Red River Union disaster

[33RDNCK]

The Union Army that Banks carried up the Red River in 1864 was comprised of detachments that were later instrumental in operations in Virginia (19th Corps, Valley Campaign), Mississippi, Missouri, and Tennessee (16th Corps, Tupelo, Price's Raid, Nashville Campaign). If these troops are lost to the Union, how does that change the course of the war? I'll carry this a bit further in assuming that Porter's fleet is also lost at Alexandria. In order to defeat Banks, we'll keep all the Confederate infantry in LA, and let Price's cavalry handle Steele in AR (Steele was on the defensive without the help of CSA infantry).

So, what does the rest of the war look like in this reality? I am inclined to think that something like this might take place:

1) Transfer of most of Trans-Miss infantry to Miss, allowing the CSA to retake Memphis. Alternatively, full-blown CSA invasion of Missouri.

2) Forrest has a much greater impact on Sherman's supply lines, delaying fall of Atlanta.

3) Virginia campaign stalls

Overall impact is probably just stalemate vs. Confederate collapse in latter half of 1864.

 

[Generic Username]

1) Transfer of most of Trans-Miss infantry to Miss, allowing the CSA to retake Memphis. Alternatively, full-blown CSA invasion of Missouri.

They can't do the former because of Union control of the river, but they can, as you suggest alternatively, do an earlier and far larger version of Price's Raid in mid 1864. Richard Taylor had 11,255 PFD available at the start of the Red River Campaign, and this grew to just shy of 23,000 as reinforcements arrived. That's a potent enough force to overrun much of Southern Missouri and thus necessitate serious force diversions on top of those that would be required in this scenario given the lack of a force to attack Mobile and face Early in the Valley.

2) Forrest has a much greater impact on Sherman's supply lines, delaying fall of Atlanta.

Could be even worse if Sherman is forced to detach forces, since the Army of the Potomac is too damaged to do so in 1864 like it did in 1863.

3) Virginia campaign stalls

Quite possible, it really depends on what Grant does with the situation in the Valley.

Overall impact is probably just stalemate vs. Confederate collapse in latter half of 1864.

McClellan wins and doesn't repudiate the Peace Plank then, so you get a Confederate win by exhaustion.

 

[Trevfo]

Definitely a missed opportunity of epic proportions. If Kirby Smith would have just let Richard Taylor follow through with his plans, ripples affecting several other campaigns could have really had an impact on the outcome of the war. Delaying the war or making it more of a war of attrition was possible. A big "what if" to be sure.

 

[BrianB]

Most likely result (in my humble opinion): Public pressure in the north to "do something" is overwhelming. Despite his preferences to the contrary, Grant is forced to postpone the Atlanta campaign and send Sherman (with at least one corps) to Shreveport to fix the situation.

Sherman would have been able to fix the situation, but it is late summer before he is back in Georgia and ready to move on Atlanta. He probably would not have been able to take Atlanta in time for the November elections.

In Virginia, Grant finds himself under pressure to accomplish something before the November 1864 elections. Grant loses the strategic option of entrenching around Petersburg and waiting for attrition to weaken Lee's army. So, Grant has to get very aggressive in the weeks leading up to election.

So, the unanswerable question becomes: Would Grant have been able to win a spectacular victory in September/October 1864 that would take the place of the fall of Atlanta, and help Lincoln win re-election in November? The "spectacular victory" would pretty much have to involve either the capture of Richmond OR the severe defeat of Lee's army - either would have been a tall order.

What if McClellan wins in November? The South would have had revived morale, believing that McClellan would actually propose some sort of peace when he becomes president in March 1865. The Union military leadership would also fear that McClellan might carry through with his peace proposal. I think you could have seen intense and aggressive military action by the Union forces (trying to establish a situation where "We have clearly won and even McClellan won't make peace now" versus renewed ferocity of Confederate resistance).

 

[JSylvester]

The Union Army that Banks carried up the Red River in 1864 was comprised of detachments that were later instrumental in operations in Virginia (19th Corps, Valley Campaign), Mississippi, Missouri, and Tennessee (16th Corps, Tupelo, Price's Raid, Nashville Campaign). If these troops are lost to the Union, how does that change the course of the war? I'll carry this a bit further in assuming that Porter's fleet is also lost at Alexandria. In order to defeat Banks, we'll keep all the Confederate infantry in LA, and let Price's cavalry handle Steele in AR (Steele was on the defensive without the help of CSA infantry).

So, what does the rest of the war look like in this reality? I am inclined to think that something like this might take place:

1) Transfer of most of Trans-Miss infantry to Miss, allowing the CSA to retake Memphis. Alternatively, full-blown CSA invasion of Missouri.

2) Forrest has a much greater impact on Sherman's supply lines, delaying fall of Atlanta.

3) Virginia campaign stalls

Overall impact is probably just stalemate vs. Confederate collapse in latter half of 1864.

I am not sure about the outcome even if Taylor would have had Price's three infantry divisions with him. Due to Banks fielding about 30,000 men, the Confederates would still be outnumbered by a fair margin. Even more important, Banks could always retreat towards the safety of his flotilla and their guns, so a complete victory would be even less likely. On the other hand, it would be much more likely if Kirby Smith had thrown more men at Steele's column near Camden. Price had his expedition historically almost surrounded and later almost managed to trap them at Jenkin's Ferry. Removing Steele would have completely opened up the road to Missouri and would result in major detachments, but a transfer of troops to Mississippi would be out of the question due to lack of river control.

 

[BrianB]

@JSylvester - Banks was retreating through a region of Louisiana known to this day as "the island". It is formed by the Cane River (to the south and east) and the Red River (to the north). It is a terrible place strategically to put an army (and goes to illustrate the poor ability of Banks to make strategic decisions). The best terrain I can compare it to in the eastern theater would be the Bermuda Hundred in Virginia. If you are on "the island", it would not take a huge force to bottle you up there - Richard Taylor probably had sufficient force to do so, but after Kirby Smith took 50% or so of his forces away from him (to send to Arkansas to fight Frederick Steele, who really was no longer a threat), Taylor lacked sufficient force to trap Banks on the island.

 

[33RDNCK]

I guess I was envisioning a scenario that involved the destruction of Porter's fleet, which then loosens the Union grip on the Mississippi. If Banks gets in trouble, the fleet may not have enough time to build that wing dam they used to get over the falls at Alexandria.

 

[Louisiana Jayhawker]

There was never a chance to destroy Banks Army. Mansfield was a limited battle with a portion of Banks Army. Pleasant Hill is the full-strength Armies match up. Taylor got routed off the field of battle. There was never a chance for the Federal Navy force to be prevented from escaping Alexandria. Price's forces were mangled up from battle and lack adequate numbers to make a difference. Taylor's weakness shows up again at Yellow Bayou whereupon he attacks full force and again is routed and this time solely by Banks rear guard force. Note a transfer across the Mississippi River was attempted after the Red River campaign but so many troops deserted the entire operation was abandoned. The Federal Navy would have stopped it anyway as there were plenty of vessels on duty no matter what happen at Alexandria.

 

[Generic Username]

I guess I was envisioning a scenario that involved the destruction of Porter's fleet, which then loosens the Union grip on the Mississippi. If Banks gets in trouble, the fleet may not have enough time to build that wing dam they used to get over the falls at Alexandria.

Hadn't thought of that, very plausible indeed.

 

[Louisiana Jayhawker]

The only pressures that Banks faced at Alexandria was the falling water level of the Red River and Sherman's demand of the immediate return of his troops loaned to Banks. There was no Confederate threat due to their lack of numbers and having been mauled over in battle. Banks was comfortably withdrawing from the campaign with a still very powerful Army and Navy. Some thinly protected vessels on the Red were shot up by Confederate field guns, but that had little bearing on the total picture. Banks seemed more worried about saving his obtained cotton than any combat.

 

[Drew]

The Union Army that Banks carried up the Red River in 1864 was comprised of detachments that were later instrumental in operations in Virginia (19th Corps, Valley Campaign), Mississippi, Missouri, and Tennessee (16th Corps, Tupelo, Price's Raid, Nashville Campaign). If these troops are lost to the Union, how does that change the course of the war? I'll carry this a bit further in assuming that Porter's fleet is also lost at Alexandria. In order to defeat Banks, we'll keep all the Confederate infantry in LA, and let Price's cavalry handle Steele in AR (Steele was on the defensive without the help of CSA infantry).

So, what does the rest of the war look like in this reality? I am inclined to think that something like this might take place:

1) Transfer of most of Trans-Miss infantry to Miss, allowing the CSA to retake Memphis. Alternatively, full-blown CSA invasion of Missouri.

2) Forrest has a much greater impact on Sherman's supply lines, delaying fall of Atlanta.

3) Virginia campaign stalls

Overall impact is probably just stalemate vs. Confederate collapse in latter half of 1864.

This is an absurd, "what if" thread. We don't and can't know, "what if."

The Red River Campaign was a disaster for the Union and we can thank both Banks and Porter for that, equally. In the end, they both ran like scalded dogs.

Northwest Luzzy-ana whipped them and I'm sorry if that hurts anyone's feelings.

 

[LematLemat]

This is an absurd, "what if" thread. We don't and can't know, "what if."

The Red River Campaign was a disaster for the Union and we can thank both Banks and Porter for that, equally. In the end, they both ran like scalded dogs.

Northwest Luzzy-ana whipped them and I'm sorry if that hurts anyone's feelings.

I apologize if you don't find what-if scenarios entertaining, but the entire purpose of this forum is for the discussion of what-ifs. A lot of people find what-ifs enjoyable, because the speculation and creative aspects are fun.

Frankly, if you don't like it, you don't have to engage in it. Your reply comes off as dismissive, and in all honesty, very rude.

 

[bayouace]

Without the genius of Bailey's Dam the Union Flotilla would have been bottled up at Alexandria until the Red River rose again, and Banks would have had to leave a substantial amount of troops to protect it. My opinion.

 

[33RDNCK]

I apologize if you don't find what-if scenarios entertaining, but the entire purpose of this forum is for the discussion of what-ifs. A lot of people find what-ifs enjoyable, because the speculation and creative aspects are fun.

Frankly, if you don't like it, you don't have to engage in it. Your reply comes off as dismissive, and in all honesty, very rude.

Thank you for this. I don't know why someone would be opposed to discussing alternative outcomes.

 

[Generic Username]

I am not sure about the outcome even if Taylor would have had Price's three infantry divisions with him. Due to Banks fielding about 30,000 men, the Confederates would still be outnumbered by a fair margin. Even more important, Banks could always retreat towards the safety of his flotilla and their guns, so a complete victory would be even less likely. On the other hand, it would be much more likely if Kirby Smith had thrown more men at Steele's column near Camden. Price had his expedition historically almost surrounded and later almost managed to trap them at Jenkin's Ferry. Removing Steele would have completely opened up the road to Missouri and would result in major detachments, but a transfer of troops to Mississippi would be out of the question due to lack of river control.

It's been awhile since I looked into it, but Taylor had 23,000 PFD by the end of the campaign; do we know how many men were in the divisions Price took with him? I think numerical parity isn't out of the question, if not a superiority which, when combined with the terrain features noted by @BrianB lays the perfect framework for destroying Banks.

 

[Generic Username]

So, the unanswerable question becomes: Would Grant have been able to win a spectacular victory in September/October 1864 that would take the place of the fall of Atlanta, and help Lincoln win re-election in November? The "spectacular victory" would pretty much have to involve either the capture of Richmond OR the severe defeat of Lee's army - either would have been a tall order.

In his own words: No, and he was actually wanting to abandon the Siege of Petersburg entirely at this time. Without 6th and 19th Corps (Which have been destroyed here), Grant lacked the manpower to go on the offensive and probably would be worse off once Early starts his Valley Campaign. Credit to @67th Tigers for this:

The 14th July sees the panic ending as far as Grant is concerned. He was been forced into giving up 6th and 19th Corps, and wants them back. Grant's reading of the situation is that the whole operation was a diversion, and Lee will transfer the whole valley force back and overwhelm him, i.e. what Lee tried to do to McClellan in '62.​

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The 6th & 19th Corps should be got here without any delay so that they may be used before the return of the troops sent into the valley by the enemy. - Grant to Halleck, 14th July 1862​

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This is Grant's position for the next five months. He believes the Shenandoah is a diversion. On the same day (but sent on the 16th) Grant writes to Sherman. This letter is frank and admits that Grant's attempt to capture Richmond has failed, and in context that Grant believes he can't attack Richmond with the troops he has. He states to Sherman that he intended to make a "desperate effort" to withdraw from Richmond to a threatening position that would allow him to detach troops to Sherman. In Grant's logic he was insufficient force to attack, but the force he has is much greater than needed for defence, thus:​

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City Point, Va, July, 14th [struck out and 16th written in another hand] 1864​

MAJ. GEN. W . T . SHERMAN, CHATTAHOOCHE GA.​

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The attempted invation of Maryland having failed to give the enemy a firm foothold North they are now returning with possibly 25 000 troops. All the men they have here beyond a sufficiency to hold their strong fortifications will be an element of weakness by eating up their supplies. It is not improbable therefore that you will find in the next fortnight reinforcements in your front to the number indicated above. I advise therefore that if you get Atlanta then you set about destroying railroads as far to the East and South of you as possible. Collect all the stores of the country for your own use and select a point that you can hold until help can be had. I shall make a desperate effort to get a position here which will hold the enemy without the necessity of so many men. If successful I can detach from here for other enterprises looking as much to your assistance as anything else.​

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U. S. GRANT​

Lt. Gen.​

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The military telegraph passes through the room next to Stanton's office, and Stanton read the transmissions. He copied this and handed it to Lincoln, who was not amused and wrote:​

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In your despatch of yesterday to Gen. Sherman, I find the following, to wit: 'I shall make a desparate effort to get a position here which will hold the enemy without the necessity of so many men.' Pressed as we are by lapse of time, I am glad to hear you say this; and yet I do hope you may find a way that the effort shall not be desperate in the sense of great loss of life. - Lincoln to Grant, 17th July 1864​

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This nixed Grant's planned withdrawal. Grant was left in limbo, unable to get the troops he believed were necessary to attack, but probably keenly aware that he was on thin ice and any disaster during the withdrawal would finish him. Hence he was paralysed by indecision and did nothing.​

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On the 20th, in response to a request for one of the heavy artillery regiments back to man the Washington defences, Grant tries to negotiate an exchange of it for 6th Corps with Halleck. Grant then tries to order it back and is rebuffed, repeating his order on 24th July:​

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I presume you had not yet received my dispatch directing the 6th Corps to be returned here and the 19th retained.- Grant to Halleck, 24th July 1864​

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Grant was forced to acquiesce, and it was probably Lincoln who changed his mind. On 31st July Lincoln had a private meeting with Grant. It was apparently, as John Y. Simon observed, not a happy meeting for Grant. It was "an interview without coffee". On 1st August Grant writes not about getting his troops back, but putting his man, Sheridan, in control of them.​

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Despite Lincoln's correction, Grant's opinion hasn't changed. After laying low for a month by the 29th August he is asking again for 6th Corps:​

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If this can be done the 6th Corps might be brought here and the 19th left for other service. - Grant to Halleck, 29th August 1864​

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This is ignored, and the collected papers have no more pleas for 6th Corps until the beginning of October.​

 

[Generic Username]

The Union Army that Banks carried up the Red River in 1864 was comprised of detachments that were later instrumental in operations in Virginia (19th Corps, Valley Campaign), Mississippi, Missouri, and Tennessee (16th Corps, Tupelo, Price's Raid, Nashville Campaign). If these troops are lost to the Union, how does that change the course of the war? I'll carry this a bit further in assuming that Porter's fleet is also lost at Alexandria. In order to defeat Banks, we'll keep all the Confederate infantry in LA, and let Price's cavalry handle Steele in AR (Steele was on the defensive without the help of CSA infantry).

So, what does the rest of the war look like in this reality? I am inclined to think that something like this might take place:

1) Transfer of most of Trans-Miss infantry to Miss, allowing the CSA to retake Memphis. Alternatively, full-blown CSA invasion of Missouri.

2) Forrest has a much greater impact on Sherman's supply lines, delaying fall of Atlanta.

3) Virginia campaign stalls

Overall impact is probably just stalemate vs. Confederate collapse in latter half of 1864.

This is what Michael J. Forsyth's argues in his book on the subject:

By mid-June 1864 all the Federal offensives had stalled. In the east, the Army of the Potomac had suffered more than 50,000 casualties in its campaign against the Army of Northern Virginia. In spite of the bloodletting, Robert E. Lee had confounded the Federals at every turn. Not satisfied to remain on the defensive, Lee launched his 2nd Corps under Lieutenant General Jubal Early on a foray down the Shenandoah Valley in early June. Lee's purpose was to clear remaining Federals from the Valley to secure its fertile farms as a source of sustenance for his army. Also, he wanted to relieve pressure on the Army of Northern Virginia now holed up on a defensive belt covering Richmond and Petersburg. The opportunistic Early not only cleared the Valley in an aggressive drive, but he kept right on going across the Potomac into Maryland. After brushing aside a scratch force on the Monocacy, Early marched to the very gates of Washington panicking the Lincoln Administration. 43 The government now demanded that Grant respond to this threat by sending troops to bolster the depleted Washington defenses.​

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Grant dispatched the VI Corps from the Army of the Potomac and directed the XIX Corps arriving from New Orleans after taking part in the Red River Campaign. The XIX Corps helped save the capital and went on to play a prominent role in driving the Confederates out of the Shenandoah. In October, the XIX Corps proved pivotal to defeating and practically destroying Early's army at Cedar Creek. 44 The battle of Cedar Creek permanently closed off the Valley from Confederate control. Had the XIX Corps been captured or destroyed in Louisiana, Cedar Creek in all likelihood would not have happened.​

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In the west, Sherman's army found itself frustrated in its drive to Atlanta. The wily Joseph Johnston proved a master of defensive warfare always keeping one step ahead of his foe. Of greater concern, in Sherman's opinion, were the operations of the elusive Rebel general Nathan Bedford Forrest. "I was disturbed by a bold raid made by the rebel General Forrest," Sherman stated in his memoirs. Forrest spent his spring raiding through west Tennessee and was threatening to cut Sherman's tenuous supply line between Nashville and Chattanooga. Should Forrest enjoy success in this endeavor, Sherman feared he would have to abandon the Atlanta campaign. With this in mind he pressured Banks to return the 10,000 troops of the XVI and XVII Corps on loan for the Red River Campaign. 45 Upon A. J. Smith's arrival at Memphis from the Red River Valley, Sherman dispatched him to keep Forrest busy and "off our roads"—the Nashville & Chattanooga Railroad. Smith, a tenacious fighter, did this in superb fashion by occupying all of Forrest's attention and fighting him to a draw at Tupelo in mid-July. Meanwhile, Sherman kept the pressure on Johnston by constantly forcing him back toward Atlanta. Smith's efforts against Forrest made Sherman's eventual capture of Atlanta in September possible. 46 However, if Sherman's veterans had been captured in Louisiana, where would Sherman have found the troops to occupy Forrest? The absence of these men could have caused a disheartening setback in the Atlanta campaign for Federal arms.​

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The XIII Corps formed the nucleus of the force that would finally make Grant's desired move to close Mobile. In August a combined army and naval force stormed the harbor forts and land face protecting the city. It was this battle that brought Admiral David G. Farragut lasting fame with his well- known quote, "**** the torpedoes, full speed ahead." The XIII Corps stormed and took the fortifications protecting the mouth of the bay in support of the naval force. 47 Once again the question arises: Where would the Federals have scraped together enough troops to take Mobile if the Rebels had destroyed the XIII Corps in the Red River Valley?​

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Finally, the loss of the Army of the Gulf in Louisiana would have translated into the destruction or capture of a large chunk of Admiral Porter's Mississippi River Squadron. Low water in the Red had trapped the gunboats above the rapids at Alexandria. Therefore, without protection from the army the precious fleet would have been lost. 48 Infinite possibilities were available to the Rebels if they could have gotten their hands on a few good boats. At best they might have challenged Federal dominance of the Mississippi or at the very least the Confederates could have reopened communications with their brethren east of the Mississippi. This would have nullified the results of the great victory at Vicksburg the year before.​

 

[67th Tigers]

Deleted

 

[Generic Username]

Deleted

I'd be interested in reading what you had to say.

 

[67th Tigers]

I'd be interested in reading what you had to say.

I confused one Porter with another Porter, then realised I was addressing a point about the wrong Porter...