The single most important event

[MRB1863]

What do you think the single most important event was during the three days of Gettysburg and why?

 

[Andy Cardinal]

My opinion is Lee's (or Ewell's) decision to attack early afternoon July 1. The morning action between between Heth and Buford/Wadsworth was little more than a bloody skirmish. Lee had stated he did not want to bring on a general engagement. After the morning's action has ended, the army could still have disengaged and repositioned itself. The decision to arrack on the afternoon of July 1 committed the Army of Northern Virginia to a major battle of Gettysburg.

 

[rpkennedy]

I would say the establishment of Cemetery Hill as the base of Union operations over the course of July 1. It began with John Reynolds deciding to fight northwest of town leaving a strong fallback position to his rear and continued by Oliver Howard who continued Reynolds decision by deploying 2 of his 3 divisions north of town while keeping his remaining division (and 1 battery) as a reserve on Cemetery Hill. Lastly, Winfield Scott Hancock rallying the broken First and Eleventh Corps on Cemetery Hill and maintaining a strong front against a potential attack (Colonel Charles Wainwright of the First Corps and Major Thomas Osborn of the Eleventh Corps forming 40+ guns on the hill was key to this defense) and then reporting to Meade that Cemetery Hill was a place to make a stand.

Ryan

 

[rpkennedy]

I could also argue that JEB Stuart's decision to ride around the Army of the Potomac rather than double back towards the Army of Northern Virginia was the key moment in the campaign. This one action affected nearly every decision made by Confederate officers up until July 3rd.

Ryan

 

[JOHN42768]

IMHO sort of a tie between Chamberlain holding Round top or Lee's insistence on the illfated charge on the 3rd.

 

[Rhea Cole]

On the second day, my wife's greatgreatgrandad a pvt in the 3rd Georgia, made it to the Emmentsburg Road & somehow back again. He & what was left of his regiment watched Pickett's Virginians follow in his footsteps. Benjamin Lester was known as the only man who returned home whole to Burke County, Georgia.

 

[rpkennedy]

On the second day, my wife's greatgreatgrandad a pvt in the 3rd Georgia, made it to the Emmentsburg Road & somehow back again. He & what was left of his regiment watched Pickett's Virginians follow in his footsteps. Benjamin Lester was known as the only man who returned home whole to Burke County, Georgia.

The 3rd Georgia was (relatively) lucky in that they were in the center of the brigade line and so didn't suffer as much when the brigade was flanked on their left and only two companies followed along with the 22nd Georgia when they penetrated the Union line. The 48th Georgia to the 3rd's left had their flank crushed by Webb's Pennsylvanians and the 22nd Georgia was routed from the top of Cemetery Ridge.

Ryan

 

[Rhea Cole]

Tactically, nothing was more important than the Union signal team on top of Little Roundtop. A small party of men armed with pistols & what amounted to a tablecloth on a stick stopped the entire Confederate 2nd Corps in its tracks. The time lost countermarching in the broiling July sun had a profound impact on the Confederate attack against Meade's left. Had Longstreet been able to attack hours earlier, his men fresher by hours & miles, there is no telling what might have occurred?

A deep & abiding irony is that six all but unarmed men stimied Lee, Longstreet, Hood & the flower of the Army of the Northern Virginia with a bluff. The signalists kept their flags waving despite having no messages to send. The sight of the flag flashing against the skyline left legendary poker player Longstreet no choice but to fold his cards, halt & get back behind the ridge. His opponent didn't even have a pair in his hand when he raked all in the chips. It doesn't get better than that.

 

[Rhea Cole]

Strategicly, the best thing that happened at Gettysburg was that Lee was at Gettysburg at all. Lee had advanced into Pennsylvania seeking a single grand Battle that would lead to the fall of Washington & Lincoln's surrender. This is not my opinion, that was the announced goal of the invasion. The character of the Western Armies under a Grant & Sherman was ignored. There is a vast body of documentation that makes it abundantly clear that winning the war by taking Washington was a chimera.

Lee's advance was a great Napoleonic raid. He entered Pennsylvania without a supply line. It was July, crops were sprouting, not being harvested. Lee's equines started to die as soon as he entered Northern Territory from lack of fodder. (It takes 8 hours to graze a horse on a green pasture.) Famously, Lee only had three days of ammunition. Even if he had managed some kind of tactical victory, a retreat back to Virginia was inevitable. After three days of fighting, virtually every wagon in Lee's army was making the 40 mile retreat back to the Potomac River. Had Lee managed some form of victory, he would have had to abandon his wounded in order to advance toward Washington. As it was, it took General Imboden four hours to get from where Lee had given him command of the wagons & the head of the retreat. The conversation between Lee & Longstreet in the Killer Angles was actually Lee & Imboden.

Had Picket managed to make some kind of lodgement in the Union Center, it would not have mattered. Lee literally would have had absolutely no option but to head back south to Virginia. For the Union it was win Lee looses, loose he looses.

It is interesting to point out, that while Lee advanced 40 miles, Rosecrans was stepping off on a front 70 miles wide. His objective, Chattanooga, was over 100 grim, rationless, mountsinous miles away. Unlike Lee, Rosecrans came to stay. Strategically, The best thing about the Battle Of Gettysburg for the Union was that it was fought in Pennsylvania.

 

[Rhea Cole]

The 3rd Georgia was (relatively) lucky in that they were in the center of the brigade line and so didn't suffer as much when the brigade was flanked on their left and only two companies followed along with the 22nd Georgia when they penetrated the Union line. The 48th Georgia to the 3rd's left had their flank crushed by Webb's Pennsylvanians and the 22nd Georgia was routed from the top of Cemetery Ridge.

Ryan

Anne's g-g-grandad was nobody you wanted to be standing near to. He served from the first muster, the Cheech & Chong-ish Coatal Island debacle, the sunken road, Gettysburg, the Crater & signed papers at Appomattox. Apart from a piece of metal left in his right cheek & a lifetime of nightmarish memories, he came home unscathed. A considerable heap of bones were needed to make him statistically possible. We have a photo of him at 3 or so. He is wearing an elaborate dress & being hugged by a black nurse. My wife remembers seeing her sitting in a corner by the stove patting out biscuits. Do you have a family connection with the 3rd GA?

 

[Saint Jude]

Howard's decision to establish a defensive position on Cemetery Hill on July 1.

 

[Carronade]

Lee's advance was a great Napoleonic raid. He entered Pennsylvania without a supply line. It was July, crops were sprouting, not being harvested. Lee's equines started to die as soon as he entered Northern Territory from lack of fodder. (It takes 8 hours to graze a horse on a green pasture.)

Interesting point; I've always assumed that a Civil War army marching through unspoiled farmland would be almost independent logistically until it got into a major battle.

 

[Rhea Cole]

Interesting point; I've always assumed that a Civil War army marching through unspoiled farmland would be almost independent logistically until it got into a major battle.

That only works if you can spend all day gathering supplies like Sherman's bummers did. The army also had to keep moving. Even a halt of a couple of days could eat out the surrounding area. Armies from the time of Henry the V onward withered & died when local foodstuffs ran out. In Lee's case, July is not harvest time. Even the spring crop of animals was not ready for market. Having to retrace his route through the already foraged over area left little to collect.

 

[rpkennedy]

Anne's g-g-grandad was nobody you wanted to be standing near to. He served from the first muster, the Cheech & Chong-ish Coatal Island debacle, the sunken road, Gettysburg, the Crater & signed papers at Appomattox. Apart from a piece of metal left in his right cheek & a lifetime of nightmarish memories, he came home unscathed. A considerable heap of bones were needed to make him statistically possible. We have a photo of him at 3 or so. He is wearing an elaborate dress & being hugged by a black nurse. My wife remembers seeing her sitting in a corner by the stove patting out biscuits. Do you have a family connection with the 3rd GA?

I do not; all of my relatives were Union soldiers, mostly from New York but with a couple from Vermont, Maryland, and Illinois regiments. But I did a ton of research on Wright's Brigade at Gettysburg when I put together a tour for this site's get-together several years ago. I did do a write-up here and will have to do a quick search and link it when I get off of work. Also, if you're up his way at some point, I'd be happy to give that tour again (that applies to everyone interested, as well).

Ryan

 

[Dead Parrott]

Strategicly, the best thing that happened at Gettysburg was that Lee was at Gettysburg at all. Lee had advanced into Pennsylvania seeking a single grand Battle that would lead to the fall of Washington & Lincoln's surrender. This is not my opinion, that was the announced goal of the invasion. The character of the Western Armies under a Grant & Sherman was ignored. There is a vast body of documentation that makes it abundantly clear that winning the war by taking Washington was a chimera.

Lee's advance was a great Napoleonic raid. He entered Pennsylvania without a supply line. It was July, crops were sprouting, not being harvested. Lee's equines started to die as soon as he entered Northern Territory from lack of fodder. (It takes 8 hours to graze a horse on a green pasture.) Famously, Lee only had three days of ammunition. Even if he had managed some kind of tactical victory, a retreat back to Virginia was inevitable. After three days of fighting, virtually every wagon in Lee's army was making the 40 mile retreat back to the Potomac River. Had Lee managed some form of victory, he would have had to abandon his wounded in order to advance toward Washington. As it was, it took General Imboden four hours to get from where Lee had given him command of the wagons & the head of the retreat. The conversation between Lee & Longstreet in the Killer Angles was actually Lee & Imboden.

Had Picket managed to make some kind of lodgement in the Union Center, it would not have mattered. Lee literally would have had absolutely no option but to head back south to Virginia. For the Union it was win Lee looses, loose he looses.

It is interesting to point out, that while Lee advanced 40 miles, Rosecrans was stepping off on a front 70 miles wide. His objective, Chattanooga, was over 100 grim, rationless, mountsinous miles away. Unlike Lee, Rosecrans came to stay. Strategically, The best thing about the Battle Of Gettysburg for the Union was that it was fought in Pennsylvania.

Great post.

I love it when people remember the importance of wagons!

 

[Rhea Cole]

I do not; all of my relatives were Union soldiers, mostly from New York but with a couple from Vermont, Maryland, and Illinois regiments. But I did a ton of research on Wright's Brigade at Gettysburg when I put together a tour for this site's get-together several years ago. I did do a write-up here and will have to do a quick search and link it when I get off of work. Also, if you're up his way at some point, I'd be happy to give that tour again (that applies to everyone interested, as well).

Ryan

Thank you, same to you should you visit Middle Tennessee. I am a living history volunteer at Stones River National Batttlefield & can give you the "our side of the rope" tour. My wife's other relation of note was General John Sprague who received a Metal of Honor for defeating Wheeler's attempt to destroy Sherman's ammunition trains.

 

[Dead Parrott]

That only works if you can spend all day gathering supplies like Sherman's bummers did. The army also had to keep moving. Even a halt of a couple of days could eat out the surrounding area. Armies from the time of Henry the V onward withered & died when local foodstuffs ran out. In Lee's case, July is not harvest time. Even the spring crop of animals was not ready for market. Having to retrace his route through the already foraged over area left little to collect.

Great points again. Forgaing like that only works when there is no serious opposing army in proximity (and guerilla activity is slight).

 

[Rhea Cole]

Great post.

I love it when people remember the importance of wagons!

You are so right. Trash hauling, as my C-130 pilot brother calls it, was what made everything else possible. As they say, amateurs talk of tactics, professionals talk of logistics. Lee could have moved rations & fodder or wounded, but not both.

 

[Wallyfish]

Single event, hummmm. While I readily admit that this is a sequence of events. I would say the July 2nd union efforts starting with the First Minnesota charge, followed by Willard's NY boys movement stopping Barksdale's charge coupled with Freeman McGilvery's desparate Plum Run Line blasting canister into the charging Confederates near the Trostle Farm all stopped the Confederates from breaking the Union line.

Wow, that was one long sentence. Now if sequence of events don't count. I would say the 1st Minnesota charge has to be up there in military importance. Such a small regiment stopping a charge of overwhelming number of Confederates as they bought time for redeployment of union men. That is 1A. Courageous and important.


1B in my opinion is McGilvery Plum Run Line.

 

[jackt62]

I say that Meade's decision in the late afternoon of Day 1 to concentrate the AOTP and fight at Gettysburg was the most important event of the battle. Despite the Union debacle on the 1st day, the analysis by Hancock and Howard as to the defensive advantage of what has come to be known as the "Fishhook" line, essentially sealed the fate of the ANV.