Red River Union disaster

[Generic Username]

I confused one Porter with another Porter, then realised I was addressing a point about the wrong Porter...

Any particular thoughts about the rest of his comments?

 

[33RDNCK]

Great discussion. Assuming Banks' army is captured/destroyed as a fighting force, and the fleet is destroyed after failing to build the dam (no protection from the Army = no dam), what do the Trans-Mississippi Confederates do next? I'll have to research Union naval assets that were stationed along the Miss, but not with Porter up the Red. I can't see a scenario where the CSA captures the fleet intact; it would have been too easy for Porter to destroy his own ships. Still, there might be a lot to salvage.

Missouri invasion has always seemed like a dead-end to me. The federals could easily reinforce Missouri by river and rail, whereas the CSA can do neither. There is, likewise, little to be gained by retaking Little Rock/Arkansas valley; Arkansas could no longer sustain an Army by 1864. That leaves sitting tight, or finding a way to get across the Miss; maybe they can cross if the Federal fleet is greatly reduced. That, and morale would be sky-high, and desertion far less likely than the July 1864 historical timeline.

 

[Generic Username]

Missouri invasion has always seemed like a dead-end to me. The federals could easily reinforce Missouri by river and rail, whereas the CSA can do neither. There is, likewise, little to be gained by retaking Little Rock/Arkansas valley; Arkansas could no longer sustain an Army by 1864. That leaves sitting tight, or finding a way to get across the Miss; maybe they can cross if the Federal fleet is greatly reduced. That, and morale would be sky-high, and desertion far less likely than the July 1864 historical timeline.

Missouri is a means to an end, rather than the end itself.

First, and foremost, the invasion of Missouri in an election year will be a major blow to Northern morale and the Lincoln Administration in particular. Early's invasion of Maryland in July of 1864 was sufficient to trigger the largest inflationary episode of the war in the North, as the prospects were seen as dim at that point given the high casualties at the front. By taking much of Missouri, the hand of the Pro-Peace faction in the North will be considerably strengthened and this could pay dividends come November.

Outside of the political arena, there is a real military value in this play. The casualties taken in the Overland Campaign combined with the loss of 6th and 19th Corps to deal with the Early in the Valley had left Grant incapable of offensive action and he actually was in favor of a retreat from Petersburg in favor of reinforcing Sherman. Here, they'd probably have no choice but to do such a retreat given the lack of room Grant has to do further detachments to rescue Missouri and maintain the Siege:

A lot of possibilities flow from here, and depends on if the Army of the Potomac is bottled up at Bermuda Hundred or if it's entirely been pulled out, like the end phase of the Peninsular Campaign in 1862.

 

[33RDNCK]

I agree that a full-scale Missouri invasion would pay huge political dividends. The issue I see is being able to feed the infantry on the long hike through Arkansas and SW Missouri. Hindman struggled to feed his Army in 1862, with Arkansas a lot less picked over than in 1864. Southwest Missouri, I imagine, would be a similar supply desert. I guess an alternative strategy would be sending Wharton's cavalry corps north combined with Price's cavalry, which gives CS an invasion force of roughly 20000 mounted men.

 

[33RDNCK]

Missouri is a means to an end, rather than the end itself.

First, and foremost, the invasion of Missouri in an election year will be a major blow to Northern morale and the Lincoln Administration in particular. Early's invasion of Maryland in July of 1864 was sufficient to trigger the largest inflationary episode of the war in the North, as the prospects were seen as dim at that point given the high casualties at the front. By taking much of Missouri, the hand of the Pro-Peace faction in the North will be considerably strengthened and this could pay dividends come November.

Outside of the political arena, there is a real military value in this play. The casualties taken in the Overland Campaign combined with the loss of 6th and 19th Corps to deal with the Early in the Valley had left Grant incapable of offensive action and he actually was in favor of a retreat from Petersburg in favor of reinforcing Sherman. Here, they'd probably have no choice but to do such a retreat given the lack of room Grant has to do further detachments to rescue Missouri and maintain the Siege:

View attachment 482018

A lot of possibilities flow from here, and depends on if the Army of the Potomac is bottled up at Bermuda Hundred or if it's entirely been pulled out, like the end phase of the Peninsular Campaign in 1862.

Good read. Thanks for the link.

 

[steve59p]

I agree that a full-scale Missouri invasion would pay huge political dividends. The issue I see is being able to feed the infantry on the long hike through Arkansas and SW Missouri. Hindman struggled to feed his Army in 1862, with Arkansas a lot less picked over than in 1864. Southwest Missouri, I imagine, would be a similar supply desert. I guess an alternative strategy would be sending Wharton's cavalry corps north combined with Price's cavalry, which gives CS an invasion force of roughly 20000 mounted men.

Interesting idea but if feeding Infantry is a problem wouldn't 20,000 horses be a serious one as well? They would be able to move faster - provided they could capture enough fodder as I doubt they would be able to graze - but that's still a substantial force to supply. If Arkansas and Missouri have already been well picked over is there going to be enough and if their having to requisition stuff from the locals - even if paying with largely useless confederate script could that make them less than popular there which would also restrict their actions. Not saying its impossible as I don't know enough about the region at this time and the logistics that would be involved but it sounds a challenge.

 

[Generic Username]

I agree that a full-scale Missouri invasion would pay huge political dividends. The issue I see is being able to feed the infantry on the long hike through Arkansas and SW Missouri. Hindman struggled to feed his Army in 1862, with Arkansas a lot less picked over than in 1864. Southwest Missouri, I imagine, would be a similar supply desert. I guess an alternative strategy would be sending Wharton's cavalry corps north combined with Price's cavalry, which gives CS an invasion force of roughly 20000 mounted men.

Interesting idea but if feeding Infantry is a problem wouldn't 20,000 horses be a serious one as well? They would be able to move faster - provided they could capture enough fodder as I doubt they would be able to graze - but that's still a substantial force to supply. If Arkansas and Missouri have already been well picked over is there going to be enough and if their having to requisition stuff from the locals - even if paying with largely useless confederate script could that make them less than popular there which would also restrict their actions. Not saying its impossible as I don't know enough about the region at this time and the logistics that would be involved but it sounds a challenge.

Price invaded Missouri with 12,000 men and in the course of the campaign was joined by 6,000 Confederate irregulars. Also of note: besides Missouri Militia, a major force opposing him was AJ Smith's XVI Corps, which here has mostly been destroyed in Louisiana. Here's a pretty good AH treatment, sort of like what we are talking about here.

 

[steve59p]

Price invaded Missouri with 12,000 men and in the course of the campaign was joined by 6,000 Confederate irregulars. Also of note: besides Missouri Militia, a major force opposing him was AJ Smith's XVI Corps, which here has mostly been destroyed in Louisiana. Here's a pretty good AH treatment, sort of like what we are talking about here.

That doesn't seem to answer the question of what those men and horses are eating? Confederate irregulars are only likely to worse this problem as they add more mouths to feed.

 

[Generic Username]

That doesn't seem to answer the question of what those men and horses are eating? Confederate irregulars are only likely to worse this problem as they add more mouths to feed.

Point being they invaded Missouri with 18,000 men historically and were able to keep them mostly fed. Without AJ Smith to oppose them, they'll face less opposition and can thus forage more.

 

[Saphroneth]

A fast moving force that is able to forage is generally able to sustain itself as follows:


A normal balanced army (I'd assume about 3 times as many men as horses, so about 35 lbs per 3 men) can last without actual starvation (for the locals) for 15 days in an area which grows the food for about that many people.

An all-cavalry force would have a food requirement of about 84 lbs per 3 men, so a bit more than double that. They'd be able to last without actual starvation for about 6 days in an area which grows the food for about that many men - or, to put it another way, a force of (say) 24,000 cavalry which is moving and foraging needs to forage an area with about 4,000 people's food growth in it per day.


If the population density is 25 people per square km, none of the food is normally exported, and you're moving 16 miles per day, that means a strip about ten miles wide.


This is all rule of thumb stuff, plug in different assumptions accordingly. But it doesn't immediately come out as outright impossible.

 

[steve59p]

A fast moving force that is able to forage is generally able to sustain itself as follows:


A normal balanced army (I'd assume about 3 times as many men as horses, so about 35 lbs per 3 men) can last without actual starvation (for the locals) for 15 days in an area which grows the food for about that many people.

An all-cavalry force would have a food requirement of about 84 lbs per 3 men, so a bit more than double that. They'd be able to last without actual starvation for about 6 days in an area which grows the food for about that many men - or, to put it another way, a force of (say) 24,000 cavalry which is moving and foraging needs to forage an area with about 4,000 people's food growth in it per day.


If the population density is 25 people per square km, none of the food is normally exported, and you're moving 16 miles per day, that means a strip about ten miles wide.


This is all rule of thumb stuff, plug in different assumptions accordingly. But it doesn't immediately come out as outright impossible.

To clarify is this without devastating the area their foraging in or with? Only if their leaving those regions plucked clean, possibly with severe suffering for the local population then their both going to make themselves deeply unpopular - with both short and longer term results - and also means they need to make sure they have a safe route back. Otherwise they have the problem Napoleon had during his retreat from Moscow, when his army ended up marching back through the region they had already foraged off on the march to Moscow with devastating results for them.

 

[Saphroneth]

To clarify is this without devastating the area their foraging in or with?

"Without actual starvation" - the foraged area can tolerate this level of foraging once without anyone starving, though food surpluses are consumed. Essentially it amounts to the assumption that an area with a fed population of 100,000 men (say) produces enough food for that population, obviously, plus enough surplus to account for about 4% of the annual needs of an army of 100,000 men (and their horses).

Some areas will have more, but the given number can be relied upon as a planning assumption.

 

[Saphroneth]

If you take literally all the food from the locals, then you can sustain 100,000 men and 20,000 horses for the majority of a year in an area that normally feeds 100,000 men and 20,000 horses (depending on how conveniently it's stacked up etc).

Note that this is "fed population", not actual population. If you're based in an area of very rich farmland where the average farm would normally export enough food overseas to feed 50,000 people and 20,000 horses, then ipso facto you can sustain an army of 50,000 people and 20,000 horses in that area more-or-less indefinitely - because you're taking the food that would otherwise be exported, while the food from your own territory that would otherwise feed your army is going elsewhere, and one way or another unless large amounts of food are actually being destroyed it works out on a gobal scale.

 

[Louisiana Jayhawker]

It appears to me to have been much loose play with the Confederate troops number. One poster above claimed that at start of campaign Taylor has total of 11,255 troops under his command to commence. Then claims Taylor has 23,000 troops at end of campaign. This is not historical. At Mansfield, Taylor has a total of 8,800 effectives at the commencement of his campaign. At the commencement of the Battle of Pleasant Hill and with reinforcements, Taylor has a total of under 12,000 effectives. Clearly, the poster must have gotten confused with the numbers. He and his associates use the inflated figure of 23,000 to falsely speculate a Confederate force for a futuristic invasion of Missouri. As stated, Taylor never had 23,000. He never had more than 12,000, and quickly had less than that after they got shot up and routed at Pleasant Hill. How is Taylor's less than 12,000 going to defeat Banks more than 30,000 even after Pleasant Hill? Better yet how is Taylor going to capture the Federal Fleet? The Federals had slipped the iron platings off their ironclads and dropped them in the river bottom before passing the Dam to escape the shallows. If that failed, they were planning to burn and destroy the fleet so that they would leave noting for the Confederates.

 

[Generic Username]

It appears to me to have been much loose play with the Confederate troops number. One poster above claimed that at start of campaign Taylor has total of 11,255 troops under his command to commence. Then claims Taylor has 23,000 troops at end of campaign. This is not historical. At Mansfield, Taylor has a total of 8,800 effectives at the commencement of his campaign. At the commencement of the Battle of Pleasant Hill and with reinforcements, Taylor has a total of under 12,000 effectives. Clearly, the poster must have gotten confused with the numbers. He and his associates use the inflated figure of 23,000 to falsely speculate a Confederate force for a futuristic invasion of Missouri. As stated, Taylor never had 23,000. He never had more than 12,000, and quickly had less than that after they got shot up and routed at Pleasant Hill. How is Taylor's less than 12,000 going to defeat Banks more than 30,000 even after Pleasant Hill? Better yet how is Taylor going to capture the Federal Fleet? The Federals had slipped the iron platings off their ironclads and dropped them in the river bottom before passing the Dam to escape the shallows. If that failed, they were planning to burn and destroy the fleet so that they would leave noting for the Confederates.

All numbers are drawn directly from Confederate reports, which Steven Newton compiled in Lost for the Cause: The Confederate Army in 1864. The 8,000 number is what Taylor claimed he had, but the reports show he had 23,000 PFD by the end. The alternative is to believe 8,000 (or 12,000?) men forced 30,000 Federals to retreat and inflicted 2:1 casualties upon them.

In which case, I'm not sure why you're doubting Taylor getting his reinforcements from Smith wouldn't be decisive, since by your numbers we've established one of Taylor's Confederates is worth 3 Federals under Banks.

 

[steve59p]

"Without actual starvation" - the foraged area can tolerate this level of foraging once without anyone starving, though food surpluses are consumed. Essentially it amounts to the assumption that an area with a fed population of 100,000 men (say) produces enough food for that population, obviously, plus enough surplus to account for about 4% of the annual needs of an army of 100,000 men (and their horses).

Some areas will have more, but the given number can be relied upon as a planning assumption.

OK thanks. So the locals would be impoverished somewhat and rather unhappy but lot left totally destitute or actually starving. That was what I was unclear on.

 

[Saphroneth]

OK thanks. So the locals would be impoverished somewhat and rather unhappy but lot left totally destitute or actually starving. That was what I was unclear on.

Yes. Note that in harvest time there's more to be had in a given area, which is what Sherman did in Georgia, but the result of taking advantage of that is that there's not enough food left in the area to last the whole rest of the year. Food thus has to come in from outside.

 

[SWS]

Probably my favorite 'what-if' in the whole history of the War. Geographically, Monette's Ferry (Bluff) presented the Confederates with their most "magnificent chance" to capture and destroy a Federal army, and subsequently the fleet above the falls at Alexandria, as @BrianB relates, and it was wasted owing mainly to Kirby-Smith's vanity (or "pig-headed obstinacy") concerning the pursuit of Steele's column in Arkansas. That same vanity prevented Bragg from concentrating fully at Chattanooga in 1862.

Walker's stout division and batteries, with Bee's horse supporting its flanks, might've been sufficient to hold the "strongest position in the State" on the afternoon of 23 April until Polignac, Churchill, and Wharton could close on the enemy's rear about Cloutierville on the night of the 23rd-24th and cover the road to Beasley's Plantation. Much also depends on the placement of Confederate troops in mid-April and the situation of the Confederate high-command. Logistics are essential here.

Nonetheless, Banks' rapid and unceasing thirty-mile march from Grand Ecore to the Cane Valley on April 21-23 was rather impressive, especially considering the XVI Corps rear-guard also had ample occasion to pillage and burn every vacated manor and negro cabin on the line-of-march, and the Cane was eminently fordable. The concentrated panoply of the XIX Corps in the valley of the Cane also deeply-impressed Bee's isolated troopers, similar to what D.H. Hill witnessed in the Middletown Valley on 14 September 1862. The U.S. artillery is also to be reckoned with. But everything else was in Southern favor, if only they had sufficient force to hold Monette's against assault.