good intel to work with,

 

[Jamieva]

Retreat---Hooker did. And he lived to fight another day. Lee was on defensive at Fredericksburg which given the evolvement of rifle at that time period gave a distinct advantage to the defender. Both times Lee went on offensive he was repulsed with heavy losses as was often the case with any Civil War general who was obliged to attack.

Lee was on the defense at Antietam and took massive casualties. He took 800 casualties on May 2 in successful attack.

You might the only person on gods green earth that thinks Chancellorsville is a confederate loss.

 

[RobertP]

Retreat---Hooker did. And he lived to fight another day. Lee was on defensive at Fredericksburg which given the evolvement of rifle at that time period gave a distinct advantage to the defender. Both times Lee went on offensive he was repulsed with heavy losses as was often the case with any Civil War general who was obliged to attack.

Have you ever thought about a scenario where Lee switches places with Hooker. They out man and out gun him by 2:1 AND they have achieved operational surprise by placing 2/3's of the ANV in his rear. Honestly man, how do you think that would have turned out for Fightin' Joe?

 

[jackt62]

In just under 30 months of active field command, Lee suffered 209,000 combat casualties, about 7000/month, and accomplished nothing except slaughter and delay of the ultimate rebel defeat.

But perhaps delay itself was the objective; the southland could only hope that a war-weary north would eventually agree to a negotiated settlement or alternatively, that a Democratic victory in the 1864 presidential election would favor such a settlement.

 

[jackt62]

Retreat---Hooker did. And he lived to fight another day. Lee was on defensive at Fredericksburg which given the evolvement of rifle at that time period gave a distinct advantage to the defender. Both times Lee went on offensive he was repulsed with heavy losses as was often the case with any Civil War general who was obliged to attack.

Don't quite figure how Lee retreating at Chancellorsville was a smart move. That was exactly what Hooker's plan was intended to do; force Lee to withdraw from the Rappahannock line while Stoneman's cavalry cut off the ANV's line of retreat and supply. Or alternatively, catch and crush the ANV in a pincer movement at the clearing east of Chancellorsville crossroads. Instead, the wily Lee made a bold decision to confront the AotP's two-pronged assault by dividing his forces and undertaking to defeat Hooker's forces in detail. Which is exactly what happened.

 

[JackADriscoll]

Don't quite figure how Lee retreating at Chancellorsville was a smart move. That was exactly what Hooker's plan was intended to do; force Lee to withdraw from the Rappahannock line while Stoneman's cavalry cut off the ANV's line of retreat and supply. Or alternatively, catch and crush the ANV in a pincer movement at the clearing east of Chancellorsville crossroads. Instead, the wily Lee made a bold decision to confront the AotP's two-pronged assault by dividing his forces and undertaking to defeat Hooker's forces in detail. Which is exactly what happened.

Yes attack was the move hooker didn't plan for.