Pinkerton's Estimates

[JPK Huson 1863]

Am just following the thread while treading water- over my head to contribute, just awfully interesting because McClellan and Pinkerton seem to have been Peter Principled. Can follow THAT. I don't know- what Mark said on ' liars figure '. Did McClellan get way over his head- past his level of competency, just would not admit he had no end game? OR Pinkerton? Seems a dreadful combination, 2 men who were kind of playing some massive game of let's pretend with an entire war at stake.

Like I said- probably over my head. Commenting on what the little guy's personality glitches seem to be based on letters to his wife, ( scary ) and the continual justification for not DOING anything. One of those men, if you'd met him, think you'd probably get the willies without knowing why. Plus bet he wouldn't be happy if ( when ) you were a lot taller than him.

 

[Mark F. Jenkins]

So Pinkerton relied on a flawed estimation system and passed his numbers to his boss, McClellan; Mac, in turn, cooked the books so to speak, inflating the numbers to justify requests for more men/materials. Eventually, Pinkerton revised his figures upwards to more closely align with his employer's...expectations. And nowhere, at any time, was there even a smidgen of effort put toward actually evaluating the information which was coming in. Does that pretty much sum it all up?

Sounds accurate to my understanding.

 

[Mark F. Jenkins]

Did McClellan get way over his head- past his level of competency, just would not admit he had no end game?

He strikes me as someone who was always trying to 'live up to' the role he'd envisioned for himself, and not quite making it. The braggadocio, the grand statements, the casual insults flung at people that didn't agree with him-- all seem consistent with that. All the more ironic because he actually had the means and opportunity to be the grand hero of the hour, if he'd only possessed the wherewithal to use them. There could be elements of the classical 'tragic hero' (or perhaps antihero) there.

 

[Jamieva]

My brief understanding had always been Pinkerton's numbers were a little high, but in his correspondence to Washington, McClellan was upping the number so that he could get more supplies, material and men (McDowell's corps) to join him.

 

[Shadow9216]

Mac's letters to his wife reveal a messianic complex- he believed he had been "sent" to "deliver the Union" and was living out a great destiny. I've always been puzzled at his end-game however. When would he have had enough troops to do something? What was the magic number?

I'm leaning toward those who claim Mac never really wanted to fight- at least that would explain why he never bothered to work out the discrepancies in reports, or gather specific information, or any of the other tasks he should have been able to do. He had the resources available and the sort of intellect well-suited to absorbing large amounts of data and synthesizing it into a plan- his reforming of the AoP and the attention he paid to the details of supply, bivouac, and so on point to this- yet he failed to do anything along the lines of evaluation and interpretation. His contemporaries on both sides were able to realize the necessity of resolving information dissonance, so why couldn't he? A very selective myopia.

@JPK Huson 1863 has the right of it- two men playing a game with lives at stake. Pinkerton was just as culpable for "giving the customer what he wants" rather than being honest about the information, regardless of Mac's preferences.

 

[Northern Light]

Mac's letters to his wife reveal a messianic complex- he believed he had been "sent" to "deliver the Union" and was living out a great destiny. I've always been puzzled at his end-game however. When would he have had enough troops to do something? What was the magic number?

I'm leaning toward those who claim Mac never really wanted to fight- at least that would explain why he never bothered to work out the discrepancies in reports, or gather specific information, or any of the other tasks he should have been able to do. He had the resources available and the sort of intellect well-suited to absorbing large amounts of data and synthesizing it into a plan- his reforming of the AoP and the attention he paid to the details of supply, bivouac, and so on point to this- yet he failed to do anything along the lines of evaluation and interpretation. His contemporaries on both sides were able to realize the necessity of resolving information dissonance, so why couldn't he? A very selective myopia.

@JPK Huson 1863 has the right of it- two men playing a game with lives at stake. Pinkerton was just as culpable for "giving the customer what he wants" rather than being honest about the information, regardless of Mac's preferences.

That is my take on him at this point. He didn't want to fight, but why? Was he afraid he might lose? Was he not committed to the Northern cause? Was he reluctant to sacrifice the army he had worked so hard to build? Was all his braggadocio a front to cover his basic insecurity? He is " a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma" to borrow a phrase from Winston Churchill.

 

[JPK Huson 1863]

Just do not think the guy strikes me as someone who knew what on earth he was doing at that level, that's all. We all know someone like that- some weird miracle is going to occur at the 7th hour which will bail them out. The problem with this type is, is frequently they'll have accidental successes. It's fatal, gives the impression there's substance when there just isn't. I don't know anything about military stuff, maybe people in general ( you should forgive the pun ). Bragging desperately to his wife, to anyone and everyone, probably could not quite believe anyone still bought it. Everything, everything is someone else's fault, with gullible, admiring people who bought that, too. Those types are never wrong either- gosh- Lincoln had him figured out finally, so he hated him. Seems to me McClellan and Pinkerton knew perfectly well each the other was full of it. It's what gives me the willies about both of them, like they were playing with toy soldiers.

The Peter Principle is supposedly what broke American commerce- promoting executives to their level of incompetence instead of keeping them where they function at their best.

 

[Mark F. Jenkins]

As has been said, nobody on either side knew anything in practical (as opposed to theoretical) terms about moving large armies around and sending them into combat, with the possible (and arguable) exception of Winfield Scott (arguable because the U.S. Army in Mexico was small by Civil War standards). So I don't particularly fault Little Mac for inexperience in that area, at least at first. Crucially, he never appeared to learn anything about it... which to my mind is Grant's particular strength, that he tended to learn his lessons and apply them. (Not a surefire charm against making big mistakes :: coughColdHarborcough :: but I think one can see progression in his thought.)

(Along those lines, and in a naval bent... both Farragut and Porter were, in their day, compared to Nelson-- Farragut for more obvious reasons and Porter by Grant for some reason that made sense to Grant but not to me. The comparison falls down, though, because neither man actually deployed fleets in the sense that Nelson did, and not against large organized enemy fleets. The closest things to true fleet actions in the war were New Orleans and Mobile Bay, where in both cases the Confederate squadron was heavily outgunned, and Memphis, which involved neither Farragut nor Porter and was more of a melee than a fleet action... but Nelson was the go-to-guy of the age in terms of naval excellence, so the compliment could never be higher than being mentioned in the same breath with Nelson. I'll stop rambling here now. My main point being that there were very few or no officers at the outset of the war that had any practical experience in large military operations on land or sea.)

 

[Elennsar]

As has been said, nobody on either side knew anything in practical (as opposed to theoretical) terms about moving large armies around and sending them into combat, with the possible (and arguable) exception of Winfield Scott (arguable because the U.S. Army in Mexico was small by Civil War standards). So I don't particularly fault Little Mac for inexperience in that area, at least at first. Crucially, he never appeared to learn anything about it... which to my mind is Grant's particular strength, that he tended to learn his lessons and apply them. (Not a surefire charm against making big mistakes :: coughColdHarborcough :: but I think one can see progression in his thought.)

That raises a question to me. Did McClellan feel that the issue of handling a large army in combat was beyond his skills? Not necessarily consciously, but if I felt that I'd be overwhelmed mentally trying to handle all of what that means, I'd pursue a low combat strategy too (Sherman's comes to mind).

Not to say McClellan was "incompetent" - he could be perfectly competent in some areas - but not everyone has the skill set to be an air traffic controller either. Or a navigator.

No one was prepared for this, but some learned and just as much to the point, some were better prepared to face that level of chaos where so much even if your HQ is in the best possible location is beyond your immediate ability to influence - like trying to move the limbs of a giant, clumsy robot by issuing instructions to the program that actually controls the limbs instead of controling the limbs directly.

 

[67th Tigers]

McClellan refers to sending a telegram on April 7th stating that "It seems clear that I shall have the whole force of the enemy on my hands - probably not less than 100,000 men, and probably more." in his report here:
http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;idno=waro0012;q1=85,000;view=image;seq=29;size=100;page=root

Wool: http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=Yorktown;rgn=full text;idno=waro0014;didno=waro0014;view=image;seq=0078

Note the future tense. He is saying the enemy is going to bring their main force to Yorktown. He is of course right there.

Johnston eventually has 87 infantry regiments, 4 battalions, 63 artillery batteries, 4 cavalry regiments and some militia. About 100,000 grand aggregate.

About 12,000 grand aggregate were the other side of the James.

What baffles me past all reason, though, as relates to the general topic and not Yorktown specifically:

http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=100,000;rgn=full text;idno=waro0012;didno=waro0012;view=image;seq=0177

And yet McClellan sent this wtfbbq nonsense:

http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=responsibility;rgn=full text;idno=waro0012;didno=waro0012;view=image;seq=0069

How in the name of muffin can he seriously state a report on the enemy having 200,000 men (and of course responsibility for a disaster can't possibly fall on the commanding general in the field, oh no, but the issue of his charming personality is another problem) when he knows that it takes a Herculean effort to supply half as many men? I don't know if this speaks of his ignorance of Confederate logistics or his lack of concern for whether or not what he's saying makes sense or both.

By what measure?

Since he states the enemy is estimated at 200 regiments plus odds and sods it's immediately clear this is an estimate of "grand aggregate". The reasons why grand aggregate was adopted seem to be partially that it was the category Lincoln always used when estimating McClellan's strength.

All generals most of the time miscalculated enemy numbers and insisted their need for reinforcements was very pressing, but this is why McClellan is on the list of failures. This is not the stuff of a victor.

Yet Grant seeing more than double at Fort Donelson and again at Shiloh is?

Pinkerton's overestimates are lower than those of Sherman in Kentucky, Grant throughout the whole of 1862, and Meade at Gettysburg.

 

[Mark F. Jenkins]

Pinkerton's overestimates are lower than those of Sherman in Kentucky, Grant throughout the whole of 1862, and Meade at Gettysburg.

Didn't seem to keep Grant from his operations in 1862, anyway. But some numbers would be helpful to underpin those examples.

 

[Elennsar]

Note the future tense. He is saying the enemy is going to bring their main force to Yorktown. He is of course right there.

Johnston eventually has 87 infantry regiments, 4 battalions, 63 artillery batteries, 4 cavalry regiments and some militia. About 100,000 grand aggregate.

About 12,000 grand aggregate were the other side of the James.

Per McClellan, Johnston arrived (past tense) with "heavy reinforcements" yesterday. He does not mention "and more reinforcements are arriving all the time" to suggest that even more troops will be coming to swell that into 100,000+.

But granting that he means "when everyone is up for Johnston" for discussion's sake:
If McClellan is talking "Grand aggregate" for Johnston, what the muffin is up with him listing his own forces as those "for duty" (not clear from his writing whether he means "present for duty equipped" or "present for duty")?

More on that below.

By what measure?

Since he states the enemy is estimated at 200 regiments plus odds and sods it's immediately clear this is an estimate of "grand aggregate". The reasons why grand aggregate was adopted seem to be partially that it was the category Lincoln always used when estimating McClellan's strength.

When his forces are reported by him as "for duty" when talking about how if only he had more men, its not immediately clear that he's using a different set of figures entirely to talk about Rebel numbers.

And I'm honestly not sure which is worse: An apples to oranges comparison to make the odds against him seem worse than he thought they were in the field (as he knows from managing his own army, "total present" and "available for duty" are not identical numbers) or an apples to apples comparison that overstates the number of Confederates against him by a considerable margin but which is attempting to show the odds in the field rather than an intentional misrepresentation of them.

This is the sort of thing that Stanton being an angel would not make any different or any less appalling. Stanton is not responsible for what McClellan did with the forces he had, Stanton is not responsible for McClellan seeing obstacles but not solutions.

Yet Grant seeing more than double at Fort Donelson and again at Shiloh is?

Pinkerton's overestimates are lower than those of Sherman in Kentucky, Grant throughout the whole of 1862, and Meade at Gettysburg.

Not enough to deter Grant from actually pitching into the enemy?
Not enough to make Grant demand other theaters be stripped so that forces can concentrate on his army (as McClellan did after the Seven Days)?

Pinkerton talks about 200,000+ Rebels a year earlier. I don't know Lee's actual aggregate present in either case (the Seven Days or at Gettysburg), but that's much further from his actual fighting force than an estimate of 90,000 infantry, 4-5,000 artillery and 10,000 cavalry is (for Gettysburg). Though as of May 31: ~80,000+Davis + four of Pettigrew's regiments + the 1st MD battalion/2nd MD would add up close to 90,000 (per http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/c...o=waro0026;didno=waro0026;view=image;seq=1102 it would be 2,971 aggregate present for Davis and probably over 3,000 for Pettigrew, though in lieu of any good count of the 44th North Carolina I'm hesitant at being too precise there.).

McClellan saw odds and trembled, Meade and Grant did not. There is why they are known as successful generals, and McClellan is known as the arrogant whiner who saw double.

Being a Democrat and an unfriend of Stanton would be minor if not irrelevant had McClellan been the sort of general cut out to lead 100,000 men instead of the sort of general to expect everyone to drop everything for him.

I'm not saying McClellan got all the support possible, but what he did with what's available does not favor compromising

 

[Shadow9216]

My copy of The Secret War for the Union arrived today (betterworldbooks.com), I'm sure I'll have more to say when I've read it.

 

[67th Tigers]

Didn't seem to keep Grant from his operations in 1862, anyway. But some numbers would be helpful to underpin those examples.

Actually it did. For example, who wrote this:

"Matters here look favorable in one sense. We have the works of the enemy well invested and they do not seem inclined to come out. They are very strong however being well fortified and having not less than 30,000 troops. All statements places their numbers much higher."

[Actual enemy strength about 13,000 effectives]

"Appearances now indicate that we will have a protracted siege here. The ground is very broken and the fallen timber extending far out from the breast works I fear the result of attempting to carry the place by storm with raw troops. I feel great confidance [sic] however of ultimately reducing the place. As yet I have had no batteries thrown up hoping with the aid of the Gunboats to obviate the necessity. The present high water has prevented my extending the right to the river."

and this:

"If all the Gun Boats that can, will immediately make their appearance to the enemy, it may secure us a Victory. Otherwise all may be defeated. A terrible conflict ensued in my absence, which has demoralized a portion of my command. I think the enemy is much more so. If the Gun Boats do not show themselves it will reassure the enemy and still further demoralize our troops. I must order a charge to save appearances. I do not expect the Gun Boats to go into action, but to make their appearance, and throw a few shells at long range."

It was Grant at Fort Donelson. Grant massively overestimated the enemy strength and decided to settle in for a long siege as his overestimates were much greater than any Pinkerton ever produced. In fact Grant's decisions at Donelson and McClellan's at Yorktown are essentially identical. However at Donelson the enemy fumbled badly (whilst Grant was 8 miles off the field on a gunboat - an error far worse than any time McClellan spent on the Galena) and returned to find everything in pieces. He ordered a charge to save face and was amazed that the enemy then proceeded to offer to surrender.

(all quotes from Simon's Papers of US Grant vol. 4)

 

[Mark F. Jenkins]

True, Grant did have the advantage of Foote and his gunboats.