Shunpike or bust?

[Johnny Shafto]

I'll admit right off I'm an admirer of General Lew Wallace. Without rehashing the details, which have been previously discussed here at CWT, I feel the good General got a bad rap after Halleck and Grant as much as threw him under the limber for the Shiloh turnaround. (Evidently upon reflection even Grant as much as admitted this.) Hypothetically…If Wallace had continued along the Shunpike, and likely arrived on the field of battle much earlier, what would have happened? Wallace briefly considered attacking the Confederates but abandoned the idea. Aware of the trouble ahead…was this primarily a tactical decision? Better late on day one for the opportunity to open the attack on day two? Let's invite Wallace, Grant, and Sherman over for an after dinner discussion.

 

[Yankeedave]

I have always wondered if there was some intent on flanking with Wallace, but as event moved past him, he had to pull back.

 

[jackt62]

Studying various accounts about what happened to Wallace's division at Shiloh, leads me to conclude that poorly given verbal orders from Grant were the basis of the confusion about which road Wallace was to take. Wallace contended that in accordance with orders, moving down Shunpike, rather than River Road, would have been the quickest means of reaching the Union right. In fact, by the time Wallace was nearing the scene of battle, the front had already shifted closer to Pittsburg Landing in which case it is very possible that Wallace's division could have been in position to assault the enemy's right flank. But before that ever happened, Grant's couriers finally redirected Wallace to move along River Road, which Wallace did, albeit counter-marching his troops, which added more time. Grant unfortunately chose to pin the rap for the failings of Day 1 on Wallace, possibly to detract attention from questions about Grant's own performance at Shiloh. As a result, Wallace was effectively sidetracked from most front-line positions until 1864. Grant may have softened his criticism towards Wallace in later years, but the initial damage had been done.

 

[Johnny Shafto]

Counter-marching…possibly because he knew 3rd Division was about to enter the fray at the end of one road or another? Evidently they were about 3/4 of the way down Shunpike when those couriers finally caught up. There may have even been the smell of a fight in the air. I do think he probably had no choice but to turn. The enemy would likely have known his position in time to organize defensively. I have no idea the nature of the terrain where first contact might have occurred. I do believe Wallace's cavalry had a good idea of the lay of the land.

My first visit to a Civil War battlefield is tentatively scheduled for this November at Shiloh. Trying my best to understand as much as possible between now and then. The more learned the greater my appreciation for the history and the men that lived it. The very thought of walking in their footsteps, and paying respect to those that still remain, is, for lack of a better word….intense.

 

[Nathan Stuart]

The delayed arrival of Wallace's Division on the field in day one at Shiloh is not fully explained and understood.

Whatever his failings and shortcomings (if any) were at Shiloh, Wallace's command performance was effective in other instances during the war.

Prior to Shiloh, at Fort Doneslson (February 15, 1862), Wallace blocked a Confederate sortie in an attempted breakout from the defenses of Fort Donelson. (This action saved the early career of Grant).

At Monocacy, on July 9 1864, he may have at least partially redeemed himself by delaying Early's small Army advancing on Washington D.C.. Although Wallace's much smaller force was defeated at Monocacy, his stand there bought enough valuable time for the reinforcement of defenses around the national capital. (Wallace's action here was a contributing factor in Early's failure to invade the city).

 

[Johnny Shafto]

Some of these couriers reportedly indicated that they thought 3rd Division was lost. Lost on a road that Wallace previously had scouted while even making repairs along the way to hasten movement. Perhaps it was these couriers who were unsure of their whereabouts and one possible reason they didn't make contact with Wallace sooner was due to the lousy condition of the River road.

The writer Gail Stephens, author of The Shadow of Shiloh, along with other historians and locals, retraced the movement of the 3rd Division. Under better conditions, well fed and watered, and with fine hiking boots, they were unable to improve on the time posted by Wallace and company.

 

[NedBaldwin]

... Grant unfortunately chose to pin the rap for the failings of Day 1 on Wallace, possibly to detract attention from questions about Grant's own performance at Shiloh. As a result, Wallace was effectively sidetracked from most front-line positions until 1864. Grant may have softened his criticism towards Wallace in later years, but the initial damage had been done.

i think Wallace suffered from being promoted too early such that he had seniority which the high command didnt know what to do with.

He was made a Major General after Fort Donelson, making him senior to Sherman, George Thomas, McPherson, Hulrbut, Ord, Rosecrans.... due to this he would have to be given high command (Corps, District) or nudged aside. Grant didnt think he was good enough to replace Sherman or McPHerson or Hulrbut etc so he had to sidetrack him.

Wallace took leave on his own during the summer of 62 and when he wanted to come back near the end of the year, Grant wrote to Halleck that "I could manage if he had less rank".

Wallace made it worse by keep arguing about the events of Shiloh, writing a letter almost a year after the battle direct to Stanton complaining, which apparently annoyed Halleck.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Wallace made it worse by keep arguing about the events of Shiloh, writing a letter almost a year after the battle direct to Stanton complaining, which apparently annoyed Halleck.

And during the approach to Corinth, Wallace grumbled about the operation to a couple young officers who were passing through his camp, and who turned out to be on their way to join Halleck's staff.

In Wallace's autobiography, he blamed this episode for getting on Halleck's bad side and his losing his command.

 

[jackt62]

He was made a Major General after Fort Donelson, making him senior to Sherman, George Thomas, McPherson, Hulrbut, Ord, Rosecrans.... due to this he would have to be given high command (Corps, District) or nudged aside

With the exception of Hurlbut, all the others were WP graduates. Could this be an instance where Wallace's "political" background triggered the usual negative reaction among the professional officer corps, and particularly Grant in this instance?

 

[Johnny Shafto]

And during the approach to Corinth, Wallace grumbled about the operation to a couple young officers who were passing through his camp, and who turned out to be on their way to join Halleck's staff.

In Wallace's autobiography, he blamed this episode for getting on Halleck's bad side and his losing his command.

In his youth Wallace was a rambunctious lad. Comes as little surprise his temperament tended to outpace what little political diplomacy he may have had. Speaking ones mind can at times be counterproductive. Still it might be fair to say that, at the time, being on Halleck's bad side placed him in good company.

 

[DanSBHawk]

With the exception of Hurlbut, all the others were WP graduates. Could this be an instance where Wallace's "political" background triggered the usual negative reaction among the professional officer corps, and particularly Grant in this instance?

I happened on a snippet of James Grant Wilson's wartime diary that may be related. After Grant's accident in New Orleans in Sept '63, he was laid up in bed and Wilson visited him. On Sept 13th, Wilson wrote this entry, redacted by Wilson or the publisher:

I've been trying to think if there were any other generals from Indiana at Shiloh. If this pertains to Wallace, there may have been more to the story of the falling out between Wallace and Grant than just Wallace's first-day tardiness.

As far as "political generals," some did better than others with the West-Pointers.

 

[Johnny Shafto]

I happened on a snippet of James Grant Wilson's wartime diary that may be related. After Grant's accident in New Orleans in Sept '63, he was laid up in bed and Wilson visited him. On Sept 13th, Wilson wrote this entry, redacted by Wilson or the publisher:

View attachment 447867

I've been trying to think if there were any other generals from Indiana at Shiloh. If this pertains to Wallace, there may have been more to the story of the falling out between Wallace and Grant than just Wallace's first-day tardiness.

As far as "political generals," some did better than others with the West-Pointers.

 

[NedBaldwin]

With the exception of Hurlbut, all the others were WP graduates. Could this be an instance where Wallace's "political" background triggered the usual negative reaction among the professional officer corps, and particularly Grant in this instance?

If he had not been promoted so early, maybe he could have been like other successful non-WP -- Logan, Blair, Dodge

 

[NedBaldwin]

I've been trying to think if there were any other generals from Indiana at Shiloh. If this pertains to Wallace, there may have been more to the story of the falling out between Wallace and Grant than just Wallace's first-day tardiness.

Wallace seems likely for that quote.
Veatch is a possibility - but other reports of his conduct at Shiloh say he acted with great courage.

 

[SeanMichaelChick]

Wallace's problem is that Halleck did not like political generals, but he could be a bit kinder to Republicans and Wallace was a Democrat. For instance, Halleck liked Hurlbut, who just so happened to be of Lincoln's staunchest allies in Illinois. So Halleck cultivated Hurlbut. Grant after Fort Donelson and Shiloh purposely befriended Halleck friends and favorites (Sherman, McPherson, Hurlbut, Smith, Pope, Sheridan, Ord) to gain his approval. It worked over time although it remained a very strange and strained relationship. Halleck and Grant were FAR better at army politics than most give credit.

Wallace did not help his case by showing up at the Fort Donelson surrender discussion before Grant, who was very sensitive about being usurped. It seems to be an innocent mistake by Wallace, but Grant was noticeably cooler after that. To make it worse, Wallace complained to people who were friends with Grant about Shiloh. Another example of such bone-headed actions was Thomas Worthington. He hated Sherman and brought it up to Halleck, who played a large role in saving Sherman's career and promoting his actions at Shiloh. The ability to deal properly with the politics of war and build friendships with fellow officers was a skill men such as Wallace and especially Worthington did not master. One might call this unfair. I call it human nature.

Wallace was doomed. He was a Democrat serving a Republican administration that mostly undermined Democratic generals, lest they gain political capital. He was under Halleck who disliked political generals, particularly ones who gave him no advantage in his dealings with the Republicans who ran the government. He had none of the qualifications Grant prized, namely obedience and Halleck's favor. The last nail in the coffin was that his division suffered few losses on April 7. They were vital to victory bythreatening the Rebel right but no other division got off so light at Shiloh unless you count Thomas J. Wood's command. That might be where the coward comment came from. Wallace lost at most 300 men. Most of Grant's brigades lost more than that and three of Buell's brigades reported losses in excess of 300.

As to Wallace, I doubt he seriously considered going down the Shunpike to hit the Confederate rear. Owl Creek was sluggish but deep and it could be crossed at one bridge which was being guarded by the Texas Rangers (the best Rebel cavalry unit at Shiloh), and for time both the 38th Tennessee and Crescent Regiment and some artillery. Wallace mentioned considering it (but he apparently told no one at the time) but after the war he looked at the ground and said it would be folly.

That said I highly recommend Wallace's autobiograpghy. Its a great read but also very accurate at least about Shiloh. It lines up well with contemporary accounts and is still the best account of the fighting on the Union right on April 7 since it is vivid and detailed.

 

[SeanMichaelChick]

I happened on a snippet of James Grant Wilson's wartime diary that may be related. After Grant's accident in New Orleans in Sept '63, he was laid up in bed and Wilson visited him. On Sept 13th, Wilson wrote this entry, redacted by Wilson or the publisher:

Where did you get this redacted entry from? Its pretty good stuff and very blunt.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Where did you get this redacted entry from? Its pretty good stuff and very blunt.

It's from James G Wilson's book, The Life and Public Services of Ulysses Simpson Grant.

Grant is described as being told by Sherman of Wallace standing behind a tree at Shiloh. Tim Smith writes in his Shiloh book that on the second day of the battle, Wallace ordered his men prone several times during heavy enemy fire. This may account for both the low casualties in Wallace's division, and also the story from Sherman. Wallace may have stood behind a tree while his men were prone.

Grant may have had a misunderstanding of Wallace because of this. Wallace did a good job on the second day, and in fact Tim Smith is more complimentary of Wallace's division on the second day than of the Army of the Ohio, or of the tired Army of the Tennessee soldiers of the first days battle.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Wallace did not help his case by showing up at the Fort Donelson surrender discussion before Grant, who was very sensitive about being usurped. It seems to be an innocent mistake by Wallace, but Grant was noticeably cooler after that. To make it worse, Wallace complained to people who were friends with Grant about Shiloh.

In his autobiography, Wallace does not claim that Grant was upset in any way with Wallace being in Dover before him.

Wallace does write that some in Grant's headquarters were colder towards him for not including a mention in his official report of them delivering orders during the battle. But Wallace writes that Grant was very friendly towards him after the battle.

 

[Ole Miss]

If one has not been to Shiloh, especially in a wet April, it is difficult to understand how difficult the terrain is in that Northern sector of the battlefield. The Tennessee River quite often floods the lowland swamps and timber area making the rudimentary roads difficult to use and coupled with a lack of accurate maps and guides, Wallace was in trouble.

The battle at the time Grant stopped and spoke with Wallace was very fluid and the Confederates were attacking primarily due North which would have had Wallace marching directly into the Confederate assault if he had stayed on the Shunpike. To say Wallace was floundering would be accurate but Grant was also at fault. He gave Wallace orders before he knew the positioning of the forces on the battlefield and then expected Wallace to be at hand despite not knowing what he wanted and where. Wallace bore the stigma of being lost when it was not his title to bear, in my opinion.
Regards
David

 

[DanSBHawk]

If one has not been to Shiloh, especially in a wet April, it is difficult to understand how difficult the terrain is in that Northern sector of the battlefield. The Tennessee River quite often floods the lowland swamps and timber area making the rudimentary roads difficult to use and coupled with a lack of accurate maps and guides, Wallace was in trouble.

The battle at the time Grant stopped and spoke with Wallace was very fluid and the Confederates were attacking primarily due North which would have had Wallace marching directly into the Confederate assault if he had stayed on the Shunpike. To say Wallace was floundering would be accurate but Grant was also at fault. He gave Wallace orders before he knew the positioning of the forces on the battlefield and then expected Wallace to be at hand despite not knowing what he wanted and where. Wallace bore the stigma of being lost when it was not his title to bear, in my opinion.
Regards
David

When this was discussed in an earlier thread, my impression was that Wallace was ordered to Pittsburg Landing to be placed in a reserve status. He misunderstood the order, but it may or may not have been his fault. Wallace was unjustly accused of being lost, but he didn't get the order right, whether it was his fault or not.