Showing the"White Feather"

Andy Cardinal

1st Lieutenant
Forum Host
Joined
Feb 27, 2017
Location
Ohio
skirmishline.jpg

The 6th Wisconsin led the Iron Brigade's advance on the morning of September 17. Reaching the edge of the North Woods, Colonel Bragg ordered Captain John A. Kellogg's Company I on forward on the left and Captain Alexander S. Hooe's Company C on the right as skirmishers. The rest of the regiment deployed in line of battle behind them. They quickly reached the southern edge of the woodlot. "In front of the woods was an open field," Major Rufus Dawes recalled; "beyond this was a house, surrounded by peach and apple trees, a garden, and outhouses" -- the Miller Farm. As soon as Companies I and C emerged from the woods, Confederate skirmishers positioned around the Miller house and outbuildings opened a "vigorous fire." Dawes remembered Kellogg's company dashing "across the field at a full run" and carrying out a "rapid flank movement very handsomely executed," driving the Confederates away from the Miller buildings. All had not gone well with Captain Hooe, however. As Bragg wrote in his official report, "the right of my line of skirmishers..." -- i.e., Hooe's Company C -- "failed to advance, either from a failure to hear or heed commands." That was all that was said officially. Similarly, Rufus Dawes said nothing in his published account. The truth, however, as Bragg revealed years later to Antietam historian Ezra Carman, was that Hooe "showed the white feather."

Hooe's father was a graduate of the United States Military Academy and had been decorated for gallantry during the Mexican War after losing an arm at Palo Alto. The elder Hooe passed away at the age of 41 in December 1847 in Baton Rouge. The younger Hooe "was born in a fort, and nearly his whole life has been spent in a garrison." An 1861 newspaper article described Hooe as a "patriotic and efficient officer who has a thorough knowledge of the duties of a soldier." His company made a fine appearance. Alexander Hooe had all the appearance of making a fine soldier. Once in battle, however, he froze under the strain of combat. One soldier in his company wrote that "At Bull Run he had to go to the front to lead his company forward into line and you would have thought he was trying to sneak up on a wild turkey." According to Bragg, at Antietam Hooe "dodged behind a tree and grew there, letting his line go helter-skelter without direction." In his private journal, Dawes wrote that Company C did not move as the regiment advanced, "and we saw no more of them for some time." At least some of the men from Company C did move forward, however, remaining on the skirmish line until fired on by friendly troops. Hooe resigned his commission in February 1863.

Sources:

History of Crawford and Richland Counties
Cullum's Register
Giants in Their Tall Black Hats
The Iron Brigade in Civil War and Memory
 
Last edited:
What saddens me about this story is that there was probably an expectation on this young man that he would be a soldier and carry on his father's legacy. No doubt being thrust into battle told a story all of its own. He was not suited to the task of being a soldier. And the story of life and death being written on the battlefield ensured that he could only be painted as a 'coward'.

The 'white feather' as a term implies 'cowardice' and engenders 'shame'. No man wants to be a coward.

Or live with that kind of shame.

I don't know how you reconcile moments such as these with the necessities of war. But the 'white feather' does not take into account the very individual nature of each man and how he may eventually give account of himself.
 
What saddens me about this story is that there was probably an expectation on this young man that he would be a soldier and carry on his father's legacy. No doubt being thrust into battle told a story all of its own. He was not suited to the task of being a soldier. And the story of life and death being written on the battlefield ensured that he could only be painted as a 'coward'.

The 'white feather' as a term implies 'cowardice' and engenders 'shame'. No man wants to be a coward.

Or live with that kind of shame.

I don't know how you reconcile moments such as these with the necessities of war. But the 'white feather' does not take into account the very individual nature of each man and how he may eventually give account of himself.
I haven't been able to find too much about Captain Hooe beyond what I included in the post, except that officially his resignation was due to sickness.

What I found interesting about the story was that nothing was ever officially said about Hooe or his difficulties in battle. He was allowed to save face, at least publicly.

The test of combat ("seeing the elephant") was indeed an individual event for each person, and no one could say how he would respond until he met the test. I'm sure cases like this were more common that we may realize, especially if units protected their own as seemed to be the case here.

It is also quite possible that Hooe would have been perfectly fine as a private soldier, but the weight of leading men into battle is what "unmanned him" (to use the language of the time.
 
What I found interesting about the story was that nothing was ever officially said about Hooe or his difficulties in battle. He was allowed to save face, at least publicly.
Yes, I noticed this, too. So there was an element of respect for him or his father's legacy that kept him from the the worst of the consequences for his lack of courage under fire.

I'm sure cases like this were more common that we may realize, especially if units protected their own as seemed to be the case here.
I also thought this. I'm sure it was not an uncommon occurrence, especially for those experiencing battle for the first time. I seem to remember in the movie 'Red Badge of Courage' the young man and main character at first fled on 'seeing the elephant', but returned to fight gallantly once he overcame his fear. This could also have been quite common. The return after confronting the fear.

Which is why I suggested it would be hard to know how each individual man might eventually give account of himself. He may go back. He may experience regret and find another way to protect and defend in a situation removed from the battlefield. And even much later in life. There are so many possibilities. And the thought of being tarred with this brush for a lifetime is not a pleasant one to imagine.

It is also quite possible that Hooe would have been perfectly fine as a private soldier, but the weight of leading men into battle is what "unmanned him" (to use the language of the time.
Yes, and we still have the expression today to 'man up'. I use it myself from time to time. And there is a time and a place. The challenge is out there. And it could mean a million different things, but I use it as a term to express stepping into responsibility. Which is what Hooe was not able to do in leading his men into battle. So, being 'unmanned' is probably appropriate for the situation.

Thankfully, there is always an option to 'man up' at some stage depending on the circumstances.
 
Last edited:
Do we know how he acted at Brawner's Farm? That was some very heavy action and he may have been experiencing some emotional trauma from that experience.

Ryan
The only reference I've found so far is to "Bull Run" -- which may or may not include Brawner's Farm.
I couldn't find a mention of Captain Hooe prior to Antietam, at least in reference to his conduct. One wonders if perhaps he hit his limit after the fighting at Second Manassas and South Mountain and his nerves broke. It was certainly not unheard of.

Ryan
There is also the shell that burst in the ranks just as the regiment began to move, killing and wounding 13. I'm sure that unnerved many men.
 
This makes me think of the "Peter Principle," a concept that sometimes gets applied in business and management. A pithy way of putting it is that workers get promoted to the level of their own incompetence. If you do well at one level in the hierarchy, then you are likely to get promoted to the next level. The process will continue until you reach a job at which you are incompetent. Since you're incompetent, you won't be promoted, and will remain stuck in a job where you can never live up to expectations. An unhappy position, we can imagine.

I found a reference in which military strategist Carl von Clausewitz refers to a similar phenomenon in military hierarchies: "there is nothing more common than to hear of men losing their energy on being raised to a higher position, to which they do not feel themselves equal." (On War, Book 1)

Roy B.
 
This makes me think of the "Peter Principle," a concept that sometimes gets applied in business and management. A pithy way of putting it is that workers get promoted to the level of their own incompetence. If you do well at one level in the hierarchy, then you are likely to get promoted to the next level. The process will continue until you reach a job at which you are incompetent. Since you're incompetent, you won't be promoted, and will remain stuck in a job where you can never live up to expectations. An unhappy position, we can imagine.

I found a reference in which military strategist Carl von Clausewitz refers to a similar phenomenon in military hierarchies: "there is nothing more common than to hear of men losing their energy on being raised to a higher position, to which they do not feel themselves equal." (On War, Book 1)

Roy B.

A good example of the "Peter Principle" would be the elevation of Burnside to army command. The irony is that Burnside himself knew he was not up to that job but was not able to decline it.
 
A good example of the "Peter Principle" would be the elevation of Burnside to army command. The irony is that Burnside himself knew he was not up to that job but was not able to decline it.
I can imagine a number of factors that could push an officer to accept a promotion he wasn't up to, such as a sense of honor, loyalty, or even shame. Maybe ambition or desire for power as well. In the case of Hooe, I can imagine he was under a lot of pressure to live up to his father's legacy.

I'm curious to know, what do you know about Burnside and why he accepted responsibility that he wasn't up to?

Roy B.
 
I can imagine a number of factors that could push an officer to accept a promotion he wasn't up to, such as a sense of honor, loyalty, or even shame. Maybe ambition or desire for power as well. In the case of Hooe, I can imagine he was under a lot of pressure to live up to his father's legacy.

I'm curious to know, what do you know about Burnside and why he accepted responsibility that he wasn't up to?

Roy B.

Because he was told that if he didn't take command, it was going to go to Hooker, a man that Burnside hated.

Ryan
 
I can imagine a number of factors that could push an officer to accept a promotion he wasn't up to, such as a sense of honor, loyalty, or even shame. Maybe ambition or desire for power as well. In the case of Hooe, I can imagine he was under a lot of pressure to live up to his father's legacy.

I'm curious to know, what do you know about Burnside and why he accepted responsibility that he wasn't up to?

Roy B.

Burnside actually turned it down the first time he was offered command of the AOTP after McClellan's unsuccessful Peninsula campaign in June 1862. Burnside did have a commendable sense of honor; as he was a friend of McClellan and very loyal to him he could not accept such an appointment. At the same time, Burnside's modesty was unique among the senior leaders of the AOTP; although he had success leading the amphibious Roanoke expedition in North Carolina early on, he was astute enough to realize that the higher level of command was something he was not comfortable with. Unfortunately, events were to show he was right about that.
 
Burnside's modesty was unique among the senior leaders of the AOTP; although he had success leading the amphibious Roanoke expedition in North Carolina early on

Yes, I was thinking about the Roanoke expedition. I'm down in North Carolina, so we're greatly conscious of that success. Might have been seen as an indication of promise for higher command.

Roy B.
 
Yes, I was thinking about the Roanoke expedition. I'm down in North Carolina, so we're greatly conscious of that success. Might have been seen as an indication of promise for higher command.

Roy B.

That was the basis for Lincoln's original offer of command of the AOTP to Burnside a few months afterward. But as you point out, it was the "Peter Principle" at work.
 
Because he was told that if he didn't take command, it was going to go to Hooker, a man that Burnside hated.

Ryan

Hooker was probably the exact opposite of Burnside in terms of personality. Hooker was a vainglorious self-promoter, whereas Burnside was modest and understood the limits of his abilities. That difference was certainly a major reason for Burnside's loathing of Hooker.
 

Learn About Us
About CivilWarTalk
Contact the Webmaster
Meet the Staff
Link to CivilWarTalk
Join Our Community
Register
Browse Forums
View Today's Discussions
Search the Forum
Get Help
FAQ
Student Guide
Forum Rules & Etiquette
Copyright / DMCA

     Contact Us CivilwarTalk on Facebook CivilWarTalk on YouTube CivilWarTalk on Twitter RSS Feed

Bringing the American Civil War and More to Life.
© 1999 - , CIVILWARTALK, LLC - Site Version 10.0

SlaveryTalk.com - SecessionTalk.com - CivilWarTalk.com - ReconstructionTalk.com
Back
Top