Question on Tactics

[Rhea Cole]

The daily drill schedule served two purposes. Paramount was instilling a muscle memory that triggered an instant response to bugle, drum or voice command. Secondary, but no less important, the daily schedule left little or no time for the men to get into trouble.

Link:

Union Soldier Describes Daily Life in Civil War Camp

An article featuring a Civil War letter written by a Connecticut soldier, Philip W. Hudson, to his father on 17 May 1861.

blog.genealogybank.com

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

I was in JROTC for all four years of high school and marched in some parades.

The basics of marching seemed simple to learn, but making them second-nature doesn't happen without regular, intensive practice. And we only did simple block marching in a group of 12-24 on a concrete tarmac or down wide paved streets.

Deploying hundreds of men, by company, from a column to a line of battle, often over broken ground, possibly with gunfire and roaring cannons in earshot?

No wonder marching was the one thing most troops were well-drilled in.

 

[luke1861]

Hello,

Wow, thank you for asking this question because you got lots of wonderful responses. I learned a great deal reading them! I don't think anyone mentioned reenactments to you. I have been studying the war for years and it wasn't until my first reenactment back in 1993 that I really got to see what Civil War armies in the field looked like.

Obviously, it depends on which reenactment you go to, and I certainly understand that reenactments cannot be completely realistic; however, when I went to reenactments, I learned that the smooth motions of the armies in perfect alignment that I had visualized when reading the books was not the reality at all. Yes, the tactics in books and the graphic information you have received on this thread are correct, yet the reality of actual troops performing the maneuvers in the field is fraught with difficulty. It was at reenactments that I first saw soldiers stumbling, not keeping up. making mistakes and having to break ranks and formations and then have to reform as they traversed uneven ground, and around trees and rocks as they moved.

It really helped me understand why you so often hear of soldiers saying that all they do is, "drill, drill, drill!" Drill would be necessary to attain any semblance of proficiency. I also had to realize that America did have some pre-war militia units and that these local militia units were often made up of a hundred or so fellows which is a Company sized unit. They may have been well trained at Company sized movements, but when they became part of Regiments, with ten Companies of roughly one hundred men each, they had to learn how to maneuver all over again! Then they needed to learn Brigade maneuvers where four or five regiments had to move as one and then Divisions had a few Brigades that had to maintain some form of cohesion. (At the beginning of the war a Company would have had 100 men, Regiments 1000 men, Brigades 3-5 Regiments, so up to 5000 men, Divisions 2-3 Brigades so 10,000 to 15,000 men, and a Corps of three Divisions could have as many as 30,000 t0 45,000 men. Sickness and casualties brought those numbers down rapidly, so those numbers are just a framework. Brigades were often the size of large Regiments.)

So, if you ever get a chance to visit a reenactment going on, it is an interesting experience. Most do not have huge numbers of soldiers, however, there are usually enough for you to get a sense of what it was like. I attend the Cedar Creek reenactment, south of Winchester, VA, every October. Usually, the weekend closest to the actual battle date of October 19, 1864. I cannot say for certain, but I think there are possibly three to five thousand soldiers there each year, (which is a lot!) and I have seen more. Last year was the 160th anniversary so it was large. We shall see what the 161st is like. One nice thing about the Cedar Creek event is that they usually have substantial Cavalry and Artillery units, so you get to see how they function and move as well. Also, it is unique because it takes place on part of the actual battlefield which is rare.

I do not know where you live, however, there are quite a few reenactments in the east and near various battlefields. I understand there is a good reenactment in northern Florida, near Lake City where the Olustee battlefield is, in February each year. I guess there are events out in the Western Theatre area as well. I think it would be worth checking into possible reenactments near you if you are interested in this topic.

Thanks again for the interesting thread.

Thanks for the response! I live in Arkansas and I know there are a few reenactments around here. I'll try to go to the next one.

 

[CowCavalry]

I often wonder of what the actual "tempo" of an attack or assault by infantry would actually look like. Descriptions of "hot and heavy fighting" or "deafening crashes of musketry" make me wonder what that would look and sound like to the modern ear. Or is a "charge" performed at a run, as Pickett's was not as I understand it. I realize that they were sometimes done at the quick or the double quick. I wonder if the modern observer would think the action "slow", compared to modern warfare. I equate the deafening musketry to the sound of fireworks going off in the distance on a holiday.

 

[captaindrew]

I often wonder of what the actual "tempo" of an attack or assault by infantry would actually look like. Descriptions of "hot and heavy fighting" or "deafening crashes of musketry" make me wonder what that would look and sound like to the modern ear. Or is a "charge" performed at a run, as Pickett's was not as I understand it. I realize that they were sometimes done at the quick or the double quick. I wonder if the modern observer would think the action "slow", compared to modern warfare. I equate the deafening musketry to the sound of fireworks going off in the distance on a holiday.

Very rarely at a run, would be about impossible to keep your formation. It would be at quick or double quick. Quick time is actually the common march step. During that period it was about 100 beats/steps per minute. Slightly slower than the modern military and marching bands which go by 120 beats/steps per minute to give you a visual idea. Double quick was 160 beats/steps per minute, a trot if you will. You can still do this and stay in formation.

 

[Rhea Cole]

Very rarely at a run, would be about impossible to keep your formation. It would be at quick or double quick. Quick time is actually the common march step. During that period it was about 100 beats/steps per minute. Slightly slower than the modern military and marching bands which go by 120 beats/steps per minute to give you a visual idea. Double quick was 160 beats/steps per minute, a trot if you will. You can still do this and stay in formation.

The Awful Mathematics of Death

The pace of an attack was predicated on a grim formula. Loading in nine times, infantry rate of fire was 3 shots / minute.

As the opponent was reloading the attackers could move with impunity.

After the first volley the tactic was to fire at will. The volley became more ragged, but the basic rhythm stayed the same.

Even on a sunny afternoon at Stones River NB the fire slackened. The musket nipple of the man on the right plugged up.

After (+/-) fifteen rounds musket bores became fouled enough to slow & eventually prevent loading. 40 rounds in the ammunition pouch meant that a regiment had (+/-) one hour of fire to be managed.

For centuries, the beaten zone was (+/-) 150 yards deep. The tactic was to advance quickly, accepting a predictable rate of casualties, fire a volley at (+/-) 40 yards & charge bayonets out of the smoke.

Rifled muskets increased the musket's 40 - 50 yard effective range to 300 yards. No matter the rate of advance, the losses were unsustainable.

Add to the equation longer range & far more lethal artillery support = the 30 to 40% casualties that the Army of Northern Virginia's infantry routinely suffered even in victory.

The tactical conundrum was only solved by the coordination of infantry, tanks & aircraft in 1939. In 2025 the "Death Zone" between the lines is 25 miles deep. Attacks are by three-five man infiltration storm tactics. 250,000 casualties are suffered to advance a few miles.

Closing with & defeating the opponent has been a constant throughout history. The how & with what is the challenge.

Note: The paroxysm of rapid fire that typifies artillery in reenactments is no way a representation of actual practice.

Artillery Support

Black powder muzzle loading field artillery, typically 12 pound Napoleon smoothbore & 3" rifled cannon…

…were limited to a rate of fire of more than one round / minute. R.E. Gibbon's Artillerists Manual.

Not only is there the physical effort required to reposition the gun after the recoil…

…with the assistance of #3 the gunner had to aim each shot…

… the battery commander observed & managed the fall of shot. That all takes time to get results.

View from a battery during the Battle of Gettysburg. Refer to the notes for detail. Note the fire of Confederate batteries. The challenges & opportunities that the battery commander's managed are thought provoking.

Living History Volunteers Stones River NB. Photos by Rhea Cole

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

The Awful Mathematics of Death

View attachment 570224
The pace of an attack was predicated on a grim formula. Loading in nine times, infantry rate of fire was 3 shots / minute.

View attachment 570225
As the opponent was reloading the attackers could move with impunity.

View attachment 570226
After the first volley the tactic was to fire at will. The volley became more ragged, but the basic rhythm stayed the same.

View attachment 570227
Even on a sunny afternoon at Stones River NB the fire slackened. The musket nipple of the man on the right plugged up.

View attachment 570232
After (+/-) fifteen rounds board became fouled enough to slow & eventually prevent loading. 40 rounds in the ammunition pouch meant that a regiment had (+/-) one hour of fire to be managed.

View attachment 570233
For centuries, the beaten zone was (+/-) 150 yards deep. The tactic was to advance quickly, accepting a predictable rate of casualties, fire a volley at (+/-) 40 yards & charge bayonets out of the smoke.

Rifled muskets increased the musket's 40 - 50 yard effective range to 300 yards. No matter the rate of advance, the losses were unsustainable.

View attachment 570236
Add to the equation longer range & far more lethal artillery support = the 30 to 40% casualties that the Army of Northern Virginia's infantry routinely suffered even in victory.

The tactical conundrum was only solved by the coordination of infantry, tanks & aircraft in 1939. In 2025 the "Death Zone" between the lines is 25 miles deep. Attacks are by three-five man infiltration storm tactics. 250,000 casualties are suffered to advance a few miles.

Closing with & defeating the opponent has been a constant throughout history. The how & with what is the challenge.

Note: The paroxysm of rapid fire that typifies artillery in reenactments is no way a representation of actual practice.

Artillery Support

View attachment 570228
Black powder muzzle loading field artillery, typically 12 pound Napoleon smoothbore & 3" rifled cannon…

View attachment 570230
…were limited to a rate of fire of more than one round / minute. R.E. Gibbon's Artillerists Manual.
View attachment 570231
Not only is there the physical effort required to reposition the gun after the recoil…
View attachment 570237
…the gunner had to aim each shot.
View attachment 570238
The battery commander had to observe & manage the fall of shot.

View attachment 570239
View from a battery during the Battle of Gettysburg. Refer your the notes for detail. Note the fire of Confederate batteries. The challenges & opportunities that the battery commander's managed are thought provoking.

View attachment 570229
Living History Volunteers Stones River NB. Photos by Rhea Cole

Excellent explanation, @Rhea Cole.

 

[captaindrew]

The Awful Mathematics of Death

View attachment 570224
The pace of an attack was predicated on a grim formula. Loading in nine times, infantry rate of fire was 3 shots / minute.

View attachment 570225
As the opponent was reloading the attackers could move with impunity.

View attachment 570226
After the first volley the tactic was to fire at will. The volley became more ragged, but the basic rhythm stayed the same.

View attachment 570227
Even on a sunny afternoon at Stones River NB the fire slackened. The musket nipple of the man on the right plugged up.

View attachment 570232
After (+/-) fifteen rounds musket bores became fouled enough to slow & eventually prevent loading. 40 rounds in the ammunition pouch meant that a regiment had (+/-) one hour of fire to be managed.

View attachment 570233
For centuries, the beaten zone was (+/-) 150 yards deep. The tactic was to advance quickly, accepting a predictable rate of casualties, fire a volley at (+/-) 40 yards & charge bayonets out of the smoke.

Rifled muskets increased the musket's 40 - 50 yard effective range to 300 yards. No matter the rate of advance, the losses were unsustainable.

View attachment 570236
Add to the equation longer range & far more lethal artillery support = the 30 to 40% casualties that the Army of Northern Virginia's infantry routinely suffered even in victory.

The tactical conundrum was only solved by the coordination of infantry, tanks & aircraft in 1939. In 2025 the "Death Zone" between the lines is 25 miles deep. Attacks are by three-five man infiltration storm tactics. 250,000 casualties are suffered to advance a few miles.

Closing with & defeating the opponent has been a constant throughout history. The how & with what is the challenge.

Note: The paroxysm of rapid fire that typifies artillery in reenactments is no way a representation of actual practice.

Artillery Support

View attachment 570228
Black powder muzzle loading field artillery, typically 12 pound Napoleon smoothbore & 3" rifled cannon…

View attachment 570230
…were limited to a rate of fire of more than one round / minute. R.E. Gibbon's Artillerists Manual.
View attachment 570231
Not only is there the physical effort required to reposition the gun after the recoil…
View attachment 570237
…with the assistance of #3 the gunner had to aim each shot…
View attachment 570238
… the battery commander observed & managed the fall of shot. That all takes time to get results.

View attachment 570239
View from a battery during the Battle of Gettysburg. Refer to the notes for detail. Note the fire of Confederate batteries. The challenges & opportunities that the battery commander's managed are thought provoking.

View attachment 570229
Living History Volunteers Stones River NB. Photos by Rhea Cole

If the CO was smart he wouldn't fire a whole force volley under attack. This is why there's firing by rank (alternating front and rear ranks) in the manuals. You never want your whole force to be unloaded at once. 20 or 30 seconds is an eternity in a firefight, even then. And also why there is NO SUCH THING as "fire at will" in the manuals. It's "firing by file", which sets up independent (at will) firing. For those that don't know it, starting at the right flank each file partner fires, then the next, and so on down the line. After you fire you automatically load and fire at will until ordered to cease fire. This staggers the fire down the line so again your whole force would never be completely unloaded. Firing a whole force volley was used for effect at times but not a good idea, especially when opponents get into closer range.

 

[The Ninth Ohio]

If the CO was smart he wouldn't fire a whole force volley under attack. This is why there's firing by rank (alternating front and rear ranks) in the manuals. You never want your whole force to be unloaded at once. 20 or 30 seconds is an eternity in a firefight, even then. And also why there is NO SUCH THING as "fire at will" in the manuals. It's "firing by file", which sets up independent (at will) firing. For those that don't know it, starting at the right flank each file partner fires, then the next, and so on down the line. After you fire you automatically load and fire at will until ordered to cease fire. This staggers the fire down the line so again your whole force would never be completely unloaded. Firing a whole force volley was used for effect at times but not a good idea, especially when opponents get into closer range.

Also to note, fire by file was always from the right, much to the chagrin of War of Rights players everywhere.

Alternating fire by company is another tactic that allows a battalion to pour a consistent fire in while still maintaining volley fire.

 

[ColonelBuckwalter]

Link:

https://ia600907.us.archive.org/28/items/hardeesrifleligh01hard/hardeesrifleligh01hard.pdf

"Hardee's Rifle & Light Infantry Tactics" was in the haversack of officers on both sides.
•
Link:

The artillerist's manual : Gibbon, John, 1827-1896, comp : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

Appendix and Index (p. [501]-568) numbered as p. [1]-67, 568

archive.org

General Gibbon's manual is the best how to book for Civil War artillery.

Springing Hardee on someone is just mean.

 

[Rhea Cole]

Springing Hardee on someone is just mean.

The absolute worst is the artillery manual. It is detailed to molecular degree.

 

[Old Soldier]

Bear in mind that the official strength of a regiment was 1000 men - 10 companies of 100 men . I suspect that this was rarely achieved in the field given the noted numbers of sick and injured. There are notes on regiments being just 300 men on arrival and some down to 50 after a long engagement. The manuals are all well and good, but they rarely give the reality of the regiment in the field. The companies were arranged, by the book, as two ranks of 50 however straight lines and 'dressing' were rarely achieved to parade standard, especially when on the move. In some cases, men from supporting infantry regiments were moved at company strength to be under the command of the forward regiment to compensate for poor turnout or battle losses, although this was often frowned upon if the regiment was a locally recruited one.

The appearance on the battlefield was supposed to be a continuous line, but the view was often different to the artists representations with regiments in woods, buildings, behind fences, hedges and walls. The .58 and .577 bullet was much more powerful than the old musket ball, especially over 200 yards or more, (400 yards effective, dangerous at 1,000 yards) and taking cover was a necessity. Yes, they may well have fired by volley - but this was by company and usually no more than two volleys before a 'Fire at will' (individual fire) order was issued. Gone were the days of two opposing line closing upon each other and even offering the first volley to the opposing line! It was a lesson hard-learned as the Battle of Antietam proved.

 

[Rhea Cole]

If the CO was smart he wouldn't fire a whole force volley under attack. This is why there's firing by rank (alternating front and rear ranks) in the manuals. You never want your whole force to be unloaded at once. 20 or 30 seconds is an eternity in a firefight, even then. And also why there is NO SUCH THING as "fire at will" in the manuals. It's "firing by file", which sets up independent (at will) firing. For those that don't know it, starting at the right flank each file partner fires, then the next, and so on down the line. After you fire you automatically load and fire at will until ordered to cease fire. This staggers the fire down the line so again your whole force would never be completely unloaded. Firing a whole force volley was used for effect at times but not a good idea, especially when opponents get into closer range.

I use the term "fire at will" to explain in modern terms the firing that followed volley fire. We have to be aware that many of our CWT readers are not as wonky as others may be. Thanks for the follow on detailed explanation.

 

[Belfoured]

The absolute worst is the artillery manual. It is detailed to molecular degree.

If you mean the 1861/1864 Instructions, we may disagree - at least the portions involving "school of the piece". Same goes for Patten's simplified adaptation. For artillery, if I want to make somebody's eyes glaze over my "go to" reference is Gibbon, which as we know is a treatise and not a drill manual.

 

[Rhea Cole]

If you mean the 1861/1864 Instructions, we may disagree - at least the portions involving "school of the piece". Same goes for Patten's simplified adaptation. For artillery, if I want to make somebody's eyes glaze over my "go to" reference is Gibbon, which as we know is a treatise and not a drill manual.

You take my point exactly. For the "layman" for want of a better term, Gibbon is the educational volume on CW artillery I know of. I carry a spiral bound highly edited version in my haversack. The illustrations allow me to explain how a fuze looked & functioned + tactical doctrine.

At the quarterly training secessions at Stones River it is hard enough to get footwork correct. Reading it in the manual, in my experience, only makes volunteer's slightly nauseous. I have a copy, but at the retail end of the drill don't refer to it often.

I highly recommend the NPS historic weapons drill manuals. Ranger Jim Lewis at Stones River was very involved in developing those manuals. The historic drill is tweaked for safety. Not one observer in a thousand would notice, but the record for safety speaks for itself. Manuals will be sent upon request. Read more here.

Link:

Historic Weapons Policies & Manuals for Living History - Fort Laramie National Historic Site (U.S. National Park Service)

living history, historic weapons, fort laramie, training, manuals, policies

www.nps.gov

 

[1st Section]

If you think the "School of the Piece" is challenging, just wait till you get to the next few chapters...

https://fb.watch/E2z9MZYhoe

 

[Belfoured]

If you think the "School of the Piece" is challenging, just wait till you get to the next few chapters...

https://fb.watch/E2z9MZYhoe

For myself, I think it's clear that I don't find "school of the piece" particularly challenging, either in the Instructions or Patten's adaptation. I should have clarified that once you get to platoon, section, battery etc it gets more convoluted. There are a number of primary source accounts of Union battery members - not just officers - getting their hands on a copy of the Instructions and reading it.

 

[Belfoured]

You take my point exactly. For the "layman" for want of a better term, Gibbon is the educational volume on CW artillery I know of. I carry a spiral bound highly edited version in my haversack. The illustrations allow me to explain how a fuze looked & functioned + tactical doctrine.

At the quarterly training secessions at Stones River it is hard enough to get footwork correct. Reading it in the manual, in my experience, only makes volunteer's slightly nauseous. I have a copy, but at the retail end of the drill don't refer to it often.

I highly recommend the NPS historic weapons drill manuals. Ranger Jim Lewis at Stones River was very involved in developing those manuals. The historic drill is tweaked for safety. Not one observer in a thousand would notice, but the record for safety speaks for itself. Manuals will be sent upon request. Read more here.

Link:

Historic Weapons Policies & Manuals for Living History - Fort Laramie National Historic Site (U.S. National Park Service)

living history, historic weapons, fort laramie, training, manuals, policies

www.nps.gov

Not sure we're on the same book and page - I may be missing something regarding Gibbon. I'm skeptical that what you refer to as a "layman" would easily grasp his text on "theory" and "practice" of fire. Granted, I haven't tried explaining it to somebody but I would find it challenging to avoid the complexity. I agree that it's useful for explaining things like fuzes. But, as I said, it's not a drill manual.

 

[Rhea Cole]

Not sure we're on the same book and page - I may be missing something regarding Gibbon. I'm skeptical that what you refer to as a "layman" would easily grasp his text on "theory" and "practice" of fire. Granted, I haven't tried explaining it to somebody but I would find it challenging to avoid the complexity. I agree that it's useful for explaining things like fuzes. But, as I said, it's not a drill manual.

Mine is the point of view is that of a 30 year NPS living historian in the "Black Powder Parks" extending from Fort Donelson to Kennesaw Mountain. In that time not only have I spoken with innumerable visitors, I have participated in the training of volunteer cannon crew from the NPS, Tennessee State Parks & private batteries. Also, here on CWT many of our friends are not conversant in the arcane arts of the red leg.

An example of what I have learned was, as it should be, from the mouth of a little girl. During the repetition of a talk about the contribution of contrabands to the construction of Fortress Rosecrans & child raised her hand. "Excuse me, what is a contraband." In a moment of blinding clarity I asked for a show of hands. Of the (+/-) 25 visitors only a small minority raised their hands. Lesson learned, from that point on I have used self-liberated people instead. On so many levels it richly communicates what I am meaning to say.

That was a mighty lesson that I have tried to apply to conversation with my gran & great grand girls… admittedly with mixed success.

 

[Belfoured]

Mine is the point of view is that of a 30 year NPS living historian in the "Black Powder Parks" extending from Fort Donelson to Kennesaw Mountain. In that time not only have I spoken with innumerable visitors, I have participated in the training of volunteer cannon crew from the NPS, Tennessee State Parks & private batteries. Also, here on CWT many of our friends are not conversant in the arcane arts of the red leg.

An example of what I have learned was, as it should be, from the mouth of a little girl. During the repetition of a talk about the contribution of contrabands to the construction of Fortress Rosecrans & child raised her hand. "Excuse me, what is a contraband." In a moment of blinding clarity I asked for a show of hands. Of the (+/-) 25 visitors only a small minority raised their hands. Lesson learned, from that point on I have used self-liberated people instead. On so many levels it richly communicates what I am meaning to say.

That was a mighty lesson that I have tried to apply to conversation with my gran & great grand girls… admittedly with mixed success.

I once tried to "simplify" for a group the "theory"/"practice" of fire at the time of the 19th century (much of which applies very basically today albeit in very different stats, properties, etc). It turned out to be one of those monologues in a comedy club that gets only one person laughing at the back of the room who the rest of the audience decides you have paid and "planted". I put in a good amount of effort coming up with easy examples, etc. I never wasted my time again.