Discussion Repeaters Versus Muzzleloaders

[Rhea Cole]

The drawback to repeating rifles is the massive ammunition expenditure. If a soldier has hundreds of rounds available, he will fire them all, so logistics is a new game. The repeater was the assault rifle of its day. It definitely had all the advantages previously noted: you can sustain a high rate of fire, reload lying down, etc. But they are more expensive than muzzleloaders, especially at a time when the whole of an obsolete European arsenal was thrown open to equip soldiers quickly and cheaply. Metallic cartridges have the added dilemma that now you have to allocate a resource, brass, to make cartridges that you didn't have to concern yourself with before.
From our vantage point it's easy to see the Civil War as a completed action rather than an evolution. American military development was behind in 1861. The armies were poorly trained. There wasn't a lot of money to work with. The officer corps remembers beating the Mexicans with a volly of rifle fire followed with the bayonet. It took a lot of OJT to change minds to find more advanced tactical solutions. Getting breechloading and repeating arms in the hands of the troops was part of that evolution.
@ Irishtom29: "gin gin I love you!"

Officers loosing control of the fire of their men leading to a waste of ammunition was the argument made by the hide bound head of the ordinance board. That was why Wilder's men bought their own Spencers. At Stones River NB we do a Lightening Brigade program every year during the anniversary of Hoovers Gap & the Tullahoma Campaign. The waste of ammunition argument grew out of the 40 round per man standard infantry reg. It also reflected the necessity of pausing to clean fouled barrels of muzzleloaders. In practice, the waste of ammunition fear proved unfounded. Wilder's men used the nose bags of their horses as ammo carriers, so did not run out of ammunition. They also had small two wheel ammo carts. The fire superiority displayed by Colt revolving rifles, Spencers & Henrys at critical times during the Tullahoma, Chattanooga, Atlanta, Nashville & March to the Sea dispels any doubts as to their effectiveness.

 

[Saphroneth]

Officers loosing control of the fire of their men leading to a waste of ammunition was the argument made by the hide bound head of the ordinance board.

It was also a battlefield observation made by Prussian officers in 1870 during the Franco-Prussian War.

In practice, the waste of ammunition fear proved unfounded.

Not really; the Prussians noticed it with Hanoverian troops in 1870-1. It didn't affect the better drilled Prussians, but it did the Hanoverians.
What this means is that the "waste of ammunition" issue is not an unsolvable problem, but it is a problem that needs to be solved - you can't just ignore it.

 

[FedericoFCavada]

While the cartridge box carried four 10-round bundles with 48 to 60 percussion caps, for a total of 40 rounds, soldiers were often stuffing extra packets of cartridges into pockets and so on. Soldiers who did not like carrying the extra weight would discard the extra bundles of cartridges, which may account for the relatively pristine condition Minié/Burton balls are found by some relic hunters. Soldiers who expected heavy fighting would retain the extra load.

Claud E. Fuller's book The Rifle Musket provides the reader with a very keen sense of what the rifle musket was capable of. As for how the weapons were actually used, I might further suggest the work of the late Paddy Griffith and Earl J. Hess, The Rifle Musket in Civil War Combat: Reality and Myth (Kansas):

https://civilwartalk.com/threads/the-rifle-musket-in-civil-war-combat-by-earl-j-hess.152570/

I recall that it discusses the various methods of cartridge resupply, and certainly has a table of ammunition expenditure too.

 

[Saphroneth]

Officers loosing control of the fire of their men leading to a waste of ammunition was the argument made by the hide bound head of the ordinance board.

As an incidental aside, I thought I'd point out that the "hide bound" head of the Ordnance board actually ordered vast numbers of breechloaders. They were of course greatly outnumbered by the orders for muzzle loaders, but none of the breech loader manufacturers was able to provide the number of breech loaders that had been ordered in the first place.


I think that, since Ripley was ordering vastly more breech loaders than private manufacturers could produce*, we can avoid insulting him by describing him as hidebound. There is simply no way to produce more breech loaders given Union industrial capacity.+

* Some manufacturers were contracted for upwards of 15,000 weapons and produced none whatsoever.
+ Except the complete retooling of Springfield into a breech loader manufactory, which means reducing the Union's supply of rifled long arms drastically and probably not getting many breech loaders anyway.

 

[byron ed]

...Wilder's men used the nose bags of their horses as ammo carriers, so did not run out of ammunition. They also had small two wheel ammo carts...

Where to find info / specs / pics on those carts?

 

[Saphroneth]

Where to find info / specs / pics on those carts?

I suspect the search term you want is "tumbril".

 

[Rhea Cole]

As an incidental aside, I thought I'd point out that the "hide bound" head of the Ordnance board actually ordered vast numbers of breechloaders. They were of course greatly outnumbered by the orders for muzzle loaders, but none of the breech loader manufacturers was able to provide the number of breech loaders that had been ordered in the first place.


I think that, since Ripley was ordering vastly more breech loaders than private manufacturers could produce*, we can avoid insulting him by describing him as hidebound. There is simply no way to produce more breech loaders given Union industrial capacity.+

* Some manufacturers were contracted for upwards of 15,000 weapons and produced none whatsoever.
+ Except the complete retooling of Springfield into a breech loader manufactory, which means reducing the Union's supply of rifled long arms drastically and probably not getting many breech loaders anyway.

I was referring to Lincoln's attempt to get the ordnance board to purchase Spencers. No new fangled repeaters were going to be purchased under their administration.

 

[Saphroneth]

I was referring to Lincoln's attempt to get the ordnance board to purchase Spencers. No new fangled repeaters were going to be purchased under their administration.

But they did - that's what I meant too.

The US government ordered 700 Spencers for the Navy in July 1861 and 10,000 for the Army in December 1861. Spencer misses his deadline of starting deliveries by March 1862 (reporting production problems at the factory), leading the government to reduce the order to 7,500; it takes him until December 1862 to produce 1,200 weapons and June 1863 to fulfil the order of 7,500.


The government ordered more Spencers than Spencer could physically produce. There is no way for them to have ordered more than that and have it mean anything.

 

[FedericoFCavada]

As an incidental aside, I thought I'd point out that the "hide bound" head of the Ordnance board actually ordered vast numbers of breechloaders. They were of course greatly outnumbered by the orders for muzzle loaders, but none of the breech loader manufacturers was able to provide the number of breech loaders that had been ordered in the first place.


I think that, since Ripley was ordering vastly more breech loaders than private manufacturers could produce*, we can avoid insulting him by describing him as hidebound. There is simply no way to produce more breech loaders given Union industrial capacity.+

* Some manufacturers were contracted for upwards of 15,000 weapons and produced none whatsoever.
+ Except the complete retooling of Springfield into a breech loader manufactory, which means reducing the Union's supply of rifled long arms drastically and probably not getting many breech loaders anyway.

James Wolfe Ripley, (*1794-†1870), 5th Chief of Ordnance delivered the Model 1855 suite of rifle muskets, rifles, pistol-carbines, etc. This was absolutely state of the art for the time. He really was hidebound and managed to ultimately alienate Abraham Lincoln, which led to his being put out to pasture with his retirement and being made inspector of New England coastal fortifications by Sep. 1863. His was an unenviable and very difficult position during a very trying time. He also made decisions that in retrospect, or perhaps with the benefit of hind-sight were questionable.

 

[Saphroneth]

James Wolfe Ripley, (*1794-†1870), 5th Chief of Ordnance delivered the Model 1855 suite of rifle muskets, rifles, pistol-carbines, etc. This was absolutely state of the art for the time. He really was hidebound and managed to ultimately alienate Abraham Lincoln, which led to his being put out to pasture with his retirement and being made inspector of New England coastal fortifications by Sep. 1863. His was an unenviable and very difficult position during a very trying time. He also made decisions that in retrospect, or perhaps with the benefit of hind-sight were questionable.

But this procurement issue isn't one of them, surely? If you order so many repeaters that the factory has to ask for you to reduce the size of the order so they don't fail the contract, then you are clearly not soft-pedalling repeaters.
He also ordered 20,000 of the Marsh breech-loader (of which none were ever delivered), for example.

If you want to blame someone for why the Union did not have more breech loaders during the Civil War, Ripley is not the person to blame.

 

[leftyhunter]

I suspect the search term you want is "tumbril".

Aside from cost and ammunition consumption, were there any areas with respect to performance that a Springfield or Enfield was superior to a Henry or Spencer. For instance, were they more accurate in trained hands or significantly more range?

What led me to this question was, I was speculating today. What if the Union raised a sharpshooter brigade and gave them repeaters? Would this just be the most elite unstoppable force in warfare in 1865?

The repeater vs ML debate is similar to the assault rifle vs battle rifle debate..
If the average range of combat is over one hundred yards especially 200 to 300 yards then a well trained regiment equipped with a basic ML rifle is superior to one armed with a repeater due to the greater power of the ML.
If the average combat range is under 100 yards and especially if the troops are in defensive positions and well trained then the repeater is the superior weapon.
Of course for the most part neither Union or Confederate troops with a few exceptions were well trained in marksmanship. Neither side had the time or inclination to train their troops properly in marksmanship. Again there are a few exceptions to the rule.
Also it would be a huge stretch to claim that repeaters were one of the most important factors in the Union Army's eventual victory over the Confederate Army.
Leftyhunter

 

[CowCavalry]

Officers loosing control of the fire of their men leading to a waste of ammunition was the argument made by the hide bound head of the ordinance board. That was why Wilder's men bought their own Spencers. At Stones River NB we do a Lightening Brigade program every year during the anniversary of Hoovers Gap & the Tullahoma Campaign. The waste of ammunition argument grew out of the 40 round per man standard infantry reg. It also reflected the necessity of pausing to clean fouled barrels of muzzleloaders. In practice, the waste of ammunition fear proved unfounded. Wilder's men used the nose bags of their horses as ammo carriers, so did not run out of ammunition. They also had small two wheel ammo carts. The fire superiority displayed by Colt revolving rifles, Spencers & Henrys at critical times during the Tullahoma, Chattanooga, Atlanta, Nashville & March to the Sea dispels any doubts as to their effectiveness.

Its one thing for a brigade to be able to transport enough ammunition for a battle or a single campaign and another to supply say, the Army of the Potomoc. They had logistical supply problems enough as it was, if you triple or quadruple the ammunition amount, imagine that added stress on the supply train, all the way up from the mule teams to the locomotives and cars that would have to haul it. It is doubtful whether or not the ammo manufacturers would have been able to keep up. It reminds me of the electric or natural gas automobiles of today; the infrastructure is not yet there for widespread use.

 

[Saphroneth]

If the average combat range is under 100 yards and especially if the troops are in defensive positions and well trained then the repeater is the superior weapon.

I have to quibble about using 100 yards as the number. We don't actually know (or not yet) that that's the value to use.

Overall, though, the point that shorter-range combat favours the Repeater (or conceals what disadvantages it has) is correct.

The fire superiority displayed by Colt revolving rifles, Spencers & Henrys at critical times during the Tullahoma, Chattanooga, Atlanta, Nashville & March to the Sea dispels any doubts as to their effectiveness.

I have to point out that the number of Henrys manufactured was tiny - indeed, the number of Spencers produced was not very large. This isn't because of a lack of contracts but a lack of manufacturing capacity.


The number of Spencers delivered by the end of 1864 was 34,176 carbines and 11,471 rifles; the number of Henry rifles was less than 2,000. (Both numbers from Executive Document 99, 40th Congress, second session.) The Colt was produced to the tune of 18,300 in total when production ceased in 1864*, and it had significant flaws (like the slight tendency to blow the user's fingers off if there was a chain fire, which made users understandably nervous); the number purchased by the Union government appears to be significantly less than that.

These are rare weapons; they have greater effectiveness in certain specialist scenarios, but they're also much more costly and there is simply no way to make them general issue.

* this number is from Wikipedia because I've lost my link to document 99, though I have my notes on the Spencer/Henry numbers.

 

[leftyhunter]

Aside from cost and ammunition consumption, were there any areas with respect to performance that a Springfield or Enfield was superior to a Henry or Spencer. For instance, were they more accurate in trained hands or significantly more range?

What led me to this question was, I was speculating today. What if the Union raised a sharpshooter brigade and gave them repeaters? Would this just be the most elite unstoppable force in warfare in 1865?

It should also be noted that despite numerous foreign miltary observers during the ACW not only was not foreign nation interested in purchasing the original Spencer or Henry no foreign firearms manufacture offered as far as I know a licensing deal. Post ACW a limited amount of Winchester rifles were sold to the Ottoman Empire and Czarist Russia. During WW1 the Winchester 1894 the grandson so to speak of the Henry was sold to the French Army.
Post ACW certain American military small arms were license produced overseas.
Leftyhunter

 

[Saphroneth]

It should also be noted that despite numerous foreign miltary observers during the ACW not only was not foreign nation interested in purchasing the original Spencer or Henry no foreign firearms manufacture offered as far as I know a licensing deal. Post ACW a limited amount of Winchester rifles were sold to the Ottoman Empire and Czarist Russia. During WW1 the Winchester 1894 the grandson so to speak of the Henry was sold to the French Army.

Speaking of foreign nations, it's interesting to compare Spencer/Henry production and even Sharps production with the fastest production facility on the planet for breechloaders at the time - the Sommerda factory that produced the Dreyse 'needle rifle'. That had a production of about 30,000 a year, which is at the same time nearly an order of magnitude faster than pretty much any American breech loading factory until at least mid-war and still clearly far too low to equip a significant continental army given just a couple of years.

The only feasible way to equip a substantial number of Union troops with breech loaders, let alone repeaters, in the Civil War is to start the war with them already on hand.

 

[Saphroneth]

But having them on hand isn't really feasible either, for a different reason - a reason that speaks to the nature of prewar US arms procurement and what shaped it.

The first question we have to ask is, what kind of war did the United States expect to fight?
Usually this can be answered by looking at their previous war experience, and there are basically three types.

1) A DEFENSIVE war where the United States is being invaded, such as (in popular perception) the War of 1812.
In this case the expectation was that the bulk of the immediate defence would fall on local militia, who would be numerous but would not need to be given first line weapons across the continent. Only the Regular Army would need first line weapons, and the somewhat cheaper solution of keeping in store huge numbers of second line (or third line) weapons to issue as needed would suffice for the militia.

2) An OFFENSIVE war in the near abroad, such as Mexico.
In this case the expectation was that the bulk of the fighting would fall on the Regulars and a relatively small contingent of Volunteers in the expeditionary force. These men could be armed with first line weapons.

3) An INDIAN war.
In this case the Regulars would do all the fighting.

In all of these cases, the number of first line weapons that would need to be procured would be relatively small.

What did the US Army do? Well, it procured a relatively small number of first line weapons (e.g. Mississippi rifles, Springfields, and then the Maynard Tape system which was an attempt at faster loading). There was a willingness to spend a fair amount on providing the first line weapons on the scale of a complete issue to the entire US Army with a fair number of spares, and that meant about 60,000 Springfields of the M1855 type (which took ~4 years to produce).

This means that, if you have a good repeater or breechloader design that's available in ~1855, you can probably get about ~30,000 of them built by the time of the Civil War depending on complexity (assuming that all government factories build it) and they replace the M1855 Springfields.

 

[Rhea Cole]

I have to quibble about using 100 yards as the number. We don't actually know (or not yet) that that's the value to use.

Overall, though, the point that shorter-range combat favours the Repeater (or conceals what disadvantages it has) is correct.


I have to point out that the number of Henrys manufactured was tiny - indeed, the number of Spencers produced was not very large. This isn't because of a lack of contracts but a lack of manufacturing capacity.


The number of Spencers delivered by the end of 1864 was 34,176 carbines and 11,471 rifles; the number of Henry rifles was less than 2,000. (Both numbers from Executive Document 99, 40th Congress, second session.) The Colt was produced to the tune of 18,300 in total when production ceased in 1864*, and it had significant flaws (like the slight tendency to blow the user's fingers off if there was a chain fire, which made users understandably nervous); the number purchased by the Union government appears to be significantly less than that.

These are rare weapons; they have greater effectiveness in certain specialist scenarios, but they're also much more costly and there is simply no way to make them general issue.

* this number is from Wikipedia because I've lost my link to document 99, though I have my notes on the Spencer/Henry numbers.

Just as factoid, 230,000 Spencers were produced, total. The ability of men armed with Spencers to achieve fire superiority over men armed with muzzleloaders is exemplified by a fire fight that lasted over 3 1/2 hours. A 500 man skirmish line of the 5th New York was attacked by a division of Confederate infantry. The New Yorkers held them off until there ammo ran low. After suffering 80 casualties, they withdrew. The Confederate commanders reported that they had engaged an entire brigade. They had no idea that 500 cavalry men armed with Spencers had stopped them in their tracks. The point being, even a small number of Spencer Repeaters could have dramatic effect on a battlefield.

 

[Saphroneth]

Just as factoid, 230,000 Spencers were produced, total.

So what? What matters is how many of them were produced early enough that they could reasonably have seen combat before the end of the war. The 230,000 number is over 80% composed of weapons produced after the Confederates surrendered.

The ability of men armed with Spencers to achieve fire superiority over men armed with muzzleloaders is exemplified by a fire fight that lasted over 3 1/2 hours. A 500 man skirmish line of the 5th New York was attacked by a division of Confederate infantry. The New Yorkers held them off until there ammo ran low. After suffering 80 casualties, they withdrew. The Confederate commanders reported that they had engaged an entire brigade

When exactly was this?

I feel I should point out that if it was in 1863 or later then 500 men is actually a pretty reasonable brigade - it'd be on the small side, but e.g. Kelly's brigade was only 530 men at Gettysburg.

 

[Saphroneth]

...actually, the other thing I feel I should point out about that example is that there is no earthly way those cavalrymen could have been using anything like the Spencer's full fire rate for three and a half hours. Even if they were each firing an average of one shot per minute over this firefight that lasted ca. three and a half hours, they'd each have burned through 210 shots for 105,000 shots total.
If they'd been using the Spencer's full fire rate the number gets much more extravagant. The Spencer is sometimes quoted as up to fourteen rounds per minute, and even at 10 rounds per minute you're looking at over 1,000,000 rounds.


Now, I think it's quite plausible that a group of cavalrymen could drive off an attack with a burst of intense fire from their Spencers. But that's not a 3 1/2 hour firefight.

 

[Don Dixon]

The following table documents the production of the Springfield 1855-64 family of rifle muskets at Springfield Armory during the Civil War, and is indicative of exactly how desperate was the Federal Army's need for serviceable military weapons.

Rifle Musket	1861	1862	1863	1864	1865	Total
Model 1855	6,202					6,202
Model 1861		102,410	162,719			265,129
Model 1863			55,065	217,201		272,266
Model 1864				58,999	194,640	253,639
Total	6,202	102,410	217,784	276,200	194,640	797,236

(Thomas, Roundball to Rimfire, I, 65)

To put these numbers in further context, then LTC Ripley, wrote to Secretary Cameron on 19 June 1861 that the Springfield Armory "cannot be relied on now for more than 3,000 muskets per month, and it will be necessary to resort to contracts." Ripley was intimately familiar with Springfield Armory, having been the armory superintendent from 1841 to 1854, and having seen the problems which the armory had had in bringing the Model 1842 smoothbore percussion musket into interchangeable parts production. Even if Ripley's estimate had been correct, it would have taken Springfield 28 years at that rate of production to equip a million-man army; assuming no combat or other losses.

Between 1861 and 1865, the Federal Army contracted for a total of 1,525,000 Springfield rifle muskets, of which only 643,439 were delivered by the contractors during the entire war: 42 percent of the Springfields contracted for by the Federal Army.

Some authors have asserted that the Federal Army, given the industrial power of the North, should have concentrated on the production of breech-loading arms, and met the initial need for arms through imports of muzzleloading weapons from Europe. This view is incredibly naïve. It would have required that early in 1861 Federal officials have the prescience to understand that the war was going to be something other than a brief spat. It would have required that ordnance officials understand and admit the clear superiority of breechloading weapons over muzzleloading arms. It would have required that there be agreement on which breechloading arm(s) to manufacture. And, it would have required that the selected arm(s) be both reliable and of interchangeable parts manufacture. The Federal ordnance establishment was justifiably cautious about using new weapons designs until it was sure that the weapons could be manufactured to the Ordnance Office's standards of uniformity. In order to produce the necessary volume of arms, it would have required that the patent holders of breechloading arms agree to permit other manufacturers to manufacture their arms, or that the Federal government seize the patents, violating the owners' property rights. It would have required that the Federal government have the will to pay the cost, since breechloading arms were appreciably more expensive than muzzzleloading arms. And, it would have required that the North actually have the capacity to rapidly expand its arms and ammunition manufacturing capabilities. That Federal contractors were only able to deliver 42 percent of the much simpler Springfield rifle muskets for which they had contracted illustrates the fallacy of the concept, as do other examples.

Give me a break.

Regards,
Don Dixon