Chickamauga Rosecrans' Staff at Chickamauga

[trice]

Came across this recently and thought others might like to see it:

The Significance of Major General William S. Rosecrans' Staff on the Outcome of the Chickamauga Campaign

Thesis by Robert D. Richardson at DTIC:

Abstract:​

​

This study is an analysis of the roles, responsibilities, and functions of General Rosecrans staff prior to and during the Chickamauga campaign, using lessons learned in comparison to current Army doctrine on command and control. Primary sources for staff information on the Army of the Cumberland are the Official Records and actual telegrams from the staffs during this period. Doctrinal manuals on senior level staffs did no exist therefore, these staffs were composites of regimental and War Department staff positions and as hoc positions.​

Paperback at Amazon. com, $50.80

 

[Belfoured]

Came across this recently and thought others might like to see it:

The Significance of Major General William S. Rosecrans' Staff on the Outcome of the Chickamauga Campaign

Thesis by Robert D. Richardson at DTIC:

Abstract:​

​

This study is an analysis of the roles, responsibilities, and functions of General Rosecrans staff prior to and during the Chickamauga campaign, using lessons learned in comparison to current Army doctrine on command and control. Primary sources for staff information on the Army of the Cumberland are the Official Records and actual telegrams from the staffs during this period. Doctrinal manuals on senior level staffs did no exist therefore, these staffs were composites of regimental and War Department staff positions and as hoc positions.​

Paperback at Amazon. com, $50.80

Thanks for posting this. I'm interested in the activities of our friend Captain Cist, notorious in the post-war efforts to point the finger of blame at Tom Wood. I recall one of the sources indicating that he was in what we call today a "rear area" on September 20.

 

[trice]

Thanks for posting this. I'm interested in the activities of our friend Captain Cist, notorious in the post-war efforts to point the finger of blame at Tom Wood. I recall one of the sources indicating that he was in what we call today a "rear area" on September 20.

Cist was in Chattanooga. Seems like a natural position for a "Lieutenant and Acting Assistant Adjutant-General" in that situation.

 

[Belfoured]

Cist was in Chattanooga. Seems like a natural position for a "Lieutenant and Acting Assistant Adjutant-General" in that situation.

I wouldn't disagree with that. Obviously, it means that his 1882 claim about the September 20 order was at best hearsay and not based on personal knowledge.

The linked paper illustrates the wide variation of staff functions and usage at the army level during the ACW. At one extreme we have officers such as Grant and Rosecrans, who during the war evolved to something approaching more modern staffs. At the other extreme is Lee, who retained a too-small staff that often functioned as glorified messengers.One interesting fact - alluded to in the article - is that US Army regulations did not officially recognize a "chief of staff", contrary to the French and some others. Instead, the AAJ had that role, but during the war several generals used the title "chief of staff". As it did in so many respects, the US Army lagged behind others even for decades after the ear.

 

[trice]

I wouldn't disagree with that. Obviously, it means that his 1882 claim about the September 20 order was at best hearsay and not based on personal knowledge.

Cist was actually in an excellent position to have the inside dope on what was being said inside the Army of the Cumberland -- both during the war (Thomas kept him on as AAG after Rosecrans was relieved) and after the war.

Cist was elected corresponding secretary of the Society of the Army of the Cumberland in 1869 and was editor of 15 of the 17 volumes of the Reports of the Society of the Army of the Cumberland (Cincinnati, 17 vols., 1868–85). As such, he would have seen and heard a very large number of the accounts and arguments of the veterans. His Army of the Cumberland book came out in 1882.

Which is just to say it might have been hearsay -- but Cist was in a position to hear an awful lot that would be unknown and unheard today.

 

[David Moore]

Cist was actually in an excellent position to have the inside dope on what was being said inside the Army of the Cumberland -- both during the war (Thomas kept him on as AAG after Rosecrans was relieved) and after the war.

Cist was elected corresponding secretary of the Society of the Army of the Cumberland in 1869 and was editor of 15 of the 17 volumes of the Reports of the Society of the Army of the Cumberland (Cincinnati, 17 vols., 1868–85). As such, he would have seen and heard a very large number of the accounts and arguments of the veterans. His Army of the Cumberland book came out in 1882.

Which is just to say it might have been hearsay -- but Cist was in a position to hear an awful lot that would be unknown and unheard today.

Cist's grave in Cincinnati's Spring Grove Cemetery. Chase and many McCooks buried there too.

 

[Belfoured]

Cist was actually in an excellent position to have the inside dope on what was being said inside the Army of the Cumberland -- both during the war (Thomas kept him on as AAG after Rosecrans was relieved) and after the war.

Cist was elected corresponding secretary of the Society of the Army of the Cumberland in 1869 and was editor of 15 of the 17 volumes of the Reports of the Society of the Army of the Cumberland (Cincinnati, 17 vols., 1868–85). As such, he would have seen and heard a very large number of the accounts and arguments of the veterans. His Army of the Cumberland book came out in 1882.

Which is just to say it might have been hearsay -- but Cist was in a position to hear an awful lot that would be unknown and unheard today.

Technically it had to be hearsay if he in fact was at Chattanooga the morning of September 20. Hearsay is information that a witness cannot testify to based on direct personal knowledge but is instead based on what someone else told him had happened. It's generally inadmissible because the witness with personal knowledge cannot be cross-examined to determine if his statement is true, false, unreliable, etc. A contrast would be, for example, Captain Richards of 81st Indiana Co. H, McCook's HQ escort, who it appears was present and so could testify based on personal knowledge. (We also have "totem pole hearsay" - Witness A testifies that Witness B told him that Witness C said X happened). There's no question that Cist was well-placed to acquire all sorts of information from others. The "devil in the details" would be from who he got the information and whether they were making claims based on their own personal knowledge. Given all the internal squabbles inside the A of the C about these events and the related politics/agendas, sorting through all this to get at the "truth" is no simple exercise. William Glenn Robertson in his essay in Gateway took the shortcut of summarizing the "fatal order" story as based on "army gossip".

 

[trice]

Technically it had to be hearsay if he in fact was at Chattanooga the morning of September 20. Hearsay is information that a witness cannot testify to based on direct personal knowledge but is instead based on what someone else told him had happened. It's generally inadmissible because the witness with personal knowledge cannot be cross-examined to determine if his statement is true, false, unreliable, etc. A contrast would be, for example, Captain Richards of 81st Indiana Co. H, McCook's HQ escort, who it appears was present and so could testify based on personal knowledge. (We also have "totem pole hearsay" - Witness A testifies that Witness B told him that Witness C said X happened). There's no question that Cist was well-placed to acquire all sorts of information from others. The "devil in the details" would be from who he got the information and whether they were making claims based on their own personal knowledge. Given all the internal squabbles inside the A of the C about these events and the related politics/agendas, sorting through all this to get at the "truth" is no simple exercise. William Glenn Robertson in his essay in Gateway took the shortcut of summarizing the "fatal order" story as based on "army gossip".

Certainly. But almost everything here comes down to hearsay and the usual issues of comparing supposed eye-witness testimony to the real event.

I don't think Cist's account of this event in his book is gospel. Wood's account is contradicted, whether it is accurate or not, by the accounts of others. If Wood's account is correct, McCook's is clearly not -- and if McCook's account is correct, there is something very wrong with Wood's account. Rosecrans account looks wobbly. Opdycke's account looks no more reliable than the accounts of Rosecrans or Cist. All of those people line up on one side or the other of the who-did-what-when finger-pointing. Cist was a Rosecrans guy and -- not too surprisingly -- he is not real critical of Rosecrans. I should talk about that in some other thread, I suppose.

Rosecrans seems to have had a god staff, though, well organized and functioning. Garfield was never liked, but he was imtelligent and efficient. I do think Rosecrans and the AOC would have been better off if poor Garesche didn't have his brains blown out by a cannonball at Stones River, though.

 

[breckod]

Certainly. But almost everything here comes down to hearsay and the usual issues of comparing supposed eye-witness testimony to the real event.

I don't think Cist's account of this event in his book is gospel. Wood's account is contradicted, whether it is accurate or not, by the accounts of others. If Wood's account is correct, McCook's is clearly not -- and if McCook's account is correct, there is something very wrong with Wood's account. Rosecrans account looks wobbly. Opdycke's account looks no more reliable than the accounts of Rosecrans or Cist. All of those people line up on one side or the other of the who-did-what-when finger-pointing. Cist was a Rosecrans guy and -- not too surprisingly -- he is not real critical of Rosecrans. I should talk about that in some other thread, I suppose.

Rosecrans seems to have had a god staff, though, well organized and functioning. Garfield was never liked, but he was imtelligent and efficient. I do think Rosecrans and the AOC would have been better off if poor Garesche didn't have his brains blown out by a cannonball at Stones River, though.

McCook's account is directly contradicted by AotC staff in the ORs.

 

[Belfoured]

Certainly. But almost everything here comes down to hearsay and the usual issues of comparing supposed eye-witness testimony to the real event.

I don't think Cist's account of this event in his book is gospel. Wood's account is contradicted, whether it is accurate or not, by the accounts of others. If Wood's account is correct, McCook's is clearly not -- and if McCook's account is correct, there is something very wrong with Wood's account. Rosecrans account looks wobbly. Opdycke's account looks no more reliable than the accounts of Rosecrans or Cist. All of those people line up on one side or the other of the who-did-what-when finger-pointing. Cist was a Rosecrans guy and -- not too surprisingly -- he is not real critical of Rosecrans. I should talk about that in some other thread, I suppose.

Rosecrans seems to have had a god staff, though, well organized and functioning. Garfield was never liked, but he was imtelligent and efficient. I do think Rosecrans and the AOC would have been better off if poor Garesche didn't have his brains blown out by a cannonball at Stones River, though.

All fair points, which gets us to Richards. If he should have been in anybody's "camp" on this it should be McCook's, because his Co. H was McCook's HQ escort. His 1898 MOLLUS paper is explicit that McCook was directly involved (I confirmed that the quote in the Carnahan article linked earlier did indeed come from Richards' paper, because Dave Powell cites the same Wood-McCook dialogue and his source note lists the MOLLUS paper). McCook had every incentive to prevaricate about his role in Wood's execution of the order, because by the time he testified everybody knew the results of Wood pulling his division out of line and that would only have further "sunk the nail in McCook's coffin". Obviously, we'll never know for certain but I can see a pretty strong argument that of three "percipient"/eye witnesses, two - McCook and Wood - had a personal stake in "salting" their respective versions. That leaves us with Richards. If somebody has information that would throw his credibility into question, that would have to be thrown into the mix but I haven't seen it.

As for Garesche, you may be right. Garfield I'm not sure about. Powell or Robertson - I forget which off hand - has him briefly involved in some way with what everybody agrees was a defective order, but Bond wrote it. My broader take on this order and staff work is that Rosey had a bit of a cluster-bleep going on. We have Starling of Crittenden's staff involved but there is no order from or to Crittenden. We have Garfield involved with other orders - hence it falls to Bond - but still on the periphery. And the order goes to a division commander whose superior is not his corps commander, but another. For a guy who actually did innovate in this area, September 20 AM was an "F" for Rosecrans IMHO.

 

[breckod]

Powell also has a footnote crediting Robertson with finding a number of letters from Wood's aides that all appear to support Wood's version, i.e. that McCook was there and Wood was initially hesitant to move. While Wood's staff may be assumed to be as biased as Cist, at least some of them were definitely there. I don't know from that note if any of the letters pre-date Cist and Wood exchanging words in public about this in the 1880s though.

 

[Belfoured]

Powell also has a footnote crediting Robertson with finding a number of letters from Wood's aides that all appear to support Wood's version, i.e. that McCook was there and Wood was initially hesitant to move. While Wood's staff may be assumed to be as biased as Cist, at least some of them were definitely there. I don't know from that note if any of the letters pre-date Cist and Wood exchanging words in public about this in the 1880s though.

That's why I see Richards as a possible "tie breaker" here, because on its face his account contradicts the guy who he was theoreticllu allied to by position - with the caveat that further research might find evidence that suggests he had a "stake" in the outcome of the dispute, as well. Suppose, for example, it turns out that McCook had ripped him that morning for being unavailable or something, or they had some post-war disagreement. Right now, however, that's unvarnished speculation.

As I keep saying, the "big picture" here is that Rosecrans fired off a bad order. Any time your best argument is that the recipient should have sought clarification/modification rather than obeying it, you're already in the hole. And issuing directions to a division commander without involving either Crittenden or McCook only exacerbates it - especially because the order required that division to align/coordinate with another.

 

[breckod]

That's why I see Richards as a possible "tie breaker" here, because on its face his account contradicts the guy who he was theoreticllu allied to by position - with the caveat that further research might find evidence that suggests he had a "stake" in the outcome of the dispute, as well. Suppose, for example, it turns out that McCook had ripped him that morning for being unavailable or something, or they had some post-war disagreement. Right now, however, that's unvarnished speculation.

As I keep saying, the "big picture" here is that Rosecrans fired off a bad order. Any time your best argument is that the recipient should have sought clarification/modification rather than obeying it, you're already in the hole. And issuing directions to a division commander without involving either Crittenden or McCook only exacerbates it - especially because the order required that division to align/coordinate with another.

As an addendum, I did pull out Powell's volume with the bibliography, the Robertson citation he makes for the paragraph discussing Wood and McCook goes to Vol. XXV, no.2 of Blue & Gray. Might be more detail on the letters from Wood's aides there.

 

[trice]

We have Starling of Crittenden's staff involved but there is no order from or to Crittenden

Starling himself later testified that he was acting as a free-lance aide for Rosecrans on the 20th:

Question. Were you in the United States service on the 19th and 20th September, and what duty were you performing during the events you have related?
Answer. I was, and was at General Rosecrans' headquarters in obedience to an order received from him, and during the 19th and 20th was acting as a member of his staff, not by any particular order, but was sent with dispatches and orders by him.

 

[breckod]

That's why I see Richards as a possible "tie breaker" here, because on its face his account contradicts the guy who he was theoreticllu allied to by position - with the caveat that further research might find evidence that suggests he had a "stake" in the outcome of the dispute, as well. Suppose, for example, it turns out that McCook had ripped him that morning for being unavailable or something, or they had some post-war disagreement. Right now, however, that's unvarnished speculation.

As I keep saying, the "big picture" here is that Rosecrans fired off a bad order. Any time your best argument is that the recipient should have sought clarification/modification rather than obeying it, you're already in the hole. And issuing directions to a division commander without involving either Crittenden or McCook only exacerbates it - especially because the order required that division to align/coordinate with another.

D'oh, I overlooked something obvious from the page where Powell discusses this. He also cites an account from Woodruff, the adjutant of the 64th Ohio, published in 1891, who was there and overheard McCook and Wood's conversation. Here it is from the National Tribune.

 

[Belfoured]

Starling himself later testified that he was acting as a free-lance aide for Rosecrans on the 20th:

Question. Were you in the United States service on the 19th and 20th September, and what duty were you performing during the events you have related?
Answer. I was, and was at General Rosecrans' headquarters in obedience to an order received from him, and during the 19th and 20th was acting as a member of his staff, not by any particular order, but was sent with dispatches and orders by him.

I think that goes to my point about the inefficiency/disorganized character of Rosecrans' staff operations on September 20. It seems there were a lot of people running around in "ad hoc" roles. The inevitable result is at least some crossed wires.

 

[Belfoured]

D'oh, I overlooked something obvious from the page where Powell discusses this. He also cites an account from Woodruff, the adjutant of the 64th Ohio, published in 1891, who was there and overheard McCook and Wood's conversation. Here it is from the National Tribune.
View attachment 443701

On the one hand, this account appears to be another by a witness with no apparent stake in the outcome that confirms an exchange between McCook and Wood - although he clearly was a vehement "fan" of Wood. On the other, it records their exchange differently than Richards did. It also places Harker in the mix, yet I've seen nothing from Harker about this (I may have missed something). One issue is that Woodruff identifies himself as the 64th's "Adjutant" (certainly plausible - he was a 1st Lt. on that date). If he was in position to hear the exchange between McCook and Wood, one would think that his CO, Col. McIlvane, would have been there as well. In fact it would seem that a veritable crowd was gathered round. If so, it's odd that an event which became such a subject of heated controversy appears to have so relatively few first-hand accounts. This one surfaced in December 1891. Richards' surfaced in 1898. Yet more questions .....

 

[trice]

I think that goes to my point about the inefficiency/disorganized character of Rosecrans' staff operations on September 20. It seems there were a lot of people running around in "ad hoc" roles. The inevitable result is at least some crossed wires.

There is an inherent philosophical conflict between strong-structure/rigid and loose-structure/flexible organization and command. There are advantages and disadvantages to both approaches.

Having a large supply of talented, hard-working, intelligent, trained professionals favors the strong-structure/rigid approach. Having a deficit of talented, hard-working, intelligent, trained professionals favors the loose-structure/flexible approach. Lee -- with a shortage -- preferred to put his good people in combat commands, but eventually suffers for it when Jackson, Longstreet and Stuart become casualties. The Union, with more capable/trained people, generally built better staffs.

Rosecrans built a strong staff that functioned well, and so did Thomas. The staffs of McCook and Crittenden look OK (in my limited knowledge), but Rosecrans in the Chattanooga-Chickamauga campaign scrambles the organization of the AOC to the point where Crittenden controls a single division and McCook not much more. Rosecrans in a crisis seems to think put-your-trust-in-Thomas. McCook and Crittenden are treated like place-holders. Their staffs become sidelined to a large extent. It looks like Rosecrans may have co-opted Starling ( or Starling simply made himself available because he didn't have musch to do for Crittenden).

 

[Belfoured]

There is an inherent philosophical conflict between strong-structure/rigid and loose-structure/flexible organization and command. There are advantages and disadvantages to both approaches.

Having a large supply of talented, hard-working, intelligent, trained professionals favors the strong-structure/rigid approach. Having a deficit of talented, hard-working, intelligent, trained professionals favors the loose-structure/flexible approach. Lee -- with a shortage -- preferred to put his good people in combat commands, but eventually suffers for it when Jackson, Longstreet and Stuart become casualties. The Union, with more capable/trained people, generally built better staffs.

Rosecrans built a strong staff that functioned well, and so did Thomas. The staffs of McCook and Crittenden look OK (in my limited knowledge), but Rosecrans in the Chattanooga-Chickamauga campaign scrambles the organization of the AOC to the point where Crittenden controls a single division and McCook not much more. Rosecrans in a crisis seems to think put-your-trust-in-Thomas. McCook and Crittenden are treated like place-holders. Their staffs become sidelined to a large extent. It looks like Rosecrans may have co-opted Starling ( or Starling simply made himself available because he didn't have musch to do for Crittenden).

Agree pretty much on all this. The haphazard actions on September 20 seem to be a consequence of Rosecrans' tendency to "go frenetic" at times. By way of comparison I look at Meade on July 2 at Gettysburg. He spent the late afternoon and evening effectively "triaging" things after Sickles' put a snowball underway in the wrong direction based on his foolish and insubordinate unilateral decision. I've never had the impression that Meade was not fully in control of himself. Instead, a succession of actions were taken that salvaged the Union position, from its left all the way to its right.

There isn't much that's been done on Civil War staff practices. The Right Hand of Command by R. Steven Jones (2000) is a very good exposition of different practices - focusing on Lee, Sherman, McClellan, and Grant- and how there was a slow evolution towards more efficient and effective use of a staff that would then continue after the war, with the US playing "catch up" to the Europeans.