Third conscription act

[atlantis]

The Third conscription act has been described as largely unenforceable. Why is that, it was enacted in February 1864 and conditions in the confederacy were relatively stable.
It seems like a decent effort to mobilize manpower.

Your thoughts.

 

[Stryker65]

The Third conscription act has been described as largely unenforceable. Why is that, it was enacted in February 1864 and conditions in the confederacy were relatively stable.
It seems like a decent effort to mobilize manpower.

Your thoughts.

William Marvel talks about this a great deal in his recent (2024) book The Confederate Resurgence of 1864. The main reason for the "Third Conscription Act" was that most of the Confederacy's units had enlisted for three years, and in the spring of 1864, those enlistment terms would be expiring. While this was all fair and well in the North, which could easily raise 100,000 more men to replace 100,000 mustering out, this was certainly not possible in the South. With the multiple recent defeats of the Confederacy (Chattanooga, Gettysburg, Vicksburg, Texas, etc.), Confederate morale was at an all time low in December 1863/January 1864, and increasing desertions/mutinies clearly predicted that, if given the chance, many Confederate soldiers would not reenlist.

Therefore, the Third Conscription Act was less of an actual "conscription" act, as its purpose to solely to force soldiers back into the army. If a Confederate soldier chose not to reenlist, he would be mustered out -- and promptly conscripted, under this new law, back into his regiment. One may remember how the Confederacy did exactly this in converting all their 1-year regiments to 3-year regiments in 1862; the same would then apply here.

With regards to its enforceability, I think that comes down to how unmanageable conscription was after 1863 for the Confederacy in general. What with organized banditti, organized deserters (Jones County, MS for instance), hostile women and children, and an overall increase in all of those due to the aforementioned rise in desertion.

Source:
- William Marvel, The Confederate Resurgence of 1864, pp. 59-62.

Additional source: The following ultimatum was given to Arkansas state troops in September, 1864 when they were given the "offer" of being mustered into Confederate service -- this came, of course, under the February 1864 conscription act:

(OR V53, pp. 1018-1019).

 

[LetUsHavePeace]

William Marvel talks about this a great deal in his recent (2024) book The Confederate Resurgence of 1864. The main reason for the "Third Conscription Act" was that most of the Confederacy's units had enlisted for three years, and in the spring of 1864, those enlistment terms would be expiring. While this was all fair and well in the North, which could easily raise 100,000 more men to replace 100,000 mustering out, this was certainly not possible in the South. With the multiple recent defeats of the Confederacy (Chattanooga, Gettysburg, Vicksburg, Texas, etc.), Confederate morale was at an all time low in December 1863/January 1864, and increasing desertions/mutinies clearly predicted that, if given the chance, many Confederate soldiers would not reenlist.

Therefore, the Third Conscription Act was less of an actual "conscription" act, as its purpose to solely to force soldiers back into the army. If a Confederate soldier chose not to reenlist, he would be mustered out -- and promptly conscripted, under this new law, back into his regiment. One may remember how the Confederacy did exactly this in converting all their 1-year regiments to 3-year regiments in 1862; the same would then apply here.

With regards to its enforceability, I think that comes down to how unmanageable conscription was after 1863 for the Confederacy in general. What with organized banditti, organized deserters (Jones County, MS for instance), hostile women and children, and an overall increase in all of those due to the aforementioned rise in desertion.

Source:
- William Marvel, The Confederate Resurgence of 1864, pp. 59-62.

Additional source: The following ultimatum was given to Arkansas state troops in September, 1864 when they were given the "offer" of being mustered into Confederate service -- this came, of course, under the February 1864 conscription act:
View attachment 582314(OR V53, pp. 1018-1019).

"While this was all fair and well in the North, which could easily raise 100,000 more men to replace 100,000 mustering out, this was certainly not possible in the South."
The money raised from commutation tells a different story, as I tried to illustrate by posting the results of that attempt to make conscription pay for itself. The post got deleted because it was "off-topic" so let me try again by posting the Provost Marshal's numbers:

 

[atlantis]

William Marvel talks about this a great deal in his recent (2024) book The Confederate Resurgence of 1864. The main reason for the "Third Conscription Act" was that most of the Confederacy's units had enlisted for three years, and in the spring of 1864, those enlistment terms would be expiring. While this was all fair and well in the North, which could easily raise 100,000 more men to replace 100,000 mustering out, this was certainly not possible in the South. With the multiple recent defeats of the Confederacy (Chattanooga, Gettysburg, Vicksburg, Texas, etc.), Confederate morale was at an all time low in December 1863/January 1864, and increasing desertions/mutinies clearly predicted that, if given the chance, many Confederate soldiers would not reenlist.

Therefore, the Third Conscription Act was less of an actual "conscription" act, as its purpose to solely to force soldiers back into the army. If a Confederate soldier chose not to reenlist, he would be mustered out -- and promptly conscripted, under this new law, back into his regiment. One may remember how the Confederacy did exactly this in converting all their 1-year regiments to 3-year regiments in 1862; the same would then apply here.

With regards to its enforceability, I think that comes down to how unmanageable conscription was after 1863 for the Confederacy in general. What with organized banditti, organized deserters (Jones County, MS for instance), hostile women and children, and an overall increase in all of those due to the aforementioned rise in desertion.

Source:
- William Marvel, The Confederate Resurgence of 1864, pp. 59-62.

Additional source: The following ultimatum was given to Arkansas state troops in September, 1864 when they were given the "offer" of being mustered into Confederate service -- this came, of course, under the February 1864 conscription act:
View attachment 582314(OR V53, pp. 1018-1019).

"While this was all fair and well in the North, which could easily raise 100,000 more men to replace 100,000 mustering out, this was certainly not possible in the South."
The money raised from commutation tells a different story, as I tried to illustrate by posting the results of that attempt to make conscription pay for itself. The post got deleted because it was "off-topic" so let me try again by posting the Provost Marshal's numbers:
View attachment 582455

View attachment 582454

You don't happen to know how much money that is in today.

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

William Marvel talks about this a great deal in his recent (2024) book The Confederate Resurgence of 1864. The main reason for the "Third Conscription Act" was that most of the Confederacy's units had enlisted for three years, and in the spring of 1864, those enlistment terms would be expiring. While this was all fair and well in the North, which could easily raise 100,000 more men to replace 100,000 mustering out, this was certainly not possible in the South. With the multiple recent defeats of the Confederacy (Chattanooga, Gettysburg, Vicksburg, Texas, etc.), Confederate morale was at an all time low in December 1863/January 1864, and increasing desertions/mutinies clearly predicted that, if given the chance, many Confederate soldiers would not reenlist.

Therefore, the Third Conscription Act was less of an actual "conscription" act, as its purpose to solely to force soldiers back into the army. If a Confederate soldier chose not to reenlist, he would be mustered out -- and promptly conscripted, under this new law, back into his regiment. One may remember how the Confederacy did exactly this in converting all their 1-year regiments to 3-year regiments in 1862; the same would then apply here.

With regards to its enforceability, I think that comes down to how unmanageable conscription was after 1863 for the Confederacy in general. What with organized banditti, organized deserters (Jones County, MS for instance), hostile women and children, and an overall increase in all of those due to the aforementioned rise in desertion.

Source:
- William Marvel, The Confederate Resurgence of 1864, pp. 59-62.

Additional source: The following ultimatum was given to Arkansas state troops in September, 1864 when they were given the "offer" of being mustered into Confederate service -- this came, of course, under the February 1864 conscription act:
View attachment 582314(OR V53, pp. 1018-1019).

Thanks for the explanatory post, @Stryker65.

 

[Stryker65]

Here is the financial data

View attachment 582495
The dollar figure today for the total amount raised through commutation would be $5.48 Billion if we use the monetary standard of the day - i.e. $20=1 ounce of gold. 1.6% of the current Federal budget would be $118.4 Billion.

This has absolutely no bearing on the topic at hand -- this refers to the Union draft, while the OP was about Confederate conscription.

 

[Stryker65]

"While this was all fair and well in the North, which could easily raise 100,000 more men to replace 100,000 mustering out, this was certainly not possible in the South."
The money raised from commutation tells a different story, as I tried to illustrate by posting the results of that attempt to make conscription pay for itself. The post got deleted because it was "off-topic" so let me try again by posting the Provost Marshal's numbers:
View attachment 582455

View attachment 582454

Hmm. So ... the Union could "not" raise another 100,000 men? You then discount the fact that Ohio raised 60 new regiments, Pennsylvania raised 30 new regiments, New York raised 20 new regiments, Illinois raised 10 new regiments, Indiana raised 20 new regiments.

You do understand that a lot of the recruiting for the Union came from non-conscripted troops, right? The question at hand is not the cost of the Union draft, but the necessity of the Confederate conscription. If you want to debate the Union draft, there's a "new thread" function where you can argue that.

 

[LetUsHavePeace]

This has absolutely no bearing on the topic at hand -- this refers to the Union draft, while the OP was about Confederate conscription.

The reply was for Atlantis in response to his question about what the money paid for commutation was worth.

 

[LetUsHavePeace]

Hmm. So ... the Union could "not" raise another 100,000 men? You then discount the fact that Ohio raised 60 new regiments, Pennsylvania raised 30 new regiments, New York raised 20 new regiments, Illinois raised 10 new regiments, Indiana raised 20 new regiments.

You do understand that a lot of the recruiting for the Union came from non-conscripted troops, right? The question at hand is not the cost of the Union draft, but the necessity of the Confederate conscription. If you want to debate the Union draft, there's a "new thread" function where you can argue that.

I marvel at Stryker65's lightning speed to find the data for the States' new regiments that were formed after the Confederacy's extension of conscription in February 1864. It took me 20 minutes to page through Dyer to check the dates for Ohio's cavalry alone and I stopped at the battalion level and did not continue on with the independent companies.

Here are the formation dates for the units of Ohio cavalry, by regiment and independent battalions, in chronological order.
Regiments 1,2,4: August to October 1861.
Regiment 3: September to December 1861
Regiments 6,7,9,10,11: October 1861
Regiment 5: October to November 1861
Regiment 12: November 1863
Regiment 8: January 1864
1st Independent Battalion: October 1861
4th Independent Battalion: August to September 1863, mustered out February to March 1864
5th Independent Battalion: July to September 1863, mustered out February 1864

There are 2 bits bit of data that could be offered in support for Stryker's assertion about the USA's ability to raise "new" men. Ohio did form Cavalry Regiment 13 in May 1864 but it was a consolidation of the 4th and 5th Independent Battalions, not a new enlistment. There was one set of men from Ohio who did join up after February 1864 to ride horses for the Union - the 2nd Independent Battalion. They were enlisted in August 1864 - for guard duty only.

I wrote about the money because I thought it was relevant to the fundamental question: why did the Confederacy effectively convert all its enlistments from a period of service into conscription for the duration? What the money shows is that the war had gotten to the point where neither side could "raise" new soldiers, even if they tried to buy them. Even for the USA, which had the money, conscription with deferments for the privileged was not going to provide fresh meat for the slaughter.

 

[LetUsHavePeace]

If anyone has recommendations for sources that digitize Dyer's numbers, links would be greatly appreciated.

 

[Stryker65]

I marvel at Stryker65's lightning speed to find the data for the States' new regiments that were formed after the Confederacy's extension of conscription in February 1864. It took me 20 minutes to page through Dyer to check the dates for Ohio's cavalry alone and I stopped at the battalion level and did not continue on with the independent companies.

Here are the formation dates for the units of Ohio cavalry, by regiment and independent battalions, in chronological order.
Regiments 1,2,4: August to October 1861.
Regiment 3: September to December 1861
Regiments 6,7,9,10,11: October 1861
Regiment 5: October to November 1861
Regiment 12: November 1863
Regiment 8: January 1864
1st Independent Battalion: October 1861
4th Independent Battalion: August to September 1863, mustered out February to March 1864
5th Independent Battalion: July to September 1863, mustered out February 1864

There are 2 bits bit of data that could be offered in support for Stryker's assertion about the USA's ability to raise "new" men. Ohio did form Cavalry Regiment 13 in May 1864 but it was a consolidation of the 4th and 5th Independent Battalions, not a new enlistment. There was one set of men from Ohio who did join up after February 1864 to ride horses for the Union - the 2nd Independent Battalion. They were enlisted in August 1864 - for guard duty only.

I wrote about the money because I thought it was relevant to the fundamental question: why did the Confederacy effectively convert all its enlistments from a period of service into conscription for the duration? What the money shows is that the war had gotten to the point where neither side could "raise" new soldiers, even if they tried to buy them. Even for the USA, which had the money, conscription with deferments for the privileged was not going to provide fresh meat for the slaughter.

On the Ohio regiments: By 60 new units, I refer to the units numbered 130 through 172, and then, six months later, the units numbered 173 through 197. To break that down, 43 NEW regiments (roughly 30,000 NEW men), and then, immediately afterwards 24 after that. You may note that these units were not "conscripted," but were rather federalized militia regiments. Militia enlisted into the volunteer service still counts as volunteers, as exemplified by (just a few here) the 79th, 80th, 82nd, 83rd, 84th, 87th, 175th, 177th, and 182nd New York.

I stand by my assertion that the US was able to raise NEW men, as described by the reasons above. If you require examples from other states, I can provide those as well -- almost every major Union recruitment state was still enlisting at the end of the war. Two examples are the 197th Ohio and 215th Pennsylvania, both of which were recruited to maximum strength and sent out to the field ... around April 29, 1865.

With regards to funding, it may be of note that some regiments were raised by what we would call Grass Roots movements: the 213th and 214th Pennsylvania infantry were both organized through fundraisers of the Philadelphia-based Union League.

 

[Stryker65]

If anyone has recommendations for sources that digitize Dyer's numbers, links would be greatly appreciated.

Dyer is indeed a cumbersome resource, and I would instead direct you, if you are interested, to see the US Army Register Volume 5 (Ohio and Michigan) and perhaps also Volume 6 (Indiana and Illinois). If you'd like, I can also share the complete 8-volume Google Books set. You will find these much more concise than the organization of the Compendium.

 

[atlantis]

On the Ohio regiments: By 60 new units, I refer to the units numbered 130 through 172, and then, six months later, the units numbered 173 through 197. To break that down, 43 NEW regiments (roughly 30,000 NEW men), and then, immediately afterwards 24 after that. You may note that these units were not "conscripted," but were rather federalized militia regiments. Militia enlisted into the volunteer service still counts as volunteers, as exemplified by (just a few here) the 79th, 80th, 82nd, 83rd, 84th, 87th, 175th, 177th, and 182nd New York.

I stand by my assertion that the US was able to raise NEW men, as described by the reasons above. If you require examples from other states, I can provide those as well -- almost every major Union recruitment state was still enlisting at the end of the war. Two examples are the 197th Ohio and 215th Pennsylvania, both of which were recruited to maximum strength and sent out to the field ... around April 29, 1865.

With regards to funding, it may be of note that some regiments were raised by what we would call Grass Roots movements: the 213th and 214th Pennsylvania infantry were both organized through fundraisers of the Philadelphia-based Union League.

Off topic but the policy of creating new units instead of placing men into existing units strikes me as a very poor policy. The vets can be rough on you, but they can teach you a lot.

 

[Mississippian1861]

On the Ohio regiments: By 60 new units, I refer to the units numbered 130 through 172, and then, six months later, the units numbered 173 through 197. To break that down, 43 NEW regiments (roughly 30,000 NEW men), and then, immediately afterwards 24 after that. You may note that these units were not "conscripted," but were rather federalized militia regiments. Militia enlisted into the volunteer service still counts as volunteers, as exemplified by (just a few here) the 79th, 80th, 82nd, 83rd, 84th, 87th, 175th, 177th, and 182nd New York.

I stand by my assertion that the US was able to raise NEW men, as described by the reasons above. If you require examples from other states, I can provide those as well -- almost every major Union recruitment state was still enlisting at the end of the war. Two examples are the 197th Ohio and 215th Pennsylvania, both of which were recruited to maximum strength and sent out to the field ... around April 29, 1865.

With regards to funding, it may be of note that some regiments were raised by what we would call Grass Roots movements: the 213th and 214th Pennsylvania infantry were both organized through fundraisers of the Philadelphia-based Union League.

I'm going to quibble with you a bit. Most white Union regiments raised after 1863 have either one of two things going on:

1. Short (1 year or less) enlistment terms or
2. Large bounties-many of the New York regiments being raised were offering $1000 or more to enlist men, which is a small fortune.

These terms were offered as to avoid a draft entirely. IRRC each congressional district received a certain quota it had to raise or there would be a draft. Rhode Island sent recruiters into New York City to get enough men to fill out the 3rd Rhode Island Cavalry, for example.

These regiments also tended to attract a few different kinds of men:

1. Bounty Jumpers
2. Very young soldiers
3. Men who had seen previous service and reenlisted, either through boredom or the big bounties.

The "Old" regiments really resented many of these new units that were given large bounties. Billings in "Hardtack and Coffee" went so far as to say that the new units, and the men enlisted into old units in 1864 and 65, were more or less useless in the field.

 

[Stryker65]

I'm going to quibble with you a bit. Most white Union regiments raised after 1863 have either one of two things going on:

1. Short (1 year or less) enlistment terms or
2. Large bounties-many of the New York regiments being raised were offering $1000 or more to enlist men, which is a small fortune.

This is true! Most of the regiments I described above were raised for 1 year or less.

These terms were offered as to avoid a draft entirely. IRRC each congressional district received a certain quota it had to raise or there would be a draft. Rhode Island sent recruiters into New York City to get enough men to fill out the 3rd Rhode Island Cavalry, for example.

Also correct -- another very prominent example is the 26th New York Cavalry, which contained a battalion each from Massachusetts, Vermont, and New York.

These regiments also tended to attract a few different kinds of men:
1. Bounty Jumpers
2. Very young soldiers
3. Men who had seen previous service and reenlisted, either through boredom or the big bounties.

And this would especially be true with the units raised for 1 year in February and March, 1865 -- whether "veteran" units or not, many DID contain men with prior service. For instance, almost every field officer in the Ohio state militia had first seen service in the Ohio volunteers.

Which then brings up an interesting question -- can regiments such as the 2nd Maine Cavalry be considered "new"? One of its qualifications was that its recruits needed to be veterans, and as this followed the muster-out of the 21st-28th infantry regiments, multiple field officers came from those Port Hudson veterans.

The "Old" regiments really resented many of these new units that were given large bounties. Billings in "Hardtack and Coffee" went so far as to say that the new units, and the men enlisted into old units in 1864 and 65, were more or less useless in the field.

And indeed they were -- when reading the histories of these units, one will find that few served in the field. Excepting, of course, maybe ten of the Ohio units and five of the New York units, most served in garrison duties from Winchester to Leavenworth.

---

The outlier to all this, of course, is the 1864 National Guard, which I believe was the first federalization of US state militia on a large scale. In relation to the OP, compare what Lincoln did with the National Guardsmen with what Jefferson Davis did with the Arkansas, Georgia, and Mississippi militia. The National Guardsmen were allowed to muster out peaceably, while the Confederate militiamen were given two choices: transfer to Confederate service or be conscripted into Confederate service.

 

[Stryker65]

Off topic but the policy of creating new units instead of placing men into existing units strikes me as a very poor policy. The vets can be rough on you, but they can teach you a lot.

It was indeed -- this was, I think, the primary mistake made when sending the Washington heavy artillery into the field.

 

[LetUsHavePeace]

Dyer is indeed a cumbersome resource, and I would instead direct you, if you are interested, to see the US Army Register Volume 5 (Ohio and Michigan) and perhaps also Volume 6 (Indiana and Illinois). If you'd like, I can also share the complete 8-volume Google Books set. You will find these much more concise than the organization of the Compendium.

Please. Thank you.

 

[LetUsHavePeace]

James Jones' unfinished novel Whistle applies here. The soldiers who are good at killing the enemy are good because they are smart. That makes them bad at dying and, at the same time, aware of what their own survival odds are. Jones describes in his novel the veterans' view of the new recruits and their utter incompetence: (1) nothing in ordinary soldier training prepares men for the reality of the splatter,(2) after a very short time the smart people back home come to the conclusion that the (pick an abstraction -in our discussion Union/Confederacy/Abolition/States Rights) is not worth volunteering to die for. So, you get the innocent-minded, the stupid, and the people without any political pull as the "new" soldiers; and you get the smart people, including the ones already in uniform, as gamers of the system.
I think you have to look at the Union's new soldiers in that light. The Confederacy had run out of men; the Union was quickly running out of willing, useful men.

 

[Stryker65]

Please. Thank you.

Volume 1: Units from Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut
Volume 2: Units from New York and New Jersey
Volume 3: Units from Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, and the District of Columbia
Volume 4: Units from West Virginia, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, Arkansas, Tennessee, and Kentucky
Volume 5: Units from Ohio and Michigan
Volume 6: Units from Indiana and Illinois
Volume 7: Units from Missouri, Wisconsin, Iowa, Minnesota, California, Kansas, Oregon, and Nevada
Volume 8: Units from Washington Territory, Nebraska Territory, Colorado Territory, and Dakota Territory, and the Veteran Reserve Corps (VRC), Veteran Volunteers (USVV), Galvanized Yankees (USV), and US Colored Troops (USCT)

Hope this helps!

 

[Stryker65]

James Jones' unfinished novel Whistle applies here. The soldiers who are good at killing the enemy are good because they are smart. That makes them bad at dying and, at the same time, aware of what their own survival odds are. Jones describes in his novel the veterans' view of the new recruits and their utter incompetence: (1) nothing in ordinary soldier training prepares men for the reality of the splatter,(2) after a very short time the smart people back home come to the conclusion that the (pick an abstraction -in our discussion Union/Confederacy/Abolition/States Rights) is not worth volunteering to die for. So, you get the innocent-minded, the stupid, and the people without any political pull as the "new" soldiers; and you get the smart people, including the ones already in uniform, as gamers of the system.
I think you have to look at the Union's new soldiers in that light. The Confederacy had run out of men; the Union was quickly running out of willing, useful men.

Agree with this, of course. I think what helped the Union in recruiting these units for less time was the fact that most of these were raised as rear-echelon troops, as I describe above. If I remember correctly, the only corps that actually utilized the 1-year regiments in combat was the 23rd, and those troops only fought in two battles -- Wilmington and Wise's Forks. The majority of these units, formed from militia or otherwise, were kept in the rear as railroad and storehouse guards.