Shunpike or bust?

[Johnny Shafto]

When this was discussed in an earlier thread, my impression was that Wallace was ordered to Pittsburg Landing to be placed in a reserve status. He misunderstood the order, but it may or may not have been his fault. Wallace was unjustly accused of being lost, but he didn't get the order right, whether it was his fault or not.

This relates to the previous observation by jack62 …."Studying various accounts about what happened to Wallace's division at Shiloh, leads me to conclude that poorly given verbal orders from Grant were the basis of the confusion about which road Wallace was to take. Wallace contended that in accordance with orders, moving down Shunpike, rather than River Road, would have been the quickest means of reaching the Union right."

It seems reasonable to assume, having scouted the Shunpike rather throughly, Wallace would have been in the best position to make a determination. Regardless, his decision to turn seems to have been his only choice, and his arrival time at the landing was as timely as we could expect.

 

[DanSBHawk]

This relates to the previous observation by jack62 …."Studying various accounts about what happened to Wallace's division at Shiloh, leads me to conclude that poorly given verbal orders from Grant were the basis of the confusion about which road Wallace was to take. Wallace contended that in accordance with orders, moving down Shunpike, rather than River Road, would have been the quickest means of reaching the Union right."

It seems reasonable to assume, having scouted the Shunpike rather throughly, Wallace would have been in the best position to make this determination.

If Wallace had understood the orders were to go to Pittsburg Landing, and not to where he assumed the Union line was fighting, then it would not have made sense to choose to go by the Shunpike, because it wasn't the shortest route to the landing.

 

[Ole Miss]

Remember that Grant had a very sketcthy picture of the battle and how it was progressing when he saw Wallace at Crump Landing at about 9am. The vast swamp and low land was a mystery to all but the locals and they were unfamiliar with military needs for moving Wallace's 3rd Division 7,500 men strong. Narrow wagon roads through dismal areas resulted in long protracted marches with man and animals, wagons and artrillery pieces!
Regards
David

 

[Joseph A. Rose]

Wallace's problem is that Halleck did not like political generals, but he could be a bit kinder to Republicans and Wallace was a Democrat. For instance, Halleck liked Hurlbut, who just so happened to be of Lincoln's staunchest allies in Illinois. So Halleck cultivated Hurlbut. Grant after Fort Donelson and Shiloh purposely befriended Halleck friends and favorites (Sherman, McPherson, Hurlbut, Smith, Pope, Sheridan, Ord) to gain his approval. It worked over time although it remained a very strange and strained relationship. Halleck and Grant were FAR better at army politics than most give credit.

Wallace did not help his case by showing up at the Fort Donelson surrender discussion before Grant, who was very sensitive about being usurped. It seems to be an innocent mistake by Wallace, but Grant was noticeably cooler after that. To make it worse, Wallace complained to people who were friends with Grant about Shiloh. Another example of such bone-headed actions was Thomas Worthington. He hated Sherman and brought it up to Halleck, who played a large role in saving Sherman's career and promoting his actions at Shiloh. The ability to deal properly with the politics of war and build friendships with fellow officers was a skill men such as Wallace and especially Worthington did not master. One might call this unfair. I call it human nature.

Wallace was doomed. He was a Democrat serving a Republican administration that mostly undermined Democratic generals, lest they gain political capital. He was under Halleck who disliked political generals, particularly ones who gave him no advantage in his dealings with the Republicans who ran the government. He had none of the qualifications Grant prized, namely obedience and Halleck's favor. The last nail in the coffin was that his division suffered few losses on April 7. They were vital to victory bythreatening the Rebel right but no other division got off so light at Shiloh unless you count Thomas J. Wood's command. That might be where the coward comment came from. Wallace lost at most 300 men. Most of Grant's brigades lost more than that and three of Buell's brigades reported losses in excess of 300.

As to Wallace, I doubt he seriously considered going down the Shunpike to hit the Confederate rear. Owl Creek was sluggish but deep and it could be crossed at one bridge which was being guarded by the Texas Rangers (the best Rebel cavalry unit at Shiloh), and for time both the 38th Tennessee and Crescent Regiment and some artillery. Wallace mentioned considering it (but he apparently told no one at the time) but after the war he looked at the ground and said it would be folly.

That said I highly recommend Wallace's autobiograpghy. Its a great read but also very accurate at least about Shiloh. It lines up well with contemporary accounts and is still the best account of the fighting on the Union right on April 7 since it is vivid and detailed.

Sean,

I think that Grant's dislike of Wallace had a number of possible motives: Halleck's distate for politicial generals; Wallace's high rank (esp. over Grant's proteges); Hillyer's petulance for not being mentioned in Wallace's FD OR; and Grant's need for a scapegoat. Grant, unfortunately, let his personal feelings overrule generalship in assessing a a subordinate's worth.

The "coward" comment probably is a personal reference to Lew Wallace and not to the fighting done by his division. Well after the war, Wm. Rowley and Wm. Sherman were both disparaging Wallace's supposed conduct.

The thought of continuing into the enemy rear was thought of by Wallace only after Rowley reached him. Grant apparently later agreed that Wallace should have attempted it.

Joe

 

[Johnny Shafto]

Excited to begin this read which I found on the shelf at the Shiloh bookstore. Follow up comments due shortly.

 

[Ole Miss]

I believe you will discover, this aspect of the Battle of Shiloh, was not Grant's "finest hour" to say the least
Regards
David

 

[SeanMichaelChick]

I happened on a snippet of James Grant Wilson's wartime diary that may be related. After Grant's accident in New Orleans in Sept '63, he was laid up in bed and Wilson visited him. On Sept 13th, Wilson wrote this entry, redacted by Wilson or the publisher:

View attachment 447867

I've been trying to think if there were any other generals from Indiana at Shiloh. If this pertains to Wallace, there may have been more to the story of the falling out between Wallace and Grant than just Wallace's first-day tardiness.

As far as "political generals," some did better than others with the West-Pointers.

I finally looked at the source you cited. Interesting book all around. The only other general from Indiana at Shiloh was Veatch. He came under Sherman's direct observation on April 6 at Woolf Field. That said, I think it must be Wallace as Veatch was not someone Grant had any special feelings toward, while the summer of 1863 saw Wallace actively looking to repair his reputation.

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

Studying various accounts about what happened to Wallace's division at Shiloh, leads me to conclude that poorly given verbal orders from Grant were the basis of the confusion about which road Wallace was to take. Wallace contended that in accordance with orders, moving down Shunpike, rather than River Road, would have been the quickest means of reaching the Union right. In fact, by the time Wallace was nearing the scene of battle, the front had already shifted closer to Pittsburg Landing in which case it is very possible that Wallace's division could have been in position to assault the enemy's right flank. But before that ever happened, Grant's couriers finally redirected Wallace to move along River Road, which Wallace did, albeit counter-marching his troops, which added more time. Grant unfortunately chose to pin the rap for the failings of Day 1 on Wallace, possibly to detract attention from questions about Grant's own performance at Shiloh. As a result, Wallace was effectively sidetracked from most front-line positions until 1864. Grant may have softened his criticism towards Wallace in later years, but the initial damage had been done.

Yep. I do not believe that Lew Wallace was negligent. He may just have become confused as to what the proper action was, depending on orders and the limited geographical and tactical information that he had.

 

[Johnny Shafto]

Another excellent reads on the subject…

 

[SSVilla]

With the exception of Hurlbut, all the others were WP graduates. Could this be an instance where Wallace's "political" background triggered the usual negative reaction among the professional officer corps, and particularly Grant in this instance?

It's not just the "political background." The problem with the political generals is that they were in the war for glory seeking and politicking, it was all a popularity contest for them, specially early on. It was all about getting their names in the press. I read an essay that Wallace got in a row with C.F. Smith when Smith was initially assigned to Paducah because it caused Wallace to be removed or be superseded. Wallace originated bad press for Smith as a result. C.F. Smith nearly retired because he had been so hounded by bad press, but Halleck spared him writing to Washington reaffirming his confidence in him and stating that he had to be retained. I wish I had this citation for you but it was a library book and I no longer have it on loan. It was one of the Grant's Lieutenant's books edited by Woodworth.

Lew Wallace wrote he was using the Shunpike road because he wanted to perform a heroic deed coming in the rear of the confederate army.

It was actually Larry J. Daniel who made me wonder at why is Grant's order questioned here when it was Wallace who lost it, and he didn't exactly tell a straight story about it.

 

[Johnny Shafto]

It's not just the "political background." The problem with the political generals is that they were in the war for glory seeking and politicking, it was all a popularity contest for them, specially early on. It was all about getting their names in the press. I read an essay that Wallace got in a row with C.F. Smith when Smith was initially assigned to Paducah because it caused Wallace to be removed or be superseded. Wallace originated bad press for Smith as a result. C.F. Smith nearly retired because he had been so hounded by bad press, but Halleck spared him writing to Washington reaffirming his confidence in him and stating that he had to be retained. I wish I had this citation for you but it was a library book and I no longer have it on loan. It was one of the Grant's Lieutenant's books edited by Woodworth.

Lew Wallace wrote he was using the Shunpike road because he wanted to perform a heroic deed coming in the rear of the confederate army.

It was actually Larry J. Daniel who made me wonder at why is Grant's order questioned here when it was Wallace who lost it, and he didn't exactly tell a straight story about it.

View attachment 536474

Wasn't the Shunpike in significantly better condition than the River Road? It seems I read somewhere that Wallace had scouted both roads and felt that he could make better time on the Shunpike. This term "implied" used above seems vague when attributing what Wallace may or may not have stated. Wasn't Wallace initially positioning unaware of how far Confederate troops had advanced eastward towards the landing? It feels rather that he was simply looking for the quickest way to reach the action rather than attempting some sort of flanking maneuver. You say Wallace wrote of attempting a "heroic deed". This also has much room for interpretation especially if taken out of context. Where can this quote be found in Wallace's words and in the context of disobeying orders or attempting to flank? At the time of issuing his what could generously be described as vague orders Grant was clueless concerning road conditions. Nor was he aware of how quickly and how far the enemy would eventually advance. In my view much of the criticism over Wallace amounts to armchair quarterbacking with Grant covering for both himself and Sherman after being caught with pants down. As an admirer of Grant I think it can be said this was not his finest hour with relation to Wallace. No question Grant was brilliant in the delay and regroup tactics which had much to do with both Buell and Wallace. This business about resting men costing lives also seems bogus. In modern times, under better conditions, with better equipment, it has been proven that the time required to move from point A to point B was well within the final timeframe. And these experimental exercises were done with far fewer numbers and without heavy equipment. Harrumph!

 

[Horse_Artillery_23]

The whole situation with Wallace and his march to the battlefield has been a reoccurring interest for me the last several years. My view point is that Wallace certainly had the best of intentions, but sometimes things go awry in transit. Since we don't know what exactly the order said...its hard to really make a determination on Wallace. Here are some points I have considered in my opinion of the subject.

1. The present situation of a major battle (the scale of which was unseen before in America) certainly created a cloudy ground level view from the leadership perspective.....meaning in this context....Grant upon giving the orders to Wallace to move to Pittsburg Landing, was made in transit to the active front. I have to consider the amount of thoughts running through Grant's mind of dealing with a battle of unknown circumstances of which he was convinced would not happen on his front. With literally have to formulate his plans on the Tigress and then arriving at the scene of the fighting amidst confusion...it is easy to see how Grant, although sharp, could have let a few details in his decision making process slip into the void of his very busy mind.

2. It is clear over a 160 years later that certain generals/colonels were given different treatment in historical memory in regard to their performance at Shiloh. Of course there has always been controversy in this sector, and I do not intend to solve it here...but the question for me has always been.... if Wallace's actions were a "shortcoming" or "leadership defect" on April 6 then how does that measure against Sherman or Prentiss who were effectively "surprised." By surprised I mean in the context that their camps were certainly overrun and they did not fully comprehend the attack which was coming......I do understand Sherman and Prentiss caution with taking every "rookie" or "green" soldiers report of a mass Confederates in their front for truth...I can also understand that the general intelligence from higher echelons placed the Army of Mississippi in Corinth. In a very real sense I can absolutely understand, when considering the terrain, and raw nature of the troops why they were slow to realize until it was too late. In other words I do not think Sherman or Prentiss were inept or bad or unprepared officers, in fact it is quite the opposite, I think through their caution in not believing the fullness of the reports prior to April 6 shows that they were in tune with the higher commands vision of the situation and were attempting to keep their raw divisions under a state of discipline as to not offset the higher purpose.

3. To tie into my second point...... in my opinion, not one of the Army of the Tennessee division commanders was in a proper position to receive a concentrated Confederate assault. Every division commander was forced to make a very rushed decision that morning based off reaction. Moving a division of troops is not as simple as saying "forward march." Moving any large body of soldiers, with all the Army's organization structure takes time. To be fair....it was April 1862...the war was just barely a year old....and none of these officers really had any prior experience in moving divisions in coordination with other division in a general battle that involved the entirety of both armies engaged. In my mind we cannot hold them to the same standards as a division commander in lets say 1864.

4. As for Wallace's division...... I am not convinced that the timely arrival of his division, based on Grant's expectations, would have made any sort of major difference on the first day.....Grant with or without Wallace would have still been in the "hole" with a Confederate army who could claim they had they better day....after all the Army of the Tennessee was "surprised" and driven from their forward camps....which was happening with or without Wallace.

5. Based on my examination....just like Sherman...Prentiss...WHL Wallace...and the rest who under the circumstances performed well on April 6, Lew Wallace and his men equally preformed well on April 7.

6. The burning question for me is Grant..... no doubt Grant proved to be the right man for the job as the war went on....but with Shiloh I cannot help but be perplexed as to why so much of the focus is on Grant "winning" the battle....yes no doubt his leadership won the battle for the Union....but in truth the episode was an absolute disaster....we all know of Grant's demotion and struggle to regain the top spot.....but I think focus should be given as to "why" such a large scale attack from the Confederates was even allowed to happen as it did in the first place....this no doubt rests on Grant's shoulders.

7. I think when it comes down to it....for all the points mentioned in previous posts about Wallace....politics, personality, political general, and ego....coupled with the general inexperience of leadership at that time....that Wallace simply becomes the scapegoat in order to deflect from the others. Simply put....Wallace made mistakes..but so to did every other general officer on the field that day.

8. What I would like to see is a fair and objective analysis of all the collective general officers and contributions of mistakes.....my final thought is this...... If the Army of the Tennessee had been properly prepared at Pittsburg Landing...then they likely would not have needed Wallace.

 

[DanSBHawk]

I'm not sure why we should consider April 6th a disaster for Grant. There is a profound difference between losing a battle and almost losing a battle.

At the end of the first day, most of Grant's army had fallen back to a strong compact line. The confederates had exerted every effort to defeat Grant and they had come up short. Grant obviously didn't believe he was defeated. Even without Buell showing up, and even without Lew Wallace showing up, Grant knew the very tired and very hurt confederates would have been faced with only one option on the following morning... frontal assaults against a strong defensive line supported by massed artillery. There were no more possibilities for flanking the federal army. Would the confederates have been able to succeed with frontal assaults? I doubt it. I think it would have been a Franklin situation. A bloodbath. It surely would not have been a slam-dunk for the confederates.

Having both his missing division and Buell's army just meant that Grant could forget about a defensive stand on the second day, and go on the offensive.

I don't fault Wallace for being late. He'd only been a general a short time. I think he misread the orders, and the fact that the written order was conveniently lost might arouse some suspicion that it was intentionally lost... meaning that in the evening when they had finally arrived at the battlefield, someone had looked at the written order again and realized that they hadn't really explicitly followed the literal intent of the order... and the order happened to fall in a campfire. Oops. Admittedly pure speculation on my part.

At any rate, Grant was still willing to give Lew Wallace command of the Corinth garrison less then two years later, and fully intended to do so. So the claims that Grant completely lost confidence in Wallace, or completely turned against him, are not supported by the facts.

 

[SeanMichaelChick]

"I'm not sure why we should consider April 6th a disaster for Grant."

Because being taken by surprise in your camp is an embarrassment of the highest order.

 

[Horse_Artillery_23]

"I'm not sure why we should consider April 6th a disaster for Grant."

Because being taken by surprise in your camp is an embarrassment of the highest order.

This is exactly my overall point.... no doubt Grant is a tough...determined...and even talented fighter.... not many would habe remained and pulled out a victory like that.....however in my mind the entire episode was avoidable...there were plenty of warnings....to me it has always seemed the blame game for the tactical mishaps had always been a cover or rather surface of the deeper issue which was "why" it even all happened like it did in the first place.

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

I'm not sure why we should consider April 6th a disaster for Grant. There is a profound difference between losing a battle and almost losing a battle.

At the end of the first day, most of Grant's army had fallen back to a strong compact line. The confederates had exerted every effort to defeat Grant and they had come up short. Grant obviously didn't believe he was defeated. Even without Buell showing up, and even without Lew Wallace showing up, Grant knew the very tired and very hurt confederates would have been faced with only one option on the following morning... frontal assaults against a strong defensive line supported by massed artillery. There were no more possibilities for flanking the federal army. Would the confederates have been able to succeed with frontal assaults? I doubt it. I think it would have been a Franklin situation. A bloodbath. It surely would not have been a slam-dunk for the confederates.

Having both his missing division and Buell's army just meant that Grant could forget about a defensive stand on the second day, and go on the offensive.

I don't fault Wallace for being late. He'd only been a general a short time. I think he misread the orders, and the fact that the written order was conveniently lost might arouse some suspicion that it was intentionally lost... meaning that in the evening when they had finally arrived at the battlefield, someone had looked at the written order again and realized that they hadn't really explicitly followed the literal intent of the order... and the order happened to fall in a campfire. Oops. Admittedly pure speculation on my part.

At any rate, Grant was still willing to give Lew Wallace command of the Corinth garrison less then two years later, and fully intended to do so. So the claims that Grant completely lost confidence in Wallace, or completely turned against him, are not supported by the facts.

I do not believe at all that Wallace intentionally lost the written order.

 

[DanSBHawk]

"I'm not sure why we should consider April 6th a disaster for Grant."

Because being taken by surprise in your camp is an embarrassment of the highest order.

No, losing the battle would have been far worse.

 

[DanSBHawk]

I do not believe at all that Wallace intentionally lost the written order.

After reading it, Wallace claimed he passed it around to other officers. Someone conveniently lost it. If they had saved it, there would be no controversy.

 

[DanSBHawk]

If April 6th was a disaster for anyone, it was a disaster for Beauregard. He had Grant at his weakest, and had only pushed him back. He used all his resources and still failed to defeat Grant. It had really been his only chance at success, and he failed. And the south lost A.S. Johnston on top of that.