The Never-Ending Question

[thomas aagaard]

How the Union used their army is another question but does not take away from the fact they had one and it was trained and experienced, and as was stated...........Spread out.

And that is exactly why the Union did not have an army at all... but they did have a small force of partly trained soldiers well suited to keeping control of a huge border region.

To have an army you need large numbers of trained troops and trained officers of all branches, they need to be able to work together as an army in something resembling military competence and they need to be in the same general area so they can actually operate together.

By the standard of the time 15.000men was not an army, it was smaller then a Corps in the large European armies, and smaller than the standing forces most small European states had. It was not properly trained since they where not in any way use to even battalion drill, lets not even begin on Brigade drill and combined arms.
In my view there where no armies involved in the conflict before mid 62... Just look at a battle like Shiloh... it was large armed mobs... some units when into combat without having had any drill or even knew how to load their muskets.
--

About the failure. When I read you posts, everything point to you calling the prewar deployment a failure or the fact that they where not able to get them east by summer 61...Both are wrong since there was not anything anyone (like Scott) could have done about that.

There is nothing to suggest that you are talking about the decision to keep the regular army together when they finally managed to get most of it to the east during the last month of 61...
So it is really not clear that this was what you meant...

 

[unionblue]

The Civil War was a classic "come as you are" war in every sense of the word.

As Lincoln said Confederate and Union soldiers were, "green and green alike." Both side consisted of civilians rushed into the horror of combat with little or no training. The armies that met at the first Bull Run were more mobs than soldiers.

And there is a tremendous difference in military peace time roles and war time operations. EVERY war the United States had fought in, until Desert Storm, it was unprepared for.

The Revolutionary War, the Indian Wars, the War of 1812, more Indian Wars, the War with Mexico, and the Civil War, Spanish-American War, WWI & WWII, Korea, and Vietnam. We were either too focused on the last war or had simply starved our military forces to death in the way of money, training, supplies, equipment, doctrine and training, training, TRAINING!

I remember right after Vietnam how the US government cut the defense budget to the point where I could not even qualify yearly on my primary weapon, the M-16. Ammunition was so short, it all went to line units, and rightly so. while support units were given 20 rounds a year to 'familiarize' with our rifles. We were a hollow shell right after Vietnam until Ronald Regan was elected President. Things sure did change then! New weapons! Harder, more realistic training. More support, better equipment and better doctrine was developed to fight the "next war" not the previous ones.

The US Army of 1860 was scattered across the US with about two thirds of its 16,000 men West of the Mississippi, divided up usually into 100 man companies in isolated forts all across the frontier. No one for decades had operated above a regimental sized unit, let alone a battalion, brigade, division or corps.

Right after the Civil War, the US Army was reduced to only 7,000 men who faced around 250,000 Indians and for one three month period, the US Congress neglected to pass legislation to pay them. In the Depression years, the US Army had its base pay CUT to help out with reducing the budget in those lean times.

There was no "army" in 1861 as we think of such in our time. To hold it to some mythical standard or to state that it was "trained and experienced" for war in 1861 is simply not the case.

Sincerely,
Unionblue

 

[Elennsar]

I'm not sure that the Regular Army being used as as training cadres was obviously the best possible idea. To paraphrase Mark W. Johnson (writer of That Body of Brave Men, on the Regular regiments in the Army of the Cumberland), it would have meant:

1) "A bureaucratic nightmare" - requiring "a paradigm shift of mammoth proportions" on the War Department and army staff departments, whose way of doing business would be completely changed by this.

2) The volunteers would not necessarily have taken well to it - how well are "quite democratic, suspicious of authority, anti-elitist, and invariably cliquish" volunteers going to take to being told to model themselves on the Old Army?

3) How many men in the Old Army actually know how to teach and train volunteers? Simply having skills isn't the same as being able to effectively instruct others.

Cadre plans can work, but those are all obstacles - especially #3. Whatever could be and was done in other parts of the world, or the US post-ACW, is not really an answer to how these could be taken care of in this situation.

And it would not fundamentally change that the Union had to build up a sufficientlly large army from scratch by very much, as opposed to having an army waiting to be used.

 

[leftyhunter]

The south lost because Lincoln wasn't going to quit until the south quit. He was also a lot closer in proximity to the south than say, England was to the colonies. The colonies waited England out because they could. Evemtually, distance + losing resources, men, money and interest = go ahead be your own country. That problem did not exist to Lincoln. He had the resources, men, money and interest...along with equally tough soldiers and generals.

Plus the colonies received foreign troops and naval support something Davis could only dream about. Plus the UK was fighting a two front war for India.
Leftyhunter

 

[fwb35]

I think this has already been taken care of and you certainly have a right to your opinion but I take umbrage to this. Certainly no one is saying that Jackson, Forrest, Stuart, or Lee stunk. What they are saying is that on average the South had some terrible leaders of its own, and also not many army commanders who could handle an entire army- so it's debatable about who had the better leaders.

What they're also (partially) saying and here's the reason why I jumped into this is that Union leaders (and perhaps superior leadership in some areas) deserve credit for the reason why the Confederacy lost/Union won.


I have a big issue with the mindset of the quotes above which is my issue and not your own but I feel the need to address it- I would not mind at all praising of Lee, Stuart, Jackson, or Forrest (all of whom I think by the way were great commanders) if a not very-but-still-too large percentage of it didn't seem to be wrapped up in denigrating Grant, Sherman, Thomas, or Meade.

Thank you for your reply, during my studies in college, I took several strictly WBS courses, we looked at the strictly military side of things, and compared both sides. The southern soldier had much more hardships, basically had their backs to the wall fighting in their own back yards.
In my opinion, the southern generals, mostly in the east, got more out of their men than the numerous northern generals, again, mostly in the east, that were trying to take Richmond. I do agree that some of the Southern leaders, mostly out west, did not do a good job, then again both sides had some generals that should not have been generals. I do think Grant was better than most of the generals before him, but by the time he took over the south was spent, he knew all he had to do was keep hammering away at Lee, he knew he could take losses and replace his, Lee could not.

 

[fwb35]

Jackson is overrated and Stuart was very good against terrible opponents.

Forrest was a good raider but was not very good at the other missions of the cavalry (reconnaissance, for example).

R

And that is YOUR opinion, so we agree to disagree.

If I had to choose between both sides generals to command my army, I no doubt would take the southern generals.

 

[CSA Today]

Resources alone mean nothing. Manpower can be overcome with effective strategies. The navy can not occupy land mass.
In the end the North's ability to maintain a will to win despite early failures allowed them to harness these resources into a cooperative effort.

The North certainly had the significant resources, manpower and naval advantages, but a case can be made that the Lincoln Government was willing to pay a butcher bill large enough to force a determine and defiant South back into his union against their will.

 

[Pat Answer]

Cadre plans can work, but those are all obstacles - especially #3. Whatever could be and was done in other parts of the world, or the US post-ACW, is not really an answer to how these could be taken care of.

Good point. I should have known it might not have been as simple as I implied. But of course the main consideration here is this, with which I agree:

And it would not fundamentally change that the Union had to build up a sufficientlly large army from scratch by very much, as opposed to having an army waiting to be used.

In the larger picture, the Confederacy did have some marked disadvantages in prosecuting the war. But having an army qualitatively inferior to the one the Union put in the field certainly wasn't one of them.

 

[1SGDan]

The North certainly had the significant resources, manpower and naval advantages, but a case can be made that the Lincoln Government was willing to pay a butcher bill large enough to force a determine and defiant South back into his union against their will.

Victory often comes at a high price.

 

[CSA Today]

Victory often comes at a high price.

It certain did for the Lincolnites.

 

[1SGDan]

It certain did for the Lincolnites.

No more so than the losers.

 

[fwb35]

Good point. I should have known it might not have been as simple as I implied. But of course the main consideration here is this, with which I agree:



In the larger picture, the Confederacy did have some marked disadvantages in prosecuting the war. But having an army qualitatively inferior to the one the Union put in the field certainly wasn't one of them.

They had a very big disadvantage, in numbers, supplies, and arms, they were lucky they won early battles and were able to pick up many arms from the field that Union soldiers left behind.

 

[Pat Answer]

They had a very big disadvantage, in numbers, supplies, and arms, they were lucky they won early battles and were able to pick up many arms from the field that Union soldiers left behind.

Later in the war, once Union leaders began to make the disparity of resources work for them, perhaps yes. The peak relative strength of the Confederacy in the war was those early days before Nashville and New Orleans fell and the blockade began to tighten, &c. For example, Manassas 1 was decided by the 18,000 or so engaged on each side out of the total forces in the vicinity, about 30,000 each. That battle could have gone either way, but the Confederates were never in danger of losing it because of inadequate equipment.

 

[Sons of Liberty]

The armies of the Confederacy were a potent force whose strategic mindset were those of a defensive nature. They were not an army of conquest marauding across the Union. If they had been focused on a major offensive action early in the war aimed at capturing Washington D.C. they would have certainly gained a moral victory. However, the Southern states said they wanted to leave the Union, not crush it into nonexistence.

 

[OpnCoronet]

I do agree--the outcome had a great deal to do with resources, but there are so many other reasons as well...

Probably more accurate to describe it as a matter of the efficient and effective use of resources available; especially in the early days of the war.

 

[Elennsar]

The armies of the Confederacy were a potent force whose strategic mindset were those of a defensive nature. They were not an army of conquest marauding across the Union. If they had been focused on a major offensive action early in the war aimed at capturing Washington D.C. they would have certainly gained a moral victory. However, the Southern states said they wanted to leave the Union, not crush it into nonexistence.

Describing the armies that invaded Kentucky, Missouri, Maryland (& Pennsylvania), raided through Indiana and Ohio, and attempted to seize New Mexico and points west and so on as "defensive" seems a bit much.

The Confederates were perfectly willing to go on the offense when it suited them - whether for good or ill as far as their chances of winning went.

 

[YankeeDoodle]

Again, what they accomplished with what they were up against, yes, they had better military commanders and soldiers that fought harder.

How do you figure the South's soldiers fought harder?

 

[YankeeDoodle]

I am reading A Picture of the Desolated States published in 1866... The author gives this reason for the Southern defeat at Gettysburg saying " A Power greater than mans ruled the event. The Power that lifted these azure hills and spread out these green valleys and hollowed a passage for a stream appointed to treason a limit and a term. "Thus far and no further."

He also says.."Gettysburg is but a fair sample of a large class of American town, the builders of which never seem once to have been conscious there exists such a thing as beauty." !!! Ha!

 

[thomas aagaard]

They had a very big disadvantage, in numbers, supplies, and arms, they were lucky they won early battles and were able to pick up many arms from the field that Union soldiers left behind.

And again with the myth. Until the later part of the war when the north start issuing breach loading rifles in larger umbers there south was not armed in a way that gave them any clear disadvantage.
(and it is a debatable if having a smothbore is actually any disadvantage with the terrain and lack of skills of the soldiers)

At the start of the war, they had about the same number of weapons in storage in arsenals in the south. They captured the arsenal in Harper Ferry and imported better arms from Britain than the Union.

At Vicksburg many of Grants men exchanged their old guns for modern enfields.

Lack of small arms of powder for them was NOT one of the disadvantages of the south.

 

[Sons of Liberty]

Describing the armies that invaded Kentucky, Missouri, Maryland (& Pennsylvania), raided through Indiana and Ohio, and attempted to seize New Mexico and points west and so on as "defensive" seems a bit much.

The Confederates were perfectly willing to go on the offense when it suited them - whether for good or ill as far as their chances of winning went.

Yes, there were some instances that Southern forces made forays into Northern territory, but as a whole the strategy was defensive. Wasn't the expedition into Kentucky more in the hopes of raising recruitment from that state? (Which never manifested by the way.)