Railroad capacity?

[rbasin]

So we know that, at one point in time, The Confederacy had X miles of track, Y units of rolling stock and Z locomotives. What we haven't considered is the Confederacy's ability to maintain X, Y, and Z at a later point in time.

The stats didn't remain the same.

And we know that a lot of Southern railroad lines and/or spurs went nowhere. They were built to transport from farms and plantations, not to transport to somewhere.

 

[Pat Answer]

So we know that, at one point in time, The Confederacy had X miles of track, Y units of rolling stock and Z locomotives. What we haven't considered is the Confederacy's ability to maintain X, Y, and Z at a later point in time.

The stats didn't remain the same.

Absolutely. I'm interested in those "starting points" for a base line.

 

[DaveBrt]

Thomas Weber, The Northern Railroads in the Civil War, 1952 (same time as Black's book on the Confederate railroads.

P.9 "At one time 1,400 cars waiting to be unloaded at Toledo were simply used as warehouses (American RR Review, Jan 28, 1862).

P. 9 "The New York Central had facilities at Buffalo which could load and dispatch 250 to 300 cars daily, amounting to 25,000 to 30,000 barrels of flour (American RR Journal, Nov. 16, 1861)

P. 12 "The three main East-West trunk lines (not including the B&O which was out of operation during much of the time) had a combined rolling stock in 1861 of over 650 locomotives, over 400 passenger cars, and about 8,700 freight cars of various types." (The annual reports of the three RRs).

Compare these numbers with post #9.

 

[Elennsar]

I'll find it. I just read it, but not sure where. Just happened upon it. the article had much lower numbers, But based on your numbers, I have a feeling he may have been referring to engines in use, perhaps for military needs. The article did state that military RRs had a different gauge than the privately held ones in the North.

As soon as I find it, I'll either post it here or start a new thread. Likely in the morning.

That could very well be it - the USMRR's list is by no means the same as the "total number of locomotives and cars on the rails", although given how it worked it may have been able to claim any given ones at any particular time, "Everything all the time" would take until its successor in WWI, I believe.

I am not aware of anything indicating it used a unique gauge though - although given the existence of broad gauge lines, it might just be referring to those.

 

[Pat Answer]

I'll find it. I just read it, but not sure where. Just happened upon it. the article had much lower numbers, But based on your numbers, I have a feeling he may have been referring to engines in use, perhaps for military needs. The article did state that military RRs had a different gauge than the privately held ones in the North.

As soon as I find it, I'll either post it here or start a new thread. Likely in the morning.

Please consider posting it here. It's relevant.

 

[rbasin]

 

[Elennsar]

Thomas Weber, The Northern Railroads in the Civil War, 1952 (same time as Black's book on the Confederate railroads.

P.9 "At one time 1,400 cars waiting to be unloaded at Toledo were simply used as warehouses (American RR Review, Jan 28, 1862).

P. 9 "The New York Central had facilities at Buffalo which could load and dispatch 250 to 300 cars daily, amounting to 25,000 to 30,000 barrels of flour (American RR Journal, Nov. 16, 1861)

P. 12 "The three main East-West trunk lines (not including the B&O which was out of operation during much of the time) had a combined rolling stock in 1861 of over 650 locomotives, over 400 passenger cars, and about 8,700 freight cars of various types." (The annual reports of the three RRs).

Compare these numbers with post #9.

It's rather grim. The Southern railroads simply to be far less up to the demands of the war (even before problems maintaining them at the level of 1860) in every measurable particular.

Add in the absence of any true "system" and you get something even more underwhelming than a mere count of mileage implies.

40% of Union capacity might have been enough. <10% and falling certainly isn't.

 

[rbasin]

Please consider posting it here. It's relevant.

I will. I think I found it.

 

[rbasin]

Yep, it was me. The article, which is on page 609 of The Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Civil War, concerns the U.S. Military Railroad and there is another article on the CSA Railroads. It cam into being as part of the Railroads and Telegraph Act Jan 31, 1862.

some of the basic from the articles:

Pre-war, Northern Railroads had 22,385 miles of track, compared to 8,783 miles in the South. in the South, there was 112 different railroad companies.

Not a single mile of new track was built in the South during the war.

A side note: Simon Cameron was the V.P. of the Pennsylvania Railroad. He charged two cents per mile per soldier, which was a scandal at the time.

Lincoln appointed Daniel C. McCullum military director and superintendent of railroads Feb 11, 1862 by executive order. McCullum was to report to Montgomery Meigs for financial matters. In May McCullum was authorized by Lincoln to all railroads. .

Originally, the USMRR was designed to operate rail lines in Union held Confederate territory. By the end of the war, according to Historian Francis A. Lord, the USMRR held 2100 miles of track, 6330 cars, and 419 engines.

Herman Haupt was the USMRR's chief of construction and maintenance, or USMRR Construction Corps. This Corps laid or re-built about 650 miles of track and reworked several lines to a uniformed track gauge of 4 ft 8.5 inches.

Union Conscription laws exempted Locomotive engineers.

At a cost of $30m, the USMRR maintained 16 railways in the eastern theatre and 19 shorter lines in Tenn, Miss. and Georgia. From April 1865 through 1866, McCullum returned the railroads in the South to civilian ownership and repaired war damages.

Sorry for my earlier post. I glanced at that 419 engines.

Francis A Lord wrote a book on Haupt, which I'll look for and read up on.

Also, here is Haupt's own words http://books.google.com/books?id=C3t2AAAAMAAJ&dq=herman haupt&pg=PR3#v=onepage&q&f=false

 

[M E Wolf]

This thread might be interesting (on railroads):

http://civilwartalk.com/threads/atlanta-georgia-railroad-yards.83468/#post-634258

M. E. Wolf

 

[Elennsar]

No worries, it was a good opportunity to compare studies of the subject.

I'm not sure what to make of Haupt as a judge of military matters, but that man knew railroads like . . . well, his knowledge of railroads itself would make a good metaphor.

 

[rbasin]

No worries, it was a good opportunity to compare studies of the subject.

I'm not sure what to make of Haupt as a judge of military matters, but that man knew railroads like . . . well, his knowledge of railroads itself would make a good metaphor.

I kinda like him a lot. He wasn't a military man, its true, but he had a really good head for describing what he saw. He was the one who told Pope to keep an eye out for his flank during the 2nd Bull Run Campaign

 

[Elennsar]

I kinda like him a lot. He wasn't a military man, its true, but he had a really good head for describing what he saw. He was the one who told Pope to keep an eye out for his flank during the 2nd Bull Run Campaign

That's a definite point in his favor. Not so thrilled with his less savvy understanding of Meade post-Gettysburg, however.

Going back to railroads and not men, one thing that strikes me - I suspect the data at least in part is on Bright's site, but I don't know it in any sort of complete fashion across the board: Rail weight. Rail at 35 pounds a yard can't handle the traffic rail at say, 55 pounds a yard can.

And judging by construction costs per mile, I'd wager that Southern railroads were generally lighter - which would mean that the heavy traffic of war would wear them out even faster on top of having less maintenance and less to replace worn out stuff with.

It's a dizzying spiral of failure.

 

[M E Wolf]

O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XV [S# 21]
Confederate Correspondence, Orders, And Returns Relating To Operations In West Florida, Southern Alabama, Southern Mississippi, And Louisiana From May 12, 1862, To May 14, 1863: And In Texas, New Mexico, And Arizona From September 20, 1862, To May 14, 1863.--#4

RICHMOND, MADISON PARISH, LA.,
September 1, 1862.
Col. WM. PRESTON JOHNSTON,
Aide-de-Camp, President's Office, Richmond, Va.:
COLONEL: I reached this place to-day, having crossed the Mississippi at Vicksburg and passed within 1 mile of the enemy's gunboats (two), now engaged in observing the mouth of the Yazoo at Young's Point, 10 miles above Vicksburg. General Blanchard is still in command of this department, headquarters at Monroe, La., 105 miles by the wagon road and 80 by rail to Vicksburg. The railroad is now in operation from Monroe to Tallulah; distance, 60 miles. The force in this department consists of Morrison's regiment, Thirty-first Louisiana; Gray's Twenty-eighth Louisiana; Shelley's Louisiana battalion; Chambliss' battalion (Partisan Rangers); Harper's company (Partisan Rangers), and Benton's light battery, four pieces. This force has a heavy sick list, and furnishes but 1,000 men for duty. I am informed by officers stationed here that there are but 1,200 stand of effective arms in this department, chiefly shot-guns.

I have the honor herewith to transmit through you to the President a map(*) of Madison Parish, Louisiana. The section lines will furnish the scale. From this map you will perceive that unless there is an adequate force to prevent it the enemy may construct a military road from Milliken's Bend to New Carthage, a distance of 32 miles, and through it keep open his communication with his best sources of supplies on the upper river, thus avoiding Vicksburg altogether and cutting off this only practicable line of communication with Texas, Western Louisiana, Arkansas, and the Indian Territory. Deserters from the Yankee fleet state that it lies at Lake Providence, 40 miles above Vicksburg, and consists of seven iron-clad gunboats and five transports, with troops. I should have stated that this section of Louisiana can now furnish 4,000 men for service, and the people are ready and anxious to take the field, but have no arms. I will write from Marshall, Tex., and inform you of what was done or intended by that military hybrid the Governors' caucus.

With best wishes for the President's good health, I am, colonel, yours, truly,
T. J. MACKEY,
Captain, &c.
-----
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXIII/2 [S# 35]
Correspondence, Orders, And Returns Relating To Operations In Kentucky, Middle And East Tennessee, North Alabama, And Southwest Virginia, From January 21 To August 10, 1863.
UNION CORRESPONDENCE. ETC.--#11

MEMPHIS, TENN., April 20, 1863--3 p.m.
Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief :
I send for your information the following dispatch, sent by me:
MEMPHIS, TENN., April 20, 1863.
Major-General ROSECRANS:
The enemy at Tuscumbia has been largely re-enforced by infantry. The delay in Streight's coming up compelled Dodge to attack. He did so, and drove them from Bear Creek to Caney Creek with heavy loss. Our loss 100, and one piece of artillery disabled, but saved. Streight is now in Eastport, in communication with Dodge and the gunboats. I re-enforced Dodge to-day with 2,000 men, and with instructions that, if he finds the enemy too strong to be dislodged from Tuscumbia, that Streight should proceed in rear of Dodge, by Tupelo, and then across the country. I sent cavalry on Friday to cut the Mobile and Ohio Railroad below Tupelo, and also to push down to the Jackson and Vicksburg Railroad and cut that. I recommend a strong demonstration on the enemy's left, to relieve the movement on Tuscumbia. I shall keep you informed of anything further that I learn.
S. A. HURLBUT,
Major-general.

Colonel Streight, in command of General Rosecrans' expedition, did not come up until four days after the time agreed upon for the movement to commence.
S. A. HURLBUT,
Major-general.

---------
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXIV/1 [S# 36]
Operations In Mississippi And West Tennessee, Including Those In Arkansas And Louisiana. Connected With The Siege Of Vicksburg.--January 20-August 10, 1863.
No. 2.--Reports of Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, U. S. Army, commanding Army of the Tennessee, including correspondence with the authorities at Washington, January 20-July 10.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE,
Vicksburg, Miss., July 6, 1863.
COLONEL: I have the honor to submit the following report of the Operations of the Army of the Tennessee, and co-operating forces, from the date of my assuming the immediate command of the expedition against Vicksburg, Miss., to the reduction of that place:

[extended excerpt]

On reaching Clinton, at 4.45 p.m., I ordered McClernand to move his command early the next morning toward Edwards Depot, marching so as to feel the enemy if he encountered him, but not to bring on a general engagement unless he was confident he was able to defeat him; and also to order Blair to move with him.

About 5 o'clock on the morning of the 16th, two men, employés on the Jackson and Vicksburg Railroad, who had passed through Pemberton's army the night before, were brought to my headquarters. They stated Pemberton's force to consist of about eighty regiments, with ten batteries of artillery, and that the whole force was estimated by the enemy at about 25,000 men. From them I also learned the positions being taken up by the enemy, and his intention of attacking our rear. I had determined to leave one division of Sherman's corps one day longer in Jackson, but this information determined me to bring his entire command up at once, and I accordingly dispatched him at 5.30 a.m. to move with all possible speed until he came up with the main force near Bolton. My dispatch reached him at 7.10 a.m., and his advance division was in motion in one hour from that time. A dispatch was sent to Blair at the same time to push forward his division in the direction of Edwards Station with all possible dispatch. McClernand was directed to establish communication between Blair and Osterhaus, of his corps, and keep it up, moving the former to the support of the latter. McPherson was ordered forward at 5.45 a.m. to join McClernand, and Lieutenant-Colonel Wilson, of my staff, was sent forward to communicate the information received, and with verbal
instructions to McClernand as to the disposition of his forces.

At an early hour I left for the advance, and, on arriving at the crossing of the Vicksburg and Jackson Railroad with the road from Raymond to Bolton, I found McPherson's advance and his pioneer corps engaged in rebuilding a bridge on the former road that had been destroyed by The cavalry of Osterhaus' division that had gone into Bolton the night before. The train of Hovey's division was at a halt, and blocked up the road from farther advance on the Vicksburg road. I ordered all quartermasters and wagon-masters to draw their teams to one side and make room for the passage of troops. McPherson was brought up by this road.

[extended excerpt]

Possession of Vicksburg at that time would have enabled me to have turned upon Johnston and driven him from the State, and possessed myself of all the railroads and practical military highways, thus effectually securing to ourselves all territory west of the Tombigbee, and this before the season was too far advanced for campaigning in this latitude. I would have saved the Government sending large re-enforcements, much needed elsewhere; and, finally, the troops themselves were impatient to possess Vicksburg, and would not have worked in the trenches with the same zeal, believing it unnecessary, that they did after their failure to carry the enemy's works.

[extended excerpt]
For the brilliant achievements recounted in this report, the Army of the Tennessee, their comrades of the Ninth Army Corps, Herron's division of the Army of the Frontier, and the Navy cooperating with them, deserve the highest honors their country can award.
I have the honor to be, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
U.S. GRANT,
Major-General U. S. Army, Commanding.
Col. J. C. KELTON,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Washington, D. C.

---------
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXIV/3 [S# 38]
Correspondence, Orders, And Returns Relating To Operations In Mississippi And West Tennessee (And Those In Arkansas And Louisiana Connected With The Siege Of Vicksburg) From January 20 To August 10, 1863.
CONFEDERATE CORRESPONDENCE, ETC.--#1

JACKSON, February 12, 1863.
General PEMBERTON, Vicksburg:
The following dispatches have been received from General Johnston, February 11 and 12:
Brigadier-General Chalmers has been ordered to report to you; not yet recovered from a wound. Brig. Gen. Dan. W. Adams applies to be transferred to you. Have you an adequate place for him? also wounded.
Major Dawson reports that private cars take private freight over the Vicksburg Railroad, but Government cannot ship on it. Cannot the president of the road remedy this matter? This army is in great need of salt, molasses, and sugar.
J. R. WADDY,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
-----
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXVI/2 [S# 42]
Confederate Correspondence, Orders, And Returns Relating To Operation's In West Florida, Southern Alabama, Southern Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, And New Mexico, From May 14 To December 31, 1863.--#2

HEADQUARTERS TRANS-MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT,
Shreveport, June 3, 1863.
Brig. Gen. P.O. HÉBERT,
Commanding, &c., Monroe, La.:
I am informed the railroad bridges over the Bayous Macon and Tensas can be repaired in twenty-four hours.
Major-General Taylor should now be opposite Vicksburg with his forces, and if the reports of General Grant's discomfiture at Vicksburg are true, the Vicksburg Railroad should be repaired to Richmond as speedily as practicable, or, if it cannot be repaired as far as Richmond, it should be put in running order as far east as possible. You will inform Major-General Taylor what you determine to do.
E. KIRBY SMITH,
Lieutenant-General, Commanding.
-----
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXXIV/2 [S# 62]
CONFEDERATE CORRESPONDENCE, ORDERS, AND RETURNS RELATING TO OPERATIONS IN LOUISIANA AND THE TRANS-MISSISSIPPI STATES AND TERRITORIES, FROM JANUARY 1, 1864, TO MARCH 31, 1864.--#9
HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF WEST LOUISIANA,
Alexandria, February 29, 1864.
Brigadier-General BOGGS, Chief of Staff:
GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Captain Freret's communication on the subject of railroads and telegraphic wire. As there was not sufficient wire reported to make an independent line, no orders were given to remove it. I will have it sent to department headquarters as soon as possible. Measures were taken more than a year since to insure the destruction of the engines and cars on the Baton Rouge railroad whenever the enemy threatened a permanent occupation of that region. I carefully inspected the country between Livonia and Bayou Alabama last summer, with a view to removing this rolling stock, and was deterred making the attempt by the impassable swamp 5 miles in extent. At that time, too, I had entire control of the Atchafalaya, with steam-boats running on that stream and no danger of interruption by the enemy. The attempt will be made if the lieutenant-general commanding desires it. Instructions have been given to take to pieces carefully the engines and tenders On the Monroe and Vicksburg Railroad and remove them to a safe point west of the Ouachita. The iron on that road was also ordered to be removed and can be sent to Shreveport, if necessary.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,
R. TAYLOR,
Major-General.
-----------------
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME X/1 [S# 10]
APRIL 29-JUNE 10, 1862--Advance upon and siege of Corinth …
No. 35. -- Report of Maj. Gen. John A. McClernand, U. S. Army, commanding Reserve Corps, Army of the Tennessee, of operations from April 24 to May 30.
HDQRS. RESERVE CORPS, ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
Camp Jackson, July 4, 1862.
GENERAL: My report of the part taken by my command, consisting of the First Division of the Army of the Tennessee, in the battle of Shiloh, explains how the enemy was driven from my camp on the 7th, and forced with great loss to abandon the ground he had gained on the 6th of April. I will not dwell upon the incidents of that great event now. It would be supererogatory to do so. They have passed into glorious and imperishable history, and there let them rest.
[extensive excerpt]
Hearing that the enemy were using the Mobile and Ohio Railroad as a means of so disposing his forces as to enable him to turn our right flank, attack us in the rear, and cut off our communication with the base at Pittsburg, I ordered General Wallace to advance one of the brigades of his division to an intermediate point on the line between his camp and the cross-roads. Colonel Woods (Seventy-sixth Ohio), commanding the Third Brigade of the Third Division, accordingly moved forward with his brigade, and took and strongly fortified a commanding position. In combination with this movement, at 4 o'clock in the morning General Ross, with his brigade, battalion of cavalry, and eight pieces of cannon, supported by General Logan's brigade as a reserve, under command of Brigadier-General Judah, moved forward to the railroad. Upon reaching the road he instantly encountered a detachment of the enemy's forces which had been placed there to guard it, and rapidly driving them back, tore up the road for some distance, spoiling the rails by placing them on ties and other timbers, which were fired, and thus destroyed. The celerity of this movement took the enemy by surprise, leaving him no opportunity to re-enforce the detachment thus put to flight. After having successfully accomplished the object of the movement and marched near 10 miles, our forces were returned to their camp by 10 o'clock a.m.
[extensive excerpt]
--------------
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME X/1 [S# 10]
APRIL 29-JUNE 10, 1862--Advance upon and siege of Corinth …
No. 37. -- Reports of General G. T. Beauregard, C. S. Army, commanding Department No. 2, with correspondence, orders, and supplementary statements concerning operations from April 8 to June 10.

THIRTY MILES SOUTH OF CORINTH, MISS.,
On Mobile and Ohio Railroad, June 3, 1862.
General S. COOPER:
We evacuated Corinth successfully on 30th ultimo; a complete surprise to the enemy. Rear guard arrived here unmolested last night. We brought away all our heavy guns, tents, &c., but had to burn a few trains, cut off by gross neglect in getting to a bridge.
G. T. BEAUREGARD.
-----
So much more on these 'roads...'

Here are the railroads I have found thus far in the Official Records of the Rebellion:


Jackson and Vicksburg Railroad,
Mobile and Ohio Railroad
Monroe and Vicksburg Railroad
Corinth and Jackson Railroad
Memphis and Charleston Railroad


.
M. E. Wolf

 

[AndyHall]

This description of wartime railroads in Texas is pretty vivid. It's by S. O. Young (1848-1926), who was a teenager at the time and who later wrote extensively on local history:

There were many difficulties to be overcome in the way of transportation and equally as great ones in obtaining money or credit to pay for construction. Just as the Harrisburg road got under good headway; the Houston and Texas Central got into the game. The first shovel of dirt for this road was thrown by that great railroad genius, Paul Bremond, in 1853. When he threw up that dirt he turned up more trouble for himself than generally falls to the lot of one man.

Of course, he did not know this, but I am convinced that had he done so it would have made not the slightest change in his plans. His faith in himself and his confidence in his ability to accomplish whatever he started out to do, was something sublime. When it came to energy he had any engine on his road faded to a standstill. He was a wonderful man, and he did not hesitate, at times, to attempt the apparently impossible.

When his first contractor got cold feet and threw up his job, Mr. Bremond promptly undertook to carry out the contract to build the road himself. There is where his troubles began.

The company had money enough to build two miles of road and to buy an engine. Then the unlooked-for and unprovided-for element of credit bobbed up and scared all the other stock-holders, except Mr. Bremond, off the track.

He stayed and went straight ahead just as if he had millions behind him. He had faith, the kind that is spelled with a big F, but the difficulty was to pay off several hundred clamoring Irishmen with some of his faith. He did not actually perform that miracle, but he came as near doing so as anybody could.

He was a very honest and square man himself and the Irishmen, while they cursed and hunted for him everywhere, knew that they would be paid sometime. They made life a burden for him, however. Of course, he hid out as much as possible and was not given to parading up and down Main Street in those days, but while this modesty on his part saved him some trouble, it did not save him all the time and he had some remarkable experiences.

On one occasion several hundred of the Irishmen went in a body to his residence. They yelled and hooted and made lots of noise, but finally contented themselves with tearing down his fence and carrying away the pieces. Finally they got tired of making demonstrations against him and, entering into the spirit of the game, they backed him up and went to work.

Mr. Bremond knew that when the road reached Hempstead it would begin to earn money, so he turned all his great energy towards constructing it to that point as rapidly as possible. It took him five years of the hardest work any man ever had, but he accomplished it in 1858, and at once entered on a period of comparative ease. It was a wonderful performance and not one man in 10,000 could have done it.

In two years more the road was completed to Millican and, the war coming on, it stuck there. In the meantime the Buffalo Bayou and Brazos Railroad had built into Houston. It used to come down San Jacinto Street and had an engine house and turntable at the foot of that street, right where the bridge is now. It had a long wooden depot at Polk Avenue and San Jacinto Street, where all the cars stopped, but the locomotive would come down to San Jacinto to turn round and go into the engine house.

A lot of New Yorkers backed Abe Gentry up and he began the construction of the road to New Orleans. This road had money and credit too, and while it began construction later than the Houston and Texas Central and the Buffalo Bayou and Brazos roads, when the war broke out it had as much line constructed as either of them, and had trains running to Orange.

I don't suppose there ever were such railroads as those leading out of Houston became by the second and third years of the war. Schedules and time-tables became farces. The trains came and went as they could, and spent almost as much time off the tracks as they did on them. I remember on one occasion pulling out of Columbia on the Buffalo Bayou and Brazos road, at the same time that a company of cavalry left there for Houston.

During the whole day we were never out of sight of that company. Sometimes we would be ahead and sometimes they would lead. It was see-saw all day, for it took from early in the morning until dark to make the trip of 50 miles. Finally, just at dark, we reached Brays Bayou and lost sight of the company there. They had entered the woods, ahead of us, however.

Before the close of the war all the railroads except the Houston and Texas Central and the Galveston, Houston and Henderson had gone out of commission and had ceased to run at all. In some way these two roads were kept in such condition that they could be used, but that was all. Using them was not a safe thing by any means. They crept along so slowly that while wrecks were so frequent as to attract no attention, it was a rare thing for any one to get killed or even hurt.

If full justice were done the name of Mr. Bremond would be perpetuated by the Houston and Texas Central road. It is true there is one of the principal towns on the line named after him. It is true he received loyal support and assistance from W. R. Baker, M. M. Rice, William Van Alstyne, William J. Hutchins, Cornelius Ennis and others, but theirs was money help and soon gave out. The real credit for building the road belongs to Paul Bremond, for he did what others could or would not do, pulled off his coat and went in the trenches and, figuratively, on the firing line of railroad construction in Texas.

I do not know what the reason for doing so was, but in those days the builders of locomotives always put immense smokestacks on them. The smokestacks were funnel-shape and several feet in circumference at the top. The locomotives burned wood and every few miles there were big stacks of cordwood piled alongside the track.

There was no such thing as spark-arresters and every time the fireman put fresh wood in the box the passengers got the full benefit of the sparks, cinders and smoke. It beat traveling by stage, however, and as the people knew nothing of oil-burners, spark-arresters and Pullman cars, everybody was content.

The old-time fireman earned every dollar that was coming to him, for he had to keep busy all the time. It was not child's play to have to keep steam up with only wood for fuel. Then too, it took more steam to keep an engine going at that time, for the engineer was using his whistle 10 times as often as he uses it now.

There were no fences along the right of way and as there were thousands of cattle on the prairies and woods where the road ran, the track was generally filled with them every few miles. As soon as the trains would get out of the city limits, the whistle would begin tooting and this was kept up almost without cessation. Of course, a great many cattle were killed and this led to bitter warfare between the cattlemen and the railroads.

Wrecks and attempted wrecks were frequent, for there were not wanting men, who, to get revenge on the railroad company by destroying its property, were willing to run the risk of destroying the lives of innocent passengers. The first wreck of this kind that ever occurred in Texas, was on the Houston and Texas Central, near where the water tank is, about 12 miles from Houston. Some scoundrel drove spikes between the ends of the rails and wrecked the train. No one was killed, but Mr. Bremond, who was on the train, received quite serious injuries and was laid up for repairs for several days.

It is a pity some historian of that day did not keep a record of the ups and downs of the life of the early railroad builders. It would make interesting reading today. It would show, as the Frenchman said, "more downs as ups," for their progress was marked by more temporary failures than by successes.​

 

[Elennsar]

Good history, even if perhaps slightly understating the level of spark arrester technology.

 

[rbasin]

O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XV [S# 21]
Confederate Correspondence, Orders, And Returns Relating To Operations In West Florida, Southern Alabama, Southern Mississippi, And Louisiana From May 12, 1862, To May 14, 1863: And In Texas, New Mexico, And Arizona From September 20, 1862, To May 14, 1863.--#4

RICHMOND, MADISON PARISH, LA.,
September 1, 1862.
Col. WM. PRESTON JOHNSTON,
Aide-de-Camp, President's Office, Richmond, Va.:
COLONEL: I reached this place to-day, having crossed the Mississippi at Vicksburg and passed within 1 mile of the enemy's gunboats (two), now engaged in observing the mouth of the Yazoo at Young's Point, 10 miles above Vicksburg. General Blanchard is still in command of this department, headquarters at Monroe, La., 105 miles by the wagon road and 80 by rail to Vicksburg. The railroad is now in operation from Monroe to Tallulah; distance, 60 miles. The force in this department consists of Morrison's regiment, Thirty-first Louisiana; Gray's Twenty-eighth Louisiana; Shelley's Louisiana battalion; Chambliss' battalion (Partisan Rangers); Harper's company (Partisan Rangers), and Benton's light battery, four pieces. This force has a heavy sick list, and furnishes but 1,000 men for duty. I am informed by officers stationed here that there are but 1,200 stand of effective arms in this department, chiefly shot-guns.

I have the honor herewith to transmit through you to the President a map(*) of Madison Parish, Louisiana. The section lines will furnish the scale. From this map you will perceive that unless there is an adequate force to prevent it the enemy may construct a military road from Milliken's Bend to New Carthage, a distance of 32 miles, and through it keep open his communication with his best sources of supplies on the upper river, thus avoiding Vicksburg altogether and cutting off this only practicable line of communication with Texas, Western Louisiana, Arkansas, and the Indian Territory. Deserters from the Yankee fleet state that it lies at Lake Providence, 40 miles above Vicksburg, and consists of seven iron-clad gunboats and five transports, with troops. I should have stated that this section of Louisiana can now furnish 4,000 men for service, and the people are ready and anxious to take the field, but have no arms. I will write from Marshall, Tex., and inform you of what was done or intended by that military hybrid the Governors' caucus.

With best wishes for the President's good health, I am, colonel, yours, truly,
T. J. MACKEY,
Captain, &c.
-----
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXIII/2 [S# 35]
Correspondence, Orders, And Returns Relating To Operations In Kentucky, Middle And East Tennessee, North Alabama, And Southwest Virginia, From January 21 To August 10, 1863.
UNION CORRESPONDENCE. ETC.--#11

MEMPHIS, TENN., April 20, 1863--3 p.m.
Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief :
I send for your information the following dispatch, sent by me:
MEMPHIS, TENN., April 20, 1863.
Major-General ROSECRANS:
The enemy at Tuscumbia has been largely re-enforced by infantry. The delay in Streight's coming up compelled Dodge to attack. He did so, and drove them from Bear Creek to Caney Creek with heavy loss. Our loss 100, and one piece of artillery disabled, but saved. Streight is now in Eastport, in communication with Dodge and the gunboats. I re-enforced Dodge to-day with 2,000 men, and with instructions that, if he finds the enemy too strong to be dislodged from Tuscumbia, that Streight should proceed in rear of Dodge, by Tupelo, and then across the country. I sent cavalry on Friday to cut the Mobile and Ohio Railroad below Tupelo, and also to push down to the Jackson and Vicksburg Railroad and cut that. I recommend a strong demonstration on the enemy's left, to relieve the movement on Tuscumbia. I shall keep you informed of anything further that I learn.
S. A. HURLBUT,
Major-general.

Colonel Streight, in command of General Rosecrans' expedition, did not come up until four days after the time agreed upon for the movement to commence.
S. A. HURLBUT,
Major-general.

---------
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXIV/1 [S# 36]
Operations In Mississippi And West Tennessee, Including Those In Arkansas And Louisiana. Connected With The Siege Of Vicksburg.--January 20-August 10, 1863.
No. 2.--Reports of Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, U. S. Army, commanding Army of the Tennessee, including correspondence with the authorities at Washington, January 20-July 10.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE,
Vicksburg, Miss., July 6, 1863.
COLONEL: I have the honor to submit the following report of the Operations of the Army of the Tennessee, and co-operating forces, from the date of my assuming the immediate command of the expedition against Vicksburg, Miss., to the reduction of that place:

[extended excerpt]

On reaching Clinton, at 4.45 p.m., I ordered McClernand to move his command early the next morning toward Edwards Depot, marching so as to feel the enemy if he encountered him, but not to bring on a general engagement unless he was confident he was able to defeat him; and also to order Blair to move with him.

About 5 o'clock on the morning of the 16th, two men, employés on the Jackson and Vicksburg Railroad, who had passed through Pemberton's army the night before, were brought to my headquarters. They stated Pemberton's force to consist of about eighty regiments, with ten batteries of artillery, and that the whole force was estimated by the enemy at about 25,000 men. From them I also learned the positions being taken up by the enemy, and his intention of attacking our rear. I had determined to leave one division of Sherman's corps one day longer in Jackson, but this information determined me to bring his entire command up at once, and I accordingly dispatched him at 5.30 a.m. to move with all possible speed until he came up with the main force near Bolton. My dispatch reached him at 7.10 a.m., and his advance division was in motion in one hour from that time. A dispatch was sent to Blair at the same time to push forward his division in the direction of Edwards Station with all possible dispatch. McClernand was directed to establish communication between Blair and Osterhaus, of his corps, and keep it up, moving the former to the support of the latter. McPherson was ordered forward at 5.45 a.m. to join McClernand, and Lieutenant-Colonel Wilson, of my staff, was sent forward to communicate the information received, and with verbal
instructions to McClernand as to the disposition of his forces.

At an early hour I left for the advance, and, on arriving at the crossing of the Vicksburg and Jackson Railroad with the road from Raymond to Bolton, I found McPherson's advance and his pioneer corps engaged in rebuilding a bridge on the former road that had been destroyed by The cavalry of Osterhaus' division that had gone into Bolton the night before. The train of Hovey's division was at a halt, and blocked up the road from farther advance on the Vicksburg road. I ordered all quartermasters and wagon-masters to draw their teams to one side and make room for the passage of troops. McPherson was brought up by this road.

[extended excerpt]

Possession of Vicksburg at that time would have enabled me to have turned upon Johnston and driven him from the State, and possessed myself of all the railroads and practical military highways, thus effectually securing to ourselves all territory west of the Tombigbee, and this before the season was too far advanced for campaigning in this latitude. I would have saved the Government sending large re-enforcements, much needed elsewhere; and, finally, the troops themselves were impatient to possess Vicksburg, and would not have worked in the trenches with the same zeal, believing it unnecessary, that they did after their failure to carry the enemy's works.

[extended excerpt]
For the brilliant achievements recounted in this report, the Army of the Tennessee, their comrades of the Ninth Army Corps, Herron's division of the Army of the Frontier, and the Navy cooperating with them, deserve the highest honors their country can award.
I have the honor to be, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
U.S. GRANT,
Major-General U. S. Army, Commanding.
Col. J. C. KELTON,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Washington, D. C.

---------
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXIV/3 [S# 38]
Correspondence, Orders, And Returns Relating To Operations In Mississippi And West Tennessee (And Those In Arkansas And Louisiana Connected With The Siege Of Vicksburg) From January 20 To August 10, 1863.
CONFEDERATE CORRESPONDENCE, ETC.--#1

JACKSON, February 12, 1863.
General PEMBERTON, Vicksburg:
The following dispatches have been received from General Johnston, February 11 and 12:
Brigadier-General Chalmers has been ordered to report to you; not yet recovered from a wound. Brig. Gen. Dan. W. Adams applies to be transferred to you. Have you an adequate place for him? also wounded.
Major Dawson reports that private cars take private freight over the Vicksburg Railroad, but Government cannot ship on it. Cannot the president of the road remedy this matter? This army is in great need of salt, molasses, and sugar.
J. R. WADDY,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
-----
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXVI/2 [S# 42]
Confederate Correspondence, Orders, And Returns Relating To Operation's In West Florida, Southern Alabama, Southern Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, And New Mexico, From May 14 To December 31, 1863.--#2

HEADQUARTERS TRANS-MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT,
Shreveport, June 3, 1863.
Brig. Gen. P.O. HÉBERT,
Commanding, &c., Monroe, La.:
I am informed the railroad bridges over the Bayous Macon and Tensas can be repaired in twenty-four hours.
Major-General Taylor should now be opposite Vicksburg with his forces, and if the reports of General Grant's discomfiture at Vicksburg are true, the Vicksburg Railroad should be repaired to Richmond as speedily as practicable, or, if it cannot be repaired as far as Richmond, it should be put in running order as far east as possible. You will inform Major-General Taylor what you determine to do.
E. KIRBY SMITH,
Lieutenant-General, Commanding.
-----
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXXIV/2 [S# 62]
CONFEDERATE CORRESPONDENCE, ORDERS, AND RETURNS RELATING TO OPERATIONS IN LOUISIANA AND THE TRANS-MISSISSIPPI STATES AND TERRITORIES, FROM JANUARY 1, 1864, TO MARCH 31, 1864.--#9
HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF WEST LOUISIANA,
Alexandria, February 29, 1864.
Brigadier-General BOGGS, Chief of Staff:
GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Captain Freret's communication on the subject of railroads and telegraphic wire. As there was not sufficient wire reported to make an independent line, no orders were given to remove it. I will have it sent to department headquarters as soon as possible. Measures were taken more than a year since to insure the destruction of the engines and cars on the Baton Rouge railroad whenever the enemy threatened a permanent occupation of that region. I carefully inspected the country between Livonia and Bayou Alabama last summer, with a view to removing this rolling stock, and was deterred making the attempt by the impassable swamp 5 miles in extent. At that time, too, I had entire control of the Atchafalaya, with steam-boats running on that stream and no danger of interruption by the enemy. The attempt will be made if the lieutenant-general commanding desires it. Instructions have been given to take to pieces carefully the engines and tenders On the Monroe and Vicksburg Railroad and remove them to a safe point west of the Ouachita. The iron on that road was also ordered to be removed and can be sent to Shreveport, if necessary.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,
R. TAYLOR,
Major-General.
-----------------
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME X/1 [S# 10]
APRIL 29-JUNE 10, 1862--Advance upon and siege of Corinth …
No. 35. -- Report of Maj. Gen. John A. McClernand, U. S. Army, commanding Reserve Corps, Army of the Tennessee, of operations from April 24 to May 30.
HDQRS. RESERVE CORPS, ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
Camp Jackson, July 4, 1862.
GENERAL: My report of the part taken by my command, consisting of the First Division of the Army of the Tennessee, in the battle of Shiloh, explains how the enemy was driven from my camp on the 7th, and forced with great loss to abandon the ground he had gained on the 6th of April. I will not dwell upon the incidents of that great event now. It would be supererogatory to do so. They have passed into glorious and imperishable history, and there let them rest.
[extensive excerpt]
Hearing that the enemy were using the Mobile and Ohio Railroad as a means of so disposing his forces as to enable him to turn our right flank, attack us in the rear, and cut off our communication with the base at Pittsburg, I ordered General Wallace to advance one of the brigades of his division to an intermediate point on the line between his camp and the cross-roads. Colonel Woods (Seventy-sixth Ohio), commanding the Third Brigade of the Third Division, accordingly moved forward with his brigade, and took and strongly fortified a commanding position. In combination with this movement, at 4 o'clock in the morning General Ross, with his brigade, battalion of cavalry, and eight pieces of cannon, supported by General Logan's brigade as a reserve, under command of Brigadier-General Judah, moved forward to the railroad. Upon reaching the road he instantly encountered a detachment of the enemy's forces which had been placed there to guard it, and rapidly driving them back, tore up the road for some distance, spoiling the rails by placing them on ties and other timbers, which were fired, and thus destroyed. The celerity of this movement took the enemy by surprise, leaving him no opportunity to re-enforce the detachment thus put to flight. After having successfully accomplished the object of the movement and marched near 10 miles, our forces were returned to their camp by 10 o'clock a.m.
[extensive excerpt]
--------------
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME X/1 [S# 10]
APRIL 29-JUNE 10, 1862--Advance upon and siege of Corinth …
No. 37. -- Reports of General G. T. Beauregard, C. S. Army, commanding Department No. 2, with correspondence, orders, and supplementary statements concerning operations from April 8 to June 10.

THIRTY MILES SOUTH OF CORINTH, MISS.,
On Mobile and Ohio Railroad, June 3, 1862.
General S. COOPER:
We evacuated Corinth successfully on 30th ultimo; a complete surprise to the enemy. Rear guard arrived here unmolested last night. We brought away all our heavy guns, tents, &c., but had to burn a few trains, cut off by gross neglect in getting to a bridge.
G. T. BEAUREGARD.
-----
So much more on these 'roads...'

Here are the railroads I have found thus far in the Official Records of the Rebellion:


Jackson and Vicksburg Railroad,
Mobile and Ohio Railroad
Monroe and Vicksburg Railroad
Corinth and Jackson Railroad
Memphis and Charleston Railroad


.
M. E. Wolf

Other railroads of some fame:

The Manassas Gap
Orange and Alexandria,
Virginia Central,
Virginia and Tennessee,
Richmond and Petersburg,
Alexandria and Washington

 

[ole]

That's a definite point in his favor. Not so thrilled with his less savvy understanding of Meade post-Gettysburg, however.

Going back to railroads and not men, one thing that strikes me - I suspect the data at least in part is on Bright's site, but I don't know it in any sort of complete fashion across the board: Rail weight. Rail at 35 pounds a yard can't handle the traffic rail at say, 55 pounds a yard can.

And judging by construction costs per mile, I'd wager that Southern railroads were generally lighter - which would mean that the heavy traffic of war would wear them out even faster on top of having less maintenance and less to replace worn out stuff with.

It's a dizzying spiral of failure.

And don't forget strap rails. They would use wooden rails with an iron strap nailed to the top to handle the wear. Needless to say, the straps had to be replaced with some frequency.

 

[ole]

Note how many RRs in the South went from nowhere to nowhere. How many changes would you have to make to get from Charleston to Memphis? In most of those stops, you'd have get off the train, traipse across town to get to the next train, but was that was equally true in the North.

The map is a bit misleading since there almost no bridges across the Mississippi at the time or the Ohio.

What is the date on this map, by the way?

 

[Elennsar]

And don't forget strap rails. They would use wooden rails with an iron strap nailed to the top to handle the wear. Needless to say, the straps had to be replaced with some frequency.

And god have mercy if they come loose and someone doesn't deal with it before a train runs over it. Train wrecks are all kinds of bad news.