Say What? Saturday: The Chief Marplot

OK so I've gone back and forth 3 times reading this. Drat it. WHAT is the genuine story, please? I keep letting the fact I like Hays and have a what amounts to a strong prejudice against diminuative, egoistic type men get in the way. Well, and have never been able to get past the whole Scott thing, either. All that aside, where's the middle ground please?
 
OK so I've gone back and forth 3 times reading this. Drat it. WHAT is the genuine story, please? I keep letting the fact I like Hays and have a what amounts to a strong prejudice against diminuative, egoistic type men get in the way. Well, and have never been able to get past the whole Scott thing, either. All that aside, where's the middle ground please?
Ethan Rafuse's aforementioned book, McClellans War, gives a pretty neutral account of McClellans actions during this time. He concludes that McClellan got his forces back from the Peninsula in a reasonable amount of time, but then he "behaved badly" as Lincoln said, by not aggressively pushing his troops in to reinforce Pope. Part of the problem was that Halleck was overwhelmed during this time, and gave McClellan too much free rein to use his own discretion on reinforcing Pope.

McClellan personally disliked Pope, and he may have wanted Pope to be defeated, and he may have been peeved about being recalled from the Peninsula. But as Rafuse writes, "What truly antagonized McClellan in August 1862 was the challenge to his own professional military judgment, something that was at the core of his sense of self, and the change in the direction of the war effort that Pope represented."
 
"In theatre?" McClellan wasn't referring to the number of confederates in the entire theater. This is what he sent Halleck on the 28th:

"Reports numerous from various sources. that Lee &​
Stuart with large forces are at Manassas. That the enemy​
with 120,000 men intend advancing on the forts near​
Arlington and Chain Bridge, with a View of attacking​
Washington & Baltimore."​

The accepted number for Lee at 2nd Manassas is about 55,000.

"At Manassas" indeed, for the troops actually engaged on the field were Jackson's and Longstreet's wings and Anderson's divisions:

Jackson: 28,000
Longstreet and Anderson: 29,800

= 57,800

On the 30th this had been reduced to ca. 55,000 by casualties.

Of course, DH Hill's wing was so close that some authors include the lead brigades of it. Had Pope not collapsed on the 30th, Lee would have had part of another 28,000 effectives.

The whole force totaled about 86,200 effectives. To convert to present (the normal category for estimates) the relationship is:

ANV%2BPFD%2Bvs%2BAP.png


86,200 * 1.1934 = 103,000 (rounded)

There was another division that didn't come north, raising Lee's whole force to ca. 96,200 (115,000).

McClellan didn't have a crystal ball to know that Lee had left a division to protect Richmond. The estimate is perfectly reasonable.
 
Rafuse's book is sorely lacking, because it relies heavily on Hennessey's Return to Bull Run. This is an excellent book for 2nd Bull Run but pays very little attention to McClellan. Hence a whole slew of information is missing from Rafuse. As an example, a frustrated McClellan boarded the steamer Ariel and went to Washington to confront Halleck at 1 a.m., getting him out of bed. Not in Rafuse, because it's not in Hennessey. I first read of it in Cozzens' Pope biography.

Carman wrote a very incisive analysis, which he summarised in Vol. 1:

"McClellan arrived at Alexandria on the evening of August 26th and reported by telegraph to Halleck next morning. As fast as his troops arrived they were virtually taken from him and he was reduced to the command of a few orderlies, camp guards and construction parties, instead of being put in command of the combined forces of himself and Pope, as General Halleck had, on more than one occasion, indicated. He assured Halleck of his readiness to lend any assistance in his power, but complained of the extreme difficulty of doing anything while his power was curtailed and his position undefined. Meanwhile Secretary Stanton and his associates in the cabinet had formed a resolution that no more should McClellan command any army of the Union, and they were jubilant when Pope reported a great victory on the field of Second Manassas. They looked upon Pope as the coming man and could not conceal their intense pleasure in the apparent utter downfall of McClellan.6

There was a sudden transformation. Early on the morning of September 1st it began to dawn upon Halleck's mind that Pope's reported victories were defeats, and this impression was confirmed by a dispatch from Pope that the enemy was undeniably feeling for his right, upon which he telegraphed Pope: "If the enemy moves as your last telegram indicates, and you engage him to-day without a decisive victory, I suggest a gradual drawing of your army to Fairfax Court House, Annandale or, if necessary, farther south, toward Alexandria." He then sent for McClellan and gave him verbal directions to take charge of the defenses of Washington, expressly limiting his jurisdiction to the works and their garrisons, and prohibiting him from exercising any control over the troops actively engaged under Pope.7"

There is a really full account of events in Vol 3, which begins:

"It is now generally conceded that the sad reverses to Pope's army were due to the insistence of Halleck in the effort to unite the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Virginia on the line of the Rappahannock. At the time Halleck, Pope, and their friends contended that the campaign would have been successful and that Lee would have been defeated, August 30th, had proper support been given Pope, and the absence of this support was charged principally against McClellan.1"

later writing:

"Up to this time Halleck, beyond tardily yielding to McClellan's suggestion to bringSumner from Aquia to Washington, had done absolutely nothing to assist Pope, nor to help McClellan and Franklin in getting the latter ready to start for the front. Washington was full of horses, wagons, artillery, and supplies of every kind, and those were in Halleck's hands, not in McClellan's. McClellan had no control over them in any way; Franklin and his division commanders were snubbed when they asked for them, and it was clearly Halleck's duty, as commander-in-chief of the army, to see to this and to see to it promptly. All could be done by giving the order, but he was too much engrossed with other affairs.19"

"There is nothing in the history of this day, as revealed by McClellan's dispatches, that shows any indifference, or want of energy on McClellan's part, but to the contrary. All the suggestions made by him were proper, and were approved by Halleck, and from whom he received no censure, because of Franklin's failure to go forward."

Generally the whole chapter is probably the best summary of events written. In short:

1. McClellan did nothing militarily wrong, and was right in every particular
2. Pope was engaged in a fantasy that he was winning
3. Halleck came to believe Pope's fantasy and discount McClellan's realistic information, until it all came crashing down.

(edit)

Carman concludes:

"It has been freely and very unjustly charged against McClellan, Franklin, and even Sumner that they withheld help from Pope and thereby caused his defeat at the Second Manassas. We believe the charge utterly groundless and that each and every one of them, was actuated by a loyal devotion to country and we think the records prove it. We have gone into some detail to present the facts and shall briefly review them.71"

(continues with a summary)
 
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"At Manassas" indeed, for the troops actually engaged on the field were Jackson's and Longstreet's wings and Anderson's divisions:

Jackson: 28,000
Longstreet and Anderson: 29,800

= 57,800

On the 30th this had been reduced to ca. 55,000 by casualties.

Of course, DH Hill's wing was so close that some authors include the lead brigades of it. Had Pope not collapsed on the 30th, Lee would have had part of another 28,000 effectives.

The whole force totaled about 86,200 effectives. To convert to present (the normal category for estimates) the relationship is:

View attachment 371190

86,200 * 1.1934 = 103,000 (rounded)

There was another division that didn't come north, raising Lee's whole force to ca. 96,200 (115,000).

McClellan didn't have a crystal ball to know that Lee had left a division to protect Richmond. The estimate is perfectly reasonable.
Sorry but as I've said many times, the numbers get horribly manipulated here. I'll go with the commonly accepted numbers. That's 55,000. And since McClellan had just come from the vicinity of Richmond, he very well should have known Lee left a force there.
 
Rafuse's book is sorely lacking, because it relies heavily on Hennessey's Return to Bull Run. This is an excellent book for 2nd Bull Run but pays very little attention to McClellan. Hence a whole slew of information is missing from Rafuse. As an example, a frustrated McClellan boarded the steamer Ariel and went to Washington to confront Halleck at 1 a.m., getting him out of bed. Not in Rafuse, because it's not in Hennessey. I first read of it in Cozzens' Pope biography.

Carman wrote a very incisive analysis, which he summarised in Vol. 1:

"McClellan arrived at Alexandria on the evening of August 26th and reported by telegraph to Halleck next morning. As fast as his troops arrived they were virtually taken from him and he was reduced to the command of a few orderlies, camp guards and construction parties, instead of being put in command of the combined forces of himself and Pope, as General Halleck had, on more than one occasion, indicated. He assured Halleck of his readiness to lend any assistance in his power, but complained of the extreme difficulty of doing anything while his power was curtailed and his position undefined. Meanwhile Secretary Stanton and his associates in the cabinet had formed a resolution that no more should McClellan command any army of the Union, and they were jubilant when Pope reported a great victory on the field of Second Manassas. They looked upon Pope as the coming man and could not conceal their intense pleasure in the apparent utter downfall of McClellan.6

There was a sudden transformation. Early on the morning of September 1st it began to dawn upon Halleck's mind that Pope's reported victories were defeats, and this impression was confirmed by a dispatch from Pope that the enemy was undeniably feeling for his right, upon which he telegraphed Pope: "If the enemy moves as your last telegram indicates, and you engage him to-day without a decisive victory, I suggest a gradual drawing of your army to Fairfax Court House, Annandale or, if necessary, farther south, toward Alexandria." He then sent for McClellan and gave him verbal directions to take charge of the defenses of Washington, expressly limiting his jurisdiction to the works and their garrisons, and prohibiting him from exercising any control over the troops actively engaged under Pope.7"

There is a really full account of events in Vol 3, which begins:

"It is now generally conceded that the sad reverses to Pope's army were due to the insistence of Halleck in the effort to unite the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Virginia on the line of the Rappahannock. At the time Halleck, Pope, and their friends contended that the campaign would have been successful and that Lee would have been defeated, August 30th, had proper support been given Pope, and the absence of this support was charged principally against McClellan.1"

later writing:

"Up to this time Halleck, beyond tardily yielding to McClellan's suggestion to bringSumner from Aquia to Washington, had done absolutely nothing to assist Pope, nor to help McClellan and Franklin in getting the latter ready to start for the front. Washington was full of horses, wagons, artillery, and supplies of every kind, and those were in Halleck's hands, not in McClellan's. McClellan had no control over them in any way; Franklin and his division commanders were snubbed when they asked for them, and it was clearly Halleck's duty, as commander-in-chief of the army, to see to this and to see to it promptly. All could be done by giving the order, but he was too much engrossed with other affairs.19"

"There is nothing in the history of this day, as revealed by McClellan's dispatches, that shows any indifference, or want of energy on McClellan's part, but to the contrary. All the suggestions made by him were proper, and were approved by Halleck, and from whom he received no censure, because of Franklin's failure to go forward."

Generally the whole chapter is probably the best summary of events written. In short:

1. McClellan did nothing militarily wrong, and was right in every particular
2. Pope was engaged in a fantasy that he was winning
3. Halleck came to believe Pope's fantasy and discount McClellan's realistic information, until it all came crashing down.

(edit)

Carman concludes:

"It has been freely and very unjustly charged against McClellan, Franklin, and even Sumner that they withheld help from Pope and thereby caused his defeat at the Second Manassas. We believe the charge utterly groundless and that each and every one of them, was actuated by a loyal devotion to country and we think the records prove it. We have gone into some detail to present the facts and shall briefly review them.71"

(continues with a summary)
From Carman Volume 3:

We now know that Franklin would have had no serious​
opposition in reaching either Manassas or Centreville, on the​
28th, but McClellan did not then know it, nor did anyone in​
Washington know it. It must be admitted that on the 29th,
McClellan did not act with all of the Vigor expected of him, but​
this is attributable to his belief in the exaggerated rumors that​
Lee had 70,000 men or more in the Vicinity of Fairfax Court—​
House and, that to send Franklin beyond Annandale, was to​
send him to certain destruction.​

Even with Carman's apologism for McClellan, it's obvious that McClellan failed to aggressively send troops to Pope. Granted, Halleck does not look good in the situation either.

It should be noted that Carman was virulently anti-Halleck.
 
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Sorry but as I've said many times, the numbers get horribly manipulated here. I'll go with the commonly accepted numbers. That's 55,000.

Which is how numbers get manipulated. There's been a general interest in revising rebel numbers to reject lost cause dogma in the last few decades. It's fascinating that you believe this should be done selectively; accept the Lost Cause when it suits you and reject it when it doesn't...
 
Which is how numbers get manipulated. There's been a general interest in revising rebel numbers to reject lost cause dogma in the last few decades. It's fascinating that you believe this should be done selectively; accept the Lost Cause when it suits you and reject it when it doesn't...

The CSA was already struggling to supply and feed all of its troops even in 1862 their is a famous photo and description of CSA troops on the march in Lee's Maryland Campaign they were described as scarecrows and covered in dirt and ragged , Do you seriously think the CSA could field such vast numbers without having logistical issues , Even the Union was having serious problems supplying their armies at around this time if McClellan is to be believed.

Considering Lee took around 40,000 men into the Maryland and the common number accepted at Sharpsburg is around 33-38k i find the numbers you are quoting to be unrealistic to say the least.

Are you sure your not related to George? :tongue:.
 
Which is how numbers get manipulated. There's been a general interest in revising rebel numbers to reject lost cause dogma in the last few decades. It's fascinating that you believe this should be done selectively; accept the Lost Cause when it suits you and reject it when it doesn't...
It's not accepting the Lost Cause. It's accepting the work of credible historians. Random people on the internet are not a credible source.
 
DanSBHawk said:


It's not accepting the Lost Cause. It's accepting the work of credible historians. Random people on the internet are not a credible source.
Ah, so that stalwart of the Lost Cause, William Allan, is transformed into a "credible historian" by "lost cause washing".


Scott1967 said:


Considering Lee took around 40,000 men into the Maryland and the common number accepted at Sharpsburg is around 33-38k i find the numbers you are quoting to be unrealistic to say the least.
He didn't. He led approximately 76,000 effectives into Maryland, by the rebels own available returns. The supposed weakness of the rebels at Antietam is a major plank of the Lost Cause, and it's not certain they that few. Their own returns show that 36,418 in the infantry divisions, plus about 771 reserve artillery and about 5,761 cavalry (these being the first returns after the battle) = ca. 42,950 effectives after the battle. They acknowledge 13,724 casualties on the 17th, implies about 56,674 at Antietam.

The first complete return after Antietam (10th October) lists 64,273 effectives remaining (implying ca. 77,997 effectives at the time of Antietam) and 78,204 present.

By November the numbers still hadn't recovered to the high of ca. 86,000 effectives Lee had in late August, having only 72,000 effectives after fighting 2nd Bull Run and Antietam. After this, forces start being ordered away (Evan's brigade at first, then Ranson's division). In fact the strength of the army (in effectives) from Antietam to the Overland Campaign is:

Date of ReturnEffective Strength (inc. offrs)Missing Units and Major Changes
30th September '6252,790Cavalry not reported
10th October '6264,273
20th October '6268,033
10th November '6270,909Arty Reserve not reported
20th November '6273,798Evans' Brigade has left
10th December '6278,513
20th December '6275,516
31st December '6276,799
31st January '6378,079Ransom's Division has left
28th February '6362,607Longstreet detached with 3 divisions and some cavalry
31st March '6364,799
20th May '6367,562Longstreet has rejoined
31st May '6374,459
31st July '6345,396Cavalry not reported
10th August '6358,666
20th August '6359,260
31st August61,202
10th September '6346,184Longstreet detached
20th September '6347,080
30th September '6348,0671 Bde not reported
31st October '6349,502
10th December '6349,580
20th December '6346,9912 bdes detached
31st December '6347,1272 bdes detached
10th January '6446,9132 bdes detached
31st January '6438,614many bdes missing from return
10th February '6433,989very incomplete
20th February41,4353 bdes detached, some not reported
10th March '6439,634Cavalry corps not reported etc.
20th March '6447,405First complete return since January (similar strength, has been ca. 47,000 the whole period)
10th April '6452,952
20th April54,344

If Lee hadn't lost Evans and Ransom, he would have returned back to ca. 85,000 effectives in January '63. When his whole force was up, he typically had 75-80,000 effectives.
 
Ah, so that stalwart of the Lost Cause, William Allan, is transformed into a "credible historian" by "lost cause washing".
Are you saying that John Hennessy is a Lost Causer? From his book, Return to Bull Run: The Campaign and Battle of Second Manassas:

"The toils of the campaign had reduced the army​
dramatically. The nine thousand men lost at Manassas and Chantilly​
were only slightly more than the losses from straggling and​
desertions. On August 15 Lee had counted probably fifty-five​
thousand men in his army. On September 3, despite the addition of​
three new divisions totaling about nine thousand men, the number​
was only about fifty thousand."​

As I said, I'll go with credible historians rather than random people on the internet.
 
Are you saying that John Hennessy is a Lost Causer? From his book, Return to Bull Run: The Campaign and Battle of Second Manassas:

"So what you're saying is..."

No, you are confusing different numbers. The number of rebels that actually fought on 30th August, and the number that Lee had with him. They are not the same thing.

A bit like stripping down McClellan's strength at Antietam to only those that actually fought. It wouldn't be accepted for McClellan. One wonders why you do it for Lee.
 
"So what you're saying is..."

No, you are confusing different numbers. The number of rebels that actually fought on 30th August, and the number that Lee had with him. They are not the same thing.

A bit like stripping down McClellan's strength at Antietam to only those that actually fought. It wouldn't be accepted for McClellan. One wonders why you do it for Lee.
As Hennessy writes, "55,000 men in his army." He didn't limit the number only to those who fought.

And McClellan's words again:
"the enemy with 120,000 men intend advancing on the forts near Arlington and Chain Bridge, with a View of attacking Washington & Baltimore."
 
As Hennessy writes, "55,000 men in his army." He didn't limit the number only to those who fought.

Then he is wrong and is repeating Lost Cause propaganda. Here's the chain.

Hennessey cites Sears as his source.
Sears gives no citation. He may have simply pulled the number of of thin air.

However, Sears' numbers match precisely the numbers of the Lost Causer William Allan, and Harsh noted:

"Contemporary historian Stephen Sears concluded, "Reinforcements from Richmond … were at hand or on the way, but they barely made good the 9,000 men lost at Bull Run and Chantilly. On this date [September 3] Lee could count perhaps 50,000 troops with which to undertake his expedition beyond the Confederacy's northern frontier." 37 Sears offers no source for his figures, but the echo is so strong as to suggest he adopted Allan's views."

Harsh, Joseph L. Sounding the Shallows: A Confederate Compendium for the Maryland Campaign of 1862 (Kindle Locations 4278-4282). The Kent State University Press. Kindle Edition.

So there you have it.

The Lost Cause pleaded weakness. Sears "laundered" the figure by using it without proper citation and made it "credible". Hennessey was fooled it using it, trusting that Sears wasn't simply spouting Lost Cause mythology. Which he was.

Or, to paraphrase your argument in a condensed form, you believe "the Lost Cause is credible, at least when it's attacking McClellan".
 
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Then he is wrong and is repeating Lost Cause propaganda. Here's the chain.

Hennessey cites Sears as his source.
Sears gives no citation. He may have simply pulled the number of of thin air.

However, Sears' numbers match precisely the numbers of the Lost Causer William Allan, and Harsh noted:

"Contemporary historian Stephen Sears concluded, "Reinforcements from Richmond … were at hand or on the way, but they barely made good the 9,000 men lost at Bull Run and Chantilly. On this date [September 3] Lee could count perhaps 50,000 troops with which to undertake his expedition beyond the Confederacy's northern frontier." 37 Sears offers no source for his figures, but the echo is so strong as to suggest he adopted Allan's views."

Harsh, Joseph L. Sounding the Shallows: A Confederate Compendium for the Maryland Campaign of 1862 (Kindle Locations 4278-4282). The Kent State University Press. Kindle Edition.

So there you have it.

The Lost Cause pleaded weakness. Sears "laundered" the figure by using it without proper citation and made it "credible". Hennessey was fooled it using it, trusting that Sears wasn't simply spouting Lost Cause mythology. Which he was.

Or, to paraphrase your argument in a condensed form, you believe "the Lost Cause is credible, at least when it's attacking McClellan".
I've never said the Lost Cause is credible. The historians who study and write about these battles, and are respected, have more credibility than internet fans that manipulate the numbers to make McClellan look good.

McClellan's warning of an imminent attack by 120,000 confederates was ridiculous.
 
"So what you're saying is..."

No, you are confusing different numbers. The number of rebels that actually fought on 30th August, and the number that Lee had with him. They are not the same thing.

A bit like stripping down McClellan's strength at Antietam to only those that actually fought. It wouldn't be accepted for McClellan. One wonders why you do it for Lee.

Tigers you still haven't answered my question about supply's instead your throwing numbers around like their blades of grass.

Lee did not lead 76,000 men into Maryland considering the accepted numbers at 2nd Bull Run for the CSA was around 45-50k , If you take off the 9k casualties and the casualties at Chantilly that leaves Lee with around 36-42k effective's , Lee did receive reinforcements of around 10k which took his total to around 50-54k but the actual number that crossed into Maryland is accepted to be around 40-45k due to many troops refusing to cross the Potomac.

Their is not a cat in hell's chance that Richmond could have supplied 76,000 men on such short notice literally 3 days after Chantilly by the 7th of September Lee had crossed and was into Maryland and his troops were living on short rations many still not having proper shoes or boots.

Numbers on paper do not make up for common sense from a logistical stand point your numbers don't add up , Remember Lee had around 90k men in the 7 days battles he lost around 20K and another 11k at 2nd Bull Run and Chantilly that reduces him down to 70K and Richmond still needed to be defended.
 
Tigers you still haven't answered my question about supply's instead your throwing numbers around like their blades of grass.

Did you ask a question? Oh, I see. No question mark. I took it as a rhetorical device.

Lee DID historically cross the Potomac at the head of about 76,000 effectives. Of course, the Lost Cause desperately tried to deny it and minimise numbers, as they've done for other campaigns. You are repeating their attempts to explain away Lee's defeat.

To be clear four different methodologies derived this strength thus:

2a. A Survey of the Confederate Survey Records

In the early 1990's, the late Prof. Joseph Harsh had a PhD student trawl the CSR's to find the strength of Lee's army in early September. The masters dissertation has never been published, but Harsh extensively used it in his Maryland Campaign trilogy. The headline summary (by division) is given in table 24 in Sounding the Shallows and is 75,528 PFD. It appears this may be PFD as the rebels at the time defined it, so excluding extra-duty men etc. Although Allen (the student) could only find actual strength data for 25% of the companies in the army, he was able to estimate the rest from older data, or post-Antietam data combined with casualty counts.

2b. Add forward

Starting from the last available returns for formations, we can deduct casualties at 2nd Bull Run and derive an estimate. Livermore did this and estimated 77,135 before 2nd BR. However, his estimate is flawed in places. Starting with the 20th July return, Livermore included Rhett's artillery, which was the garrison artillery of Richmond, and Wise's Brigade, which was left in the garrison. He failed to give numbers for several units that served in Maryland. These include Lawton's Brigade (2,041 on 13th August), Drayton's Brigade and Evans' Brigade (joined 28th July with, according to Allen, 4,600), the 5th and 8th Florida (1,448 according to a different Allen), and the 2nd Virginia (273).

Harsh found 2,200 North Carolina recruits joined just before they left Richmond (Taken and the Flood, fn 76 to chapter 1).

Taking the forces left at Richmond at 3,300 (1,300 for Wise and 2,000 for Rhett), these total 84,397 before 2nd Bull Run, and deducting casualties gives 76,126 PFD.

2c. Add back


Starting from the returns after Antietam, the casualties can be added back to make an estimate. The first complete return after Antietam is 10th October, and Gene Thorpe has done this calculation, finding 77,769 PFD.

2d. Observations of the forces

Some people counted the forces they say. Gene Thorpe has done a wonderful job collating what he could find. Most observations were around Frederick, which the rebel army marched through. It should be noted that the cavalry, Walker's division and G.B. Anderson's brigade of D.H. Hill's division didn't march through Frederick.

The most commonly quoted observation is that of Dr. Steiner. In his diary for the 10th September he noted that the column that passed through that day took 16 hours to pass his house, and was about 64,000 men, including several thousand "negros" mixed in with the regiments. These latter would not usually be included on the returns. He noted that some rebel regiments were as weak as 150 men, and that none were more than 500. This latter point is not quite true, as a few were over 500, such as the recruit swollen 1,000 man 5th North Carolina The average regiment of 10 coys was 411 strong. The next day he watched the 8,000 men of D.H. Hill's division (minus G.B. Anderson) march through (after the wagon train one believes). The 69,000-70,000 men (exc/ the non-whites who would not be counted as troops) is consistent with the calculations above, after estimating the cavalry and 3 infantry brigades that didn't pass through.

These are PFD numbers, and the actual moving column is in fact larger. As David Powell notes here, the actual number of men moving was probably between 90,000 and 100,000. Thus McClellan's estimates perhaps aren't that fanciful. Of course, it appears that the rebels suffered a huge dose of straggling...

As Tidball wrote in his Artillery Service in the War of the Rebellion:

"Lee had present on the field two corps of nine divisions comprising 40 brigades of 185 regiments of infantry. McClellan had present six corps of 15 divisions comprising 44 brigades of 186 regiments of infantry.

The former [Lee] was slightly superior to the latter in cavalry, but as there was no opportunity for this arm on the field , it did not count on either side. The horse batteries of both sides were, however, actively engaged.

While the infantry of the two opposing armies was almost identical in point of numbers, McClellan was greatly superior in artillery. Lee had on the field 73 batteries of 288 guns; McClellan had 55 batteries of 322 guns, a difference in favor of the latter of 34 pieces. But this disparity was more than offset for by Lee's superiority of organization...."

Of course, Tidball assumes that all regiments are equal. Whilst a few of Lee's NC regiments were very full (see the 5th NC which entered Maryland a full regiment of 1,000), most were pretty empty. Then again, so were the Federal regiments, however, the Federals had quite a few full new regiments, so they're likely fuller on average.
 
Did you ask a question? Oh, I see. No question mark. I took it as a rhetorical device.

Lee DID historically cross the Potomac at the head of about 76,000 effectives. Of course, the Lost Cause desperately tried to deny it and minimise numbers, as they've done for other campaigns. You are repeating their attempts to explain away Lee's defeat.

To be clear four different methodologies derived this strength thus:

2a. A Survey of the Confederate Survey Records

In the early 1990's, the late Prof. Joseph Harsh had a PhD student trawl the CSR's to find the strength of Lee's army in early September. The masters dissertation has never been published, but Harsh extensively used it in his Maryland Campaign trilogy. The headline summary (by division) is given in table 24 in Sounding the Shallows and is 75,528 PFD. It appears this may be PFD as the rebels at the time defined it, so excluding extra-duty men etc. Although Allen (the student) could only find actual strength data for 25% of the companies in the army, he was able to estimate the rest from older data, or post-Antietam data combined with casualty counts.

2b. Add forward

Starting from the last available returns for formations, we can deduct casualties at 2nd Bull Run and derive an estimate. Livermore did this and estimated 77,135 before 2nd BR. However, his estimate is flawed in places. Starting with the 20th July return, Livermore included Rhett's artillery, which was the garrison artillery of Richmond, and Wise's Brigade, which was left in the garrison. He failed to give numbers for several units that served in Maryland. These include Lawton's Brigade (2,041 on 13th August), Drayton's Brigade and Evans' Brigade (joined 28th July with, according to Allen, 4,600), the 5th and 8th Florida (1,448 according to a different Allen), and the 2nd Virginia (273).

Harsh found 2,200 North Carolina recruits joined just before they left Richmond (Taken and the Flood, fn 76 to chapter 1).

Taking the forces left at Richmond at 3,300 (1,300 for Wise and 2,000 for Rhett), these total 84,397 before 2nd Bull Run, and deducting casualties gives 76,126 PFD.

2c. Add back


Starting from the returns after Antietam, the casualties can be added back to make an estimate. The first complete return after Antietam is 10th October, and Gene Thorpe has done this calculation, finding 77,769 PFD.

2d. Observations of the forces

Some people counted the forces they say. Gene Thorpe has done a wonderful job collating what he could find. Most observations were around Frederick, which the rebel army marched through. It should be noted that the cavalry, Walker's division and G.B. Anderson's brigade of D.H. Hill's division didn't march through Frederick.

The most commonly quoted observation is that of Dr. Steiner. In his diary for the 10th September he noted that the column that passed through that day took 16 hours to pass his house, and was about 64,000 men, including several thousand "negros" mixed in with the regiments. These latter would not usually be included on the returns. He noted that some rebel regiments were as weak as 150 men, and that none were more than 500. This latter point is not quite true, as a few were over 500, such as the recruit swollen 1,000 man 5th North Carolina The average regiment of 10 coys was 411 strong. The next day he watched the 8,000 men of D.H. Hill's division (minus G.B. Anderson) march through (after the wagon train one believes). The 69,000-70,000 men (exc/ the non-whites who would not be counted as troops) is consistent with the calculations above, after estimating the cavalry and 3 infantry brigades that didn't pass through.

These are PFD numbers, and the actual moving column is in fact larger. As David Powell notes here, the actual number of men moving was probably between 90,000 and 100,000. Thus McClellan's estimates perhaps aren't that fanciful. Of course, it appears that the rebels suffered a huge dose of straggling...

As Tidball wrote in his Artillery Service in the War of the Rebellion:

"Lee had present on the field two corps of nine divisions comprising 40 brigades of 185 regiments of infantry. McClellan had present six corps of 15 divisions comprising 44 brigades of 186 regiments of infantry.

The former [Lee] was slightly superior to the latter in cavalry, but as there was no opportunity for this arm on the field , it did not count on either side. The horse batteries of both sides were, however, actively engaged.

While the infantry of the two opposing armies was almost identical in point of numbers, McClellan was greatly superior in artillery. Lee had on the field 73 batteries of 288 guns; McClellan had 55 batteries of 322 guns, a difference in favor of the latter of 34 pieces. But this disparity was more than offset for by Lee's superiority of organization...."

Of course, Tidball assumes that all regiments are equal. Whilst a few of Lee's NC regiments were very full (see the 5th NC which entered Maryland a full regiment of 1,000), most were pretty empty. Then again, so were the Federal regiments, however, the Federals had quite a few full new regiments, so they're likely fuller on average.

Your fixation on numbers does not account for Lee's drastic actions at Sharpsburg in fact it reinforces the fact that Lee was fighting for his life being severely out numbed and out gunned , The fact that Lee could only have 500 men defending Burnside Bridge the Fact that the Texas brigade was rushed straight into line after a long march without food for 2 days , The fact that Lee always had one eye open for AP Hill to arrive all contrive to support the evidence that Lee was in a desperate situation.

Look to be frank with you everyone including Lincoln and his cabinet knew McClellan failed to support Pope , Failed to pursue Lee after Sharpsburg even though he had 30k fresh troops , Failed in his ultimate goal to capture Richmond after losing his nerve and while i admire you for trying to defend Mac even though you tend to ignore common sense and the fact that he was a detestable horrid man to everyone who he felt was his inferior you have to admit he Failed in all his objectives but one to stop Lee in Maryland and he only did that by having superior numbers.

Personally i think you need to focus on why Lee used his forces the way he did at Sharpsburg instead of adding phantom numbers that really don't make any sense , If Lee had 50k at Sharpsburg why did he have only 500 men defending a crucial crossing point near his line of retreat?.
 
Your fixation on numbers does not account for Lee's drastic actions at Sharpsburg

Lee had scattered his army to the four winds in an attempt to do many things at once. McClellan's "inconvenient" assault on South Mountain meant Lee was scrambling to reassemble his army. Divisions force marched to try at reach the field, with some shedding half their strength in the effort. Many of the men retreating from South Mountain were scattered, and made their way back to the army slowly.

Lee didn't have only 500 men (and 3 batteries) defending Burnside's Bridge. He had about 5-10,000 in the vicinity, as Walker's Division, DR Jones' division and Munford's cavalry were within half a mile of it in the morning. Crisis after crisis caused him to send these forces elsewhere. Incidently, that's the textbook economy-of-force way of defending a defile.

Lincoln and his cabinet may have thought McClellan was wrong ca. 29th August. They were listening to Pope who was sending wild claims of pursing Jackson and being about to destroy them. Meanwhile McClellan was saying Pope had been cut-off and was in danger of being destroyed. Being the only man saying the Emperor is naked rarely endears one to the Emperor.

Lincoln, Halleck's etc. fantasy was shattered when Pope wrote on the morning of the 31st:

"I should like to know whether you feel secure about Washington should this army be destroyed? You must judge what is best to be done, having in view the safety of the capital."

What? McClellan has been right this whole time? Impossible! would be said.

McClellan of course did pursue Lee after Antietam.

McClellan didn't lose his nerve in front of Richmond. Lincoln, Stanton and Halleck did.
 

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