The Peninsula Campaign: Barnard's "Lessons Learned"

[Saphroneth]

Yet, although Barnard knows far, far more about the roads, bridges, supply situation, etc. than either you or I ever will, Barnard concluded that this was an effort that should have been made. You will not find out why by trying to disprove what he says. You will not find out what he is seeing and you are missing by slicing and dicing it into tiny specimens to examine. You need to start by trying to see what he saw and why he saw it. Ignore the detail until you can get at least a general feel for what he learned and is trying to share with the rest of the Army.

You asked for my opinion on the paragraphs. My opinion is that Barnard's lessons-learned is one of these things:


1) It suggests a course of action in specific which, historically speaking, was attempted but proved not to be possible, owing to engineering details. (The collapsed bridges.)
2) It suggests a course of action in a general sense, which is general enough to be obvious (a defeated army can be productively followed up) but which in the specific engagement he uses as an example was not actually feasible (again, owing to the collapsed bridges).


Barnard was not ignorant of the bridge problems, yes. But those very bridge problems are what renders his suggested course of action impractical.


This is something that can't really be avoided - in his analysis of Seven Pines, in those paragraphs, Barnard suggests something which was not possible at the time. The specific reason why it was not possible is that the bridges which would be necessary to take that course of action had collapsed.



The reason why I'm focusing on those paragraphs is that those are the paragraphs you asked me about. The wider report doesn't actually seem to mention in so many words that the replacement New Bridge collapsed, though it does mention it being completed and then after some discussion about other matters (including the causeways leading up to the bridge) it mentions that the rail bridge is the only passage between the two parts of the army.

 

[Belfoured]

I think his characterization of the Confederates being in a state of disorganization can be considered fairly accurate.

Not only are they emerging from a confused and mishandled battle but their commanding officer, Joseph E. Johnston, has been so badly wounded he's had to be removed from the field and his replacement, G.W. Smith, suffered a what appeared to be neverous breakdown so was in no fit state to command. As such the Confederate Army is going to be in some dissary at the highest level emerging from this battle, and even Robert E. Lee taking charge the very first day in June is not going to remedy that immediately.

While it is clear Barnard underestimates the true strenght of the Confederate Army in the aftermath of this battle, he's probably right that it was the ideal time to attack because of the disruption to the Confederate command chain - but whether that was practically possible at the time I could not say.

As an aside, Smith not only was unfit for command on June 1 but had been relegated by Johnston to the role of a supernumerary on May 31 regarding his own command because of concerns about his capacity.

 

[bdtex]

Great thread. Except for Williamsburg and Gaines' Mill, I know little about the Peninsula Campaign.

 

[67th Tigers]

On the transfer of 6th Corps south of the Chickahominy. Smith's division crossed the Chickahominy on 5th June, and went into position facing Garnett's Hill. Slocum's division was attached to the 5th Corps and didn't move south until relieved by McCall's division around the 20th. They went into general reserve, and constituted McClellan's reserve division on the 25th-27th.

 

[trice]

As an aside, Smith not only was unfit for command on June 1 but had been relegated by Johnston to the role of a supernumerary on May 31 regarding his own command because of concerns about his capacity.

Yes, pretty much -- although Smith was still disputing all that in 1889. According to him he did not fall ill until the morning of the 2nd (and never did fully recover, he says, 27 years later).

 

[trice]

You asked for my opinion on the paragraphs. My opinion is that Barnard's lessons-learned is one of these things:


1) It suggests a course of action in specific which, historically speaking, was attempted but proved not to be possible, owing to engineering details. (The collapsed bridges.)
2) It suggests a course of action in a general sense, which is general enough to be obvious (a defeated army can be productively followed up) but which in the specific engagement he uses as an example was not actually feasible (again, owing to the collapsed bridges).

You are insisting on a short and tight time frame when he does not mention one at all. ***You*** are the one insisting on details that ***you*** say are unfeasible. Evaluate what he says -- not what you want to toss dirt on. Try to see what he sees before you start shooting at it.

Barnard was not ignorant of the bridge problems, yes. But those very bridge problems are what renders his suggested course of action impractical.

You keep doing the same thing, trying to marginalize what you don't want to know. You call Barnard "not ignorant", trying to ****-with-faint-praise. Understand instead that Barnard was one of the top military Engineers in the United States Army, intimately familiar with all the details you are trying to insinuate he was not taking into account. He had actually been in charge of work on the bridges and roads you refer to here. He was rebuilding them, he was trying to keep them operational. He not only knew there was a supply problem, he mentions it in the upper part of his report.

Barnard knew far more than you or I ever did or ever will about those issues. He, along with many in the AoP, suffered through them. So when you imagine that he ignored them, you should stop and realize that you are almost certainly wrong. Then you should start wondering what you are missing and why you are not even looking to see what it was.

Barnard is an Engineer. You should assume that he intended to do what Engineers do with problems: fix them. Then start looking at what he is saying in the "lessons Learned" section and try to figure out how that will work with the bridges and roads fixed.

This is something that can't really be avoided - in his analysis of Seven Pines, in those paragraphs, Barnard suggests something which was not possible at the time. The specific reason why it was not possible is that the bridges which would be necessary to take that course of action had collapsed.

I ask that you avoid hopping down this trail, always trying to disprove what you have not examined yet. Look beyond the fence instead of building it higher. One of the things Barnard does here is stress greater preparation, particularly on the roads, bridges and protections for them. Assume that will be done and try to look at what Barnard is trying to show you.

The reason why I'm focusing on those paragraphs is that those are the paragraphs you asked me about. The wider report doesn't actually seem to mention in so many words that the replacement New Bridge collapsed, though it does mention it being completed and then after some discussion about other matters (including the causeways leading up to the bridge) it mentions that the rail bridge is the only passage between the two parts of the army.

Again, try to avoid focusing on the tiny parts. Step back and look at the whole picture instead of the individual brush-strokes.

Understand that this last "Lessons Learned" section is extremely unusual in an official report. The entire report would normally end where the section I posted starts. You are completely headed in the wrong direction if you are looking for details about an individual bridge in the "Lessons learned" section -- and it is baffling that this is what you are trying to focus on. Ignore that type of thing and try to see what the "Lessons Learned" are Barnard is trying to show you.

 

[trice]

In passing, John G. Barnard was a famous mover and shaker in the field of scientific knowledge. He was a co-founder of the United States National Academy of Sciences. His influence on David Van Nostrand led to the publication of many post-Civil War books by soldiers like Sherman, Sheridan, Halleck and a host of others. (Barnard College is not named after him.)

 

[67th Tigers]

Understand that this last "Lessons Learned" section is extremely unusual in an official report. The entire report would normally end where the section I posted starts. You are completely headed in the wrong direction if you are looking for details about an individual bridge in the "Lessons learned" section -- and it is baffling that this is what you are trying to focus on. Ignore that type of thing and try to see what the "Lessons Learned" are Barnard is trying to show you.

Indeed, it is unusual, because it was a thinly veiled attempt to deflect blame from Barnard, onto McClellan. McClellan's great crime, according to Barnard, was listening to his chief engineer, Barnard, because Barnard was wrong. What's more, Barnard was then wrong about elements of how Barnard was wrong!

 

[Saphroneth]

You are insisting on a short and tight time frame when he does not mention one at all. ***You*** are the one insisting on details that ***you*** say are unfeasible. Evaluate what he says -- not what you want to toss dirt on. Try to see what he sees before you start shooting at it.

But if the time frame is expanded then the prescription either becomes nonsensical (follow up on a disrupted enemy several days after the disrupting event, and after they've fallen back into fortifications?) or if expanded enough it becomes what was actually done (McClellan did indeed attack south of the Chickahominy in June).

I ask that you avoid hopping down this trail, always trying to disprove what you have not examined yet. Look beyond the fence instead of building it higher. One of the things Barnard does here is stress greater preparation, particularly on the roads, bridges and protections for them. Assume that will be done and try to look at what Barnard is trying to show you.

Well, obviously if the bridges don't collapse then 6th Corps can cross south of the river and follow up, and if the Confederates all marched south and left Richmond then the city can easily be taken. If Barnard is talking about lessons learned then the implication is naturally that we should be talking about what would actually have been possible with the circumstances that existed at the time.

Barnard doesn't mention about "in the event of attack, the Union army should defend itself" because that is not only obvious but something that actually happened. But he mentions that 6th Corps should have crossed to the south of the river, even though that is something that 6th Corps was actually ordered to do.


Again - you asked me about those paragraphs. It is my view that those paragraphs are not actually very helpful because they suggest a course of action which is not possible in the situation as it then existed (specifically for reasons including the failure of the bridges).
If Barnard had included a paragraph (or a mention) about how at Seven Pines the bridges collapsing caused the failure of a battle plan, then it would be a useful jumping-off point about a lesson learned being that the integrity of bridges is of the utmost importance and that they should be built to endure not merely the normal flow of a river but the river in spate.

Which is within Barnard's area of expertise.

Understand that this last "Lessons Learned" section is extremely unusual in an official report. The entire report would normally end where the section I posted starts. You are completely headed in the wrong direction if you are looking for details about an individual bridge in the "Lessons learned" section -- and it is baffling that this is what you are trying to focus on. Ignore that type of thing and try to see what the "Lessons Learned" are Barnard is trying to show you.

But Barnard doesn't mention the individual bridge's failure anywhere in the entire report, at least so far as I can see. And it's important to the topic he's discussing in those paragraphs.



As far as I can see it, in those paragraphs either Barnard is discussing a general case where the specifics don't actually help in the situation he's discussing, or he's discussing a specific case where his recommendation isn't possible.


In the first paragraph, Barnard clearly says that the repulsed enemy could have been followed into Richmond and if this had been done then there would have been "no resistance to overcome" to bring over the right wing. This is a conditional - if the repulsed enemy had been followed up, then there wouldn't have been anything stopping them bringing over the right wing.
In the second paragraph, Barnard says that "we could have followed them up at the same time that we brought over the other two-fifths".

He is clearly discussing attacking the enemy south of the Chickahominy on the first of June, when the enemy retreated back towards Richmond and its fortifications (which they did on the 1st of June). In addition, he's talking about doing so with the three corps already south of the Chickahominy, while the other two corps (5th and 6th) are being brought south of the river.

This means that Barnard is advising launching an attack with 2nd, 3rd, 4th Corps on the first of June, while 5th and 6th are brought south of the river (in a way that, in those paragraphs, he does not explicitly mention). Either this is not accounting for the collapsed bridge, or it is, and if it is then the delay entailed by moving to the intact rail bridge and then to the front (about ten miles each way) is a couple of days.

The substance of the paragraphs is that the disrupted Confederate force was so weakened that the forces south of the river could have easily followed it up and routed them to the extent that their fortifications couldn't actually help. It is in fact the core argument of those paragraphs - the enemy could have been (1) followed up, (2) with the forces south of the Chickahominy (the "three fifths"), (3) into Richmond.

But the reason why I don't think this is correct is that the enemy wasn't that weakened. There were many regiments that hadn't been heavily engaged, amounting to between two-thirds and three-quarters of their total regiments in the area.


Thus, Barnard's argument for a vigourous counterattack (which is what those paragraphs are) is fundamentally mistaken as it is entirely predicated on a state of Confederate collapse which is not in fact the case.
It is my opinion that a counterattack including the fresh troops of 6th Corps might have been successful, at least in terms of driving the enemy back further than they retreated voluntarily, but without 6th Corps a counterattack would be less likely to be successful.





Now, that is of course my assessment of those paragraphs, but it seems that you disagree. Would you be so kind as to elaborate on what you think the point of those paragraphs is?

 

[trice]

Indeed, it is unusual, because it was a thinly veiled attempt to deflect blame from Barnard, onto McClellan. McClellan's great crime, according to Barnard, was listening to his chief engineer, Barnard, because Barnard was wrong. What's more, Barnard was then wrong about elements of how Barnard was wrong!

This looks like the circular logic used by some people to justify their own conspiracy theories to themselves. What are you trying to say?

 

[trice]

But if the time frame is expanded then the prescription either becomes nonsensical (follow up on a disrupted enemy several days after the disrupting event, and after they've fallen back into fortifications?) or if expanded enough it becomes what was actually done (McClellan did indeed attack south of the Chickahominy in June).


Well, obviously if the bridges don't collapse then 6th Corps can cross south of the river and follow up, and if the Confederates all marched south and left Richmond then the city can easily be taken. If Barnard is talking about lessons learned then the implication is naturally that we should be talking about what would actually have been possible with the circumstances that existed at the time.

Barnard doesn't mention about "in the event of attack, the Union army should defend itself" because that is not only obvious but something that actually happened. But he mentions that 6th Corps should have crossed to the south of the river, even though that is something that 6th Corps was actually ordered to do.


Again - you asked me about those paragraphs. It is my view that those paragraphs are not actually very helpful because they suggest a course of action which is not possible in the situation as it then existed (specifically for reasons including the failure of the bridges).
If Barnard had included a paragraph (or a mention) about how at Seven Pines the bridges collapsing caused the failure of a battle plan, then it would be a useful jumping-off point about a lesson learned being that the integrity of bridges is of the utmost importance and that they should be built to endure not merely the normal flow of a river but the river in spate.

Which is within Barnard's area of expertise.



But Barnard doesn't mention the individual bridge's failure anywhere in the entire report, at least so far as I can see. And it's important to the topic he's discussing in those paragraphs.



As far as I can see it, in those paragraphs either Barnard is discussing a general case where the specifics don't actually help in the situation he's discussing, or he's discussing a specific case where his recommendation isn't possible.


In the first paragraph, Barnard clearly says that the repulsed enemy could have been followed into Richmond and if this had been done then there would have been "no resistance to overcome" to bring over the right wing. This is a conditional - if the repulsed enemy had been followed up, then there wouldn't have been anything stopping them bringing over the right wing.
In the second paragraph, Barnard says that "we could have followed them up at the same time that we brought over the other two-fifths".

He is clearly discussing attacking the enemy south of the Chickahominy on the first of June, when the enemy retreated back towards Richmond and its fortifications (which they did on the 1st of June). In addition, he's talking about doing so with the three corps already south of the Chickahominy, while the other two corps (5th and 6th) are being brought south of the river.

This means that Barnard is advising launching an attack with 2nd, 3rd, 4th Corps on the first of June, while 5th and 6th are brought south of the river (in a way that, in those paragraphs, he does not explicitly mention). Either this is not accounting for the collapsed bridge, or it is, and if it is then the delay entailed by moving to the intact rail bridge and then to the front (about ten miles each way) is a couple of days.

The substance of the paragraphs is that the disrupted Confederate force was so weakened that the forces south of the river could have easily followed it up and routed them to the extent that their fortifications couldn't actually help. It is in fact the core argument of those paragraphs - the enemy could have been (1) followed up, (2) with the forces south of the Chickahominy (the "three fifths"), (3) into Richmond.

But the reason why I don't think this is correct is that the enemy wasn't that weakened. There were many regiments that hadn't been heavily engaged, amounting to between two-thirds and three-quarters of their total regiments in the area.


Thus, Barnard's argument for a vigourous counterattack (which is what those paragraphs are) is fundamentally mistaken as it is entirely predicated on a state of Confederate collapse which is not in fact the case.
It is my opinion that a counterattack including the fresh troops of 6th Corps might have been successful, at least in terms of driving the enemy back further than they retreated voluntarily, but without 6th Corps a counterattack would be less likely to be successful.





Now, that is of course my assessment of those paragraphs, but it seems that you disagree. Would you be so kind as to elaborate on what you think the point of those paragraphs is?

Barnard is talking in a very high view of all this. You are examining as if it is all about one or two specific details that you should not expect to be mentioned in the two very short and brief paragraphs he wrote.

All he is really saying (and this is really more obvious in the context of the entire "Lessons Learned" section I was trying to get people to focus on) is that the Army had done things wrong and should have acted differently. He says this about the period November 1861-February 1862 in the first paragraph of it. He says it about the first plans to move in Virginia. He says it about the operations against the Warwick Line, about the Battle of Williamsburg and the choice of a route after that, about how slowly they moved from there to the Chickahominy and after, about the lack of a sense of urgency on the Union side, about the lack of aggression in their defense of the Seven Days, and about the lack of forethought that led to the problems with Washington and troops, about the overall situation at the end/what was wrong/how they got there.

This section I am calling "Lessons Learned" is about introspection and review of a ten-month period where the Union effort in the East went off the rails and an opportunity to win the Civil War in 1862 escaped from their grasp. It is the equivalent of the first ten minutes of a teacher's lecture in the first class of the semester, an overview and outline of what you will be discussing for the next three months. You are attacking it as if it was the entire semester.

You keep harping on items like Barnard not mentioning one particular bridge. His report covers all of the engineering section "operations from May 23, 1861, to August 15, 1862". If you want to look at any particular operations about any particular bridge/road/etc., you probably would need to look at some other report of the dozens he probably wrote and filed (or the reports of his subordinates handling tasks he assigned them and would have referred to). You might find some of them in the Army O.R. -- but that is only 128 volumes and includes only a fraction of the reports made and filed. You might have to go physically to Washington to the archives and pay someone to search the records for you to find things you are demanding of a summary report.

What I am calling the "Lessons Learned" section is highly unusual in such a report. Barnard inserted it in an attempt to get the Army talking about the issues involved. It was not some sort of hatchet job on McClellan, although a few people seem to insist it was. Barnard actually says that much of his opinion "now" contradicts his opinion and actions while the events were going on. He thinks he was wrong before, and he wants to figure out what should have been done instead. It is intended to start the conversation and debate. This is the exact meaning of the "Lessons Learned" review -- which the US Army has made an official organized function in recent decades.

Your general approach to anything I have seen over the years here is to focus on the tiny parts. You generally do not do top-down analysis of situations. You almost exclusively do bottom-up analysis, and I think you have usually reached your conclusion long before you get to the top of the pyramid. I think the view is different from the top and the bottom. Both are important; both approaches can teach us valuable things. Relying on only one limits what you will find and hides data you need to know from you. Generally, you need a little of both approaches to analyze any complex situation -- with the exact amount of emphasis for each dependent upon what you discover as you go.

The only reason I asked you about the two brief paragraphs Barnard wrote on Seven Pines was that you had already done a deep-dive down to the bottom level (see your post at #8 in this thread). You first reaction was to count regiments and talk about a specific bridge, not to try to see what Barnard might be pointing you at. You are saying he is wrong because he could not get the Sixth Corps across the river. He is telling you something completely different, that the repulse on May 31 should have been followed up immediately: "Had it been so, there would have been no resistance to overcome to bring over our right wing." You jumped to attacking something he had not said.

If this "Lessons Learned" section actually is the equivalent of the first ten minutes of a teacher's lecture in the first class of the semester, the detailed dive you are taking would be appropriate right about after the mid-term exam on the first half of the class. It would have value then in discussing the specifics of the overall lessons.

In a thread like this, it would probably be a good idea to post in this one saying something like "I am really interested in this Seven Pines comment of Barnard's. I am starting a new thread to examine these two paragraphs on Seven Pines. Please join me over there if you'd like to talk about it in detail". Then there can be a general discussion of Barnard's ideas in this one and a detailed discussion of a tiny part of Barnard's ideas in the other thread. Otherwise, the amount of detail you want to throw in will dominate the thread, blinding most people to about 90% of the topic and it will not get discussed.

Thread-drift happens all the time and I am guilty of a lot of it myself.

 

[trice]

As a reference for Norfolk specifically, here is a contemporary map which shows the Confederate batteries:

View attachment 430674


Along the coast there's a battery marked every mile or two, and then another "layer" of batteries closer in towards Norfolk, followed by a work with 30 guns mounted. Similarly from the south there's a work with ~30 mounted guns south of Portsmouth.



If it were to be the target of a landing then it'd have to be the "main effort", with probably multiple divisions (there were quite a lot of defenders in Norfolk after all) and plenty of gunnery support to overcome the batteries; if the Virginia came out to interfere with the landing while the landing were in progress then it'd be... a problem.

Sorry to be so late getting back to this early post of yours.

Do you have an as-of-date for that map? I think there may be one in the lower right, but it distorted too much when I tried to blow it up.

Barnard is postulating an attempt to take Norfolk sometime between November 1861 and March 1862. He wants to take the port and eliminate the issue of the Virginia before she can intervene in Union actions ("By its capture the career of the Merrimac, which proved so disastrous to our subsequent operations, would have been prevented.")

The Battle of Hampton Roads is March 8-9, 1862. If the Union is going to launch an operation to prevent that, I would guess that November 15, 1861 would be an extremely early starting date for the operation and March February 15, 1862 would be very late. I am wondering, essentially, what the Confederacy had-in-place-when and how that would impact the idea.

Seeing your post with the map again made me think of that whole go-take-out-Norfolk-and-the-Merrimac idea as a what-if I had never seen examined. It would probably be best to start a new thread for something like that, over in a what-if section (he said, tongue-in-cheek, after bringing it up in this one )

 

[67th Tigers]

The Battle of Hampton Roads is March 8-9, 1862. If the Union is going to launch an operation to prevent that, I would guess that November 15, 1861 would be an extremely early starting date for the operation and March February 15, 1862 would be very late. I am wondering, essentially, what the Confederacy had-in-place-when and how that would impact the idea.

A lot, but most importantly the batteries at Sewell's Point completely stopped any idea of landing a force to attack Norfolk from Fort Monroe. I suggest reading Rowena Reed.

 

[trice]

A lot, but most importantly the batteries at Sewell's Point completely stopped any idea of landing a force to attack Norfolk from Fort Monroe. I suggest reading Rowena Reed.

Yes, Huger had troops and guns there before March 8 as part of his defenses against an advance from Fort Monroe. Any landing from Fort Monroe would probably have to be out of range of that, followed by an advance overland. Once Burnside's North Carolina Expedition starts to succeed, Huger's problems multiply and Huger has to find ways to deal with threats from the South.

Thanks for reminding me of Rowena Reed's work.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Yes, Huger had troops and guns there before March 8 as part of his defenses against an advance from Fort Monroe. Any landing from Fort Monroe would probably have to be out of range of that, followed by an advance overland. Once Burnside's North Carolina Expedition starts to succeed, Huger's problems multiply and Huger has to find ways to deal with threats from the South.

Thanks for reminding me of Rowena Reed's work.

As early as the end of May '61, Butler suggested taking Suffolk across from Newport News, break up the railroad between Richmond and Norfolk, and cut off supplies to Norfolk and starve them out. He wrote Scott on May 29, 1861:

 

[Saphroneth]

The only reason I asked you about the two brief paragraphs Barnard wrote on Seven Pines was that you had already done a deep-dive down to the bottom level (see your post at #8 in this thread). You first reaction was to count regiments and talk about a specific bridge, not to try to see what Barnard might be pointing you at. You are saying he is wrong because he could not get the Sixth Corps across the river. He is telling you something completely different, that the repulse on May 31 should have been followed up immediately: "Had it been so, there would have been no resistance to overcome to bring over our right wing." You jumped to attacking something he had not said.

Though Barnard's analysis - where he talks about his reasoning - means that regiment counting at least is completely valid. Barnard's argument with respect to why it should have been followed up includes that the Confederates were exhausted, but looking at who suffered the casualties indicates that most of their units had suffered basically no casualties.

And it's not just "a specific bridge" but the existence of bridges at all - the bridge Sumner crossed by collapsed after his infantry was over, at least to my understanding.

What this means, at least if I follow what's being said by Barnard and your interpretation thereof, is that Barnard's analysis of post-Seven Pines is:

1) following up the attack
- The repulse on May 31 should have been followed up immediately.
- This is because the enemy had exhausted themselves and run out of available resources.
- We didn't know that at the time, but we do now, which is why I say this now instead of then.

2) bringing over the right wing
- had we done this (i.e. repulsed the enemy) then we would have been able to bring over the right wing without any problems ("no resistance to overcome").


Here's my view of that...

- by regiment counting, we can determine that most of the force that the Confederates had (in terms of regiments) was not exhausted. This is a point directly against Barnard's chain of logic - the "what we know now" aspect of how exhausted the Confederates were is based on incorrect information.
- the fighting continued until darkness, and in fact resumed on June 1 with a renewed Confederate attack (Birney for example only gets involved on June 1, and Richardson's division is driven back before rallying). So clearly the Confederates were not fought out on May 31 since they were able to launch attacks on June 1.
- The Confederates withdrew to captured earthworks, with some reluctance, midmorning on June 1.

So immediately it seems clear that the picture of the Confederates as easily counterattacked after the repulse on May 31 is not a full picture of the situation. They were still attacking early on June 1 and then withdrew to captured earthworks.

This then means that an immediate counterattack by the Union forces south of the river would have been essentially a "hasty" attack against an enemy who was still fit to fight. If that's late on the 31st then the units which would be being attacked would in some cases actually be the ones who attacked the next day, so clearly still had some fight in them, on top of the attack being a night attack; if that's early on the 1st of June then either it runs into the Confederate attack (result, a general melee) or it comes after that.

The best case is if it hits the Confederates during the period when they're withdrawing into the captured earthworks, but to plan this in advance would be quite difficult given how long attacks take to plan out - on the 31st the Confederate attack had been five hours late for example!


In addition to that, the bridge problem still exists - there weren't any viable bridges on the morning of the 1st except the rail bridge, a day's march away. Now perhaps what Barnard means by "no resistance" to being able to bring over the right wing is that they could have sent 6th Corps around the wrong way, or perhaps he means that they could have crossed 6th Corps in the next few days, but neither of those is dependent on whether or not the enemy had been repulsed (while Barnard mentions the conditional).
Alternatively he could mean that pushing the enemy back would make it possible to properly repair New Bridge, but it's my understanding that the engineers erected trestles around New Bridge over the course of the 1st June (including some of the work being done in the morning, before the Confederate pull-back). So there apparently wasn't anything about enemy positions on the 1st of June preventing bridging work being done in that location, it was just that it wasn't carried to a successful conclusion.
A final possibility is that he's thinking in terms of pushing the enemy away from the Chickahominy entirely, and permitting the Union forces north of the river to cross by the existing crossing places by making sure they weren't defended. This would satisfy the conditional, but the scale of the advance required is large - the Mechanicsville Bridge is about three miles further west than the New Bridge, and it's about a mile past Fort Johnston, so if Barnard is arguing this then he's arguing the ability to take Fort Johnston.




What I suspect is going on, and I invite you to consider this and see how it holds up, is that in writing this months later Barnard has been misinformed as to the precise situation on the Confederate side of the lines on the end of the 31st May and beginning of 1st June, and is under the impression that the Confederates were more defeated and vulnerable than they in fact were.
I suspect he did think that the Confederates were in such a state that they could be repulsed (and forced not merely out of works but out of forts) by a firm offensive even by the also-disrupted Union troops, and that this mistaken impression of Barnard's was formed:
1) partly by the idea that Confederate forces in Richmond were smaller in number than the truth (so the number of troops engaged would form a higher % of the number of troops available, i.e. he thinks that all their units were in heavy fighting - as he says - rather than only some)
and
2) partly by sensationalist news reporting exaggerating the scale of Confederate disruption (at least at the brigade level and below).

It's not like the Confederates had been routed from the field; they'd attacked and gained ground, been stopped, and then some of the force had been repulsed by a counter-attack around dusk but other attacking units had (later, meaning on the 1st) voluntarily withdrawn back over some of the ground they'd taken. There were also units which hadn't really fought at all.

Certainly the Confederates are weaker than if they hadn't had the battle, but whether that rises to the point of being able to rout them back into Richmond as Barnard suggests is a substantially higher bar.

 

[trice]

Though Barnard's analysis - where he talks about his reasoning - means that regiment counting at least is completely valid. Barnard's argument with respect to why it should have been followed up includes that the Confederates were exhausted, but looking at who suffered the casualties indicates that most of their units had suffered basically no casualties.

And it's not just "a specific bridge" but the existence of bridges at all - the bridge Sumner crossed by collapsed after his infantry was over, at least to my understanding.

What this means, at least if I follow what's being said by Barnard and your interpretation thereof, is that Barnard's analysis of post-Seven Pines is:

1) following up the attack
- The repulse on May 31 should have been followed up immediately.
- This is because the enemy had exhausted themselves and run out of available resources.
- We didn't know that at the time, but we do now, which is why I say this now instead of then.

2) bringing over the right wing
- had we done this (i.e. repulsed the enemy) then we would have been able to bring over the right wing without any problems ("no resistance to overcome").


Here's my view of that...

- by regiment counting, we can determine that most of the force that the Confederates had (in terms of regiments) was not exhausted. This is a point directly against Barnard's chain of logic - the "what we know now" aspect of how exhausted the Confederates were is based on incorrect information.
- the fighting continued until darkness, and in fact resumed on June 1 with a renewed Confederate attack (Birney for example only gets involved on June 1, and Richardson's division is driven back before rallying). So clearly the Confederates were not fought out on May 31 since they were able to launch attacks on June 1.
- The Confederates withdrew to captured earthworks, with some reluctance, midmorning on June 1.

So immediately it seems clear that the picture of the Confederates as easily counterattacked after the repulse on May 31 is not a full picture of the situation. They were still attacking early on June 1 and then withdrew to captured earthworks.

This then means that an immediate counterattack by the Union forces south of the river would have been essentially a "hasty" attack against an enemy who was still fit to fight. If that's late on the 31st then the units which would be being attacked would in some cases actually be the ones who attacked the next day, so clearly still had some fight in them, on top of the attack being a night attack; if that's early on the 1st of June then either it runs into the Confederate attack (result, a general melee) or it comes after that.

The best case is if it hits the Confederates during the period when they're withdrawing into the captured earthworks, but to plan this in advance would be quite difficult given how long attacks take to plan out - on the 31st the Confederate attack had been five hours late for example!


In addition to that, the bridge problem still exists - there weren't any viable bridges on the morning of the 1st except the rail bridge, a day's march away. Now perhaps what Barnard means by "no resistance" to being able to bring over the right wing is that they could have sent 6th Corps around the wrong way, or perhaps he means that they could have crossed 6th Corps in the next few days, but neither of those is dependent on whether or not the enemy had been repulsed (while Barnard mentions the conditional).
Alternatively he could mean that pushing the enemy back would make it possible to properly repair New Bridge, but it's my understanding that the engineers erected trestles around New Bridge over the course of the 1st June (including some of the work being done in the morning, before the Confederate pull-back). So there apparently wasn't anything about enemy positions on the 1st of June preventing bridging work being done in that location, it was just that it wasn't carried to a successful conclusion.
A final possibility is that he's thinking in terms of pushing the enemy away from the Chickahominy entirely, and permitting the Union forces north of the river to cross by the existing crossing places by making sure they weren't defended. This would satisfy the conditional, but the scale of the advance required is large - the Mechanicsville Bridge is about three miles further west than the New Bridge, and it's about a mile past Fort Johnston, so if Barnard is arguing this then he's arguing the ability to take Fort Johnston.




What I suspect is going on, and I invite you to consider this and see how it holds up, is that in writing this months later Barnard has been misinformed as to the precise situation on the Confederate side of the lines on the end of the 31st May and beginning of 1st June, and is under the impression that the Confederates were more defeated and vulnerable than they in fact were.
I suspect he did think that the Confederates were in such a state that they could be repulsed (and forced not merely out of works but out of forts) by a firm offensive even by the also-disrupted Union troops, and that this mistaken impression of Barnard's was formed:
1) partly by the idea that Confederate forces in Richmond were smaller in number than the truth (so the number of troops engaged would form a higher % of the number of troops available, i.e. he thinks that all their units were in heavy fighting - as he says - rather than only some)
and
2) partly by sensationalist news reporting exaggerating the scale of Confederate disruption (at least at the brigade level and below).

It's not like the Confederates had been routed from the field; they'd attacked and gained ground, been stopped, and then some of the force had been repulsed by a counter-attack around dusk but other attacking units had (later, meaning on the 1st) voluntarily withdrawn back over some of the ground they'd taken. There were also units which hadn't really fought at all.

Certainly the Confederates are weaker than if they hadn't had the battle, but whether that rises to the point of being able to rout them back into Richmond as Barnard suggests is a substantially higher bar.

Is there anything positive you see in Barnard's paragraphs? Or is everything always completely wrong and not worth considering?

 

[trice]

The point that Norfolk could have, should have been taken is one that on its merit could have changed the campaign. It took the President to get it done. An amateur in military theory could see its importance

The Confederates were quite worried about it from the moment Burnside arrived off North Carolina. The fear was that McClellan would advance on Norfolk from the northeast while Burnside (perhaps a reinforced Burnside) approached from the south, possibly advancing along the Dismal Swamp Canal.

At the end of March, Lee is telling Magruder and Huger that it is unclear which way the Union advance will go: above the James against Magruder or below the James against Huger. This is why he wants all of Colston's Brigade south of the James -- and why Magruder is ordering those two regiments of Colston's Brigade back to Colston on April 2nd. Lee wants to be sure which way the Union is moving before ordering Colston to join Magruder.

It is only when McClellan begins marching on April 4th that the Confederates can determine which way the Union will go. Once Magruder gets reports for that, he can call for Colston's Brigade to cross the James and reinforce him.

 

[Lubliner]

"Lessons Learned" is a problematic approach for solutions that might be feasible if similar difficulties prevail in the future. There is no Timeline specified for he is not wishing to refight the campaign but answer for the maturation of knowledge and what might be done, not necessarily 'what should have been done'. He is using this explanation to show that the solutions to each problem can rectify past errors of judgment, and possibly provide a more efficient service. I get the understanding he knows that for each solution he presents, a new set of circumstances will prevail. With this whole time from each example given, an immediate new plan of action can be developed to pose a better outcome than what was done. His total report is not one of defeatism, colored by nothing gained, but instead, one of a new understanding and a positive outlook for the ensuing war.
Lubliner.

Is there anything positive you see in Barnard's paragraphs?

 

[trice]

"Lessons Learned" is a problematic approach for solutions that might be feasible if similar difficulties prevail in the future. There is no Timeline specified for he is not wishing to refight the campaign but answer for the maturation of knowledge and what might be done, not necessarily 'what should have been done'. He is using this explanation to show that the solutions to each problem can rectify past errors of judgment, and possibly provide a more efficient service. I get the understanding he knows that for each solution he presents, a new set of circumstances will prevail. With this whole time from each example given, an immediate new plan of action can be developed to pose a better outcome than what was done. His total report is not one of defeatism, colored by nothing gained, but instead, one of a new understanding and a positive outlook for the ensuing war.
Lubliner.

Yes. Barnard is writing this after the campaign, trying to find lessons for the future. He knows what he did, what McClellan did based on his opinion and recommendations, etc. He knows the approach they took did not work out well. He acknowledges that he was, for example, very much in favor of McClellan's siege-and-engineering approach at Yorktown -- he just looks back and says they should have done something different.

Interesting is that he touches on an issue nobody talks about much nowadays at the very start. In the Winter of 1861-62 there was much criticism of McClellan's approach. The politicians, the papers, the administration were pushing for something to be done "now". McClellan was resisting that pressure, wanting to build and train the army without active campaigning.

Part of that pressure was to concentrate on and take Norfolk. The Navy was particularly pressing for that: they wanted the Navy Yard back, they saw the threat of the Virginia and the Confederates building gunboats that would threaten US control of Hampton Roads. Barnard had been on McClellan's side in all that; now he says:

One of the prominent among the causes of the ultimate failure was the inaction of eight months, from August, 1861, to April, 1862. More than any other wars, rebellion demands rapid measures. In November, 1861, the Army of the Potomac, if not fully supplied with all the material, yet was about as complete in numbers, discipline, and organization as it ever became. For four months the great marine avenue to the capital of the nation was blockaded and that capital kept in a partial state of siege by a greatly-inferior enemy, in face of a movable army of 150,000 men. In the Winter 1861-62 Norfolk could and should have been taken. The Navy demanded it, the country demanded it, and the means were ample. By its capture the career of the Merrimac, which proved so disastrous to our subsequent operations, would have been prevented. The preparation of this vessel was known, and the Navy Department was not without forebodings of the mischief it would do. Though delay might mature more comprehensive plans and promise greater results, it is not the first case in which it had been shown that successful war involves something more than abstract military principles. The true question was to seize the first practicable moment to satisfy the perhaps unreasonable but natural longing of an impatient nation for results to justify its lavish confidence, and to take advantage of an undivided command and untrammeled liberty of action while it was possessed.​

​

There would undoubtedly have been difficulties in getting that done. The Confederates would have reacted and everything about the situation would have changed. OTOH, a successful operation against Norfolk would vastly change the situation. The CSS Virginia would never have left the dock, so the James would be open to USN exploitations. The south side of the James could be used for an advance on Petersburg with waterborne supply. The Confederates would be forced to abandon defense of the Peninsula, so the York River would also open up. If Burnside has gone to NC, he can now connect with and co-operate with McClellan. Had this been done, perhaps everything McClellan tried in April-June would have succeeded.