The Blockade.

[Borderruffian]

The first measure of naval warfare undertaken by the Administration, and the one which it carried out for four years with the most sustained effort, was one that seemed at the outset in the highest degree impracticable. A navy of thirty-five available modern vessels, while it might be expected to produce substantial results by concentrated attacks at isolated points on the seaboard, or in engagements with the enemy's ships-of-war, counted for almost nothing as an effectual barrier to commerce along 3,000 miles of coast. To undertake such a task, and to proclaim the undertaking to the world, in all its magnitude, at a time when the Navy Department had only three steam-vessels at its immediate disposal in home ports, was an enterprise of the greatest boldness and hardihood. For the days of paper blockades were over; and, though the United States were not a party to the Declaration of Paris, its rule in regard to blockade was only the formal expression of a law universally recognized. "Blockades, to be binding, must be effective--that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy;" or, according to the general interpretation given to the treaty, sufficient to create an evident danger in entering or leaving the port. In this sense, the Government understood its responsibilities and prepared to meet them.
It was natural, in view of the inadequacy of the force, that foreign governments should look at the measure with suspicion, and should watch its execution with careful scrutiny. Commercial communities abroad doubted the seriousness of the undertaking, because, in their ignorance of the energy and the resources of the Government, they doubted its feasibility. An effective blockade on such a scale was a thing unprecedented, even in the operations of the foremost naval powers of the world. It seemed to be an attempt to revive the cabinet blockades of half a century before, when England and France laid an embargo upon each other's coasts, and captured all vessels at sea whose destination was within the proscribed limits; and when Spain interdicted commerce with the northern colonies in South America, and as a matter of form, kept a brig cruising in the Caribbean Sea.
No time was lost in announcing the intentions of the Government. On the 19th of April, six days after the fall of Sumter, the President issued a proclamation declaring the blockade of the Southern States from South Carolina to Texas. On the 27th the blockade was extended to Virginia and North Carolina. The terms of the proclamation were as follows:

"Now therefore I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States...have further deemed it advisable to set on foot a blockade of the ports within the States aforesaid, in pursuance of the laws of the United States and of the Law of Nations in such case provided. For this purpose a competent force will be posted so as to prevent entrance and exit of vessels from the ports aforesaid. If, therefore, with a view to violate such blockade, a vessel shall approach or shall attempt to leave any of the said ports, she will be duly warned by the commander of one of the blockading vessels, who will endorse on her register the fact and date of such warning, and if the same vessel shall again attempt to enter or leave the blockaded port, she will be captured, and sent to the nearest convenient port for such proceedings against her, and her cargo as prize, as may he deemed advisable."

http://www.civilwarhome.com/blockade.htm

 

[Jacob C Gent]

Interesting, In my opinion the South made 1 major error in the blockaid, Not taking and holding Key West Florida. It was by this serious omission the Union forces had a convienient location for a coaling station. If the south had held key west, then it would make Fort Jefferson a difficult position to hold.

But it did not happen and the Union was able to keep Ships on station along the gulf coastwithout having to go to Cuba or Mexico for coal.

Winfield Scott seen this and ordered the immeadate occupation of Key west at the beginning of hostilities.

 

[Dixieroy]

Ignore please, question asked previously by another

 

[rhp6033]

Could any defense of Key West by the Confederates be sustainable? Small islands surrounded by a hostile navy of sufficient force to exclude all reinforcement, relief, and resupply have almost always fallen to the enemy, eventually. You have to have a sufficient land force to repell landings, and at the same time have a way to keep them provisioned. The larger the force, the more accute the logistics problems become very quickly.

It seems that the failure of the Confederacy to be more self-sufficient in ship-building is the main problem. The lack of industrialization, and the loss of the Norfolk/Hampton Rhodes shipyards to the Union early in the game pretty much put a time-limit on the Confederacy, as things were just going to get worse the longer the war drug on.

I've always thought that was what Lee was thinking as he was looking across the field on the morning of that third day at Gettysburg - the clock was winding down on the Confederacy, and he couldn't pack his bags and head back to Virginia without giving it one more shot at a knock-out blow to the AoP.