Say What? Saturday: The Chief Marplot

[Andy Cardinal]

This is one of my favorite Civil War quotes. It is often attributed to Lincoln, but is in reality from John Hay. On September 1, 1862, Hay wrote in his diary:

"We talked about the state of things by Bull Run and Pope's prospect. The President was very outspoken in regard to McClellan's present conduct. He said that it really seemed to him McC. wanted Pope defeated. He mentioned to me a despatch of McC.s in which he proposed, as one plan of action, to 'leave Pope to get out of his own scrape and devote ourselves to securing Washington.' He spoke also of McC's dreadful panic in the matter of Chain Bridge, which he had ordered blown up the night before, but which order had been countermanded; and also of his incomprehensible interference with Franklin's Corps which he recalled once, and then, when they had been sent ahead by Halleck's order, begged permission to recall them again; and only desisted after Halleck's sharp injunction to push them ahead till they whipped something, or got whipped themselves. The President seemed to think him a little crazy. Envy, jealousy and spite are probably a better explanation of his present conduct. He is constantly sending despatches to the President and Halleck asking what is his real position and command. He acts as chief alarmist and grand marplot of the army."

Marplot is a word not often seen, especially nowadays. A marplot is defined as "one who frustrates or ruins a plan or undertaking by meddling" -- an apt description of McClellan's actions in August 1862, at least from Lincoln's (and Hay's) perspective.

 

[Waterloo50]

View attachment 371009​

This is one of my favorite Civil War quotes. It is often attributed to Lincoln, but is in reality from John Hay. On September 1, 1862, Hay wrote in his diary:

"We talked about the state of things by Bull Run and Pope's prospect. The President was very outspoken in regard to McClellan's present conduct. He said that it really seemed to him McC. wanted Pope defeated. He mentioned to me a despatch of McC.s in which he proposed, as one plan of action, to 'leave Pope to get out of his own scrape and devote ourselves to securing Washington.' He spoke also of McC's dreadful panic in the matter of Chain Bridge, which he had ordered blown up the night before, but which order had been countermanded; and also of his incomprehensible interference with Franklin's Corps which he recalled once, and then, when they had been sent ahead by Halleck's order, begged permission to recall them again; and only desisted after Halleck's sharp injunction to push them ahead till they whipped something, or got whipped themselves. The President seemed to think him a little crazy. Envy, jealousy and spite are probably a better explanation of his present conduct. He is constantly sending despatches to the President and Halleck asking what is his real position and command. He acts as chief alarmist and grand marplot of the army."

Marplot is a word not often seen, especially nowadays. A marplot is defined as "one who frustrates or ruins a plan or undertaking by meddling" -- an apt description of McClellan's actions in August 1862, at least from Lincoln's (and Hay's) perspective.

Why was McClellan so fixed on the downfall of Pope, was it something to do with the blame game between Pope and Porter?

 

[Andy Cardinal]

Why was McClellan so fixed on the downfall of Pope, was it something to do with the blame game between Pope and Porter?

The accusations against Porter hadn't happened yet. But McClellan (correctly) saw that if Pope was successful his career was more or less over. He also had a strong personal dislike for Pope as a person and as a general. McClellanchad also written to his wife that any government that employed Pope deserved to fail.

 

[Waterloo50]

The accusations against Porter hadn't happened yet. But McClellan (correctly) saw that if Pope was successful his career was more or less over. He also had a strong personal dislike for Pope as a person and as a general. McClellanchad also written to his wife that any government that employed Pope deserved to fail.

Thanks, I was wondering if their was a single reason for McClellan's dislike, would it be correct to say that it was mostly about who could reach the top of the ladder first! Was Pope aware that McClellan was trying to undermine him?

 

[Andy Cardinal]

Thanks, I was wondering if their was a single reason for McClellan's dislike, would it be correct to say that it was mostly about who could reach the top of the ladder first! Was Pope aware that McClellan was trying to undermine him?

I'm sure Pope had a good idea that McClellan and Porter (among others) did not care for him. Another of my favorite civil war quotes comes from Porter: "I regret to see that General Pope has not improved since his youth and has now written himself down as what the military world has long known, an ***."

 

[Scott1967]

Thanks, I was wondering if their was a single reason for McClellan's dislike, would it be correct to say that it was mostly about who could reach the top of the ladder first! Was Pope aware that McClellan was trying to undermine him?

More than likely , I'm surprised the McClellan apologists haven't jumped on this already , Mac was a nasty piece of work the further i read about him the more i dislike him as a person and as a general horrid little man who would throw his own mother under the bus to further his ambitions.

 

[67th Tigers]

McClellan actually hoped Pope would succeed, but believed that he (Pope) was out of his depth. McClellan managed to get half the Army of the Potomac to Pope (5 divisions) before Pope was enveloped and cut off from McClellan's forces.

Franklin (the man) arrived in Washington on the 24th August. He went to see Halleck at 1600 who told him to go into camp at Alexandria and not to go forward until transportation was available. The infantry of 6th Corps offloaded on the 25th-26th, but by the night of the 27th the whole of 6th Corps only had 16 horses. There were plenty of horses and wagons available in Washington, but Halleck refused to release any to Franklin, citing feeding the men in the forts as more important.

On the afternoon of the 26th Halleck orders Franklin to go forward, less than hour later countermands the order (I will note that Hennessy misses the existence of the 2nd order countermanding the marching order), telling Franklin to wait until he has transport. The men of 6th Corps have 2 days rations in their packs and whatever ammunition they arrived with. The 16 horses are hauling 4 guns, each of which only has 10 rounds.

Halleck telegraphs McClellan that he should go from Aquia Creek to Alexandria and sort things out. He will arrive 0800 the next day

In the evening Haupt telegraphs Halleck that Bull Run Bridge is threatened. Halleck replies that Haupt should find any general officer and secure the bridge. Late that night Haupt finds Hancock, the most senior officer actually present, and arranges to sent Taylor's brigade plus two other regiments.

Situation late 26th - Halleck had ordered Franklin forward for the 27th and then rescinded the order. Franklin, Smith and Slocum are all in Washington, leaving Hancock in command at Alexandria. McClellan is at Aquia Landing, where Sumner's 2nd Corps is landing and Burnside is with Cox's division. He is under orders not to do anything. Hancock arranges with a small force of infantry to move to the Bull Run Bridge starting 0400 27th. McClellan boards a steamer heading to Alexandria that night.

On the 27th Taylor's expedition departs on time and runs straight into AP Hill's division. They are smashed.

McClellan reports by telegraph he has arrived at 0800. McClellan starts sending regular updates, sending over a dozen despatches on the 27th. His intent to push 6th Corps forward without transport or artillery is nixed when he hears of Taylor's destruction. The situation has clarified that there is a strong enemy force between him and Pope, and McClellan asks Halleck for an order. Halleck buckled under the pressure, and in the evening send to McClellan "I have no time for details. You will therefore, as ranking general in the field, direct as you deem best; but at present orders for Pope's army should go through me."

Given that McClellan can't get a straight answer from Halleck, he boards the steamer Ariel. Arriving in Washington he goes to Halleck's house, gets him out of bed at 1 a.m. on the 28th, and has a conversation with him. Him and a few staff spend the morning of the 28th chasing down the missing corps and division commanders of 6th Corps, and securing transport for 6th Corps. Parts of 12th Corps' trains were found sitting in Washington but Halleck had ignored requests for them to be moved. McClellan gets them moving to Alexandria, along with 2 squadrons of cavalry he found. McClellan returns to Alexandria in the after, Franklin et al. in tow and reports his arrival at 1610 hrs. Halleck replies and states Sumner, Cox and Taylor should be put into the defences. No mention of the disposition of the remaining 5 bdes of 6th Corps is made, and so McClellan orders them to advance at 0600 the next morning.

Situation late 28th - Sumner's corps, Cox's division and Taylor's bde is under orders to move into the Washington defences. Two sqns of cavalry are coming down, and Banks' supply train is heading to Alexandria. The remainder of 6th Corps is under orders to move forward at dawn.

On the 29th Franklin advances as proposed. McClellan sends several telegrams to Halleck asking how far they should advance. Lincoln asks McClellan directly what they should do. McClellan frankly replies that either Pope should fight his way back to them, or they should push everything to get to him. Lincoln sends at 1610 a message endorsing option 2, which officially became the policy finally.

Meanwhile at 1448 hrs Halleck clarified that Franklin's movement was only a recce; "I want Franklin's corps to go far enough to find out something about the enemy. Perhaps he may get such information at Annandale as to prevent his going further; otherwise he will push on towards Fairfax".

There is anger at Washington that Baldy Smith stopped at Annandale (Franklin was still at Alexandria, sorting out his logistcs). McClellan stepped in and took the blame. It is well understood that McClellan protected Franklin, and in 1864 when the idea of calling Franklin to command was mooted Halleck told Grant: "Genl. Franklin would not give satisfaction. The President ordered him to be tried for negligence & disobedience of orders when here before, but Genl McClellan assumed the responsibility of his repeated delays in obeying orders."

McClellan had already ordered the advance to resume at 0600 next morning before Halleck contacted him. They did. They reach Centreville on the afternoon of the 30th to find Pope has already broken. McClellan forms the available forces into a line along the Cub Run, which halts Jackson's pursuit. Once Pope's army linked up with the 6th and 2nd Corps, as per Halleck's orders they transfer to Pope's command leaving McClellan with no forces.

McClellan didn't "order the chain bridge blown up". At midday of the 30th (i.e. before all forces were finally removed from him) an order went to Barnard for Captain Ellis to be prepared if necessary to fire the bridge, i.e. it was a contingency that was prepared for. That Hay (or Lincoln) can't tell the difference between a contingency and a positive order is telling.

 

[Cavalier]

Forty + years reading about McClellan and I still don't know what to think of him. Halleck however, I believe was a weasel. At least I have learned what a marplot is.

John

 

[Andy Cardinal]

This is an interesting episode overall. Welles believed that Pope's promotion was part of a plot by Stanton and Chase to overthrow (if that's the right to term) McClellan. Lincoln seems to have at least partly drawn into it, although I believe Lincoln still retained positive personal opinion of McClellan. Stanton wanted him court martialed as an example. That example later became Porter.

Halleck was supposed to manage this mess. It is,easy to see how he unwillingly walked into a terrible situation and was probably paralyzed by the politics of it all.

 

[Saruman]

View attachment 371009​

This is one of my favorite Civil War quotes. It is often attributed to Lincoln, but is in reality from John Hay. On September 1, 1862, Hay wrote in his diary:

"We talked about the state of things by Bull Run and Pope's prospect. The President was very outspoken in regard to McClellan's present conduct. He said that it really seemed to him McC. wanted Pope defeated. He mentioned to me a despatch of McC.s in which he proposed, as one plan of action, to 'leave Pope to get out of his own scrape and devote ourselves to securing Washington.' He spoke also of McC's dreadful panic in the matter of Chain Bridge, which he had ordered blown up the night before, but which order had been countermanded; and also of his incomprehensible interference with Franklin's Corps which he recalled once, and then, when they had been sent ahead by Halleck's order, begged permission to recall them again; and only desisted after Halleck's sharp injunction to push them ahead till they whipped something, or got whipped themselves. The President seemed to think him a little crazy. Envy, jealousy and spite are probably a better explanation of his present conduct. He is constantly sending despatches to the President and Halleck asking what is his real position and command. He acts as chief alarmist and grand marplot of the army."

Marplot is a word not often seen, especially nowadays. A marplot is defined as "one who frustrates or ruins a plan or undertaking by meddling" -- an apt description of McClellan's actions in August 1862, at least from Lincoln's (and Hay's) perspective.

Like Sturgis, I don't care for John Pope one pinch of owl dung. In 1847, Braxton Bragg wrote to his friend:

After the battle of Buena Vista in 1847, Lieutenant John Pope and a friend "kidnapped two Mexican women, one only 14 years old… for carnal purposes. [These girls]… live with them now, and ride [throughout] the city with them in defiance of decency in an open carriage."

 

[DanSBHawk]

On the 29th Franklin advances as proposed. McClellan sends several telegrams to Halleck asking how far they should advance. Lincoln asks McClellan directly what they should do. McClellan frankly replies that either Pope should fight his way back to them, or they should push everything to get to him. Lincoln sends at 1610 a message endorsing option 2, which officially became the policy finally.

Lincoln did not ask McClellan what should be done. Lincoln knew very well what should be done: Defeat the confederate army. McClellan didn't seem as if he knew that. Here is how Ethan Rafuse describes this incident in his book McClellans War:

Perhaps sensing that Halleck's grasp on the situation and command authority was increasingly shaky.​

Lincoln decided to personally telegraph McClellan asking. "What news from direction of Manassas​

Junction? What generally?" McClellan responded by writing to Lincoln and Halleck to tell them "very​

plainly." he later told his wife, "what I think ought to be done." The time had come. he advised Lincoln, to​

decide between two irreconcilable courses of action. These were: "lst To concentrate all our available​

forces to open communication with Pope - 2nd To leave Pope to get out of his scrape & at once use all our​

means to make the Capital safe." He assured Lincoln and Halleck that he would "do all in my power" to​

carry out their wishes and only asked that they make their decisions promptly and clearly lay out "what my​

orders and authority are." McClellan was less diplomatic in a letter to his wife fifteen minutes later. "I have​

a terrible task on my hands now - perfect imbecility to correct. No means to act with, no authority - yet​

determined if possible to save the country. . . Two of my corps will either save that fool Pope or be​

sacrificed."​

​

Lincoln immediately advised McClellan that he thought "your first alternative, to wit, 'to concentrate all​

our available forces to open communication to Pope: is the right one." Privately, Lincoln was furious at​

McClellan to a degree that surprised those who came into contact With him. McClellan's dismissal of Pope's​

active engagement with the Confederates as a mere "scrape" that it was his responsibility to "get out of."​

rather than an opportunity for a victory to which every effort must be made to take advantage of - or a​

defeat that every effort must be made to prevent - infuriated Lincoln in no small part because of the​

personal stake he had in Pope's operations.​

​

 

[DanSBHawk]

This is an interesting episode overall. Welles believed that Pope's promotion was part of a plot by Stanton and Chase to overthrow (if that's the right to term) McClellan. Lincoln seems to have at least partly drawn into it, although I believe Lincoln still retained positive personal opinion of McClellan. Stanton wanted him court martialed as an example. That example later became Porter.

Halleck was supposed to manage this mess. It is,easy to see how he unwillingly walked into a terrible situation and was probably paralyzed by the politics of it all.

Apparently, Chase thought McClellan should be shot.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

Apparently, Chase thought McClellan should be shot.

Yes -- although from memory I thought it was Stanton.

 

[DanSBHawk]

View attachment 371009​

This is one of my favorite Civil War quotes. It is often attributed to Lincoln, but is in reality from John Hay. On September 1, 1862, Hay wrote in his diary:

"We talked about the state of things by Bull Run and Pope's prospect. The President was very outspoken in regard to McClellan's present conduct. He said that it really seemed to him McC. wanted Pope defeated. He mentioned to me a despatch of McC.s in which he proposed, as one plan of action, to 'leave Pope to get out of his own scrape and devote ourselves to securing Washington.' He spoke also of McC's dreadful panic in the matter of Chain Bridge, which he had ordered blown up the night before, but which order had been countermanded; and also of his incomprehensible interference with Franklin's Corps which he recalled once, and then, when they had been sent ahead by Halleck's order, begged permission to recall them again; and only desisted after Halleck's sharp injunction to push them ahead till they whipped something, or got whipped themselves. The President seemed to think him a little crazy. Envy, jealousy and spite are probably a better explanation of his present conduct. He is constantly sending despatches to the President and Halleck asking what is his real position and command. He acts as chief alarmist and grand marplot of the army."

Marplot is a word not often seen, especially nowadays. A marplot is defined as "one who frustrates or ruins a plan or undertaking by meddling" -- an apt description of McClellan's actions in August 1862, at least from Lincoln's (and Hay's) perspective.

In keeping with the "chief alarmist" name, on August 28th McClellan had warned Halleck that Lee had 120,000 men in the area, over double what Lee actually had.

 

[67th Tigers]

What is interesting to read are the letters between Pope and Halleck after the matter. They essentially boil down to Pope refusing to accept any blame for his actions and demanding that either Halleck or McClellan take the fall for him. He keeps implying he was dirt on Halleck in an attempt to blackmail him, either Halleck remove McClellan and action the court-martial of Porter, or Pope would make Halleck's position untenable, and Pope also wanted to be rewarded for his loyalty to the government (read the Republican administration).. He revealed openly in 1865 that he had evidence Halleck had falsified reports from Corinth.

Halleck for his part initially ignored Pope's clumsy attempt at blackmail, but in November noted that there was a movement to blame him (Halleck) for the Bull Run debacle. Suddenly Halleck got friendly with Pope and actioned the order to remove McClellan (which he'd had for two days) and court-martial Porter.

 

[67th Tigers]

In keeping with the "chief alarmist" name, on August 28th McClellan had warned Halleck that Lee had 120,000 men in the area, over double what Lee actually had.

Lee's army at the time was approximately 96,000 effectives (ca. 120,000 present). On the 28th the whole force bar a division under GW Smith was in theatre, with the arrival of DH Hill, Walker, McLaws etc.

McClellan predicted that if Pope was defeated, Lee would cross the upper Potomac, exactly as he did, and the Federals should be ready to march on them, exactly as they did.

Owen has converted everything into effectives, and the balance was:

Pope's Force
Sigel: 14,500
Banks 12,100
McDowell: 22,100
Pennsylvania Reserve Division: 6,800
Heintzelman: 14,300 (Kearny: 6,600 and Hooker: 7,700)
Porter: 9,800 (Morell: 4,800* and Sykes: 4,000)
Reno: 7,400
Det. Cox: 1,400
Piatt: 900
= 89,300 effectives

Other field forces
Sumner: 11,100 (Richardson: 4,700 and Sedgwick: 6,400)
Franklin: 11,200 (Slocum: 5,100 and Smith: 6,000)
Couch: 5,100
Cavalry: 4,000
Artillery Reserve: 600
= 32,000
Burnside: 4,000
Cox: 3,600
Total = 39,600 effectives

vs
Jackson: 28,000
Longstreet and Anderson: 29,800
DH Hill: 28,400
= 86,200 effectives (ca. 120,000 present)

 

[DanSBHawk]

Lee's army at the time was approximately 96,000 effectives (ca. 120,000 present). On the 28th the whole force bar a division under GW Smith was in theatre, with the arrival of DH Hill, Walker, McLaws etc.

McClellan predicted that if Pope was defeated, Lee would cross the upper Potomac, exactly as he did, and the Federals should be ready to march on them, exactly as they did.

Owen has converted everything into effectives, and the balance was:

Pope's Force
Sigel: 14,500
Banks 12,100
McDowell: 22,100
Pennsylvania Reserve Division: 6,800
Heintzelman: 14,300 (Kearny: 6,600 and Hooker: 7,700)
Porter: 9,800 (Morell: 4,800* and Sykes: 4,000)
Reno: 7,400
Det. Cox: 1,400
Piatt: 900
= 89,300 effectives

Other field forces
Sumner: 11,100 (Richardson: 4,700 and Sedgwick: 6,400)
Franklin: 11,200 (Slocum: 5,100 and Smith: 6,000)
Couch: 5,100
Cavalry: 4,000
Artillery Reserve: 600
= 32,000
Burnside: 4,000
Cox: 3,600
Total = 39,600 effectives

vs
Jackson: 28,000
Longstreet and Anderson: 29,800
DH Hill: 28,400
= 86,200 effectives (ca. 120,000 present)

"In theatre?" McClellan wasn't referring to the number of confederates in the entire theater. This is what he sent Halleck on the 28th:

"Reports numerous from various sources. that Lee &​

Stuart with large forces are at Manassas. That the enemy​

with 120,000 men intend advancing on the forts near​

Arlington and Chain Bridge, with a View of attacking​

Washington & Baltimore."​

The accepted number for Lee at 2nd Manassas is about 55,000.

 

[TerryB]

cool word...wish I could use it in a sentence.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

Lincoln did not ask McClellan what should be done. Lincoln knew very well what should be done: Defeat the confederate army. McClellan didn't seem as if he knew that. Here is how Ethan Rafuse describes this incident in his book McClellans War:

Perhaps sensing that Halleck's grasp on the situation and command authority was increasingly shaky.​

Lincoln decided to personally telegraph McClellan asking. "What news from direction of Manassas​

Junction? What generally?" McClellan responded by writing to Lincoln and Halleck to tell them "very​

plainly." he later told his wife, "what I think ought to be done." The time had come. he advised Lincoln, to​

decide between two irreconcilable courses of action. These were: "lst To concentrate all our available​

forces to open communication with Pope - 2nd To leave Pope to get out of his scrape & at once use all our​

means to make the Capital safe." He assured Lincoln and Halleck that he would "do all in my power" to​

carry out their wishes and only asked that they make their decisions promptly and clearly lay out "what my​

orders and authority are." McClellan was less diplomatic in a letter to his wife fifteen minutes later. "I have​

a terrible task on my hands now - perfect imbecility to correct. No means to act with, no authority - yet​

determined if possible to save the country. . . Two of my corps will either save that fool Pope or be​

sacrificed."​

​

Lincoln immediately advised McClellan that he thought "your first alternative, to wit, 'to concentrate all​

our available forces to open communication to Pope: is the right one." Privately, Lincoln was furious at​

McClellan to a degree that surprised those who came into contact With him. McClellan's dismissal of Pope's​

active engagement with the Confederates as a mere "scrape" that it was his responsibility to "get out of."​

rather than an opportunity for a victory to which every effort must be made to take advantage of - or a​

defeat that every effort must be made to prevent - infuriated Lincoln in no small part because of the​

personal stake he had in Pope's operations.​

​

McClellan actually hoped Pope would succeed, but believed that he (Pope) was out of his depth. McClellan managed to get half the Army of the Potomac to Pope (5 divisions) before Pope was enveloped and cut off from McClellan's forces.

Franklin (the man) arrived in Washington on the 24th August. He went to see Halleck at 1600 who told him to go into camp at Alexandria and not to go forward until transportation was available. The infantry of 6th Corps offloaded on the 25th-26th, but by the night of the 27th the whole of 6th Corps only had 16 horses. There were plenty of horses and wagons available in Washington, but Halleck refused to release any to Franklin, citing feeding the men in the forts as more important.

On the afternoon of the 26th Halleck orders Franklin to go forward, less than hour later countermands the order (I will note that Hennessy misses the existence of the 2nd order countermanding the marching order), telling Franklin to wait until he has transport. The men of 6th Corps have 2 days rations in their packs and whatever ammunition they arrived with. The 16 horses are hauling 4 guns, each of which only has 10 rounds.

Halleck telegraphs McClellan that he should go from Aquia Creek to Alexandria and sort things out. He will arrive 0800 the next day

In the evening Haupt telegraphs Halleck that Bull Run Bridge is threatened. Halleck replies that Haupt should find any general officer and secure the bridge. Late that night Haupt finds Hancock, the most senior officer actually present, and arranges to sent Taylor's brigade plus two other regiments.

Situation late 26th - Halleck had ordered Franklin forward for the 27th and then rescinded the order. Franklin, Smith and Slocum are all in Washington, leaving Hancock in command at Alexandria. McClellan is at Aquia Landing, where Sumner's 2nd Corps is landing and Burnside is with Cox's division. He is under orders not to do anything. Hancock arranges with a small force of infantry to move to the Bull Run Bridge starting 0400 27th. McClellan boards a steamer heading to Alexandria that night.

On the 27th Taylor's expedition departs on time and runs straight into AP Hill's division. They are smashed.

McClellan reports by telegraph he has arrived at 0800. McClellan starts sending regular updates, sending over a dozen despatches on the 27th. His intent to push 6th Corps forward without transport or artillery is nixed when he hears of Taylor's destruction. The situation has clarified that there is a strong enemy force between him and Pope, and McClellan asks Halleck for an order. Halleck buckled under the pressure, and in the evening send to McClellan "I have no time for details. You will therefore, as ranking general in the field, direct as you deem best; but at present orders for Pope's army should go through me."

Given that McClellan can't get a straight answer from Halleck, he boards the steamer Ariel. Arriving in Washington he goes to Halleck's house, gets him out of bed at 1 a.m. on the 28th, and has a conversation with him. Him and a few staff spend the morning of the 28th chasing down the missing corps and division commanders of 6th Corps, and securing transport for 6th Corps. Parts of 12th Corps' trains were found sitting in Washington but Halleck had ignored requests for them to be moved. McClellan gets them moving to Alexandria, along with 2 squadrons of cavalry he found. McClellan returns to Alexandria in the after, Franklin et al. in tow and reports his arrival at 1610 hrs. Halleck replies and states Sumner, Cox and Taylor should be put into the defences. No mention of the disposition of the remaining 5 bdes of 6th Corps is made, and so McClellan orders them to advance at 0600 the next morning.

Situation late 28th - Sumner's corps, Cox's division and Taylor's bde is under orders to move into the Washington defences. Two sqns of cavalry are coming down, and Banks' supply train is heading to Alexandria. The remainder of 6th Corps is under orders to move forward at dawn.

On the 29th Franklin advances as proposed. McClellan sends several telegrams to Halleck asking how far they should advance. Lincoln asks McClellan directly what they should do. McClellan frankly replies that either Pope should fight his way back to them, or they should push everything to get to him. Lincoln sends at 1610 a message endorsing option 2, which officially became the policy finally.

Meanwhile at 1448 hrs Halleck clarified that Franklin's movement was only a recce; "I want Franklin's corps to go far enough to find out something about the enemy. Perhaps he may get such information at Annandale as to prevent his going further; otherwise he will push on towards Fairfax".

There is anger at Washington that Baldy Smith stopped at Annandale (Franklin was still at Alexandria, sorting out his logistcs). McClellan stepped in and took the blame. It is well understood that McClellan protected Franklin, and in 1864 when the idea of calling Franklin to command was mooted Halleck told Grant: "Genl. Franklin would not give satisfaction. The President ordered him to be tried for negligence & disobedience of orders when here before, but Genl McClellan assumed the responsibility of his repeated delays in obeying orders."

McClellan had already ordered the advance to resume at 0600 next morning before Halleck contacted him. They did. They reach Centreville on the afternoon of the 30th to find Pope has already broken. McClellan forms the available forces into a line along the Cub Run, which halts Jackson's pursuit. Once Pope's army linked up with the 6th and 2nd Corps, as per Halleck's orders they transfer to Pope's command leaving McClellan with no forces.

McClellan didn't "order the chain bridge blown up". At midday of the 30th (i.e. before all forces were finally removed from him) an order went to Barnard for Captain Ellis to be prepared if necessary to fire the bridge, i.e. it was a contingency that was prepared for. That Hay (or Lincoln) can't tell the difference between a contingency and a positive order is telling.

Among orher things, department clerks were organized into companies to defend the capital and rumor had it that a boat at full steam waited in the Potomac to take the President, cabinet, and other officials to safety if necessary. This would have been August 31- September 1.

McClellan later wrote that when Lincoln met with him on the morning of September 2, Limcoln believed the capital was lost. I havent found anything other than McClellan's later account that references this. Orher accounts do suggest that Stanton "lost his head" at this time though.

 

[GwilymT]

More than likely , I'm surprised the McClellan apologists haven't jumped on this already , Mac was a nasty piece of work the further i read about him the more i dislike him as a person and as a general horrid little man who would throw his own mother under the bus to further his ambitions.

Ask and he shall receive