Real importance and effect? Debate?

[Big Yehudah]

Historian Gary Gallagher feels the capture of Vicksburg was of little importance because the Union had long before captured New Orleans. Was the CSA already "split in two" when they lost New Orleans? What are your thoughts forum goers?

 

[1SGDan]

I would opine that Vicksburg was very important. The administration was under severe political pressure to open the river for the transshipment of goods from the mid-west. New Orleans was of little importance in this regard until the goods could make it all the way down the river. Vicksburg and Port Hudson prevented that.

 

[caller]

Historian Gary Gallagher feels the capture of Vicksburg was of little importance because the Union had long before captured New Orleans. Was the CSA already "split in two" when they lost New Orleans? What are your thoughts forum goers?

I can see Gallagher's point, but disagree with his assessment. While it was certainly valuable to have New Orleans, what good would it be to possess the two ends of the river if you couldn't get past the middle of it? Life would be tough moving soldiers and goods and whatnot. Perhaps a good way to think of this would be - if you hold the muzzle and butt of the rifle, you had better also hold the trigger.
On a little further reflection I can see that from an economic standpoint, controlling New Orleans had a greater impact on the south, but militarily, I believe Vicksburg was very important.

 

[Mark F. Jenkins]

The relative importance of Vickburg (and Port Hudson, which really shouldn't be left out of the discussion IMHO) has been and can be debated almost endlessly, but one thing is certain: both sides thought it of strategic importance. Whether it actually was or not, objectively, is almost beside the point-- if both sides thought it was, then it was (even if as no more than a symbol).

 

[caller]

The relative importance of Vickburg (and Port Hudson, which really shouldn't be left out of the discussion IMHO) has been and can be debated almost endlessly, but one thing is certain: both sides thought it of strategic importance. Whether it actually was or not, objectively, is almost beside the point-- if both sides thought it was, then it was (even if as no more than a symbol).

Excellent point. Both sides were aware New Orleans had fallen yet both sides put forth quite a bit of effort to gain/maintain control of the city. The strategic value of the bluffs over the sharp bend can not be dismissed.

 

[Mark F. Jenkins]

Yup. Porter's successful passage on April 16, 1863 rather obscures how difficult an obstacle they were to pass. It's notable that in his (probably justified) opinion, they could not have re-passed the batteries going upstream (since they would have had the current against them instead of with them, they would have been under the batteries' fire for a much longer period of time).

 

[rbasin]

New Orleans was vital for the Federal Navy. Really enabled the USA to begin the Anaconda plan in earnest.

 

[Big Yehudah]

Excellent responses. Thanks guys.

 

[ole]

Both agree and disagree with the esteemed Dr. Gallagher. It is true that the Confederate traffic across the river was effectively halted by the taking of New Orleans. By the time Vicksburg was taken, Western Grain made it to New York via railroad. The Confederacy was, in fact, sundered.

The problem is, few saw it that way. Vicksburg had to fall to dishearten the Confederacy and elate the Union -- to polish up the victory and symbolically bring the realization home to the populous of both sides.

 

[KansasFreestater]

Yup. Porter's successful passage on April 16, 1863 rather obscures how difficult an obstacle they were to pass. It's notable that in his (probably justified) opinion, they could not have re-passed the batteries going upstream (since they would have had the current against them instead of with them, they would have been under the batteries' fire for a much longer period of time).

Hey, Mark, you'd be a good person for me to ask this question I've had for a while. Since Porter was able, in the event, to get past those dreaded batteries so easily -- i.e., with hardly any loss -- why didn't Grant & Co. do that whole operation at the start, without all the intervening months of dead ends and frustration???

 

[Nathanb1]

Hey, Mark, you'd be a good person for me to ask this question I've had for a while. Since Porter was able, in the event, to get past those dreaded batteries so easily -- i.e., with hardly any loss -- why didn't Grant & Co. do that whole operation at the start, without all the intervening months of dead ends and frustration???

Have you looked at a map? I highly recommend the Civil War Trust's animated map of Vicksburg.

 

[rbasin]

Hey, Mark, you'd be a good person for me to ask this question I've had for a while. Since Porter was able, in the event, to get past those dreaded batteries so easily -- i.e., with hardly any loss -- why didn't Grant & Co. do that whole operation at the start, without all the intervening months of dead ends and frustration???

Grant's big problem would have been supplies. Could have been unpredictable with Vicksburg in the way.

 

[cash]

Historian Gary Gallagher feels the capture of Vicksburg was of little importance because the Union had long before captured New Orleans. Was the CSA already "split in two" when they lost New Orleans? What are your thoughts forum goers?

Vicksburg was one of two holdouts on the Mississippi River. Except for Vicksburg and Port Hudson the Union controlled the Mississippi. The confederacy was already cut in two by the loss of the vast majority of the Mississippi.

Vicksburg was important as a symbol, not for any practical reasons.

 

[cash]

I can see Gallagher's point, but disagree with his assessment. While it was certainly valuable to have New Orleans, what good would it be to possess the two ends of the river if you couldn't get past the middle of it? Life would be tough moving soldiers and goods and whatnot. Perhaps a good way to think of this would be - if you hold the muzzle and butt of the rifle, you had better also hold the trigger.
On a little further reflection I can see that from an economic standpoint, controlling New Orleans had a greater impact on the south, but militarily, I believe Vicksburg was very important.

The Trans-Mississippi was a major source of beef for the confederacy. With the loss of the Mississippi and crossings of that river, the confederate armies lost one of their most important food sources.

 

[John Winn]

I think what's been said pretty much answers the question. I'd just point out that Gallagher (who I admire very much) is a strong supporter of the 'the war could have been won in the East despite loss in the West' school. This is one of those classic Civil War civil wars. I tend to agree with Gallagher that a victory could have been had even after losing the river and a great deal of the West but don't think that's the same as saying Vicksburg wasn't of importance (with which I wouldn't agree).

 

[Mark F. Jenkins]

Hey, Mark, you'd be a good person for me to ask this question I've had for a while. Since Porter was able, in the event, to get past those dreaded batteries so easily -- i.e., with hardly any loss -- why didn't Grant & Co. do that whole operation at the start, without all the intervening months of dead ends and frustration???

Echoing Nate and rbasin, the basic problem was geography and logistics. The way Grant eventually did it was one of the riskier approaches; his preference may be seen in the first attempt at Vicksburg, where a waterborne flanking movement by Sherman was to be coordinated with a primary overland advance south from Memphis. However, Earl Van Dorn scotched that idea with his destruction of Holly Springs (and, to at least an extent, Forrest's operations farther away had an effect as well, although they're not usually directly considered with the Vicksburg operations).

Grant's army would have been at the end of a very torturous and easily-disrupted supply line (he was not literally operating without a supply line, despite his statements in his Memoirs, although it in truth was a very abbreviated and minimal supply line), and in fact did come close to exhausting his supplies until the Walnut Hills ("Chickasaw Bluffs") came under Union control and supplies started flowing via that route.

Porter was also very reluctant to risk 'stranding' a significant portion of his fleet below Vicksburg unless the operation looked like it had a good chance of success (and even then seems to have required some prodding from high levels to go along with it).

Sherman was never a fan of the operation as it was eventually carried out; he advised trying the overland route (presumably with better guards at Holly Springs) again, but Grant seems to have decided that to return to Memphis would look too much like a retreat, whether it was one in truth or not... and, frankly, might very well have led to Grant's removal from command (to judge from the near-contemporaneous examples of Burnside, Hooker, and Rear Admiral Du Pont)...

 

[ole]

Hey, Mark, you'd be a good person for me to ask this question I've had for a while. Since Porter was able, in the event, to get past those dreaded batteries so easily -- i.e., with hardly any loss -- why didn't Grant & Co. do that whole operation at the start, without all the intervening months of dead ends and frustration???

It took Grant that long to persuade Porter to do it. No one wanted to run that gauntlet. Porter ran it at night and, thanks to Rebel gunners and a lot of luck, he made it through.

 

[KansasFreestater]

Echoing Nate and rbasin, the basic problem was geography and logistics. The way Grant eventually did it was one of the riskier approaches; his preference may be seen in the first attempt at Vicksburg, where a waterborne flanking movement by Sherman was to be coordinated with a primary overland advance south from Memphis. However, Earl Van Dorn scotched that idea with his destruction of Holly Springs (and, to at least an extent, Forrest's operations farther away had an effect as well, although they're not usually directly considered with the Vicksburg operations).

Grant's army would have been at the end of a very torturous and easily-disrupted supply line (he was not literally operating without a supply line, despite his statements in his Memoirs, although it in truth was a very abbreviated and minimal supply line), and in fact did come close to exhausting his supplies until the Walnut Hills ("Chickasaw Bluffs") came under Union control and supplies started flowing via that route.

Porter was also very reluctant to risk 'stranding' a significant portion of his fleet below Vicksburg unless the operation looked like it had a good chance of success (and even then seems to have required some prodding from high levels to go along with it).

Sherman was never a fan of the operation as it was eventually carried out; he advised trying the overland route (presumably with better guards at Holly Springs) again, but Grant seems to have decided that to return to Memphis would look too much like a retreat, whether it was one in truth or not... and, frankly, might very well have led to Grant's removal from command (to judge from the near-contemporaneous examples of Burnside, Hooker, and Rear Admiral Du Pont)...

Very good explanation, Mark. Just what I was looking for. Thank you!

 

[rickvox79]

I actually started listening to one of Gary Gallagher's lecturing sessions this week dealing with Lee and his generals. I've also listened to his 48 part lecture overview of the war. He definitely has an affinity for the eastern front, which is understandable considering its importance. I do think the west was overlooked by historians over the years but I think it has gotten more attention lately. The strategic importance of the city of Vicksburg is probably lessened with the loss of New Orleans but the fact that nearly 30,000 Confederate troops surrendered cannot be understated IMO.

The loss of an entire army, supplies and the last hold out to the Mississippi had large negative implications for the South and was probably more of a moral low than the defeat at Gettysburg. I thought Michael Ballard from his book "Vicksburg: The Campaign That Opened The Mississippi" summed it up nicely:

"With the fall of Vicksburg, the Confederacy lost an army that never fought again. The Confederacy also lost thousands of square miles of territory and suffered a permanent disruption in logistical support, sporadic though it has been, that the Trans-Mississippi supplied to the rest of the Confederacy. Scattered military action continued in the region encompassing Louisiana, Arkansas, Mississippi, Alabama and West Tennessee, but the loss of Vicksburg and the Mississippi in effect shrank the Western Confederacy from Texas to the Alabama-Georgia border. The ordnance lost when Pemberton surrendered could not be replaced. The impact of the surrender on Southern morale was considerably greater than that of Lee's withdrawal from Pennsylvania."

 

[Pat Answer]

Have you looked at a map? I highly recommend the Civil War Trust's animated map of Vicksburg.

That's the one I can't get to work!