The Confederate Army.

In the Confederate Army, regimental officers were elected.
Didn't that change after a certain date?

Also, can anyone explain what exactly Forrest's big reorg was supposed to do? I'm constantly running into it while trying to find records but don't understand it.
 
Didn't that change after a certain date?

Also, can anyone explain what exactly Forrest's big reorg was supposed to do? I'm constantly running into it while trying to find records but don't understand it.

It generally changed with the reorganization in the spring of '62.

R
 
This one page link offers a concise and interesting comparison of the two armies prior to Gettysburg.

http://gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/battle-of-gettysburg-facts/strength-comparison-of-the-armies/ Here are the words but the charts are well worth the study

Despite the similar structure the organization of the two armies look very different when comparing corps and divisions. Lee organized his army into only three army corps (which had increased from only two before April 1), but each was roughly twice the size of their seven Union counterparts. One small factor in this difference was that Meade had an Artillery Reserve of 2,400 men that were not part of any army corps and does not show up in the table below, while all of Lee's artillery was assigned to an army corps or a division and is included in the tables

Just like army corps, Lee had fewer divisions than Meade (9 vs. 19) but their average strength was almost double (6,778 vs. 3,835). The two weakest Confederate divisions were just a but stronger than the largest Union, and Lee's stongest division was three times the size of Meade's weakest.
 
This one page link offers a concise and interesting comparison of the two armies prior to Gettysburg.

http://gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/battle-of-gettysburg-facts/strength-comparison-of-the-armies/ Here are the words but the charts are well worth the study

Despite the similar structure the organization of the two armies look very different when comparing corps and divisions. Lee organized his army into only three army corps (which had increased from only two before April 1), but each was roughly twice the size of their seven Union counterparts. One small factor in this difference was that Meade had an Artillery Reserve of 2,400 men that were not part of any army corps and does not show up in the table below, while all of Lee's artillery was assigned to an army corps or a division and is included in the tables

Just like army corps, Lee had fewer divisions than Meade (9 vs. 19) but their average strength was almost double (6,778 vs. 3,835). The two weakest Confederate divisions were just a but stronger than the largest Union, and Lee's stongest division was three times the size of Meade's weakest.
How does that relate to differences in deployment on the field?
 
The size of divisions in the confederate army, especially in 1862 ranged widely. In the ANV some divisions were 2 brigades, then you had the Light Division which had 6. The divisions became more standardized as the formalization of Corps occured.
I have always found it odd that Hill's Light Division was the largest in the ANV.
 
Didn't that change after a certain date?

Also, can anyone explain what exactly Forrest's big reorg was supposed to do? I'm constantly running into it while trying to find records but don't understand it.
@rpkennedy is correct, after the Spring of 1862, potential officers were required to pass an exam.

The days of popularity contests were over. I'm thinking the Battle of Shiloh may have prompted this change.

As far as Forrest's reorganization, I'm sure one of my co hosts @diane , @Nathanb1 or @DixieRifles may be able to shed light on that topic.
 
As far as Forrest's reorganization, I'm sure one of my co hosts @diane , @Nathanb1 or @DixieRifles may be able to shed light on that topic.
@Allie ,
It seemed many times when Forrest raised his own units, they would be taken away from him and assigned to someone else. He would have to almost start from scratch. That may be what you're running into as far as reorganization.

I'll look for any threads on this in the Forrest forum.
 
Forrest was constantly reorganizing in 1862, particularly after the Conscription Act became law and the CSA quadrupled in size overall after Shiloh. Part of it was his quick rise in rank, part of it was Grant's quick rise, activities in Kentucky, the fall of New Orleans and Ft Donelson and Nashville. There were huge shifts in troop movements. That was a very active year, for sure! There is always a lot of confusion about what troopers were where with his command in particular. Toward the end he had a huge number of absentees, deserters and partisans who came and went on his rosters.
 
@Allie ,
It seemed many times when Forrest raised his own units, they would be taken away from him and assigned to someone else. He would have to almost start from scratch. That may be what you're running into as far as reorganization.

I'll look for any threads on this in the Forrest forum.

Forrest completely outfitted and paid for several companies at the beginning - he knew one reason Isham Harris had tapped him was he was one of the richest men in Tennessee. However, when he paid for and trained no less than three brigades and had them yanked away from him, he began to get a little testy! When Bragg lured him away with a vacation so's he could steal yet another, that's when Forrest came snarling into his tent for a famous little chat... :eek: This unfortunate situation was also partly responsible for the tragic results of Ft Pillow - Forrest had had to literally beat the bushes for men who really, really didn't want to be in anybody's army!
 
Forrest had to recruit and re-organize his division and then corps but I think the question is how his organization compares to the organization of Union. I admit that I'm not that familiar with Union organization. Then there is the question of how the different armies deployed their units.
By 1864, Forrest's cavalry operated entirely as mounted infantry. I find it odd that Union General Sturgis command that advanced into Mississippi resulting in the Battle of Brices Crossroads was made up of both Infantry and Cavalry---and artillery support. Forrest timed it so he could defeat the cavalry first before confronting the infantry. The Union cavalry was needed to screen their movements. I guess if there had been better coordination, the Union forces could have been in a better position to stop Forrest.
And then there was the awful heat.
 
I read an interesting theory (I think it was Castel) that goes back to the differences in sizes of brigades, divisions and corps -- especially in the Western CS armies.

The writer's proposition was that 1) larger units placed an unnecessary burden on the commanders and that 2) the practice reduced the number of general officers, thus reducing the pool from which replacements could be drawn.
 
I read an interesting theory (I think it was Castel) that goes back to the differences in sizes of brigades, divisions and corps -- especially in the Western CS armies.

The writer's proposition was that 1) larger units placed an unnecessary burden on the commanders and that 2) the practice reduced the number of general officers, thus reducing the pool from which replacements could be drawn.

That was certainly the theory (and, in some cases, practice).

The reason that Lee wanted to go to a three-corps system was because he felt that the corps had become too large and unwieldy for one person to control.

We see how the large Union corps at the start of the Overland Campaign made them fairly cumbersome to control. Hancock ended up breaking his front in two and giving Birney and Gibbon portions to control while he tried to command the whole. It basically created an extra command level that caused delay and confusion unnecessarily.

R
 
How does that relate to differences in deployment on the field?
I have always found it odd that Hill's Light Division was the largest in the ANV.
I understand that Hill coined the name but nobody really knows why.
...The writer's proposition was that 1) larger units placed an unnecessary burden on the commanders and that 2) the practice reduced the number of general officers, thus reducing the pool from which replacements could be drawn.
The reason that Lee wanted to go to a three-corps system was because he felt that the corps had become too large and unwieldy for one person to control...

I'm currently reading one of the few available biographies of him, the old A. P. Hill, Lee's Forgotten General by Warren Woods Hassler and have just today read the section on and following Chancellorsville and the creation of the Third Corps. Lee's correspondence recommending it and Hill to command was quoted in full and was largely as stated by ole and rpkennedy. Hassler also put forth the theory about Hill's choice of the name of his Light Division stated by 20thncarolina. However, following the creation of the Third Corps, the division, now commanded by William Dorsey Pender, was no longer the largest because two of its brigades were stripped off and combined with two others to create a new division led by Henry Heth. There was something of a problem because R. E. Lee had only "imported" Heth from the Western Theater to lead one of Hill's brigades in the days prior to Chancellorsville, making him the senior brigadier. Hill felt that was unfair to Pender, who he knew and preferred to succeed him as commander of the Light Division, so recommended the above resolution to Lee who approved it. Hill's third division was acquired by transferring Richard H. Anderson and his brigades from Longstreet's Corps, thereby making Anderson the senior division commander in Hill's Third Corps.
 
Suppose that`s at least one of the reasons why the later where promoted to Major Generals in the regular army during the war. A regular rank always outranks the equal volunteer rank; no matter the seniority.

Having a brevet rank, while considered an honor, did not pay the rent. All the regular army officers were looking for their bread and butter once the war ended. The only thing that mattered in terms of pay was the regular rank, to which they would revert. So we have the case of many Union officers who were brevetted as brigadier or major generals but whose regular rank may only have been captain or major. Certainly, it was very important for those career officers to achieve promotion to a higher regular, as opposed to brevet, rank.
 
I'm currently reading one of the few available biographies of him, the old A. P. Hill, Lee's Forgotten General by Warren Woods Hassler and have just today read the section on and following Chancellorsville and the creation of the Third Corps. Lee's correspondence recommending it and Hill to command was quoted in full and was largely as stated by ole and rpkennedy. Hassler also put forth the theory about Hill's choice of the name of his Light Division stated by 20thncarolina. However, following the creation of the Third Corps, the division, now commanded by William Dorsey Pender, was no longer the largest because two of its brigades were stripped off and combined with two others to create a new division led by Henry Heth. There was something of a problem because R. E. Lee had only "imported" Heth from the Western Theater to lead one of Hill's brigades in the days prior to Chancellorsville, making him the senior brigadier. Hill felt that was unfair to Pender, who he knew and preferred to succeed him as commander of the Light Division, so recommended the above resolution to Lee who approved it. Hill's third division was acquired by transferring Richard H. Anderson and his brigades from Longstreet's Corps, thereby making Anderson the senior division commander in Hill's Third Corps.
Read this book, very good work on Hill.
 
It's been discussed here before, but that situation was responsible for the awkward chain-of-command in Grant's 1864 Overland Campaign whereby Burnside's IX Corps was NOT considered a part of the Army of the Potomac (since he ranked Meade) although operating right beside it. Burnside received orders directly from Grant's headquarters thereby adding an otherwise unnecessary level of command and making command control and coordination more complicated than it should've been.

In discussing it before, I disagreed with the view you express.

Lincoln had the authority to assign as Army commander a general whose date of rank was later than some of his subordinates. In fact when Lincoln chose Meade to head the AotP, he was not the senior general and one of those he was junior to was Sedgwick, one of his Corps commanders at the start of the 1864 campaign. In addition, after about 3 weeks of the campaign, Burnside was put under Meade.
 

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