Lee Robert E. Lee cancelling a promotion

Vahan

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I wanted to see your guys opinion on Colonel Edward Asbury O'neal's promotion being cancelled for horrible performance at Gettysburg do you think it was fair, given the fact he was recommended for Brig. Gen. promotion for his courage at Chancellorsville? He also did a great job in Peninsular campaign, and Maryland campaign. Also did Robert E. Lee ever do this to anyone else?
 
Lee held it up, Jefferson Davis cancelled it. Totally fair. O'Neal proved that he has no reason commanding a brigade. 40% casualties on Day 1 was totally avoidable and meaningless...
 
I believe that the cancellation Colonel O'Neal's promotion to Brigade Command was due to "Army politics". It may have started when Colonel O'Neal was transferred to Rodes' Brigade in June 1862 to complete the transformation into an ALL Alabamian brigade (3rd, 5th, 6th, 12th, and 26th Alabama Infantry regiments.) Many in Alabama, including Congressmen William Yancey and Clement C. Clay, were unhappy that an Alabamian had not been promoted to Brigade command over Robert Rodes, a native Virginian. O'Neal was the likely candidate that the people of Alabama had in mind, and he had strong political connections in Alabama. The protests from the politicians and some of the Alabama troops, were ignored, and Rodes retained command.

After Robert Rodes was elevated to Division command before the Battle of Chancellorsville, O'Neal was given his opportunity at Brigade command. He had shown himself to be fearless in battle and worthy of promotion. Unfortunately, he was wounded in the leg by a shell, during the Battle of Chancellorsville. Now, E_just_E made the point that "O'Neal proved that he has no reason commanding a brigade. 40% casualties on Day 1 was totally avoidable and meaningless..." I would respectfully disagree.

When Robert Rodes brought his Division onto Oak Hill, northwest of Gettysburg on July 1, 1863, the battle had been raging for several hours. Rodes "thought" he was on the Union's right flank, and made preparations for an attack on that flank. Part of these dispositions was detaching the 3rd Alabama Infantry from O'Neal's Brigade and placing another of his regiments, the 5th Alabama in a reserve position. When O'Neal's Brigade was ordered forward for its initial attack, there were only three understrength regiments to make the advance. (After the Battle of Chancellorsville, the 26th Alabama had been so decimated, that the regiment only had a company Lieutenant left in command!) Unbeknownst to General Rodes, during all the time that he had been organizing his troops for the attack, the entire Union XI Corps had made their way through the town of Gettysburg and taken up a position on his left flank. (Union troops would continue to pour forward on his left throughout the afternoon.) When O'Neal's Brigade went forward, they were quickly torn to pieces by a strong front and enfilading fire on their left. There was no way these three regiments could succeed over overwhelming numbers. The initial attack was over in 15 - 20 minutes. O'Neal, unexplanedly had not gone forward with these troops. He did however, rally his retreating troops, and with the aid of the 5th Alabama, made two more charges on their front before joining Gordon's men for the route of the Union Army through Gettysburg late in the day.

Rodes Division suffered terribly on July 1st, but Robert Rodes must bear the blame. However, by the end of August 1863, O'Neal was replaced primarily because of the animosity of Robert Rodes. IMO this was an injustice to Colonel Edward O'Neal.
 
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I believe that the cancellation Colonel O'Neal's promotion to Brigade Command was due to "Army politics". It may have started when Colonel O'Neal was transferred to Rodes' Brigade in June 1862 to complete the transformation into an ALL Alabamian brigade (3rd, 5th, 6th, 12th, and 26th Alabama Infantry regiments.) Many in Alabama, including Congressmen William Yancey and Clement C. Clay, were unhappy that an Alabamian had not been promoted to Brigade command over Robert Rodes, a native Virginian. O'Neal was the likely candidate that the people of Alabama had in mind, and he had strong political connections in Alabama. The protests from the politicians and some of the Alabama troops, were ignored, and Rodes retained command.

After Robert Rodes was elevated to Division command before the Battle of Chancellorsville, O'Neal was given his opportunity at Brigade command. He had shown himself to be fearless in battle and worthy of promotion. Unfortunately, he was wounded in the leg by a shell, during the Battle of Chancellorsville. Now, E_just_E made the point that "O'Neal proved that he has no reason commanding a brigade. 40% casualties on Day 1 was totally avoidable and meaningless..." I would respectfully disagree.

When Robert Rodes brought his Division onto Oak Hill, northwest of Gettysburg on July 1, 1863, the battle had been raging for several hours. Rodes "thought" he was on the Union's right flank, and made preparations for an attack on that flank. Part of these dispositions was detaching the 3rd Alabama Infantry from O'Neal's Brigade and placing another of his regiments, the 5th Alabama in a reserve position. When O'Neal's Brigade was ordered forward for its initial attack, there were only three understrength regiments to make the advance. (After the Battle of Chancellorsville, the 26th Alabama had been so decimated, that the regiment only had a company Lieutenant left in command!) Unbeknownst to General Rodes, during all the time that he had been organizing his troops for the attack, the entire Union XI Corps had made their way through the town of Gettysburg and taken up a position on his left flank. (Union troops would continue to pour forward on his left throughout the afternoon.) When O'Neal's Brigade went forward, they were quickly tour to pieces by a strong front and enfilading fire on their left. There was no way these three regiments could succeed over overwhelming numbers. The initial attack was over in 15 - 20 minutes. O'Neal, unexplainedly had not gone forward with these troops. He did however, rally his retreating troops, and with the aid of the 5th Alabama, made two more charges on their front before joining Gordon's men for the route of the Union Army through Gettysburg late in the day.

Rodes Division suffered terrible on July 1st, but Robert Rodes must bear the blame. However, by the end of August 1863, O'Neal was replaced primarily because of the animosity of Robert Rodes. IMO this was an injustice to Colonel Edward O'Neal.
You make a really excellent point and I completely agree O'neal's got blamed wrongfully when it should have fell on Rodes head. What do you think about the native Alabamian Cullen Andrews Battle taking over in place of O'neal? Not taking anything away from O'neal but he was easily forgotten about when Battle took his place and had a spectacular career leading the brigade.
 
You make a really excellent point and I completely agree O'neal's got blamed wrongfully when it should have fell on Rodes head.

If you are a Brig. General (or a Colonel) and attacking, you are at the head of the attack (see: "Charge, Pickett's") and not hiding behind the Brigade you sent to death, pretending you are a Major General, like O'Neal did. Inexcusable. He was a lawyer and a politician and it showed on the field.
 
You make a really excellent point and I completely agree O'neal's got blamed wrongfully when it should have fell on Rodes head. What do you think about the native Alabamian Cullen Andrews Battle taking over in place of O'neal? Not taking anything away from O'neal but he was easily forgotten about when Battle took his place and had a spectacular career leading the brigade.

There is an excellent description of what transpired to make Colonel Cullen Battle commander of the Alabama Brigade in "Major General Robert E. Rodes of the Army of Northern Virginia" by Darrell L. Collins, pages 302 - 310. A very quick summary would be; Robert Rodes was determine to get rid of Colonel O'Neal, Cullen Battle wasn't his first choice, but he was from Alabama and the next senior Colonel in the Brigade.

IMO he turned out to be a very capable Brigadier General.
 
If you are a Brig. General (or a Colonel) and attacking, you are at the head of the attack (see: "Charge, Pickett's") and not hiding behind the Brigade you sent to death, pretending you are a Major General, like O'Neal did. Inexcusable. He was a lawyer and a politician and it showed on the field.

Explain to me how you command a brigade from the front? You command all units from Regiment to Army from behind your command.
 
Explain to me how you command a brigade from the front? You command all units from Regiment to Army from behind your command.

Attacking Brigade (and confederate rules of engagement) : Brigadier General is on horseback utilizing his sword to show direction of movement for the troops. He is at the attacking point of the brigade making sure that all of his soldiers can see him. As I said, contrast O'Neal's position with that of Barksdale, Kemper, Armistead, or Garnett, in that battle (the first 2 were also politicians,) and draw your conclusions about acceptable behaviour.
 
Attacking Brigade (and confederate rules of engagement) : Brigadier General is on horseback utilizing his sword to show direction of movement for the troops. He is at the attacking point of the brigade making sure that all of his soldiers can see him. As I said, contrast O'Neal's position with that of Barksdale, Kemper, Armistead, or Garnett, in that battle (the first 2 were also politicians,) and draw your conclusions about acceptable behaviour.

And look at what happened to those four brigade commanders. That attitude is what deprived the Confederate army of so many excellent officers at every level.

While I generally agree with you that O'Neal was an average brigade commander, the idea that he should have led from the front is also problematic. What he should have been doing is coordinating his attack with Iverson on his right and Doles on his left as well as directing his assaulting regiments.

R
 
And look at what happened to those four brigade commanders. That attitude is what deprived the Confederate army of so many excellent officers at every level.

While I generally agree with you that O'Neal was an average brigade commander, the idea that he should have led from the front is also problematic. What he should have been doing is coordinating his attack with Iverson on his right and Doles on his left as well as directing his assaulting regiments.

R

Indeed. And I am just the messenger :) I do not agree or disagree with the tactics. I am just indicating the expected behaviour for Confederate Brigade Commanders. Different than the Union, thus the clarification previously. "Good", "bad", "horrible" or not, it was what was expected... And if it did not happen, someone was not deemed fit to serve.
 
Indeed. And I am just the messenger :smile: I do not agree or disagree with the tactics. I am just indicating the expected behaviour for Confederate Brigade Commanders. Different than the Union, thus the clarification previously. "Good", "bad", "horrible" or not, it was what was expected... And if it did not happen, someone was not deemed fit to serve.

There were a number of brigade commanders at Gettysburg alone that didn't lead from the front. The problem for O'Neal was that he was put in the spotlight by his brigade's failure.

R
 
There were a number of brigade commanders at Gettysburg alone that didn't lead from the front. The problem for O'Neal was that he was put in the spotlight by his brigade's failure.

R

Other than AP Hill's mess, I really cannot think of many (healthy) Confederate Brig Gens who did not lead from the front in Gettysburg. Matter of fact, some Division Commanders also did...

Can you think of any?
 
I don't think Daniels, Iverson or Ramseur led from in front of their brigades at any time at the burg.

I'm no authority on that kind of stuff though. Just from OR's and stuff I have read, I believe the brigade commander may lead a brigade to a point of attack. He may even lead them on the advance (like Barksdale or Wofford did) but not often.

I would kind of concur that at times it was necessary to do but then they became ex-brigade commanders pretty fast.
If they got lucky they might get command of a division and called brave if they made it through.

I can certainly think of Union brigade commanders who seemed to follow the same style. Thinking of Caldwells division moving to the area of the Wheat field. Certainly an example of leading from the front at the brigade level. Cross and Kelly, Brooke and Zook... but I don't think it always was the case.
 
Southern generals were very brave but ultimately cost their side by being at the front of the line far too often. They couldn't afford to lose all the good generals they lost
 
Other than AP Hill's mess, I really cannot think of many (healthy) Confederate Brig Gens who did not lead from the front in Gettysburg. Matter of fact, some Division Commanders also did...

Can you think of any?

Just thought I would add that O'Neal was wounded in the leg by a shell at the Battle of Chancellorsville eight weeks earlier. The wound was severe enough that he had to be relieved of command and helped from the field. I have no information on the condition of his wound by the time of the Battle of Gettysburg, but this MAY have been the reason for his uncharacteristic behavior. He had always been fearless in battle and had led from the front as Colonel of the 26th Alabama.
 
Also did Robert E. Lee ever do this to anyone else?
I thought he treated Magruder kind of miserably after the Seven Days.

Magruder had done a good job psyching out McClellan at Yorktown holding back the AoP for a month with about 20,000 men. Then Johnston took over with one plan -- retreat to Richmond. During the Battle of Beaver Dam Creek, Magruder with a few men, kept most of the AoP on the south side of the Chickahominy River while McClellan again thought he was facing a huge Rebel army on both sides of the river. Then things went sour. Magruder was told to attack the Union rear guard at Savage's Station. He was told that Jackson and Huger would be on their flanks. At this point he was confused, sick and high on morphine. And he was kind of a weirdo anyway. No help arrived. He attacked and got trounced. At Glendale he was sent on a futile march to help the useless General Holmes, then had to march back for the Malvern Hill battle the next day. He was still sick with stomach problems. He was given ridiculous orders which he carried out and again got whipped. Lee shipped him off to Texas while Jackson, who screwed up every opportunity he had during the Seven Days, apparently got off without even a slap on the wrist. Jackson had been exhausted too, but he stayed in Virginia.
 
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I thought he treated Magruder kind of miserably after the Seven Days.

Magruder had done a good job psyching out McClellan at Yorktown holding back the AoP for a month with about 20,000 men. Then Johnston took over with one plan -- retreat to Richmond. During the Battle of Beaver Dam Creek, Magruder with a few men, kept most of the AoP on the south side of the Chickahominy River while McClellan again thought he was facing a huge Rebel army on both sides of the river. Then things went sour. Magruder was told to attack the Union rear guard at Savage's Station. He was told that Jackson and Huger would be on their flanks. At this point he was confused, sick and high on morphine. And he was kind of a weirdo anyway. No help arrived. He attacked and got trounced. At Glendale he was sent on a futile march to help the useless General Holmes, then had to march back for the Malvern Hill battle the next day. He was still sick with stomach problems. He was given ridiculous orders which he carried out and again got whipped. Lee shipped him off to Texas while Jackson, who screwed up every opportunity he had during the Seven Days, apparently got off without even a slap on the wrist. Jackson had been exhausted too, but he stayed in Virginia.
I agree with you on magruder being treated shabbily by lee. Her certainly had his favourites. Lee would let mistakes go unpunished from some whilst give others the magruder treatment
 
What is the right answer, please? Honestly curious. There are a names of men who did not survive, Blue and Gray in this thread and men like Iverson whose men in the ranks paid horribly. The generals must have been unbelievably tough themselves. Reading how Barksdale was barely restraining himself, so incredibly impatient to attack, not a single thought he could die- pretty amazing. Losing so many of these had to have taken a toll but could either side not have had them in front?

I don't know enough to understand whether they could or could not have- it's an honest question.
 
I thought he treated Magruder kind of miserably after the Seven Days.

Actually not. When McClellan started to advance up the Peninsula about 30,000 effectives were defending the Warwick line or within easy march of it. Magruder himself was rapidly superceded by DH Hill, who in turn was superceded by Johnston.

He never "psyched McClellan out" - he put up a solid defence of 30,000 men (i.e. more than the Vicksburg garrison) heavily entrenched behind a river line.

http://67thtigers.blogspot.be/2015/07/effective-strength-of-opposing-armies.html
 

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