Should Forrest have been given independent command earlier?

@Rhea Cole Willing to take those dislikes as well, since I would tend to agree. I've read the OR reports of Forrest demolishing the Middle/West Tennessee outposts, and it's just...what's the point? Sure, you can take a company or five here or there, but then they stick in a new company and they repair the railroads just as fast.

I think many people forget that Tupelo could have easily been avoided if Forrest didn't engage at all (especially not dismounted). AJ Smith's corps was starving when they fought, and they only had enough food for the return trip. Another day down so deep in Mississippi and they would have left for lack of supplies.

(As an aside, I've noticed that Confederate cavalry commanders ultimately failed at fighting on foot: Stuart at Dranesville, Wheeler at Dover, Price at Helena, and of course, Forrest at Tupelo.)

If I may, what's your opinion of Forrest's 1862 West Tennessee raid? I'd say it was a bit different since the Union hadn't gotten around to establishing blockhouses and outposts yet...
 
@Rhea Cole Willing to take those dislikes as well, since I would tend to agree. I've read the OR reports of Forrest demolishing the Middle/West Tennessee outposts, and it's just...what's the point? Sure, you can take a company or five here or there, but then they stick in a new company and they repair the railroads just as fast.

I think many people forget that Tupelo could have easily been avoided if Forrest didn't engage at all (especially not dismounted). AJ Smith's corps was starving when they fought, and they only had enough food for the return trip. Another day down so deep in Mississippi and they would have left for lack of supplies.

(As an aside, I've noticed that Confederate cavalry commanders ultimately failed at fighting on foot: Stuart at Dranesville, Wheeler at Dover, Price at Helena, and of course, Forrest at Tupelo.)

If I may, what's your opinion of Forrest's 1862 West Tennessee raid? I'd say it was a bit different since the Union hadn't gotten around to establishing blockhouses and outposts yet...
I think Forrest was highly competent but his effect on the war was more like a mosquito than a beast: he steals some blood but you soon pump more back.
 
@Rhea Cole Willing to take those dislikes as well, since I would tend to agree. I've read the OR reports of Forrest demolishing the Middle/West Tennessee outposts, and it's just...what's the point? Sure, you can take a company or five here or there, but then they stick in a new company and they repair the railroads just as fast.

I think many people forget that Tupelo could have easily been avoided if Forrest didn't engage at all (especially not dismounted). AJ Smith's corps was starving when they fought, and they only had enough food for the return trip. Another day down so deep in Mississippi and they would have left for lack of supplies.

(As an aside, I've noticed that Confederate cavalry commanders ultimately failed at fighting on foot: Stuart at Dranesville, Wheeler at Dover, Price at Helena, and of course, Forrest at Tupelo.)

If I may, what's your opinion of Forrest's 1862 West Tennessee raid? I'd say it was a bit different since the Union hadn't gotten around to establishing blockhouses and outposts yet...

To understand the impact of Forrest's1862 raid it is important to understand the context. Fort Donelson, Fort Henry, occupation of: Bowling Green, Columbus KY, Nashville, Clarksville, Memphis, Murfreesboro & all of Middle Tennessee. (+/-) 40% of Johnston's army had been captured or deserted.

In Tennessee the one overwhelming advantage the secessionists had was a supreme predominance of cavalry… in numbers that is. There was little or no military organization. There was a wonderful conglomeration of yahoo slave patrollers that spent all day fussing about & fighting with neighboring groups. In order to bring some order to the ameba-like organizations & impose some adult level authority onto squabbling colonels, Forrest was promoted brigadier general / nanny in chief. (I am not exaggerating)

The fall of Nashville & occupation of Middle Tennessee occurred during the velvet glove phase of the war. Grant, in his memoir, does a good job of explaining that period of time. It was believed that the population in the seceding states had been deluded by hotheads & stampeded into war. Every effort was made to accommodate the civilian population.

The 9th Michigan marched into Murfreesboro via the square to the jaunty music of their excellent band who were playing new German silver instruments. (Link to view out East Main Street:)


What the earth shattering appearance of the 9th marching paste the Ready family town house was like is vividly depicted in young Alice Ready's journal:


The view from Alice Ready's bedroom window was of these buildings that still exist.

Link:


From his store, among several properties still owned by the Spence family, John Spence had felt the first wafts of the winds of war. In response he began a journal that he would keep throughout the fell events that followed.

Link:


In 1860 Murfreesboro's six square blocks housed 2,000 souls, half & half free & slave. Immediately, upon the fall of Nashville local slaves self-liberated. The 9th Michigan spread out along the Maney carriage lane as their color line. The old growth trees & the eternal spring made it the best campground the Old Mackerels occupied during the war. Self-liberated people flocked to their camp & were hired to perform camp follower services. This person to person encounter was registered as a seismic change of attitude about the reasons for fighting the war amongst the Michiganders.

In the early hours of July 13th 1862 young Kate Carney was woken by musket fire. From the third floor veranda of her family's enormous home north of the square, she witnessed Forrest's attack.

Link:


A company of the 9th had fortified the Rutherford CO courthouse. The Old Mackerels on the Maney carriage lane rallied in a log house surrounded by a stout log wall. Between them & the stout defenders on the square, many a saddle was emptied.

Link:


In true Forrest style, a callow Minnesota Colonel was tricked into surrendering to an inferior force. The men of the 9th swore great oaths when forced to honor the colonel's cowardly surrender.

IMG_0030.jpeg


Forrest & the surrendered colonels shared a meal of cornbread & blackeyed peas around Mrs. Maney's formal dinner table at Oaklands Plantation. The infuriated men of the 9th watched the officers gather before shuffling eastward toward McMinnville & parole.

As John Spence chronicled, for a few days Murfreesboro had a blessed break from both armies. Their idyll became a nostalgic memory when a train bearing troops from Nashville whistled to a stop at the station. Dr Eames, who managed the hospital at the Baptist Union College building, recorded local people coming to him begging for relief. The velvet glove had come off & the fisted iron gauntlet had replaced it.

Link:


Dr Eams documents how Forrest's men reverted to their habitual slave patrolling behavior either gunned down or ran down & captured the self-liberated people who were working at the hospital. Those that were returned to their masters were "…beaten unmercifully…"

You can see a lit candle at the distance of one mile. Forrest's success was the candle in the darkness of the Confederacy in 1863. The news accounts were completely over the top. Forrest was elevated to superstardom. To this day, ordinary skirmishes are extolled as the epitome of military brilliance. This is not to say that Forrest wasn't a world class light cavalry leader. He was a certified genius. However, the fact of the matter is that the CSA doctrine of cavalry raids on Union logistics in the Western Theater was an abject failure.

Link to the photos of Murfreesboro:


Link to John Spence's Journal of the Civil War:


History of the 9th Michigan with Illustratrions. For brevity I have not included Sgt Bennett's excellent history of the 9ths experience of Forrest's raid. This is one of the best regimental histories I know of.

Link:


Note: Obviously I have studied this subject for a considerable period of time. The stage where the events occurred includes my yard.

I have taken the trouble to compose this post because the people whose lives were permanently disturbed by Forrest's attack are seldom if ever a topic of conversation. It is all Forrest did this or that… never is the cost in precious life, family or livelihood his actions inflicted taken into account.

Reading Dr. Eames, Alice Ready, Sgt. Charles Bennett & John Spence's simultaneous accounts give a unique perspective on events. It is rare as hen's teeth to have such perspectives written in clear, articulate & punctuated form.
 
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You make an excellent point. On a long car drive I was able to discuss Forrest's West Tennessee exile with Ed Bearss.

Ed called me his "local guy." When his bus tours came through Middle TN I would ride along to provide up to date information. For example the easy walk on the Stones River Greenway between Bragg's HQ & Fortress Rosecrans.

After a talk at the historically restored Rutherford Co courthouse we had dinner & I picked Ed up in morning for breakfast on our screen porch & a wandering drive to Nashville checking out a bus route.

The night before a group of my self-declared Forrest worshiping friends had asked about the relative effectiveness of the Johnsonville Raid.

When he did not want to offend with his answer, Ed would cock his head, gaze off into a far corner & spout a stream of facts, biographies & distractions that left the questioner's eyes rolling. They received an especially rich data dump.

After we hit the road I asked Ed what his real answer about Forrest in West TN was. His reply was a real eye opener.

The raids on Union supply lines & outposts were a complete waste of resources. Forrest et al simply did not have the resources necessary to break the Union logistical system. At great cost of men & horses, the raiders were inflicting damage that robust US engineering repaired better than before with ease. The doctrine of cavalry raids was costing considerably more than the damage inflicted. The famous West TN raid was a gross misappropriation of a diminishing asset.

As a result of the misguided West TN. Raid Forrest joined Hood with jaded horses, exhausted men & no ammunition. His subsequent defeat at the 3rd Battle of Murfreesboro / Battle of the Cedars is one our Forest worshiping friends "kinda forget about."

The litany of Forrest's West TN campaign includes Brice's Crossroads, a tactical success w/o strategic impact; Tupelo, a loss that deprived Forrest of the force necessary to do more than raid; Johnsonville devoid of strategic impact; ineffective at Spring Hill / Franklin; defeat at the Battle of the Cedars & the utter destruction of his force during the retreat from Nashville.

Ed's discourse completely destroyed my preconceptions. Subsequent study has only reinforced my acceptance of Bearss' insightful analysis.

This has resulted in quite a few "Angry" & "Dislike" reactions here on CWT… the truth hurts sometimes.

Note: Our house is on the ground where Forrest's July 1862 raid on Murfreesboro TN took place. The newly minted general & his defeated opponents shared an after action meal of cornbread & black-eyed peas at Oaklands historic mansion a few blocks up the Maney family's carriage lane.
The Confederacy had a very limited supply of horses. Once Kentucky and Tennessee became unavailable to the Confederacy the situation got worse. There were horses in Texas. But were they truly domesticated? And was there any reliable way to get the horses from Texas to the rest of the Confederacy?
The threat Forrest represented was severe. The US forces spent considerable resources to keep him away from the main logistical connections and create opponents that kept Forrest's command occupied.
But when it was a matter of repairing breaks in the railroad, McCallum planned for it, and there were local inventories of repair equipment at multiple points on the line.
 
To understand the impact of Forrest's1862 raid it is important to understand the context. Fort Donelson, Fort Henry, occupation of: Bowling Green, Columbus KY, Nashville, Clarksville, Memphis, Murfreesboro & all of Middle Tennessee. (+/-) 40% of Johnston's army had been captured or deserted.

In Tennessee the one overwhelming advantage the secessionists had was a supreme predominance of cavalry… in numbers that is. There was little or no military organization. There was a wonderful conglomeration of yahoo slave patrollers that spent all day fussing about & fighting with neighboring groups. In order to bring some order to the ameba-like organizations & impose some adult level authority onto squabbling colonels, Forrest was promoted brigadier general, nanny in chief. (I am not exaggerating)

The fall of Nashville & occupation of Middle Tennessee occurred during the velvet glove phase of the war. Grant, in his memoir, does a good job of explaining that period of time. It was believed that the population in the seceding states had been deluded by hotheads & stampeded into war. Every effort was made to accommodate the civilian population.

The 9th Michigan marched into Murfreesboro via the square to the jaunty music of their excellent band who were playing new German silver instruments. (Link to view out East Main Street:smile:


What the earth shattering appearance of the 9th marching paste the Ready family town house was like is vividly depicted in young Alice Ready's journal:


The view from Alice Ready's bedroom window was of these buildings that still exist.

Link:


From his store, among several properties still owned by the Spence family, John Spence had felt the first wafts of the winds of war. In response he began a journal that he would keep throughout the fell events that followed.

Link:


In 1860 Murfreesboro's six square blocks housed 2,000 souls, half & half free & slave. Immediately, upon the fall of Nashville local slaves self-liberated. The 9th Michigan spread out along the Maney carriage lane as their color line. The old growth trees & the eternal spring made it the best campground the Old Mackerels occupied during the war. Self-liberated people flocked to their camp & were hired to perform camp follower services. This person to person encounter was registered as a seismic change of attitude about the reasons for fighting the war amongst the Michiganders.

In the early hours of July 13th 1862 young Kate Carney was woken by musket fire. From the third floor veranda of her family's enormous home north of the square, she witnessed Forrest's attack.

Link:


A company of the 9th had fortified the Rutherford CO courthouse. The Old Mackerels on the Maney carriage lane rallied in a log house surrounded by a stout log wall. Between them & the stout defenders on the square, many a saddle was emptied.

Link:


In true Forrest style, a callow Minnesota Colonel was tricked into surrendering to an inferior force. The men of the 9th swore great oaths when forced to honor the colonel's cowardly surrender.

View attachment 537417

Forrest & the surrendered colonels shared a meal of cornbread & blackeyed peas around Mrs. Maney's formal dinner table at Oaklands Plantation. The infuriated men of the 9th watched the officers gather before shuffling eastward toward McMinnville & parole.

As John Spence chronicled, for a few days Murfreesboro had a blessed break from both armies. Their idyll became a nostalgic memory when a train bearing troops from Nashville whistled to a stop at the station. Dr Eams, who managed the hospital at the Baptist Union College building, recorded local people coming to him begging for relief. The velvet glove had come off & the fisted iron gauntlet had replaced it.

Link:


Dr Eams documents how Forrest's men reverted to their habitual slave patrolling behavior either gunned down or ran down & captured the self-liberated people who were working at the hospital. Those that were returned to their masters were "…beaten unmercifully…"

You can see a lit candle at the distance of one mile. Forrest's success was the candle in the darkness of the Confederacy in 1863. The news accounts were completely over the top. Forrest was elevated to superstardom. To this day, ordinary skirmishes are extolled as the epitome of military brilliance. This is not to say that Forrest wasn't a world class light cavalry leader. He was a certified genius. However, the fact of the matter is that the CSA doctrine of cavalry raids on Union logistics in the Western Theater was an abject failure.

Link to the photos of Murfreesboro:


Link to John Spence's Journal of the Civil War:


History of the 9th Michigan with Illustratrions. For brevity I have not included Sgt Bennett's excellent history of the 9ths experience of Forrest's raid. This is one of the best regimental histories I know of.

Link:


Note: Obviously I have studied this subject for a considerable period of time. The stage where the events occurred includes my yard.

I have taken the trouble to compose this post because the people whose lives were permanently disturbed by Forrest's attack are seldom if ever a topic of conversation. It is all Forrest did this or that… never is the cost in precious life, family or livelihood his actions inflicted taken into account.

Reading Dr. Eames, Alice Ready, Sgt. Charles Bennett & John Spence's simultaneous accounts give a unique perspective on events. It is rare as hen's teeth to have such perspectives written in clear, articulate & punctuated form.
One way to promote peaceful co-existence is for an army to buy commissary supplies locally and pay with recognizable currency.
 
Forrest's tactics were sound. But in the end it became a numbers game. Sheridan and Wilson employed similar tactics, but with an advantage in numbers and with more heavily armed troopers.
 
@Rhea Cole I believe Murfreesboro was part of Forrest's Middle Tennessee raid; I was referring more to the West Tennessee raid (12/62-1/63) in which his goal was to tear up the Mobile/OH Railroad around Jackson, TN. This would be the raid including Parker's Crossroads and "Charge both ways!" -- IMHO, it was successful as a recruiting mission but had the same amount of (limited) success as did Frank Armstrong's Middle Tennessee raid in the same year, and MUCH less success than John Hunt Morgan's Kentucky raid in the same timeframe.
 
@Rhea Cole I believe Murfreesboro was part of Forrest's Middle Tennessee raid; I was referring more to the West Tennessee raid (12/62-1/63) in which his goal was to tear up the Mobile/OH Railroad around Jackson, TN. This would be the raid including Parker's Crossroads and "Charge both ways!" -- IMHO, it was successful as a recruiting mission but had the same amount of (limited) success as did Frank Armstrong's Middle Tennessee raid in the same year, and MUCH less success than John Hunt Morgan's Kentucky raid in the same timeframe.

The point of the Murfreesboro Raid detail is to put a face to the people who woke up to find Forrest et al charging across their front yard. If you read the citations of a very complex mix of people & points of view, it will give you an idea of what a 12 hour occupation by Forrest inflicted on the local people.

In October 1862 both Rosecrans & Bragg arrived in Middle Tennessee. Depending on Wheeler for intel, Bragg had no clew what was happening in Nashville. He even had to order a recon in force by Forrest to determine if Rosecrans was still occupying the city. The sheer incompetence that left Bragg in the dark beggars belief.

Bragg was convinced that Rosecrans & the 14th Army Corps were on the brink of starvation. Morgan et al claimed to have completely severed Nashville from the transshipment center at Louisville. Spectacularly, Morgan had roared into Elizabethton & burnt the massive trestle, completely cutting the existential Louisville & Nashville RR. He crowed like a rooster to Bragg & was lionized by adoring newspaper accounts of his prowess. Alice Ready describes Morgan arriving in the square where his men serenaded her elder sister with a rousing rendition of "Ride, Boys, Ride!" Totally swept away, Matty, the most beautiful & accomplished belle of the area agreed to be wed. After an all too short honeymoon at the family's Readyville mansion, Morgan rode north & crossed the Cumberland River.

Forrest gathered his force & crossed the Tennessee River in the West. According to the scouting reports, all it was going to take to finish off the 14th Corps was one more push by Morgan & Forrest to sever the logistics back to Louisville.

On Mrs Ready's dining room table, General Bragg was arranging & rearranging little bits of paper representing the position of regiments in the triumphant march into Nashville… truth really is stranger than fiction.

In Nashville, unlike Bragg, Rosecrans had detailed highly accurate intel on the disposition of the Army of Tennessee. He knew that Jefferson Davis, who had stayed a few blocks north of were I now sit, had ordered the excellent general Carter Stephens &10,000 men to Vicksburg.

On Christmas night, far from starving, the 14th Army Corps was marshaled on the south side of the Cumberland. All over the city, the men feasted on the luxuries of the season. Logicians celebrated surrounded by 60 days rations for men & animals. After dinner with his senior officers, Rosecrans shared the intel that showed exactly where & when Morgan / Forrest had crossed the rivers, effectively riding themselves completely out of communication with Bragg at Murfreesboro. The cherry on the Christmas pudding was the firm intel locating Carter Stephens & his 10,000 entrained irretrievably somewhere toward Mississippi.

The self inflicted disaster of ordering the majority of his cavalry & Davis had sent off one of his best commanders & 10,000 men to Vicksburg in conjunction with the inept recon & Bragg's delusional belief in the inevitable retreat by the starving 14th Corps… we know how that worked out.

Sad to say, Forrest's December 1862 raid into West Tennessee was a strategic disaster of the first order. Absolutely nothing that either Morgan or Forrest did had any effect whatsoever on the Battle of Stones River, where the real war was taking place.

Wheeler, who commanded the AoTN cavalry, foolishly rode what was left of the cavalry on a raid into Rosecrans' rear. Virtually the entire mounted force, the one true advantage Bragg had, might as well have been somewhere in Africa for all the good it did.

At a critical moment, a determined force of Union cavalry held off a ruminant of Wheeler's force & escorted a reserve ammunition train into Thomas' line exactly where it was needed most. The absence of Forrest, Morgan & Wheeler contributed directly to the defeat of Bragg's attempt to capture the Nashville Pike & N&CRR. That was a strategic hammer blow that directly led to the loss of Chattanooga.

I have never studied either Forrest or Morgan's December raids. There really is no point.

Note: I have been a living history volunteer at Stones River for 30 years.
 
One way to promote peaceful co-existence is for an army to buy commissary supplies locally and pay with recognizable currency.

That is exactly what Wellington did in Spain & France. His foragers paid with British coin. Not only was that good policy, it advertised to everyone that he was not there for repine. That was in stark contrast to the French.

Taking a page from Shakespeare's Henry V, Wellington's "proctors" carried portable triangular supports for the summery execution of looters.
 
To understand the impact of Forrest's1862 raid it is important to understand the context. Fort Donelson, Fort Henry, occupation of: Bowling Green, Columbus KY, Nashville, Clarksville, Memphis, Murfreesboro & all of Middle Tennessee. (+/-) 40% of Johnston's army had been captured or deserted.

In Tennessee the one overwhelming advantage the secessionists had was a supreme predominance of cavalry… in numbers that is. There was little or no military organization. There was a wonderful conglomeration of yahoo slave patrollers that spent all day fussing about & fighting with neighboring groups. In order to bring some order to the ameba-like organizations & impose some adult level authority onto squabbling colonels, Forrest was promoted brigadier general, nanny in chief. (I am not exaggerating)

The fall of Nashville & occupation of Middle Tennessee occurred during the velvet glove phase of the war. Grant, in his memoir, does a good job of explaining that period of time. It was believed that the population in the seceding states had been deluded by hotheads & stampeded into war. Every effort was made to accommodate the civilian population.

The 9th Michigan marched into Murfreesboro via the square to the jaunty music of their excellent band who were playing new German silver instruments. (Link to view out East Main Street:smile:


What the earth shattering appearance of the 9th marching paste the Ready family town house was like is vividly depicted in young Alice Ready's journal:


The view from Alice Ready's bedroom window was of these buildings that still exist.

Link:


From his store, among several properties still owned by the Spence family, John Spence had felt the first wafts of the winds of war. In response he began a journal that he would keep throughout the fell events that followed.

Link:


In 1860 Murfreesboro's six square blocks housed 2,000 souls, half & half free & slave. Immediately, upon the fall of Nashville local slaves self-liberated. The 9th Michigan spread out along the Maney carriage lane as their color line. The old growth trees & the eternal spring made it the best campground the Old Mackerels occupied during the war. Self-liberated people flocked to their camp & were hired to perform camp follower services. This person to person encounter was registered as a seismic change of attitude about the reasons for fighting the war amongst the Michiganders.

In the early hours of July 13th 1862 young Kate Carney was woken by musket fire. From the third floor veranda of her family's enormous home north of the square, she witnessed Forrest's attack.

Link:


A company of the 9th had fortified the Rutherford CO courthouse. The Old Mackerels on the Maney carriage lane rallied in a log house surrounded by a stout log wall. Between them & the stout defenders on the square, many a saddle was emptied.

Link:


In true Forrest style, a callow Minnesota Colonel was tricked into surrendering to an inferior force. The men of the 9th swore great oaths when forced to honor the colonel's cowardly surrender.

View attachment 537417

Forrest & the surrendered colonels shared a meal of cornbread & blackeyed peas around Mrs. Maney's formal dinner table at Oaklands Plantation. The infuriated men of the 9th watched the officers gather before shuffling eastward toward McMinnville & parole.

As John Spence chronicled, for a few days Murfreesboro had a blessed break from both armies. Their idyll became a nostalgic memory when a train bearing troops from Nashville whistled to a stop at the station. Dr Eams, who managed the hospital at the Baptist Union College building, recorded local people coming to him begging for relief. The velvet glove had come off & the fisted iron gauntlet had replaced it.

Link:


Dr Eams documents how Forrest's men reverted to their habitual slave patrolling behavior either gunned down or ran down & captured the self-liberated people who were working at the hospital. Those that were returned to their masters were "…beaten unmercifully…"

You can see a lit candle at the distance of one mile. Forrest's success was the candle in the darkness of the Confederacy in 1863. The news accounts were completely over the top. Forrest was elevated to superstardom. To this day, ordinary skirmishes are extolled as the epitome of military brilliance. This is not to say that Forrest wasn't a world class light cavalry leader. He was a certified genius. However, the fact of the matter is that the CSA doctrine of cavalry raids on Union logistics in the Western Theater was an abject failure.

Link to the photos of Murfreesboro:


Link to John Spence's Journal of the Civil War:


History of the 9th Michigan with Illustratrions. For brevity I have not included Sgt Bennett's excellent history of the 9ths experience of Forrest's raid. This is one of the best regimental histories I know of.

Link:


Note: Obviously I have studied this subject for a considerable period of time. The stage where the events occurred includes my yard.

I have taken the trouble to compose this post because the people whose lives were permanently disturbed by Forrest's attack are seldom if ever a topic of conversation. It is all Forrest did this or that… never is the cost in precious life, family or livelihood his actions inflicted taken into account.

Reading Dr. Eames, Alice Ready, Sgt. Charles Bennett & John Spence's simultaneous accounts give a unique perspective on events. It is rare as hen's teeth to have such perspectives written in clear, articulate & punctuated form.
If there was such a thing, this would be a frontrunner for CWT post of the year. Thank you so much @Rhea Cole I have permanently bookmarked this.
 
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If there was such a thing, this would be a frontrunner for CWT post of the year. Thank yoy so much @Rhea Cole I have permanently bookmarked this.

I am glad to be of service. When I put this together there was no clicking to access UNC library. It is enlightening to realize that the extensive entries into journals thin out to near nothing as time went on. It was all very horrible for a long, long time.

I am not aware of another collection where it is possible to lay very different POV's of the same incident side by side like this.

Note: Apart from a court marshal & one very cryptic entry I am not aware of any contemporary personal accounts by Forrest's men.
 
I wish someone would do the research to determine how many casualties were inflicted by Forrest's efforts, how many pieces of artillery he captured, how many wagons, horses, and mules he had to turn over to southern quartermasters. Keep something in mind, many of Forrest's raids took place with a specific goal. To acquire from the yankees weapons, horses, and supplies that the south could not supply. How many times did he raid west Tennesee just to equip and build from scratch his units. He was not just trying to disrupt union logistics but secure the same to equip his men. Look at what Wilson did with what amounted to being a concentrated invaision of Alabama near the end of the war. It was like a armor attack in later days. Give Forrest 10,000 mounted men along with sufficent artillery who knows what he could have done.
 
I wish someone would do the research to determine how many casualties were inflicted by Forrest's efforts, how many pieces of artillery he captured, how many wagons, horses, and mules he had to turn over to southern quartermasters. Keep something in mind, many of Forrest's raids took place with a specific goal. To acquire from the yankees weapons, horses, and supplies that the south could not supply. How many times did he raid west Tennesee just to equip and build from scratch his units. He was not just trying to disrupt union logistics but secure the same to equip his men. Look at what Wilson did with what amounted to being a concentrated invaision of Alabama near the end of the war. It was like a armor attack in later days. Give Forrest 10,000 mounted men along with sufficent artillery who knows what he could have done.

You are in luck. There have been many sophisticated studies that did cost benefit analyses of the Western CSA doctrine of cavalry raids interdiction. The universal conclusion is not one my Forest worshiper friends ( their terminology ) find easy to swallow.

General Stanley said that the cavalry wears out horses like the infantry wears out shoes.

Morgan's Ohio Raid began with (+/-) 2,500 men riding the best horses Morgan could find. @ $150 / horse that was a $375,000 dead loss to the CSA. ( $ 17,975,000 on 2025 dollars. )

Forest's capture of Straight's raiders cost (+/-) 500 horses too broken down or dead. @ $150 / horse = $ 75,000 ( $ 3,375,00 in 2024 dollars. )

Wheeler began his October 1863 raid with 5,000 of the best horses the Army of Tennessee had left. He crossed the Tennessee River with <800 serviceable horses, re: IG report. 4,200 / $150 =28.00/$ $ 609,000 ( $ 27,406,000 in 2025 dollars )

Analysts far more sophisticated than I am have crunched these numbers. The conclusion is a stark one. The doctrine of cavalry raids as a means to break the Army of the Cumberland's grip on the N&CRR was a not only a military failure, it was a resource & financial debicle.
 
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You are in luck. There have been many sophisticated studies that did cost ben fit analyses of the Western CSA doctrine of cavalry raids interdiction. The universal conclusion is not one my Forest worshiper friends ( their terminology ) find easy to swallow.

General Stanley said that the cavalry wears out horses like the infantry wears out shoes.

Morgan's Ohio Raid began with (+/-) 2,500 men riding the best horses Morgan could find. @ $150 / horse that was a $375,000 dead loss to the CSA. ( $ 17,975,000 on 2025 dollars.

Forest's capture of Straight's raiders cost (+/-) 500 horses too broken down or dead. @ $150 / horse = $ 75,000 ( $ 3,375,00 in 2024 dollars. )

Wheeler began his October 1863 raid with 5,000 of the best horses the Army of Tennessee had left. He crossed the Tennessee River with <800 serviceable horses, re: IG report. 4,200 / $150 =28.00/$ $ 609,000 ( $ 27,406,000 in 2025 dollars )

Analysts far more sophisticated than I am have crunched these numbers. The conclusion is a stark one. The doctrine of cavalry raids as a means to break the Army of the Cumberland's grip on the N&CRR was a not only a military failure, it was a resource & financial debicle.
I am not a horse expert. But logic suggests that a working horse requires substantial amounts of grain and cured hay. A horse cannot carry a trooper and forage for itself simultaneously. Something gotta give.
 
The US cavalry had the same type of problems, but it had the money, and the railroads to get the grain and hay to where it was needed. The US forces also developed a system of recovery stables to put horses and mules back into shape.
 
The US cavalry had the same type of problems, but it had the money, and the railroads to get the grain and hay to where it was needed. The US forces also developed a system of recovery stables to put horses and mules back into shape.

As the Army of the Cumberland repaired the N&CRR from Murfreesboro onward Rosecrans ordered that the southbound freights be laden with equine feed. Ammunition & rations were carried southward with equine motive power. At 14 pounds of grain & 12 pounds of the equine ration was an absolute. Either it was issued or, as the Army of Tennessee experienced demonstrates, the motive power collapses.
 
As the Army of the Cumberland repaired the N&CRR from Murfreesboro onward Rosecrans ordered that the southbound freights be laden with equine feed. Ammunition & rations were carried southward with equine motive power. At 14 pounds of grain & 12 pounds of the equine ration was an absolute. Either it was issued or, as the Army of Tennessee experienced demonstrates, the motive power collapses.
The horses and mules starve first.
 
The horses and mules starve first.

What other general in the civil war, or any other, who had become the Western Theater commander, would have ridden the 60 miles of dreadful road between Bridgeport & Chattanooga than Grant? McClellan & the A of the P cohort would have had their brains squirting out their ears at the very suggestion.
 
@Rhea Cole Willing to take those dislikes as well, since I would tend to agree. I've read the OR reports of Forrest demolishing the Middle/West Tennessee outposts, and it's just...what's the point? Sure, you can take a company or five here or there, but then they stick in a new company and they repair the railroads just as fast.

I think many people forget that Tupelo could have easily been avoided if Forrest didn't engage at all (especially not dismounted). AJ Smith's corps was starving when they fought, and they only had enough food for the return trip. Another day down so deep in Mississippi and they would have left for lack of supplies.

(As an aside, I've noticed that Confederate cavalry commanders ultimately failed at fighting on foot: Stuart at Dranesville, Wheeler at Dover, Price at Helena, and of course, Forrest at Tupelo.)

If I may, what's your opinion of Forrest's 1862 West Tennessee raid? I'd say it was a bit different since the Union hadn't gotten around to establishing blockhouses and outposts yet...
Point taken however Tupelo was not Forrest's mistake. Stephen D. Lee was actually in command and it was his idea. But the real problem was that Crossland's Kentucky brigade jump off before it was suppose to going forward singulary and was shot to pieces.
 
The US cavalry had the same type of problems, but it had the money, and the railroads to get the grain and hay to where it was needed. The US forces also developed a system of recovery stables to put horses and mules back into shape.
The one thing the AoP learned and had the resources to work with was that they could give their mounts a R &R. They set up a facility where horses could be sent to rest and refit. There are photos of the post in Miller's Photo collection. It is estimated that more than one million animals died during the war from various reasons.
 

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