Seeking input

[Saphroneth]

Do we know exactly what orderes Ferrero and Gerhardt were following? Burnside also got the 7 AM order to get his troops into position to attack, perhaps Gerhardt and Ferrero's subsequent movements were associated with that. In the case of those two, the 9 AM orders they received doesn't seem to be an attack order, but just an order to move up.

As noted, we know the actual course of events and that ca. 9AM was when Burnside issued the first actual attack order. If Burnside really had only issued an order to one regiment to attack and no others to any other unit as part of his "9AM sequence", then his confusion is understandable but his negligence is enormous; otherwise, he issued orders to those other units.

I would also disagree with your characterization of his orders to Franklin. Although they weren't exactly models of technical clarity, they evidence indicates that Burnside did want Franklin to make a full attack.

Burnside's order to Franklin stated that he wanted Franklin to make an attack with "a division, at least"; Franklin was in command of more than half a dozen divisions.

 

[Saphroneth]

And it was hardly Burnsides fault that the IX corps wasn't able to move out quickly from Fox's gap. Not only were his troops exhausted from the previous days fighting, but according to Cox no order to advance was received until noon on the 15th.

As we've just discussed, since the order was issued at 9AM then either something utterly bizarre happened with the movement of messengers or it is Burnside's fault, in that he either failed to pass on the order or was away from his CP so could not recieve it.

 

[Old Burn]

As we've just discussed, since the order was issued at 9AM then either something utterly bizarre happened with the movement of messengers or it is Burnside's fault, in that he either failed to pass on the order or was away from his CP so could not recieve it.

And as I feel I've made clear; I'm inclined to believe something bizarre happened with the messenger, or that Mclellan delayed in sending the order to advance. I also find it curious that Mclellan didn't bring up Burnsides apparent failure to carry out this order when they met in person on the evening of the 15th, according to Cox the meeting between the two was very affable.

 

[Saphroneth]

And as I feel I've made clear; I'm inclined to believe something bizarre happened with the messenger, or that Mclellan delayed in sending the order to advance.

Which, I must say, is tantamount to assuming that Burnside did nothing wrong and then using it as evidence that Burnside didn't tend to do things wrong. It is adding another unlikely event (messenger problems, OR McClellan delaying sending an order to 9th Corps specifically - when we know that Sykes' division got the order in a timely fashion) and so it reduces the probability of that specific course of events relative to the other options.

I also find it curious that Mclellan didn't bring up Burnsides apparent failure to carry out this order when they met in person on the evening of the 15th, according to Cox the meeting between the two was very affable.

That's making a lot hang on a third party account of a conversation. In practice on the evening of the 15th there hasn't yet been any major consequent events from the delay in the movement of 9th Corps (i.e. it hasn't failed to get anywhere important where benefit could have been achieved from it getting there in good time), so it could be dismissed as "normal friction", while we also have the possibility of the same dynamic as McClellan mentions in his post-Antietam letter - if McClellan starts criticizing Burnside he has to deal with an upset Burnside for the rest of the campaign.

I'll finally note that if Cox had some of the blame for the delay then it might be in Cox's interests to downplay mention of the delay or McClellan being annoyed about it - if Cox has a version of events which is "we weren't ordered to move until midday" then mentioning McClellan being annoyed about 9th Corps not moving in the morning effectively acts as a disproof of his own narrative!


In the view of the whole campaign, though, we have several cases in the September 14-17 sequence of 9th Corps not moving in a timely fashion or otherwise moving slowly (including their march of the 16th for example).

 

[Old Burn]

As noted, we know the actual course of events and that ca. 9AM was when Burnside issued the first actual attack order. If Burnside really had only issued an order to one regiment to attack and no others to any other unit as part of his "9AM sequence", then his confusion is understandable but his negligence is enormous; otherwise, he issued orders to those other units.



Burnside's order to Franklin stated that he wanted Franklin to make an attack with "a division, at least"; Franklin was in command of more than half a dozen divisions.

What other union report, besides Cox's (which as we know was later changed), put's the 11th Connecticut's attack at 9? Genuine question, because to my knowledge his is the only one. Regardless, it still appears that the orders received by Ferrero and Gerhardt were just telling them to move up.

Yes, and Franklin chose to basically use the minimum number. Gibbons' division was there in nominal support, and Reynolds would later send in Doubleday's division, but neither really got into the fight. Burnside had also ordered Franklin to move with his whole command as soon as the fog had lifted, which it had by the time Meade's division was even ready to advance.

 

[Old Burn]

Which, I must say, is tantamount to assuming that Burnside did nothing wrong and then using it as evidence that Burnside didn't tend to do things wrong. It is adding another unlikely event (messenger problems, OR McClellan delaying sending an order to 9th Corps specifically - when we know that Sykes' division got the order in a timely fashion) and so it reduces the probability of that specific course of events relative to the other options.



That's making a lot hang on a third party account of a conversation. In practice on the evening of the 15th there hasn't yet been any major consequent events from the delay in the movement of 9th Corps (i.e. it hasn't failed to get anywhere important where benefit could have been achieved from it getting there in good time), so it could be dismissed as "normal friction", while we also have the possibility of the same dynamic as McClellan mentions in his post-Antietam letter - if McClellan starts criticizing Burnside he has to deal with an upset Burnside for the rest of the campaign.

I'll finally note that if Cox had some of the blame for the delay then it might be in Cox's interests to downplay mention of the delay or McClellan being annoyed about it - if Cox has a version of events which is "we weren't ordered to move until midday" then mentioning McClellan being annoyed about 9th Corps not moving in the morning effectively acts as a disproof of his own narrative!


In the view of the whole campaign, though, we have several cases in the September 14-17 sequence of 9th Corps not moving in a timely fashion or otherwise moving slowly (including their march of the 16th for example).

All we know for sure is that no order was received until 12. I think the explanation of a messenger getting lost or Mclellan delaying sending it is just as if not more likely than Burnside not being in proper position to receive it. It is also strange that Mclellan would send a message to Burnside asking about the delay on the 15th, not bring it up in person when they met later that day, and then send another message asking about the delay on the 15th.

Also worth noting that Burnsides "delay" on the 16th wasn't nearly as long as Mclellan made it out to be, he claimed that Burnside was ordered to have his corps in place by noon when in fact he didn't even have the order at that point. It's also interesting that Mclellan was apparently worried about offending Burnsides ego, and yet he sent him a formal reprimand about his "slowness" on the 16th.

 

[Old Burn]

The 11th Connecticut attacked at 0900 by all accounts, in response to orders from Burnside which were in response to orders from McClellan. The divisions in the rear all likewise received orders at 0900.

Thus it is clear that Burnside was responding to attack orders received before 0900.

How Burnside came to alter the timings is an interesting question, but it is clear that he did, whilst extracting Cox's report which gives 0900 as the first attack time.




The only source on the pre-0700 order is Cox, who reported that on returning from getting Rodman moving, he was told Burnside had received an order from McClellan. The time is unknown, since Cox departed before 0600 to move Rodman.

Again, Burnside did attack at 0900. Ergo he must have received the attack order before this.

What other union accounts were there that the ninth Connecticut attacked at nine besides Cox's? Maybe Burnside did attack at 9, but if Cox's was the only report to mention that 9 o'clock attack by the 11th, I don't think it's unreasonable for Burnside to think he may have been mistaken.

 

[67th Tigers]

Of course, as well as all the Federal accounts, the rebels also recorded the first attack being at 0900.

Benning (20th Ga) - "The next morning early (that of the 17th) the skirmishing was renewed. It continued, constantly growing heavier on the part of the enemy, till about 9 o'clock, when our skirmishers were driven in. At about 8 o'clock Captain Eubank discovered a large body of the enemy opposite to him in a wood within range of his guns. ... In this forlorn condition were the two regiments at about 9 o'clock, when the fight opened in earnest. "

Lewis (2nd Ga) - "The enemy commenced an attack upon the center of the regiment at 9 o'clock then immediately afterward upon the left, with how many regiments we are unable to ascertain. "

 

[ErnieMac]

BG Robert Toombs, commanding the brigade of which the 2nd and 20th Georgia were part, wrote:

"At between 9 and 10 o'clock the enemy made his first attempt to carry the bridge by a rapid assault, and was repulsed with great slaughter, and at irregular intervals, up to about 1 o'clock, made four other attempts of the same kind, all of which were gallantly met and successfully repulsed by the Twentieth and Second Georgia."​

 

[Nathan Towne]

BG Robert Toombs, commanding the brigade of which the 2nd and 20th Georgia were part, wrote:

"At between 9 and 10 o'clock the enemy made his first attempt to carry the bridge by a rapid assault, and was repulsed with great slaughter, and at irregular intervals, up to about 1 o'clock, made four other attempts of the same kind, all of which were gallantly met and successfully repulsed by the Twentieth and Second Georgia."​

@ErnieMac
@67th Tigers
@Old Burn

We only have the order from McClellan to Burnside in the Official Records marked at 9:10 A.M. for Ninth Corps to commence its attack. It would most likely have been received sometime before 10:00 A.M. by Burnside and Cox. If there was no difficulty in locating them, it very well may have been received somewhat earlier, perhaps even as early as 9:30 A.M. If there was more difficulty in locating them, it could have been received a bit later, as mentioned above.

 

[67th Tigers]

@ErnieMac
@67th Tigers
@Old Burn

We have the order from McClellan to Burnside in the Official Records. It is marked as 9:10 A.M. for Ninth Corps to commence its attack. It would most likely have been received sometime before 10:00 A.M. by Burnside and Cox. If there was no difficulty in locating them, it very well may have been received somewhat earlier, perhaps even as early as 9:30 A.M. If there was more difficulty in locating them, it could have been received a bit later, as mentioned above.

There was also an 0800 order, which is what initiated the attack, which been convincingly shown to be a repeat of the 0800 order. To repeat an earlier post:

It is quite probable than an order was sent at 0910, and from the contents it was almost certainly a repeat of an earlier order (being issued before 0830, when it was written before it was known that Hooker and Mansfield were down). We know that Burnside received many orders from McClellan to attack, and since McClellan departed to supervise the fighting on the right well before 1000, this is likely a later one. This is the third order, the one Sackett carried. There will be no 4th order until close to noon, when McClellan has returned from the right to find Burnside has made no progress and sends Colonel Key with another order to attack "if it cost 10,000 men", and apparently carried a sealed order placing Burnside under arrest for disobeying orders, and placing Morell in command of 9th Corps. It worked, as Sturgis reported receiving the order to take the bridge "at all hazards".


The four orders were:
1st (before 0700) contents as reported by Burnside were to move his force to the bridge
2nd (0800), carried by Lt James Wilson, were to attack immediately
3rd (0910), carried by Col Sackett, were a repeat of the 0800 orders
4th (ca. 1200), carried by Col Key, were peremptory to attack immediately (or be arrested)


There are a lot of circumlocutions made trying to justify it taking 50 minutes for the order to make the 5 minute journey and fit Burnside's account.


Bear in mind, the rebels place the time their piquets on the eastern bank were driven in by Kingsbury as around 0800, and Kingsbury's charge was at ca. 0900.

 

[Nathan Towne]

There was also an 0800 order, which is what initiated the attack, which been convincingly shown to be a repeat of the 0800 order. To repeat an earlier post:

It is quite probable than an order was sent at 0910, and from the contents it was almost certainly a repeat of an earlier order (being issued before 0830, when it was written before it was known that Hooker and Mansfield were down). We know that Burnside received many orders from McClellan to attack, and since McClellan departed to supervise the fighting on the right well before 1000, this is likely a later one. This is the third order, the one Sackett carried. There will be no 4th order until close to noon, when McClellan has returned from the right to find Burnside has made no progress and sends Colonel Key with another order to attack "if it cost 10,000 men", and apparently carried a sealed order placing Burnside under arrest for disobeying orders, and placing Morell in command of 9th Corps. It worked, as Sturgis reported receiving the order to take the bridge "at all hazards".


The four orders were:
1st (before 0700) contents as reported by Burnside were to move his force to the bridge
2nd (0800), carried by Lt James Wilson, were to attack immediately
3rd (0910), carried by Col Sackett, were a repeat of the 0800 orders
4th (ca. 1200), carried by Col Key, were peremptory to attack immediately (or be arrested)


There are a lot of circumlocutions made trying to justify it taking 50 minutes for the order to make the 5 minute journey and fit Burnside's account.


Bear in mind, the rebels place the time their piquets on the eastern bank were driven in by Kingsbury as around 0800, and Kingsbury's charge was at ca. 0900.

@67th Tigers
@Saphroneth
@Old Burn

Hey 67th,

Yeah, so it is an interesting and important discussion. We cannot definitively rule out that orders were sent to join the attack prior to the 9:10 A.M. order. It is just that the 9:10 A.M. order is the only one which we actually have in the OR. Beyond this, it is not entirely clear. To my knowledge, no one has ever convincingly demonstrated that the 9:10 A.M. order was a repeat of earlier order to commence the attack.

In his second preliminary report in October (his September 29th report was fairly cursory), McClellan wrote that the order to attack was given around 10:00 A.M. Burnside essentially says the same in his report. Jacob Cox, who was, of course, actually commanding Ninth Corps, wrote in his report that it was received around 9:00 A.M. Later on, in several places, he argued that he had probably been mistaken and that it had in fact been received somewhere around 10:00. He says so forcefully in his Reminiscences on pages 195-198 of my copy.

McClellan, in his amended report of August 4th of 1863 stated that the order had been given at 8:00, as he did in his 1864 book. In some of the drafts of his Own Story, which are available in the McClellan Papers, he again records the time as having been approximately 10:00 A.M., but in the final version, published posthumously, he records the original order as having been issued at 8:00 A.M. That is the order which he states was carried by Lieutenant James Wilson. That is on page 611 of my copy of his Own Story.

It is not unreasonable to think that the 9:10 order could have arrived at some time between 9:30 and 10:00 if the person carrying it had trouble getting there, or finding Burnside and Cox.

The 9:10 A.M. order is actually reproduced in Cox's Reminiscences, so I don't actually have to go find it again in the OR. I will post a picture below.

Now, it is possible that this was the order which Delos Sacket carried. Sacket claimed in his letter to McClellan used in McClellan's Own Story, that he reached Burnside around 9:00, which doesn't seem to be workable, but as stated, if he was the one who carried the 9:10 order, it is very possible that he would have gotten there sometime between 9:30 and 10:00 if he had some trouble getting there, for one reason, or another. Sacket claimed in his letter to McClellan that Burnside snapped at him, saying that "you are the third or fourth one who has been to me this morning with similar orders." His letter to McClellan on this, dated February 20, 1876, can be found on pages 617-618 in my copy of McClellan's Own Story.

There also appears to be a letter to McClellan in the McClellan papers, dated January 31, 1876, in which an officer, N.H. Davis recounts that Sacket had told him the same story with regards to Burnside snapping at him. (N.H. Davis to McClellan, January 31, 1876, reel 38, McClellan Papers). However, this is a letter which I have not actually seen myself.

As for Thomas Key, McClellan claims in his Own Story, that Key was sent to Burnside twice. He makes no mention of any threat to remove him from command, though. I am going to add pictures from the relevant pages of McClellan's Own Story below. The first appearance of that story appears to have come in an article entitled "Recollections of McClellan," published in The United Service in May of 1894, written/compiled by William Biddle.

Again, both Burnside and Cox state, as does McClellan's October preliminary report, that the order was first received sometime around 10:00 A.M. If that is the case, then Sacket would have had to have arrived later that morning, or sometime in the afternoon, if his and McClellan's recollections were correct that he was not the first person sent carrying the order to attack.

What we know is that the order to commence the attack was issued by 9:10 A.M., at least per the time written on the order itself. Both Burnside and Cox stated that the original attack order was received while they were together. If this was the 9:10 A.M. order, it would have been received at some time after that.

I actually don't even have to find them, as here are McClellan's Reports.

Antietam: MGen McClellan's Official Reports

antietam.aotw.org

Now, here is Burnside's Report.

War of the Rebellion: Serial 027 Page 0416 OPERATIONS IN N. VA., W. VA., MD., AND PA. Chapter XXXI. | OSU eHistory

ehistory.osu.edu

Here is Edward Harland's report, commanding the Second brigade of Issac Rodman's division. This is the brigade which contained the 11th Connecticut, under the command of Henry Kingsbury. Harland states that they were ordered into position sometime around 7:00 P.M. and received orders to attack two hours later.

War of the Rebellion: Serial 027 Page 0452 Chapter XXXI] OPERATION IN N. VA., W. VA., MD., AND PA. | OSU eHistory

ehistory.osu.edu

 

[Old Burn]

Burnside's order to Franklin stated that he wanted Franklin to make an attack with "a division, at least"; Franklin was in command of more than half a dozen divisions.

Was going through old posts I made and noticed this, here were Burnsides full orders to Franklin that day:

"General Hardie will carry this dispatch to you and remain with you during the day. The general commanding directs that you keep your whole command in position for a rapid movement down the old Richmond road, and you will send out at once a division at least to pass below Smithfield to seize, if possible, the heights near Captain Hamilton's, on this side of the Massaponax, taking care to keep it well supported and its line of retreat open. He has ordered another column of a division or more to be moved from General Sumner's command up the Plank road to its intersection with the Telegraph road, where they will divide, with a view to seizing the heights on both of these roads. Holding these two heights, with the heights near Captain Hamiltons, will, he hopes, compel the enemy to evacuate the whole ridge between these points... You will keep your whole command in readiness to move at once as soon as the fog lifts..."

Burnside orders an initial assault by a division at least but concludes his order by committing Franklin to commit his whole command after the fog lifts. Franklin did not do this, and instead kept the majority of his command in reserve to guard his line of retreat back to the bridges. He later claimed that he assumed Burnsides verbal intentions of launching a full assault on December 12th had changed, but despite this, he never bothered asking Burnside if this was the case. Burnside ordered a full assault, he didn't lie to try to cover his tracks, that was the order.

 

[Saphroneth]

Burnside orders an initial assault by a division at least but concludes his order by committing Franklin to commit his whole command after the fog lifts.

He orders Franklin to keep his whole command ready to move (for a rapid movement down the old Richmond road).

- The heights "near Captain Hamilton's" are not actually on the Richmond road (they're close, but going down the Richmond road means skirting the heights near Hamilton's at a distance of about a mile).
- The mention of attacking with "a division at least" versus "the whole command" being ready to move down the Richmond road gives Franklin the impression that he's not meant to attack with his whole force (as if the whole command is meant to be ready to move down the Richmond road, then it's going to be not attacking the specified heights - they're a mile apart)
- What Franklin actually does is cross seven divisions over the river, putting Reynolds in charge of the attack (because his corps is the one in the first line); 6th Corps is formed to exploit (i.e. for a rapid movement down the old Richmond road).


Burnside says "a division, at least". Franklin has eight (counting divisions detached to him), so he is certainly not (in any sense) telling Franklin to use his whole command.
Burnside tells Franklin to keep his "whole command" in position to move down the Richmond road - so he is, in fact, telling Franklin to have most of his troops lined up on the Richmond road.


As for keeping a line of retreat open, that was explicitly ordered.

 

[Old Burn]

He orders Franklin to keep his whole command ready to move (for a rapid movement down the old Richmond road).

And he orders him to move it as soon as the fog had lifted, which it had by the early morning.

- The heights "near Captain Hamilton's" are not actually on the Richmond road (they're close, but going down the Richmond road means skirting the heights near Hamilton's at a distance of about a mile).

- The mention of attacking with "a division at least" versus "the whole command" being ready to move down the Richmond road gives Franklin the impression that he's not meant to attack with his whole force (as if the whole command is meant to be ready to move down the Richmond road, then it's going to be not attacking the specified heights - they're a mile apart)

Yes, that's because he's calling for a flanking maneuver against Jacksons right flank up the old Richmond road. Did Franklin assume this order from Burnside implied he was supposed to march away from the battle up that road?

Burnside says "a division, at least". Franklin has eight (counting divisions detached to him), so he is certainly not (in any sense) telling Franklin to use his whole command.

He initially calls for an attack by a division at least, but he ends the order by telling Franklin to move his entire command after the fog lifts.

As for keeping a line of retreat open, that was explicitly ordered.

Yes, for Meades division, Franklin somehow misinterprets this as meaning everyone who had crossed, and leaves an what is essentially an entire corps to guard the bridges all day.

 

[Saphroneth]

And he orders him to move it as soon as the fog had lifted, which it had by the early morning.

The orders didn't arrive until, what, half-seven? Eight?

Yes, that's because he's calling for a flanking maneuver against Jacksons right flank up the old Richmond road. Did Franklin assume this order from Burnside implied he was supposed to march away from the battle up that road?

Burnside's order states that his plan of action for the battle is to take two specific points by two separate columns, and thus force the enemy to evacuate the whole of the ridgeline between those two points. It is after this point that Burnside mentions that Franklin's whole command should be in readiness to move.

It should also be noted that the section you elided makes clear that Burnside's plan of operations was designed specifically for an attack in fog:

Holding these heights, with the heights near Captain Hamilton's, will, he hopes, compel the enemy to evacuate the whole ridge between these points.

He makes these moves by columns distant from each other, with the view of avoiding the possibility of a collision of our own forces, which might occur in a general movement during the fog. Two of General Hooker's divisions are in your rear, at the bridges, and will remain there as supports. Copies of instructions given to Generals Sumner and Hooker will be forwarded to you by an orderly very soon. You will keep your whole command in readiness to move at once as soon as the fog lifts.


If Franklin's meant to make a general attack once the fog lifts, the bolded section is irrelevant (and has no reason to exist), as there won't be a general movement during fog.

An interpretation which largely accords with this is that Burnside is intending to compel the enemy to abandon the ridgeline, and then to have much of Franklin's command march down the road towards Richmond so as to try and cut the enemy off from their base - i.e. that the Fredericksburg attacks are to open up a manoeuvre phase of the campaign, followed by Franklin's command marching along the road while the Confederates have to go cross country or on minor roads.


If what Burnside wanted to order was a full attack by Franklin's whole command, there are several ways that Burnside could have made it significantly clearer. For example, in outlining his intent for the battle he could have avoided talking about how his plan was for two roughly divisional scale columns to attack (and note that on the side of the battle where Burnside actually was what happens is a series of brigade-level assaults) and he could have avoided the repeated injunction for Franklin to keep his whole command in position to move down the old Richmond road.

He could also have used the word "flank" for the task of the whole command moving along the Richmond road, since the old Richmond Road actually moves away from Hamilton's Crossing and the ridge there. Alternatively, if the intent for the whole command is to advance once the fog lifts, he could have said "you will keep your whole command in readiness to advance at once..."


As it stands, everything is consistent with the idea that Burnside intended two divisional-scale advances followed by Franklin's command conducting a movement down the Richmond road. There is verbiage that should exist which does not, and which exists but should not, if Burnside's intent is for Franklin to conduct a full-court attack with his whole grand division - not least because expressing that should be much simpler, without need for the circumlocutions about "a division, at least".

Yes, for Meades division, Franklin somehow misinterprets this as meaning everyone who had crossed, and leaves an what is essentially an entire corps to guard the bridges all day.

Keeping open a line of retreat is a matter of distances, not the size of the force for which you want the line of retreat open. From the closest pontoon bridge to Hamilton's house is nearly six miles - and covering a six-mile frontage is absolutely a corps level job, not to mention that Burnside's stated intent involves most of the Confederate army not being otherwise occupied. They have the capacity to make mischief - Pickett and Hood's divisions could very well have advanced against the bridge, and at that point keeping the line of retreat open for the attacking force is a pretty sizeable job.

 

[Old Burn]

The orders didn't arrive until, what, half-seven? Eight?

They arrived at 7:15 AM and Franklin, despite later stating that Burnside had agreed to an attack " from my [Franklin's] division upon the enemy's right, with a column of at least thirty thousand men" somehow interpreted his orders as a reconnaissance in force and failed to ask Burnside for any clarification on the matter.

It should also be noted that the section you elided makes clear that Burnside's plan of operations was designed specifically for an attack in fog:

Holding these heights, with the heights near Captain Hamilton's, will, he hopes, compel the enemy to evacuate the whole ridge between these points.He makes these moves by columns distant from each other, with the view of avoiding the possibility of a collision of our own forces, which might occur in a general movement during the fog. Two of General Hooker's divisions are in your rear, at the bridges, and will remain there as supports. Copies of instructions given to Generals Sumner and Hooker will be forwarded to you by an orderly very soon. You will keep your whole command in readiness to move at once as soon as the fog lifts.

Yes, this was to avoid a collision of the units that moved during the initial movements. Burnside was hoping that a division at least (Franklin was free to add more) could seize the heights near captain Hamiltons during the early morning fog (Which Meade said he would be able to do) before the rest of Franklins command followed in flanking maneuver after the fog had lifted.

If Franklin's meant to make a general attack once the fog lifts, the bolded section is irrelevant (and has no reason to exist), as there won't be a general movement during fog.

There will be, Meade's division is intended to make the initial assault to be followed after the fog lifts by the rest of Franklins command.

An interpretation which largely accords with this is that Burnside is intending to compel the enemy to abandon the ridgeline, and then to have much of Franklin's command march down the road towards Richmond so as to try and cut the enemy off from their base - i.e. that the Fredericksburg attacks are to open up a manoeuvre phase of the campaign, followed by Franklin's command marching along the road while the Confederates have to go cross country or on minor roads.

This interpretation is incorrect. Burnside's plan comes larger from a strategy proposed by Edwin Sumner, who proposed that after the left wing had crossed the river they "form our whole force in line of battle, and then by a determined march, turn their [Confederates] right flank... force them from the field, and after this was done, we could occupy Fredericksburg, and reestablish our lines of communication, making the city a depot." Burnside wanted Franklin to break his connection from the river and outflank Jacksons line, which would allow them to gain possession of the heights, and with the heights would come Fredericksburg.

If what Burnside wanted to order was a full attack by Franklin's whole command, there are several ways that Burnside could have made it significantly clearer.

Yes, everyone agrees that burnsides orders could have and should have been clearer, but his intentions were clearly for a full scale assault. This should have been clear to Franklin, since according to him, he had been the one to tell Burnside to do just that.
Keeping open a line of retreat is a matter of distances, not the size of the force for which you want the line of retreat open. From the closest pontoon bridge to Hamilton's house is nearly six miles - and covering a six-mile frontage is absolutely a corps level job

Keeping open a line of retreat is a matter of distances, not the size of the force for which you want the line of retreat open. From the closest pontoon bridge to Hamilton's house is nearly six miles - and covering a six-mile frontage is absolutely a corps level job

You're under the impression that Burnside wanted Franklin to keep his own line of retreat open to the river, but if those orders are clear on anything, it's that he's referring only to Meade's division not Franklins whole command. Burnside was intending for Franklin to break off his communications with the river and march around Jacksons right flank, Franklin instead just sends Meade straight into the center of Jackson's line.

 

[Saphroneth]

They arrived at 7:15 AM and Franklin, despite later stating that Burnside had agreed to an attack " from my [Franklin's] division upon the enemy's right, with a column of at least thirty thousand men" somehow interpreted his orders as a reconnaissance in force and failed to ask Burnside for any clarification on the matter.

He didn't launch a "reconnaisance in force". He launched a corps-level attack, with an additional division or two assigned to support - about half the force under his command, which leaves only about half of it in position to move down the road. Instead what happens is that Reynolds goes and orders his gunline around, leaving the attack without a coordinating commander, and the 1st Corps and 3rd Corps supporting divisions don't go in.

Burnside wanted Franklin to break his connection from the river and outflank Jacksons line, which would allow them to gain possession of the heights, and with the heights would come Fredericksburg.

Then he probably should have said so.
Burnside's language is commensurate with issuing Franklin a warning order - that is, be ready to move as soon as the fog lifts but don't move until commanded - and that it's the attacks by widely separated columns in fog (the "a division, at least" ones) which are supposed to force the enemy to vacate the position. (Which would then be the trigger for Burnside to signal the movement to begin.)
In that interpretation, Burnside would signal Franklin once Burnside has decided that the movement should take place, perhaps with additional details.

But what Burnside doesn't say is for Franklin to break away from his line of supply or retreat. This has to be inferred.

Burnside doesn't say to launch the whole force on an attack. This has to be inferred, where "be ready to move" is treated not merely as a warning order but an actual triggering order, even though that could be stated much more clearly - Bunside's had all night to write these orders.

You're under the impression that Burnside wanted Franklin to keep his own line of retreat open to the river, but if those orders are clear on anything, it's that he's referring only to Meade's division not Franklins whole command.

So how exactly does the force that takes Hamilton have a line of retreat if Franklin's whole command doesn't? The distance from Hamilton to the bridges is still the same and it still occupies about six miles.



I honestly don't see a motive for Franklin to decide - off his own bat - that the orders Burnside has given are not in accordance with Franklin's preferred tactic, unless those orders are either actually not in accordance with Franklin's preferred tactic (i.e. they do not amount to a general attack or general outflanking movement) or so poorly written that they create that impression. That's a significant part of the issue here - Burnside's orders are such that someone who thought the best plan was an attack of a certain type didn't do that.

 

[Old Burn]

He didn't launch a "reconnaisance in force".

He didn't? Here's what Franklin had to say about that in a letter written in 1863:

"General Burnside's order, though incongruous and contradictory on its face, admitted of but one interpretation, viz., that he intended to make an armed observation from the left, to ascertain the strength of the enemy"

Kind of weird that Franklin didn't feel the need to get clarification about this order, considering the fact that a mere 12 hours earlier Burnside had stated he would use Franklins wing to make an assault. That's a pretty major difference from his last conversation with Burnside, and yet he immediately put the order into effect. It's also doubly odd that Franklin would assume Burnside wanted to use half the army to make a reconnaissance in force, its almost like he knew that wasn't the case and only said it to cover himself after he was blamed for the defeat.

Then he probably should have said so.

He did.

"The general commanding directs that you keep your whole command in position for a rapid movement down the old Richmond road... You will keep your whole command in readiness to move at once as soon as the fog lifts"

Franklin is supposed to march the rest of his command around Jackson's flank when the fog lifts, that's in the order. If Franklin was confused by this he could have sent word to Burnside for clarification, but instead, he failed to march any of his troops down the Richmond road. In fact, he failed to even assault the height near Captain Hamiltons, Meade's division never went in that direction and apparently Franklin didn't know where it was.

Burnside's language is commensurate with issuing Franklin a warning order - that is, be ready to move as soon as the fog lifts but don't move until commanded - and that it's the attacks by widely separated columns in fog (the "a division, at least" ones) which are supposed to force the enemy to vacate the position. (Which would then be the trigger for Burnside to signal the movement to begin.) In that interpretation, Burnside would signal Franklin once Burnside has decided that the movement should take place, perhaps with additional details.

Can you tell me in the order where Burnside's language indicates he's going to send a follow up order? The order is for Franklins command to be moving down the road when the fog lifts, he does not imply at any point he's going to send a follow up order.

Burnside doesn't say to launch the whole force on an attack. This has to be inferred, where "be ready to move" is treated not merely as a warning order but an actual triggering order, even though that could be stated much more clearly - Bunside's had all night to write these orders.

Do you think Franklin assumed his whole command was supposed to be ready to move up the Richmond Road for some other reason rather than attacking?

So how exactly does the force that takes Hamilton have a line of retreat if Franklin's whole command doesn't? The distance from Hamilton to the bridges is still the same and it still occupies about six miles.

They'll have a line of retreat back to Franklin's command, who will be marching opposite them up the Richmond road. Burnside did not intend for Franklins command to have line of retreat, it seems he was banking that if something went wrong they would be able to fight their way back to the river.

I honestly don't see a motive for Franklin to decide - off his own bat - that the orders Burnside has given are not in accordance with Franklin's preferred tactic, unless those orders are either actually not in accordance with Franklin's preferred tactic (i.e. they do not amount to a general attack or general outflanking movement) or so poorly written that they create that impression. That's a significant part of the issue here - Burnside's orders are such that someone who thought the best plan was an attack of a certain type didn't do that.

That's because it likely wasn't Franklins preferred mode of attack, he only started making that claim after he was blamed for the defeat. And yes, there are problems with the phrasing of the order, but it's clear that Burnside wanted Franklin to attack the heights near captain Hamiltons and make some kind of movement on the Richmond Road. Franklin did neither of these things, instead he committed 1 division to the assault with another in support, while leaving almost 2/3rds of his command to guard the bridges.

 

[Saphroneth]

Do you think Franklin assumed his whole command was supposed to be ready to move up the Richmond Road for some other reason rather than attacking?

There are things an army can do which aren't attacking, and the Richmond Road is the route by which one could cut off the Richmond road.

They'll have a line of retreat back to Franklin's command, who will be marching opposite them up the Richmond road. Burnside did not intend for Franklins command to have line of retreat, it seems he was banking that if something went wrong they would be able to fight their way back to the river.

I don't think this is in accordance with the language Burnside uses:

General Hardie will carry this dispatch to you and remain with you during the day. The general commanding directs that you keep your whole command in position for a rapid movement down the old Richmond road, and you will send out at once a division at least to pass below Smithfield to seize, if possible, the heights near Captain Hamilton's, on this side of the Massaponax, taking care to keep it well supported and its line of retreat open.

Whole command is to be in position for a rapid movement down the old Richmond road.
A division, at least, is ordered to go below Smithfield (i.e. downriver of Smithfield) and to seize, if possible, the heights near Captain Hamilton's. It's said that their line of retreat should be kept open - which shouldn't need to be specified if the whole corps is supposed to be marching just a mile away.

Franklin puts his whole command on the old Richmond road (that's 1st Corps, 6th Corps and 3rd Corps elements). He also makes a serious attempt to take the heights near Captain Hamilton's, which he does by means of an assault delegated to Reynolds.

If what Burnside wants is for Franklin's whole command to pass below Smithfield, why only single out the "a division, at least" section?

Franklin did neither of these things, instead he committed 1 division to the assault with another in support, while leaving almost 2/3rds of his command to guard the bridges.

That's not what Franklin ordered, though? Franklin moves 6th Corps onto the Richmond road above Smithfield and 3rd Corps below it, while 1st Corps leads the attack with 3rd Corps able to support; Reynolds screws up committing anything beyond the first wave so the assault has nobody able to commit troops, but the only units who can really be described as guarding bridges by my reading of the positions is Burns and perhaps the right flank of 6th Corps. All of 1st Corps, all of 3rd Corps and the left flank of 6th Corps isn't.

Can you tell me in the order where Burnside's language indicates he's going to send a follow up order? The order is for Franklins command to be moving down the road when the fog lifts, he does not imply at any point he's going to send a follow up order.

If I tell someone to be ready to do something tomorrow, that's not the same as telling them to do something tomorrow. The extra words involved in saying "be ready to XXX as soon as the fog lifts" is distinct from just saying "do XXX as soon as the fog lifts".

We know that warning orders are a thing - that is, you tell someone "be ready to attack the bridge" (just for example) and then you later send a triggering order to actually attack the bridge. This isn't an alien concept, and semaphore exists (the Army of the Potomac has a signal corps) so the idea of someone sending a short order amounting to "go now" wouldn't exactly be improbable - especially if the fog will have lifted by that time, meaning that Burnside has the ability to control the go/no go of Franklin's column pretty much in real time according to the situation on the right flank. It's about the only way he has to coordinate the two wings of his army, in fact!


Really, if what you're aiming for is a flank march around the enemy (that is, if we assume that your reading is correct), you almost want there to still be fog, to conceal the movement to at least some extent and delay the enemy reaction. It adds friction, it's true, but with most of the rest of the force not going below Smithfield (according to the orders) until the fog clears then it's materially delaying the flank movement relative to the individual movement (the attempt to take Hamilton) that's meant to take place still in fog. It means that Franklin's flanking wing has to march their head of column from above Smithfield (as the flanking wing is not the part that's going below Smithfield) along the Richmond road, then... to where? The order doesn't specify and there are several options, anything from attacking Hamilton from the east to attacking from the southeast to marching all the way to Grace Church before turning in to take the whole Confederate army in the flank and right rear.

If what Burnside wants is for Franklin to march along the Richmond road as soon as the fog lifts and then for Franklin to also do something, and he wants the orders that reach Franklin to be complete, then he does sort of need to specify what that something is...