Should Forrest have been given independent command earlier?

[Wizard of Cozz]

So I've been reading Chickamauga Campaign by David Powell. I'm about halfway through. It's been a very good book. What's been interesting is how the Confederates have this propensity of cavalry and yet it really doesn't do much for them. The problem is, is that Wheeler and Forrest both seem more inclined to raid behind enemy lines then to focus on scouting. I don't know as much about Wheeler, I know he has a pretty mixed record, at times he's solid other times not so much, but Forrest did quite well in Mississippi when basically let loose to do as he pleases. I'm wondering if that should have happened earlier. Basically Let transfer Forrest to Mississippi sometime after Stones River. Let him organize his mississippi cavalry brigades earlier and turn him loose on the Union in that area. Then organize all the cavalry under one commander in the AoT, I assume that would still be Wheeler, though not sure he was ever up to the task of being a Cavalry Corps commander, seemed much better in division command. Not sure who the solution is for the South in that area. That was the issue is that none of the corps commanders for the AoT in any of the arms ever really lived up to the job, outside of maybe A.P. Stewart when he gets it in 1864.

 

[Stryker65]

There wasn't as much of a need for Confederate cavalry in Mississippi before the start of the Vicksburg campaign, since after the first campaign (Chickasaw Bluffs) the Union forces just went back to Memphis.

Additionally, many of the Mississippi units weren't even formed yet, not to mention the thirteen Tennessee regiments Forrest organized. One of the main reasons that Forrest was able to raise these regiments was the dispersal of troops from the main cities. Many of his regiments came from West Tennessee; this was because West Tennessee had been abandoned by the AotT in favor of Vicksburg and then Chattanooga. Forrest's raids into Middle Tennessee were so successful because, similarly, Middle Tennessee had been abandoned by the AotC in favor of southeast Tennessee and northern Georgia.

 

[Wizard of Cozz]

Then maybe Mississippi would not be his destination but let loose as a Raider into West Tennesse, or maybe that's not feasible I don't know. Instead of being tied to scouting for Bragg, which he didn't do a very good job of.

 

[Stryker65]

Then maybe Mississippi would not be his destination but let loose as a Raider into West Tennesse, or maybe that's not feasible I don't know. Instead of being tied to scouting for Bragg, which he didn't do a very good job of.

I think the best time would be after the Union's capture of Chattanooga (before Chickamauga). By this time, West Tennessee is completely devoid of troops (the AotC being in Chattanooga and the AotT around Vicksburg). Chalmers' division is raiding on the Coldwater (part of the Union's decision to abandon Corinth), in North Mississippi, and could provide assistance as well.

For reference, the change would be roughly 4-5 months before Forrest's IRL transfer.

 

[uaskme]

Bragg actually moved NBF and Van Dorn west to support in MS and West TN. This was after Stones River, run up to the Tullahoma Campaign. After the Tullahoma campaign Bragg used Calvary to picket a 150 mile front. Wheeler failed to probe and report in his section so Bragg will move NBF south to do it. Battle of Chickamauga Wheeler is on the Confederate left, Forrest on the Right. Forrest fought dismounted. Cleuburn says this is the first time he had seen dead Calvary. First time Forrest had commanded a Corps. Limited experience hurt him. Powell criticized both which they deserve. After Chickamauga Forrest gets his Butt hurt, demands independent command. Think he would have been of more value staying with the AOT.

Federals misused Calvary during the run up to Chickamauga. Sent them toward Roam. Used Calvary to protect their hospitals on their right flank. Federal Calvary protect their supply line which was 50 miles in their rear. Battle of Chattanooga they patched together a Brigade from the rear under Long. Long did a raid to block Longstreet from Bragg. Bragg had sent most of his Calvary to Knoxville area. Had only scattered pickets on his flanks. So, battle of Chattanooga neither side used Calvary decisively.

 

[Nathan Stuart]

Think he would have been of more value staying with the AOT.

Realize it's always easier to be wiser in hindsight. But thought Forrest demonstrated that his forte was as a mounted raider applying 'hit and run' tactics with his own trained troopers in an independent command. He needed to operate carte blanche to be at his most effective.

Wonder how Forrest would have fared if he had remained attached to the AoT for a sustained period under the direct control of Bragg. In such a scenario, believe Forrest's repeated blow-ups/confrontational disagreements with Bragg would inevitably over time have led to a breakdown in their working command relationship and undermined the effectiveness of the AoT as a fighting force. (In this sense of harmonious command relations, thought Wheeler was a more suitable choice for cavalry leader in Bragg's army, because the former was an acolyte of the latter).

 

[Rhea Cole]

I am not being rude, but have any of you ever been to West Tennessee?

West Tennessee is bordered by the Tennessee & Mississippi Rivers. Notice that on the 1860 slave census map that there are counties with very few slaves. In fact, none of the counties are the solid black indicating plantations. Much of the small population were "tories" hostile to secession.

1860's West Tennessee, LOC

Notice how many towns & cities, roads & toll pikes there are. There are none between the KY border & Memphis. And n fact, the only transportation assets are the rivers.

This map of CSA rail roads clearly shows that the rail network in West Tennessee essentially went nowhere.

As Jefferson Davis stated, sending Forrest to West Tennessee was a waste of a one of the war's true geniuses. Independent command or not, West Tennessee was a backwater of little to no strategic value.

Forrest's great triumph at Johnsonville occurred when Thomas had ordered all the scattered detachments withdrawn to Nashville. That was what Schofield was doing, escorting them north to Nashville.

There was nothing of strategic importance that justified exiling Forrest to West Tennessee. Only Bragg could have wasted his vast talents at that time or earlier.

 

[Stryker65]

As Jefferson Davis stated, sending Forrest to West Tennessee was a waste of a one of the war's true geniuses. Independent command or not, West Tennessee was a backwater of little to no strategic value.

Forrest's great triumph at Johnsonville occurred when Thomas had ordered all the scattered detachments withdrawn to Nashville. That was what Schofield was doing, escorting them north to Nashville.

There was nothing of strategic importance that justified exiling Forrest to West Tennessee. Only Bragg could have wasted his vast talents at that time or earlier.

IIRC, part of Forrest's mission in West Tennessee was to organize the hundreds of independent cavalry and guerrilla units in the region, which had for two years been haphazardly organizing with mixed results under Generals Gideon Pillow and Robert V. Richardson. Indeed, most of Forrest's main command came from West Tennessee, these being the 12th (Green's), 14th (Neely's), 15th (Stewart's), 16th (Logwood's), 17th (Marshall's), 18th (Newsom's), 20th (Russell's), 21st (Carter's), 21st (Wilson's), 22nd (Barteau's), 22nd (Nixon's), and 28th (Hays') Tennessee cavalry regiments.

 

[danny]

Forrest's command often operated as [sort of] mounted infantry; Wheeler's as cavalry. Might not have meshed in a combined force.

Forrest had previously shown his displeasure with Wheeler when he served under his command in early 1863; declaring he would never again serve under him.

 

[Stryker65]

Forrest had previously shown his displeasure with Wheeler when he served under his command in early 1863; declaring he would never again serve under him.

That would have been at the battle of Dover, TN, in which four cavalry divisions under Wheeler (two of which were under Forrest) attacked the city of Dover, garrisoned by just one infantry regiment, and were repulsed with heavy casualties.

 

[wausaubob]

Nathan Bedford Forrest was very fortunate. Many of the Confederate cavalry raiders were shot and killed. And it did not matter whether they fought as uniformed regulars, or as irregular forces in civilian dress.

 

[Stryker65]

Nathan Bedford Forrest was very fortunate. Many of the Confederate cavalry raiders were shot and killed. And it did not matter whether they fought as uniformed regulars, or as irregular forces in civilian dress.

Also unlucky. He was probably wounded in hand-to-hand combat more times than any other general in the war.

 

[danny]

That would have been at the battle of Dover, TN, in which four cavalry divisions under Wheeler (two of which were under Forrest) attacked the city of Dover, garrisoned by just one infantry regiment, and were repulsed with heavy casualties.

Forrest had tried to get Wheeler to call off the attack

 

[Rhea Cole]

Also unlucky. He was probably wounded in hand-to-hand combat more times than any other general in the war.

Oh so true. No general in the Civil War engaged in mortal combat with subordinates or killed as many of their own men mano-a-mano as Forrest did.

 

[BillO]

In hindsight Forrest and Taylor should have been given overall command in the west. Taylor being senior.
IMO they might have been another match made in heaven, like Lee and Jackson

 

[Wizard of Cozz]

Taylor doesn't make LtG until April 1864. There is just little chance he can be made commander in the west as young as he was. He though could of been made a corps commander earlier. His plan to siege New Orleans should of been undertaken instead of him being overruled by Smith. If he takes NO and stops Banks siege of Port Hudsln. Their is a chance he makes LtG in fall of 1863. As for Forrest he is perfect for operations in secondary fronts. IMO. He'd have been an interesting choice to run dept of E Tennesse. See if he could have kept Burnside out of Knoxville longer than historically.

 

[SWS]

It's a shame Taylor's trans-Chattahoochee department contained such able lieutenants as Forrest, Maury, Gardner, Roddey, quartermaster Maj. George Whitfield, superintendent Fleming of the Mobile and Ohio, and others, who were forced to employ such few resources, especially in terms of men and finances. They made quite a team by the standards of the Confederate West.

 

[wausaubob]

Imitation may be the sincerest form of flattery. Grant and Sheridan adapted Forrest's raiding style and his mounted infantry tactics. The same was probably true of Wilder. General Sherman wanted Forrest hunted down and killed, but only during the war. After the war I think Sherman warned Forrest that if Forrest continued to be active in the KKK, Sherman would have to make an example out of Forrest and claim he was violating his parole.
Forrest achieved good results in his raids. But I wonder about the rate at which he was consuming precious equestrian resources. I also wonder if he had adequate mules, or as an alternative to a real wagon train his men were eating up the countryside. Forrest is not known for killing civilians, and he avoided crossing the Ohio River and raiding the civilian populations of Indiana and Ohio. Although he may have been wounded many times, his good decision making probably built a reputation as a formidable regular officer entitled to the benefit of the rules of war. '

 

[archieclement]

I've always found it odd he was promoted as much he was......

Like I see rise to brigade commander.......but that he increasingly demonstrates an inability to function within a chain of command....and still is promoted is curious.

Now if wanted to use him as a independent raider just to get him away from the army.......wouldn't an independent brigade been sufficient to done so?

 

[Rhea Cole]

Imitation may be the sincerest form of flattery. Grant and Sheridan adapted Forrest's raiding style and his mounted infantry tactics. The same was probably true of Wilder. General Sherman wanted Forrest hunted down and killed, but only during the war. After the war I think Sherman warned Forrest that if Forrest continued to be active in the KKK, Sherman would have to make an example out of Forrest and claim he was violating his parole.
Forrest achieved good results in his raids. But I wonder about the rate at which he was consuming precious equestrian resources. I also wonder if he had adequate mules, or as an alternative to a real wagon train his men were eating up the countryside. Forrest is not known for killing civilians, and he avoided crossing the Ohio River and raiding the civilian populations of Indiana and Ohio. Although he may have been wounded many times, his good decision making probably built a reputation as a formidable regular officer entitled to the benefit of the rules of war. '

You make an excellent point. On a long car drive I was able to discuss Forrest's West Tennessee exile with Ed Bearss.

Ed called me his "local guy." When his bus tours came through Middle TN I would ride along to provide up to date information. For example the easy walk on the Stones River Greenway between Bragg's HQ & Fortress Rosecrans.

After a talk at the historically restored Rutherford Co courthouse we had dinner & I picked Ed up in morning for breakfast on our screen porch & a wandering drive to Nashville checking out a bus route.

The night before a group of my self-declared Forrest worshiping friends had asked about the relative effectiveness of the Johnsonville Raid.

When he did not want to offend with his answer, Ed would cock his head, gaze off into a far corner & spout a stream of facts, biographies & distractions that left the questioner's eyes rolling. They received an especially rich data dump.

After we hit the road I asked Ed what his real answer about Forrest in West TN was. His reply was a real eye opener.

The raids on Union supply lines & outposts were a complete waste of resources. Forrest et al simply did not have the resources necessary to break the Union logistical system. At great cost of men & horses, the raiders were inflicting damage that robust US engineering repaired better than before with ease. The doctrine of cavalry raids was costing considerably more than the damage inflicted. The famous West TN raid was a gross misappropriation of a diminishing asset.

As a result of the misguided West TN. Raid Forrest joined Hood with jaded horses, exhausted men & no ammunition. His subsequent defeat at the 3rd Battle of Murfreesboro / Battle of the Cedars is one our Forest worshiping friends "kinda forget about."

The litany of Forrest's West TN campaign includes Brice's Crossroads, a tactical success w/o strategic impact; Tupelo, a loss that deprived Forrest of the force necessary to do more than raid; Johnsonville devoid of strategic impact; ineffective at Spring Hill / Franklin; defeat at the Battle of the Cedars & the utter destruction of his force during the retreat from Nashville.

Ed's discourse completely destroyed my preconceptions. Subsequent study has only reinforced my acceptance of Bearss' insightful analysis.

This has resulted in quite a few "Angry" & "Dislike" reactions here on CWT… the truth hurts sometimes.

Note: Our house is on the ground where Forrest's July 1862 raid on Murfreesboro TN took place. The newly minted general & his defeated opponents shared an after action meal of cornbread & black-eyed peas at Oaklands historic mansion a few blocks up the Maney family's carriage lane.