The Confederacy needed Hadrian Wall...

[5fish]

It was a disaster in 1864...

What about before 1864...? You know Valdemar like the wall...

 

[wbull1]

What would the Union troops be doing while the trenches were being built? Either subtract enough men for pickets and a guard force that can stall invaders until the workers arm themselves or have a disorganized swarm of men trying to find their weapons while under attack.

 

[wbull1]

Another issue is using slaves would bring them closer to the border, depending on where the trenches are of course, where the chance to slip away into freedom would be much greater. You lose a lot of slaves and need additional men to guard against escape. What historical examples are there of walls build by the reluctant while subject to attack at any moment?

 

[5fish]

Did you know the Japanese built walls along the beaches after the first Mongol invasion?

https://www.thoughtco.com/the-mongol-invasions-of-japan-195559

Then Japan prepared for a second attack. The leaders of Kyushu took a census of all available warriors and weaponry. In addition, Kyushu's landowning class was given the task of building a defensive wall around Hakata Bay, five to fifteen feet high and 25 miles long. Construction took five years with each landholder responsible for a section of the wall proportional to the size of his estate.

It has a name: Wiki...

The Genkō Bōrui (元寇防塁 Genkō Bōrui) was a defensive stone wall, 20 kilometres (12 mi) long, constructed along Hakata Bay in Japanin preparation for an attack by Mongol forces of the Yuan dynasty after the first attack of 1274.[1]

The second attack of 1281 was thwarted by a typhoon, or kamikaze, and the Mongols were forced to withdraw.[2] In the Edo period, some of the stones were reused for the construction of Fukuoka Castle, though Genkō Bōrui has remained intact at several points along the Hakata Bay. It was originally called "Ishitsuiji" (石築地). It was designated a national historic site on March 30, 1931.

The wall worked:Wiki...

A part of Genkō Bōrui was completed before the second invasion and prevented the enemy from landing immediately. The invaders were forced to anchor their ships at Shikanoshima Island. The battles occurred over several months between several thousand evenly-matched combatants. Takezaki Suenaga of Higo Province joined the battles and had artists draw scrolls concerning the Battle of Kōan. This second attack of 1281 was finally thwarted by a typhoon or kamikaze, and the Mongols were forced to withdraw.[6]

Even later, the defense system was continued and remained intact until 1332.

 

[5fish]

What would the Union troops be doing while the trenches were being built? Either subtract enough men for pickets and a guard force that can stall invaders until the workers arm themselves or have a disorganized swarm of men trying to find their weapons while under attack.

I have mentioned earlier when this question came up: The trenches of WW One were built on the go just like the Peterburg defenses were in 1864... I do not think controlling the slave workers would have been an issue?

 

[Taylin]

I have mentioned earlier when this question came up: The trenches of WW One were built on the go just like the Peterburg defenses were in 1864... I do not think controlling the slave workers would have been an issue?

The trenches of WW1 were a natural result of modern machinery in that war, primarily artillery and machine gun fire but also the much faster fire power of standard issue rifles. Another problem (mostly on the western front) was that the armies had limiter space to maneuver between the sea and the Swiss border which caused them to desperately try and outflank one another (Race to the Sea) in order to avoid the trenches that were already springing up.

The US didn't have any difficulty with the space in which to maneuver troops. When the first actions against Vicksburg failed (Chickasaw Bayou) Grant elected to just swing his army around and come up from the south (I know I'm simplifying things). Sherman, continuously outflanked Johnston in order to advance on Atlanta and probably the most striking example is McClellan's Peninsula campaign where instead of advancing over land all the way to Richmond he just swings around with transport ships.

 

[Saphroneth]

It's a good question: Why Lee never used any type of fortification if not as a barrier but to control the direction the union army could at least move and operate in?

He did, in the Seven Days. That was more from necessity but it did work.

Basically though the problem is that fortifications are expensive in time and in money, as well as in artillery. It took a lot of all three to fortify Washington and Richmond with permanent forts, as well as a lot of time from scarce topographical engineers; there simply wasn't the ability to construct any significant fort line elsewhere in the East.
(There's also that the Union could win a battle of positions, as McClellan demonstrated on the Peninsula; forts could delay the Union but not stop them, and it's possible to see the whole of Lee's strategy as a series of attempts to never allow a Union army within siege artillery range of Richmond again.)

 

[Saphroneth]

probably the most striking example is McClellan's Peninsula campaign where instead of advancing over land all the way to Richmond he just swings around with transport ships.

This one's also interesting because there was a fortified line across the Peninsula, and it was a really strong one (strong flanks, a river too deep to wade in front of it, and manned by over 10,000 troops at contact and the whole main Confederate army before long). McClellan broke through it in a month by rendering it untenable, largely by a concentration of heavy artillery, and as of the Seven Days he was less than a week from repeating the trick with the outer ring of the Richmond fortifications.

 

[Saphroneth]

I would argue that is worked exactly as a fortified line should. It made the enemy attack in another place.

Yes. All French planning was that the Germans would attack through the Low Countries; the reasons for the French defeat are complex but can't be summed up as "Maginot failed" because it succeeded in allowing the French to economize on manpower and deploy more force to the Belgian plain than it would otherwise have been able to.

 

[wbull1]

I have mentioned earlier when this question came up: The trenches of WW One were built on the go just like the Peterburg defenses were in 1864... I do not think controlling the slave workers would have been an issue?

Yes, trenches could be built on the fly, but if the Yankees saw Confederates starting to build they could have made the undertaking much harder.

Desertion of slaves brought in to build defenses was an issue from the very beginning of the war. General Butler's "Contraband" came to him. He didn't have to go to them. Steady losses from building crews would mean steady losses of food and supplies. Men were diverted from the Confederate Army to guard and hunt down escaping slaves. The closer the northern forces were to slaves, the more ran toward freedom.

In World War II Jews forced to work in munitions factories found ways to sabotage ammunition and slow production. With one side offering freedom and the other continuing slavery, I do think there would have been issues.

 

[E_just_E]

The Confederacy needed its own Hadrian Wall

What happened to the Roman Empire, again? Did the Hadrian Wall save it?

 

[Patrick H]

I doubt the Confederacy could have spared the manpower necessary to guard even the most important defensive points on a permanent basis. I admit I haven't read through the entire thread yet.

A fairly substantial defensive complex was built by the Union and allied militia forces to guard the Missouri Pacific railroad bridge over the Lamine River in Cooper County, Missouri. Hundreds of men were detailed to construct the works. The problem was that, once completed, the militia could not spare the manpower to permanently occupy the strong point.

J.O. Shelby captured it easily in 1863 and again in 1864 because on both occasions the defensive works were unmanned.

 

[Virginia Dave]

One can argue the many mistakes the Confederacy made during the civil war. I argue the three-big strategic mistakes were their King Cotton foreign policy, Davis insistence on trying to keep border integrity, and Lee's insistence desire to crush the Union army with his much smaller force... I will say King Cotton foreign policy may have worked if they had promise nations cheap cotton for recognition and support, instead of a cotton embargo...

The point of this What if is to address Davis and Lee failed visions. The Confederacy strategy should have been to drag the war out and allow war weariness in the North to win the war. The Confederacy should have looked back to history and follow the Chinse and Romans strategy of walls and fortification along the borders. I say the Confederacy should have used trenches and fortification in strategic places to stimy Northern efforts to invade instead on open warfare. Here are Rome's Limes! See not everywhere just in strategic places and excess points...

View attachment 221710



Only if the Confederate Leadership could have been so farsighted and creative, they could have used the rivers and mountains and trenches to make it almost impossible to invade in the east and in the west they could have a network of trenches fortification to protect vital infrastructure, croplands and stop the invader. A trench and fortification strategy would have drag out the war for years causing war weariness in the North and leading to victory. With this strategy, Atlanta may not have followed before 1864 election and giving the election to McClellan. Grant may have been stimy in the west and never rose in the ranks to lead all the Union armies. Think about it no Gettysburg or Sharpsburg...

It takes fewer men to defend a fortified position than it takes to overrun it. The old rule of thumb is a three to one ratio to attacker versus defenders. Yes, I am talking about World War One like trenches across Virginia parts of Tennessee, Mississippi, and Alabama protecting the core of the Confederacy. I never understood why the Confederacy never spiked the rivers in the west stopping all traffic... If the union tries to land troops along the coast again pick strategic places to put your tranches and fortifications to stimy any advance inland... The Overland campaign showed how quickly made fortifications are hard to overrun if not impossible.

I know you going to bring up the siege of Petersburg but that was not planned in advance and done at the end of the war after the Confederacy had little to no resources left. If they follow the strategy of conservation during the war they would have won... Davis strategy was wasteful of men and Lee's strategy of open warfare was unsustainable in men and supplies.

The Confederacy needed its own Hadrian Wall or Maginot Line or a few Roman Limes...

Interesting thought. What engineer company could have handled this, If per chance it had been thought of in time?

 

[Saphroneth]

What happened to the Roman Empire, again? Did the Hadrian Wall save it?

What happened to the Roman Empire was that hundreds of years of gradual diminuition in the resources available to the armed forces meant that it was unable to effectively protect itself against barbarians. The fact that the Roman Empire fell considerably over two hunded years after the construction of Hadrian's fortifications does not indicate they were a mistake; the United States hasn't lasted quite as long yet as the Roman Empire did (in the West) after Hadrian's accession.
If the Byzantine Empire is considered to have continuity with the Roman Empire (and it should!) then the Roman Empire lasted over a thousand years after Hadrian and was repeatedly saved by fortifications, including the massive walls of Constantinople; no modern state has the same longevity, with the closest being Ethiopia.

 

[5fish]

I found this detailed map of Richmond's defensive lines...

https://www.loc.gov/resource/g3883h.cw0643000/?r=-0.061,0.488,1.218,0.806,0

I wonder why Lee abandons Richmond so easily. Maybe, he should have falling back to Richmond and we could have The Great Siege of Richmond... instead of the Death March to Appomattox... either way the war would end in the surrender Lee...

 

[RobertP]

Cost too much. CSA does not have that much cash in hand and the slave owners are tax averse.
take

No problem. Make Lincoln pay for it.

 

[Saphroneth]

I wonder why Lee abandons Richmond so easily.

I understand it's a matter for his own logistics. With both Richmond and Petersburg held the Union can't dispatch enough force to cut Richmond off by land, because the perimeter would be too large, but with just Richmond it would be doable.
There's a reason it was felt by both sides (going back to 1862) that taking Petersburg would mean taking Richmond as well, and I suspect it's that.
Like how Yorktown was vital to the Confederate defences of Norfolk VA.

 

[LasPalmas]

One can argue the many mistakes the Confederacy made during the civil war. I argue the three-big strategic mistakes were their King Cotton foreign policy, Davis insistence on trying to keep border integrity, and Lee's insistence desire to crush the Union army with his much smaller force... I will say King Cotton foreign policy may have worked if they had promise nations cheap cotton for recognition and support, instead of a cotton embargo...

The point of this What if is to address Davis and Lee failed visions. The Confederacy strategy should have been to drag the war out and allow war weariness in the North to win the war. The Confederacy should have looked back to history and follow the Chinse and Romans strategy of walls and fortification along the borders. I say the Confederacy should have used trenches and fortification in strategic places to stimy Northern efforts to invade instead on open warfare. Here are Rome's Limes! See not everywhere just in strategic places and excess points...

View attachment 221710



Only if the Confederate Leadership could have been so farsighted and creative, they could have used the rivers and mountains and trenches to make it almost impossible to invade in the east and in the west they could have a network of trenches fortification to protect vital infrastructure, croplands and stop the invader. A trench and fortification strategy would have drag out the war for years causing war weariness in the North and leading to victory. With this strategy, Atlanta may not have followed before 1864 election and giving the election to McClellan. Grant may have been stimy in the west and never rose in the ranks to lead all the Union armies. Think about it no Gettysburg or Sharpsburg...

It takes fewer men to defend a fortified position than it takes to overrun it. The old rule of thumb is a three to one ratio to attacker versus defenders. Yes, I am talking about World War One like trenches across Virginia parts of Tennessee, Mississippi, and Alabama protecting the core of the Confederacy. I never understood why the Confederacy never spiked the rivers in the west stopping all traffic... If the union tries to land troops along the coast again pick strategic places to put your tranches and fortifications to stimy any advance inland... The Overland campaign showed how quickly made fortifications are hard to overrun if not impossible.

I know you going to bring up the siege of Petersburg but that was not planned in advance and done at the end of the war after the Confederacy had little to no resources left. If they follow the strategy of conservation during the war they would have won... Davis strategy was wasteful of men and Lee's strategy of open warfare was unsustainable in men and supplies.

The Confederacy needed its own Hadrian Wall or Maginot Line or a few Roman Limes...

Hadrian's wall was built as a way or keeping the troops busy, and therefore enforcing discipline and keeping men soldier-like when little else is going on, at an outpost distant from the capital.

This is similar to Grant's "Bayou Expeditions" and canal digging activities in early 1863, while he was waiting for warm weather to dry the roads in Mississippi sufficiently to allow his army to march to the Vicksburg area.

(As an aside to CWT, Grant also had to make it look like he was taking active measures to capture Vicksburg while he was, in fact, just waiting for dry roads. The northern press was clamoring for a big victory in the West, unsatisfied with the near constant and embarrassing defeats of the Federal armies in the East. Grant was concerned that he might be replaced. His reputation as invincible was not set in stone in early 1863.)

Also, Hadrian ordered the building of the wall that bears his name as a means of enhancing his power and status.
If a ruler orders that a wall, even largely unnecessary, be built and it is done, it reinforces his Imperial power.
Believe me, I don't want to get into modern politics, but some people, right or wrong, might say that scenario seems familiar.

 

[Saphroneth]

As an aside to CWT, Grant also had to make it look like he was taking active measures to capture Vicksburg while he was, in fact, just waiting for dry roads. The northern press was clamoring for a big victory in the West, unsatisfied with the near constant and embarrassing defeats of the Federal armies in the East.

Ah, the press. A month waiting for good campaigning weather (or supplies) is hated more than a bloody defeat if the defeat is an offensive one...

 

[Waterloo50]

I've walked along Hadrians wall many times, it's pretty impressive but as was stated earlier, it was really only built as a statement and to define the the outer limit of an empire, in practical terms it wouldn't have been enough to stop a determined invading army. I think those that lived beyond the wall weren't really sure if the wall was built to keep them out or to keep the Roman Britain's in.