Moe Daoust
Corporal
- Joined
- Jun 11, 2018
The following is from something I'm working on regarding Burnside at Antietam. I'd greatly appreciate any insights or other input other members may have on the subject.
It is a commonly known fact that Burnside and McClellan were at odds since the Battle of South Mountain. Even as recently as the morning of the 17th, McClellan had officially chastised his long-time friend for his repeated failure to comply with various orders. On the 15th, their relationship was further strained when McClellan issued the following directive, “The operation of the Special Orders of yesterday's date, assigning General Burnside to the command of the right wing, owing to the necessary separation of the Third [First] Corps, is temporarily suspended. General Hooker will report direct to these headquarters.”
The Ninth Corps had only just officially been formed on July 22nd, with Burnside at its head. Throughout the course of the next couple of months, the new Corps commander would be tasked with a series of temporary assignments, including that of commander of the right wing at the outset of the Antietam Campaign. Consequently, it became necessary to appoint Jesse Reno and then, following the latter’s death, Jacob Cox to the temporary command of the Ninth. It stands to reason that upon receipt of McClellan’s order suspending the wing, Burnside’s responsibilities should have automatically reverted to that of commander of the Ninth Corps.
As it was, Burnside had shown little initiative over recent days but he would show even less on the morning of the 17th. Apparently convinced that taking personal charge of his Ninth Corps would be tantamount to accepting a perceived slight from McClellan, Burnside insisted that Cox remain in temporary command. In a petulant display, he resorted to following McClellan’s orders to the letter, doing no more or arbitrarily forwarding them on to Cox. Already uncomfortable in his interim role and having no latitude, Cox could do little but execute the various orders reaching him from Burnside, or from McClellan via Burnside.
“It was an awkward diffusion of command responsibility, made all the worse by McClellan’s failure to smooth his old friend’s ruffled feathers or to clarify just what was expected of him in the coming fight,” writes Stephen W. Sears. At such an exceedingly critical juncture in the Maryland Campaign, it’s certain that McClellan would have had more important things to do than spend his time smoothing Burnside’s or any one else’s ruffled feathers. These were not children that McClellan was dealing with. They were responsible military men who were about to enter into one of the greatest battles of the entire war, on whose result the fate of the nation hinged.
It must also be wondered what it was that needed clarifying. As already mentioned above, upon the suspension of the right wing, Burnside’s function should have automatically reverted to that of commander of the Ninth Corp. This should have gone without saying (Cox even urged him to do so.) As such McClellan would have expected his "old friend" to perform his duties as corps commander to the best of his abilities and to follow any and all orders as were sent to him. What else was there to clarify? If Burnside had any concerns regarding his role, following the temporary suspension of the wing, he should have communicated these to McClellan. He did not.
It’s difficult to imagine how McClellan can, in any way, be blamed for the “awkward diffusion of command responsibility” that existed on the 17th. Burnside had created it and Burnside alone was responsible.
It is a commonly known fact that Burnside and McClellan were at odds since the Battle of South Mountain. Even as recently as the morning of the 17th, McClellan had officially chastised his long-time friend for his repeated failure to comply with various orders. On the 15th, their relationship was further strained when McClellan issued the following directive, “The operation of the Special Orders of yesterday's date, assigning General Burnside to the command of the right wing, owing to the necessary separation of the Third [First] Corps, is temporarily suspended. General Hooker will report direct to these headquarters.”
The Ninth Corps had only just officially been formed on July 22nd, with Burnside at its head. Throughout the course of the next couple of months, the new Corps commander would be tasked with a series of temporary assignments, including that of commander of the right wing at the outset of the Antietam Campaign. Consequently, it became necessary to appoint Jesse Reno and then, following the latter’s death, Jacob Cox to the temporary command of the Ninth. It stands to reason that upon receipt of McClellan’s order suspending the wing, Burnside’s responsibilities should have automatically reverted to that of commander of the Ninth Corps.
As it was, Burnside had shown little initiative over recent days but he would show even less on the morning of the 17th. Apparently convinced that taking personal charge of his Ninth Corps would be tantamount to accepting a perceived slight from McClellan, Burnside insisted that Cox remain in temporary command. In a petulant display, he resorted to following McClellan’s orders to the letter, doing no more or arbitrarily forwarding them on to Cox. Already uncomfortable in his interim role and having no latitude, Cox could do little but execute the various orders reaching him from Burnside, or from McClellan via Burnside.
“It was an awkward diffusion of command responsibility, made all the worse by McClellan’s failure to smooth his old friend’s ruffled feathers or to clarify just what was expected of him in the coming fight,” writes Stephen W. Sears. At such an exceedingly critical juncture in the Maryland Campaign, it’s certain that McClellan would have had more important things to do than spend his time smoothing Burnside’s or any one else’s ruffled feathers. These were not children that McClellan was dealing with. They were responsible military men who were about to enter into one of the greatest battles of the entire war, on whose result the fate of the nation hinged.
It must also be wondered what it was that needed clarifying. As already mentioned above, upon the suspension of the right wing, Burnside’s function should have automatically reverted to that of commander of the Ninth Corp. This should have gone without saying (Cox even urged him to do so.) As such McClellan would have expected his "old friend" to perform his duties as corps commander to the best of his abilities and to follow any and all orders as were sent to him. What else was there to clarify? If Burnside had any concerns regarding his role, following the temporary suspension of the wing, he should have communicated these to McClellan. He did not.
It’s difficult to imagine how McClellan can, in any way, be blamed for the “awkward diffusion of command responsibility” that existed on the 17th. Burnside had created it and Burnside alone was responsible.
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