Quick LRT question

[MikeyB]

I'm sure a very obvious answer but, when Meade was deploying his forces, why did Sickles' line stop at LRT, leaving it unoccupied? It wasn't until later that Warren did his thing and it become a pivotal part of the battle. Did Meade originally view LRT as impassable, and a solid anchor?

mike

 

[Andy Cardinal]

I think LRT didnt figure too prominently for either Meade or Lee in planning for battle.

Sickles was instructed to extend his line from Hancock's left toward Little Round Top, occupying it if practicable.

Meade's focus was originally more to his right flank than to his left. Once he was convinced that he could not launch an attack from the right & his attention shifted left, I believe he intended Sedgwick's corps to move to the left of Sickles once the 6th Corps arrived on the battlefield.

 

[FZ11]

Meade's troops are moving north toward Gettysburg and can address threats from Meade's left or left rear. Sickles was supposed to anchor the left on LRT but disobeyed his orders and advanced his line forward.

 

[MikeyB]

Meade's troops are moving north toward Gettysburg and can address threats from Meade's left or left rear. Sickles was supposed to anchor the left on LRT but disobeyed his orders and advanced his line forward.

When you say "anchor on LRT", do you mean anchor and occupy, or stop short of LRT? My impression was the latter, but i could be wrong.

 

[W. Richardson]

I think LRT didnt figure too prominently for either Meade or Lee in planning for battle.

You could be correct in that aspect, but I also have to take in view of what Meade said.

"Meade stated "At the same time that they threw these immense masses against General Sickles a heavy column was thrown upon the Round Top mountain, which was the key-point of my whole position. If they had succeeded in occupying that, it would have prevented me from holding any of the ground which I subsequently held to the last."
Source: The Union Generals Speak: The Meade Hearings on the Battle of Gettysburg, p. 108, edited by Bill Hyde


It does appear that Meade considered it most prominent.


Respectfully,
William

One Nation,
Two countries

 

[Andy Cardinal]

You could be correct in that aspect, but I also have to take in view of what Meade said.

"Meade stated "At the same time that they threw these immense masses against General Sickles a heavy column was thrown upon the Round Top mountain, which was the key-point of my whole position. If they had succeeded in occupying that, it would have prevented me from holding any of the ground which I subsequently held to the last."
Source: The Union Generals Speak: The Meade Hearings on the Battle of Gettysburg, p. 108, edited by Bill Hyde


It does appear that Meade considered it most prominent.


Respectfully,
William

One Nation,
Two countries
View attachment 309692

After the fact though. His verbal orders to Sickles were not explicit about occupying LRT, which leads me to believe it became more prominent in his mind in retrospect, and when he was enduring a pretty orchestrated attack from Sickles about his generalship. Meade's testimony: "...I had indicated to him in general terms, that his right was to rest on General Hancock's left; and his left was to extend to the Round Top mountain, plainly visible, if it was practicable to occupy it. (Hyde, p. 107). If Meade had truly considered LRT to be the key, I would think he would have directly oordered its occupation and defense.

On The other hand, Lee also sent orders with the dreaded words "if practicable."

 

[W. Richardson]

After the fact though. His verbal orders to Sickles were not explicit about occupying LRT, which leads me to believe it became more prominent in his mind in retrospect, and when he was enduring a pretty orchestrated attack from Sickles about his generalship. Meade's testimony: "...I had indicated to him in general terms, that his right was to rest on General Hancock's left; and his left was to extend to the Round Top mountain, plainly visible, if it was practicable to occupy it. (Hyde, p. 107). If Meade had truly considered LRT to be the key, I would think he would have directly oordered its occupation and defense.

On The other hand, Lee also sent orders with the dreaded words "if practicable."

I can see your point, and I agree it was later that he made such statements, but still it is from Meade himself. He left it up to Sickles to occupy it if Practicable, which with Sickles unapproved move forward it was then no longer practicable, correct? I believe Sickles was stretched to thin at that point to occupy it. It was not occupied before the move forward was it? If it was not and had not Sickles moved forward it would have been practicable to occupy and Meade would have expected it to be.

Your post does hold steam though, so I am by no means implying you are incorrect.

Respectfully,
William

One Nation,
Two countries

 

[MikeyB]

After the fact though. His verbal orders to Sickles were not explicit about occupying LRT, which leads me to believe it became more prominent in his mind in retrospect, and when he was enduring a pretty orchestrated attack from Sickles about his generalship. Meade's testimony: "...I had indicated to him in general terms, that his right was to rest on General Hancock's left; and his left was to extend to the Round Top mountain, plainly visible, if it was practicable to occupy it. (Hyde, p. 107). If Meade had truly considered LRT to be the key, I would think he would have directly oordered its occupation and defense.

On The other hand, Lee also sent orders with the dreaded words "if practicable."

Good post. And this was at the heart of my question. It sounds like Meade simply overlooked the importance of LRT, at least through the morning of July 2nd (and if your interpretation of events is correct, we had a retcon in the quote William provided.) If we believe Meade's view on the morning of July 2nd was that LRT was "the key-point of my whole position", goes back to my original question, why was it left unfortified?

 

[Andy Cardinal]

I can see your point, and I agree it was later that he made such statements, but still it is from Meade himself. He left it up to Sickles to occupy it if Practicable, which with Sickles unapproved move forward it was then no longer practicable, correct? I believe Sickles was stretched to thin at that point to occupy it. It was not occupied before the move forward was it? If it was not and had not Sickles moved forward it would have been practicable to occupy and Meade would have expected it to be.

Your post does hold steam though, so I am by no means implying you are incorrect.

Respectfully,
William

One Nation,
Two countries
View attachment 309703

I think that is one of the big questions of the battle.... What exactly did Meade order Sickles to do, and why was he unaware that his orders were not being followed until it was too late? I don't have good answers. Meade was a careful, prudent commander who habitually paid attention to details. In this case a big one was seemingly missed.

I may be wrong in this, but I don't think Sickles had enough force to adequately cover from the Pennsylvania Memorial to Little Round Top, as well as the hill itself, along the line intended. Another corps was needed on the left to defend the position properly. I believe Meade originally intended Sedgwick for this role (and incidentally to oversee Sickles) but sent Sykes when it turned out that the 6th Corps was taking longer to reach the field than Meade expected.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

Good post. And this was at the heart of my question. It sounds like Meade simply overlooked the importance of LRT, at least through the morning of July 2nd (and if your interpretation of events is correct, we had a retcon in the quote William provided.) If we believe Meade's view on the morning of July 2nd was that LRT was "the key-point of my whole position", goes back to my original question, why was it left unfortified?

Which is the reason why, in my opinion, it wasn't a key point for Meade originally. It became so as events unfolded of course.

I am not trying to say LRT was unimportant to Meade, just not as important as some other areas. I think Meade placed much more importance on Wolf Hill on the morning of July 2 than Little Round Top.

And, I think it's important to note, that LRT was not a priority in Lee's initial plan of attack either.

 

[FZ11]

Meade's orders to Sickles were to extend the Federal line to the left.... all the way to LRT connecting Sickles right to Hancock's left. Pretty simple. Sickles didn't do that. Sickles move resulted in fewer defenders per square foot than had he followed Meade's order.... plus it exposed Sickles' and Hancock's flanks. Meade was furious with Sickles move at the time he saw it. I think Meade's performance at Gettysburg was simply stunning. He had been in command only 3-4 days.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

Meade's orders to Sickles were to extend the Federal line to the left.... all the way to LRT connecting Sickles right to Hancock's left. Pretty simple. Sickles didn't do that. Sickles move resulted in fewer defenders per square foot than had he followed Meade's order.... plus it exposed Sickles' and Hancock's flanks. Meade was furious with Sickles move at the time he saw it. I think Meade's performance at Gettysburg was simply stunning. He had been in command only 3-4 days.

I agree wholeheartedly.

I think a major issue for Meade was Butterfield. Without going into all the post-battle stuff, it was clear that Meade didn't like or trust Butterfield from the beginning. Some of this stuff -- like checking Sickles's deployment -- could have been done by the chief of staff in ordinary circumstances. In 1864, for example, both Meade & Grant would utilize A. A. Humphreys in this way.

 

[FZ11]

I think Meade's staff officer went personally to Sickles at least 1X. Henry Hunt also went, then reported to Meade re Sickles movement which prompted Meade to ride to Sickles. Meade was very upset with Sickles and told Sickles so on the spot. Good book on this subject is "Gettysburg The Meade-Sickles Controversy" by Richard A. Sauers

 

[Andy Cardinal]

Hunt's account of the episode in B&L is also very interesting.

 

[rpkennedy]

I'm sure a very obvious answer but, when Meade was deploying his forces, why did Sickles' line stop at LRT, leaving it unoccupied? It wasn't until later that Warren did his thing and it become a pivotal part of the battle. Did Meade originally view LRT as impassable, and a solid anchor?

mike

Sickles simply didn't have enough men to occupy LRT. Instead, the end of his line originally ended on Munchhauer's Knoll, a small hill just north of LRT. Ironically, one of his complaints about his assigned position was that he didn't have the men to defend it but then advanced to a line that was a third longer than the position along Cemetery Ridge.

Ryan

 

[MikeyB]

Sickles simply didn't have enough men to occupy LRT. Instead, the end of his line originally ended on Munchhauer's Knoll, a small hill just north of LRT. Ironically, one of his complaints about his assigned position was that he didn't have the men to defend it but then advanced to a line that was a third longer than the position along Cemetery Ridge.

Ryan

So it sounds like based on the responses here that Meade simply did not view LRT as that essential to his battle plans on the morning of July 2nd. Otherwise, he would have found the troops to allow his lines to extend down to LRT. Had Warren or another trusted lieutenant scouted LRT on the morning of the 2nd, would be an interesting what-if topic, because I don't know why Warren's conclusions would be any different.

But there were signal corps present and wasn't some of the cavalry briefly placed here? Surely they must have had scouts. No one in the Union army realized the significance of the position until Warren caught it? (And I want to make sure I'm not overstating the importance here - whether Sickles is in his ordered position or not, if the Confederates take LRT, Meade's fishhook is untenable, right?)

 

[ErnieMac]

My own thought is that LRT did not come into play until the Federals observed Longstreet moving toward their left. Up until that time the Confederates were concentrated to the north and northwest of Gettysburg. Meade did not trust Sickles and put him out of the way protecting against a quick Confederate move in that direction. Sykes was already in reserve (arrived about 8:00 a.m.) and Sedgwick was coming up.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

So it sounds like based on the responses here that Meade simply did not view LRT as that essential to his battle plans on the morning of July 2nd. Otherwise, he would have found the troops to allow his lines to extend down to LRT. Had Warren or another trusted lieutenant scouted LRT on the morning of the 2nd, would be an interesting what-if topic, because I don't know why Warren's conclusions would be any different.

But there were signal corps present and wasn't some of the cavalry briefly placed here? Surely they must have had scouts. No one in the Union army realized the significance of the position until Warren caught it? (And I want to make sure I'm not overstating the importance here - whether Sickles is in his ordered position or not, if the Confederates take LRT, Meade's fishhook is untenable, right?)

Buford's cavalry was screening the left flank in the Peach Orchard area and extending out towards Fairield. Then Buford asked for and received permission to withdraw to Westminster and refit. When Meade found out he was angry because he assumed another cavalry force (Gregg and Kilpatrick both reached the area by then) would be sent to replace Buford. @Eric Wittenberg has a good article about this in one of the issues of Gettysburg Magazine and also discusses it in his Buford book.

Buford's withdrawal had a major and underappreciated impact on the battle of July 2. Properly covered by cavalry (as I believe Meade intended) the left flank was much more protected and there was an early warning system in place in case the Confederates should attack there. Without the cavalry Sickles understandably became much more concerned and this was one of the reasons he ordered the advance to the Emmitsburg Road. The question is, if the cavalry was there on the afternoon of July 2, would Sickles have done so?

 

[Tom Elmore]

Concerning Little Round Top, before Sickles and Meade on July 2, there was Hancock and Geary on the afternoon of July 1:

General Geary, after placing his division on the line of march from Two Taverns on the Baltimore turnpike, with two staff officers (one from the 109th Pennsylvania) rode rapidly ahead towards Gettysburg, and arrived at Cemetery Hill, where stood General Hancock in command of the troops then on the field, being the First and Eleventh Corps. General Geary dismounted and saluted General Hancock. General Hancock [asked], "General, where are your troops?" Geary replied that two brigades of his division were then advancing on the Baltimore turnpike. Hancock pointed to Little Round Top and said, "Do you see that knoll or hill? That is the key to this position, and if we can gain position on it before the enemy, we can form a line and fight a battle, but if the enemy secures it first, we will be compelled to fall back about seven miles to Pipe Creek. In the absence of General Slocum, I will order you to take possession of that hill." Geary turned to one of his staff [from the 109th], and gave [the necessary orders to secure Little Round Top]. (source: Pennsylvania at Gettysburg, address of Major Moses Veale, 109th Pennsylvania, September 11, 1889, 1:569)

The 147th Pennsylvania and 5th Ohio occupied Little Round Top, with the other regiments of the first and third brigades to their right (north), along with Knap's battery. It was not long before they observed troops marching north on the Emmitsburg road, which turned toward them and went into bivouac - the advance elements of Sickles' corps. Geary was relieved the following morning by the Third Corps.

[Incidentally, then Captain Moses Veale from the 109th Pennsylvania served on Geary's staff at Gettysburg as his assistant commissary of musters, and apparently he was one of the two staff officers who accompanied Geary to Cemetery Hill to meet with Hancock and recalled their conversation as above. Veale provides very minute detail with regard to other aspects of the battle, which bolsters confidence in his narrative.]

 

[rpkennedy]

For the record, I butchered a spelling in my last post. It's Munshower's Knoll which is just north of LRT.

Ryan