Pinkerton's Estimates

[Shadow9216]

It's been established that McClellan relied on Pinkerton's estimates of Confederate strength, and that those estimates were amazingly inaccurate. So where did Pinkerton get his information? I know he had some paid sources, but were they Confederate agents/sympathizers?

I know very little about the man, but from what I've read he was fairly adept as a railroad detective and pioneered several techniques we still use today...so how come he wasn't able to achieve similar results? Several other Federal generals had sources of information which were accurate- although McClellan ignored them in favor of his own sources, what they could do surely Pinkerton could do?

So how come the "Eye Which Never Sleeps" was unable to see?

 

[Eagle eye]

I read years ago (can't supply the source) that Pinkerton & his scouts counted CSA Regimental flags then multiplied that number by haw many men should have been in the Regiment forgetting to deduct disease,sick, desertions, other duties & that made their numbers pretty much inaccurate. By Sept '62 he failed to account for CSA KIA & WIA. McCllenan preferred to accept Pinkerton's numbers to cry for reinforcements & to reason why he wasn't chasing Lee down.
I have the book somewhere but I've got 399 others so I'm loath looking for but I don't have many on Mac so maybe I can find it in one of those.

 

[rpkennedy]

It's been established that McClellan relied on Pinkerton's estimates of Confederate strength, and that those estimates were amazingly inaccurate. So where did Pinkerton get his information? I know he had some paid sources, but were they Confederate agents/sympathizers?

I know very little about the man, but from what I've read he was fairly adept as a railroad detective and pioneered several techniques we still use today...so how come he wasn't able to achieve similar results? Several other Federal generals had sources of information which were accurate- although McClellan ignored them in favor of his own sources, what they could do surely Pinkerton could do?

So how come the "Eye Which Never Sleeps" was unable to see?

As Eagle eye pointed out, Pinkerton based his calculations on how many men a regiment should have had. In addition, McClellan assumed that Pinkerton's agents weren't counting every unit so added men to Pinkerton's count.

R

 

[Elennsar]

http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/c...aro0012;view=image;seq=288;page=root;size=100

"Statements made at these headquarters by spies, contrabands, deserters, refugees, and prisoners of war."

The Eye That Never Sleeps seems to have been very gullible and very much prone to assuming his work was, if anything, missing regiments - instead of counting units twice on several occasions.

 

[M E Wolf]

Pinkerton used several sources if I recall.

One thing must be kept in mind though, that the power of observation was hindered in summer when leaves in the trees obscured the enemy's camp. Were these observations made staying still? On the march? From balloon or from a hill side?

Reliable sources, having had 'snitches' on the street myself as a cop, are only reliable to a point and that source's area of contact. There are levels in that area also, e.g. street snitch, embedded snitch, etc.

Many of these reports are boiled down and unfortunately, not all of Pinkerton's reports and his operators were recorded in the O.R.s or elsewhere.

For example, two women who worked as scouts for General Sherman have never been identified, nor have the men who operated as scouts or spies, dressed as women if need be--never identified. Perhaps to keep them from harm after the war, e.g. retaliation -- this area is still very vague.

But, I do agree that the numbers were high and early in the war Pinkerton wasn't his best other than providing protection for Lincoln and officials within the city. And, yet -- I have empathy for Pinkerton and others like him, as there had never been a domestic war whereas, much like today--anybody on the street could be friend or foe. Vigilance was the only protection.

Just some personal opinions and thoughts,
M. E. Wolf

 

[Shadow9216]

Thanks for the responses everyone...
To follow up then:
1) Why didn't Pinkerton account for attrition? Did he not know/realize he should do so?
2) I remember reading- not sure where- that Sickles among others had access to sources which provided reliable estimates...why couldn't their results be replicated? All speculation welcome.

I've had experience in dealing with multiple sources of information, including human, and I realize the multitude of factors which impact the quality of the information- one of which involves the aggressiveness of the collector; how much effort do they put into validation of the credibility of their source/information? Do they account for the possibility that the person is trying to deceive them- tell them what they want to hear, or misdirect them? Do they passively wait for information to come to them? Etc...

In Pinkerton's case, I'm trying to understand where he was coming from as he approached this problem. We see later in the war that the AoP dedicates a specific staff to information management, and this is largely an outgrowth of the earlier attempts...that said, Pinkerton wasn't a dummy- so I'm trying to reconcile the two perceptions here.

 

[Mark F. Jenkins]

I recommend reading Edwin C. Fishel's The Secret War for the Union. Fishel makes a strong case that Pinkerton's methodology wasn't in fact all that terrible at first, but that there was pressure (specifically from McClellan) that "the numbers be made large," with a significant factor being the assumption of manpower represented by each identified regiment. (It's fairly dam ning of McClellan...)

Secret War for the Union, unfortunately, only covers things in the first half of the war, roughly up through Hooker's tenure, and only in the East... it really should be called "Military Intelligence of the Army of the Potomac 1861-1863" but that's too dreary a title for the publisher, I guess. But knowing a little about your background, I think you'll enjoy it-- it's about real intel work, not all the usual frou-frou Belle-Boyd-and-Rose-O'Neal-Greenhow trivia.

 

[Shadow9216]

Awesome, thanks Mark!

 

[rpkennedy]

I would also recommend Corey Recko's A Spy for the Union which also covers a lot of these subjects. Also, check out his interview during Season 10 of CivilWarTalk Radio.

R

 

[Mark F. Jenkins]

(Side note... just looked up Fishel's book on Amazon out of curiosity as to how much it was going for and noted that one of the reviewers dinged it for saying "may have," "possibly," and "could have" too many times, equating that to "guesswork." Obviously that reviewer is not an analyst...)

 

[M E Wolf]

Anybody dealing with 'evidence' or 'intelligence' has to do a analysis. Over analysis of the facts will play a factor though.

In sifting, the toss of the white and black, focus on the gray -- in the gray area to toss what can be explained and focus on what cannot be explained. Sort of like "Columbo" and any of the other old TV Cop/Detective dramas. Only sad part--it was Hollywood and solved and story written around the final crime.

I'm sure Pinkerton was pressured and perhaps when McClellan was finally out of the picture, Lincoln, etc., saw the flaws. The Balloon Corps also petered out around the same time, if memory serves me correctly.

Just my thoughts and opinions.

M. E. Wolf

 

[Northern Light]

Maybe this doesn't belong in this thread, but I am often bothered by McClellan's persistent whining about being out-numbered, and as Lincoln remarked, his "slows". If he was asking Pinkerton to exaggerate the ANV numbers, what was the real issue? Was he afraid to engage Lee? Was he against the war and deliberately stalling so that negotiations might end the war without more battles? Was he actually a confederate sympathizer? We know from the movie that he wasn't a Vampire, so what is going on with him? If this is the wrong place for this or there is already a thread elsewhere, please let me know.

 

[NedBaldwin]

Thanks for the responses everyone...
To follow up then:
1) Why didn't Pinkerton account for attrition? Did he not know/realize he should do so?
2) I remember reading- not sure where- that Sickles among others had access to sources which provided reliable estimates...why couldn't their results be replicated? All speculation welcome.

I've had experience in dealing with multiple sources of information, including human, and I realize the multitude of factors which impact the quality of the information- one of which involves the aggressiveness of the collector; how much effort do they put into validation of the credibility of their source/information? Do they account for the possibility that the person is trying to deceive them- tell them what they want to hear, or misdirect them? Do they passively wait for information to come to them? Etc...

In Pinkerton's case, I'm trying to understand where he was coming from as he approached this problem. We see later in the war that the AoP dedicates a specific staff to information management, and this is largely an outgrowth of the earlier attempts...that said, Pinkerton wasn't a dummy- so I'm trying to reconcile the two perceptions here.

A problem I see is were Pinkerton's estimates reported correctly and used properly.

When Pinkerton wrote "the summary of general estimates shows 200,000 men to have composed the rebel army" (see link in Mark's post) he doesn't say whether this number is effectives, present for duty (PFD), aggregate present, or roster strength (aggregate present and absent). Makes a big difference.

If we accept Leon Tenney's recent research (1992) on Confederate strength during the Seven Days, PFD was around 109,000. Looking at other related returns to see how PFD relates to total roster strenght, it is possible that the "aggregate present and absent" could be close to 200,000. But Pinkerton failed to make clear the definition of the number he was reporting.

 

[Shadow9216]

If we accept Leon Tenney's recent research (1992) on Confederate strength during the Seven Days, PFD was around 109,000. Looking at other related returns to see how PFD relates to total roster strenght, it is possible that the "aggregate present and absent" could be close to 200,000. But Pinkerton failed to make clear the definition of the number he was reporting.

And this is the type of puzzle which keeps me scratching my head- these were intelligent men, yet they made bone-headed decisions.

I find it fascinating to see how intelligence was used- or misused- by the commanders on both sides. Whether it was formalized as a military discipline or not, the concepts would have been familiar to the leaders and we can evaluate how well they used (or didn't) intelligence by examining what information was available to them and how they chose to act upon it- or not. I'm reading Landscape Turned Red right now, and Sears makes numerous observations about the information McClellan had available to him, information he should have had, and how he mishandled information he did have; in current parlance, we would say Mac suffered an intelligence failure for his inability to act on Special Order 191 and, when he did act, his insistence on adhering to information which was dated. Additionally, Mac was a former railroad man, who employed a railroad detective, and was well informed about the difficulties of rail transit over his own lines- yet he never once questioned how the Confederates were able to move all the men and material he presumed they had over rail lines inferior to his own. There were multiple places for him to look at his army and Lee's army and determine that the numbers didn't add up the way they should- a serious lack of intellectual curiosity seems to have plagued him.

Aaaaaannnndddd...since I've got y'all here reading this, I'm going to launch into the Intelligence Cycle and Mac's use thereof:

Requirements (what we need to know about Lee's army):
Mac needed to know Lee's ultimate objective, his strength, his position and disposition, and his logistics
Planning and Direction (how we'll get that info):
Mac used Pinkerton for the bulk of his gathering, with the cavalry doing a minor bit of localized collection. There was no direction to the cavalry to be aggressive, to push, or to gather specifics- not even to clarify conflicting reports.
Collection (getting it):
Mac received reports from Pinkerton, townspeople, deserters/prisoners, and his own officers.
Processing/Exploitation (how we use it):
There was no vetting of the information, sources weren't vetted for reliability, information wasn't cross-checked against other information. Special Order 191 wasn't immediately acted upon, and when it was, the action was dogmatic and inflexible.
Analysis (what we do with it):
First-level analysis (the "obvious") was conducted, but only so far as it confirmed Mac's opinions. Analysis to determine Lee's intent wasn't performed, nor was any analysis of the logistics train needed to support the ANV. Mac made numerous assumptions of Lee's intentions based on fragmented reporting but made no effort to analyze the information in hand to see if his assumptions were borne out.
Reporting (who we tell):
Mac didn't really tell anyone; granted, there wasn't much of an audience, but he also kept reports from his subordinates which might have been useful to them in their planning and troop dispositions.

 

[Northern Light]

And this is the type of puzzle which keeps me scratching my head- these were intelligent men, yet they made bone-headed decisions.

I find it fascinating to see how intelligence was used- or misused- by the commanders on both sides. Whether it was formalized as a military discipline or not, the concepts would have been familiar to the leaders and we can evaluate how well they used (or didn't) intelligence by examining what information was available to them and how they chose to act upon it- or not. I'm reading Landscape Turned Red right now, and Sears makes numerous observations about the information McClellan had available to him, information he should have had, and how he mishandled information he did have; in current parlance, we would say Mac suffered an intelligence failure for his inability to act on Special Order 191 and, when he did act, his insistence on adhering to information which was dated. Additionally, Mac was a former railroad man, who employed a railroad detective, and was well informed about the difficulties of rail transit over his own lines- yet he never once questioned how the Confederates were able to move all the men and material he presumed they had over rail lines inferior to his own. There were multiple places for him to look at his army and Lee's army and determine that the numbers didn't add up the way they should- a serious lack of intellectual curiosity seems to have plagued him.

Aaaaaannnndddd...since I've got y'all here reading this, I'm going to launch into the Intelligence Cycle and Mac's use thereof:

Requirements (what we need to know about Lee's army):
Mac needed to know Lee's ultimate objective, his strength, his position and disposition, and his logistics
Planning and Direction (how we'll get that info):
Mac used Pinkerton for the bulk of his gathering, with the cavalry doing a minor bit of localized collection. There was no direction to the cavalry to be aggressive, to push, or to gather specifics- not even to clarify conflicting reports.
Collection (getting it):
Mac received reports from Pinkerton, townspeople, deserters/prisoners, and his own officers.
Processing/Exploitation (how we use it):
There was no vetting of the information, sources weren't vetted for reliability, information wasn't cross-checked against other information. Special Order 191 wasn't immediately acted upon, and when it was, the action was dogmatic and inflexible.
Analysis (what we do with it):
First-level analysis (the "obvious") was conducted, but only so far as it confirmed Mac's opinions. Analysis to determine Lee's intent wasn't performed, nor was any analysis of the logistics train needed to support the ANV. Mac made numerous assumptions of Lee's intentions based on fragmented reporting but made no effort to analyze the information in hand to see if his assumptions were borne out.
Reporting (who we tell):
Mac didn't really tell anyone; granted, there wasn't much of an audience, but he also kept reports from his subordinates which might have been useful to them in their planning and troop dispositions.[/QUO

Intelligence Cycle is, I assume, a military term for the type of analysis used for problem solving in all life's dilemmas. It gives one some interesting insights into McClellan's modis operandi at Antietam. Can we use the paradigm to analysis his motives?

Requirements (what we need to know about McClellan's motives):
We need to understand why Mac made the decisions that he did based on the information that he had from Pinkerston and other sources.

Planning and Direction (how we'll get that info):
A carefully of Mac's life

Collection (getting it):
Through his writing, his actions and the comments of those who knew and worked with him.

Processing/Exploitation (how we use it):
Work in progress.

Analysis (what we do with it):
First-level analysis (the "obvious") will be conducted, effort to analyze the information in hand

Reporting (who we tell): The ACW community, in an award winning book.


More seriously, though, what accounts for McClellan's seemingly obtuse behaviour in using the information he had to hand? As well, given Pinkerton's assignment, why didn't he attempt to make a clearer analysis of the information he obtained, pertaining to the number of troops in the ANV?

 

[Mark F. Jenkins]

I'm not clear on whether it was Andrew Jackson or Stonewall Jackson who said "Never take the counsel of your fears" (and whichever said it, where they may have gotten it from), but I feel that this was Little Mac's typical mistake. He rationalized it away, displaced it, and did just about everything he could to make it into something else, but he has always struck me as someone who went into battle feeling half-defeated already. His correspondence with Pinkerton would stress things like the advantage to the country if the enemy's numbers were "made large," so that the Army would get more men, money, weapons, etc., but that's all a blind for not feeling up to taking on the job... his constant honing and drilling the Army, while it unquestionably did the troops some good, typified the leader who never felt quite ready.

 

[rpkennedy]

I'm not clear on whether it was Andrew Jackson or Stonewall Jackson who said "Never take the counsel of your fears" (and whichever said it, where they may have gotten it from), but I feel that this was Little Mac's typical mistake. He rationalized it away, displaced it, and did just about everything he could to make it into something else, but he has always struck me as someone who went into battle feeling half-defeated already. His correspondence with Pinkerton would stress things like the advantage to the country if the enemy's numbers were "made large," so that the Army would get more men, money, weapons, etc., but that's all a blind for not feeling up to taking on the job... his constant honing and drilling the Army, while it unquestionably did the troops some good, typified the leader who never felt quite ready.

McClellan does seem to go into battle looking to survive rather than emerge victorious. That's not exactly a good feeling from an army commander.

R

 

[101combatvet]

I believe Pinkerton was competing a bit with Lowe during the Peninsular Campaign. Lowe usually had the better intelligence, but the antiqued army relied on the older traditional method, which proved to be inaccurate time and again.

 

[Carronade]

Secret War for the Union is a good read, and it shows that remarkably accurate estimates could be made once they instituted professional methods of collecting and, perhaps more important, correlating all available data.

Given the south's significantly smaller population, especially white population, and resources, estimates of massively superior armies should have been taken with a large dose of salt. It's not impossible that they could concentrate superior numbers at a given point, but commanders should have demanded a high standard of proof rather than taking inflated estimates at face value.

 

[OpnCoronet]

Pinkerton's initial estimate of confederate forces were fairly accurate in aggregate numbers, but, all succeeding estimates grew increasingly inaccurate with each succeeding report. To me, this indicates, that it did not take Pinkerton(a businessman dealing with a customer to pickup on exactly what his customer wanted.