Pinkerton's Estimates

[Northern Light]

Pinkerton's initial estimate of confederate forces were fairly accurate in aggregate numbers, but, all succeeding estimates grew increasingly inaccurate with each succeeding report. To me, this indicates, that it did not take Pinkerton(a businessman dealing with a customer to pickup on exactly what his customer wanted.

Was this want fear or paranoia?

 

[OpnCoronet]

Was this want fear or paranoia?

In ref. the little mac, it was both. But, in ref. to Pinkerton, as noted, it was probably just a matter of business, i.e, keeping a valuable customer happy.
I believe the really fanciful numbers was from McClellan's policy of significantly increasing Pinkerton's estimates.

 

[Mark F. Jenkins]

In Fishel's book (pp. 54-55), he notes that Pinkerton didn't have all information at his disposal; cavalry scouts, etc., went right to McClellan. So the ultimate collection and correlation of data went on in Little Mac's brain, rather than in a formal intel organization. This was obviously somewhat less than ideal.

 

[Northern Light]

In ref. the little mac, it was both. But, in ref. to Pinkerton, as noted, it was probably just a matter of business, i.e, keeping a valuable customer happy.
I believe the really fanciful numbers was from McClellan's policy of significantly increasing Pinkerton's estimates.

Hmmmm. I think I need to read some more about McClellan. He intrigues me, because he seems to have all the qualifications for greatness but falls flat in the execution of his abilities, except in his own mind.
Any suggestions for good books dealing with McClellan? I would rather stay away from biographies and stay with his career in the war.

 

[Shadow9216]

So the ultimate collection and correlation of data went on in Little Mac's brain, rather than in a formal intel organization.

Mmm...that's the problem I have- I don't think it did, and it should have; Mac was by all accounts a smart guy- with the information available to him and his attention to details, no matter how small/trivial, he should have been able to synthesize the information into workable conclusions and come up with specific actions. Lee was able to do this, as were many other generals- I'd venture to say the majority of the successful generals, especially at this stage of the war, were able to manage information flows into actionable intelligence. Mac remains a puzzle- he had the mental attributes, but lacked the ability or the will to use them.

I don't believe he suffered from "over-analysis" (the paralysis of analysis), where he had too much information to make a decision, or that the information overwhelmed him; my impression is more that he had already made a decision and looked for justification for it.

 

[Mark F. Jenkins]

my impression is more that he had already made a decision and looked for justification for it.

Selection bias, so to speak?

 

[Shadow9216]

Selection bias, so to speak?

Exactly.
And Pinkerton provided the justification his employer sought; no idea if he tried to get Mac to see reason and failed, or if he made a shrewd business decision, but he gave Mac what he asked for.

Maybe the thread should be "Selection Bias in Information Operations"...

 

[67th Tigers]

Thing is, we underestimate Confederate strength (and the Lost Cause has encouraged us in this). Pinkerton's estimates were reasonable, if a little high. See http://67thtigers.blogspot.be/2014/03/confederate-army-in-virginia-1861.html for example.

 

[Mark F. Jenkins]

Well, as I said, Pinkerton's initial estimates were actually reasonable, if a bit on the high side. It wasn't till Little Mac started pushing him to raise the estimates (which he then inflated again in his own communications) that it started to veer from reasonable.

My financial accounting prof used to like to say that "Figures don't lie, but liars figure." Following where the evidence led worked for Pinkerton at the outset, but he wasn't constrained to stay there... part of the problem, as Shadow9216 noted, is that Little Mac had a bit of a hold on Pinkerton in terms of employing him; Pinkerton wasn't an independent agency that way. He also didn't get all the intel feeds. (What happened later on in the Army of the Potomac, with the creation of the Bureau of Military Information, was the formation of a true precursor to an all-sources intelligence shop.)

 

[Shadow9216]

I think Pinkerton's methodology, while limited, was reasonable- certainly he could collect information on the theoretical maximum number of troops by counting flags, but beyond that he needed to account for the missing/captured/wounded/dead in some other fashion- or caveat his info. Perhaps he did this and Mac ignored/overruled it...

 

[Elennsar]

While obviously Confederate numbers have traditionally been underreported, the numbers of Johnston having a hundred thousand men at Yorktown before the second week of April and there being two hundred thousand Confederates in the Seven Days are even more erroneous than the usual downplaying of Confederate strength.

 

[Shadow9216]

Indeed- and again we see that they're accepted without question by Mac. Not once does he ask how the army is supplied, equipped, fed, etc. He doesn't query the rail capacity of the Confederacy, although he's undoubtedly familiar with the problems of resupply and security of the lines.

 

[Jantzen]

I recommend reading Edwin C. Fishel's The Secret War for the Union. Fishel makes a strong case that Pinkerton's methodology wasn't in fact all that terrible at first, but that there was pressure (specifically from McClellan) that "the numbers be made large," with a significant factor being the assumption of manpower represented by each identified regiment. (It's fairly dam ning of McClellan...)

Secret War for the Union, unfortunately, only covers things in the first half of the war, roughly up through Hooker's tenure, and only in the East... it really should be called "Military Intelligence of the Army of the Potomac 1861-1863" but that's too dreary a title for the publisher, I guess. But knowing a little about your background, I think you'll enjoy it-- it's about real intel work, not all the usual frou-frou Belle-Boyd-and-Rose-O'Neal-Greenhow trivia.

William Styple's book McClellan's Other Story notes an interesting relationship between Pinkerton and Thomas Key, McClellan's Aide de Camp. It is surmised that Key either wrote, or at least had a strong role in writing the Harrison's Landing letter. The book is equally damning of Pinkerton, McClellan and Key.

 

[Shadow9216]

So Pinkerton relied on a flawed estimation system and passed his numbers to his boss, McClellan; Mac, in turn, cooked the books so to speak, inflating the numbers to justify requests for more men/materials. Eventually, Pinkerton revised his figures upwards to more closely align with his employer's...expectations. And nowhere, at any time, was there even a smidgen of effort put toward actually evaluating the information which was coming in. Does that pretty much sum it all up?

 

[Elennsar]

I don't know if McClellan cooked the books, but there definitely seems to be the presentation of inflated numbers from the start (when he sets down to besiege - or invest, if you prefer - Yorktown, he estimates Johnston has a hundred thousand men plus there - on April 7th or 8th, I believe. Well before everyone has come up.)

But as far as evaluation of the numbers goes, I'm not aware of any efforts there. Pinkerton reports various figures for the Seven Days army with no effort to analyze any of them at least once - and most of those figures are ludicrous at best.

Meanwhile, the forces McClellan and (Not sure about his other subordinates, but I've seen this in a message by him) Keyes report to Washington are of course at the high end.

 

[67th Tigers]

I don't know if McClellan cooked the books, but there definitely seems to be the presentation of inflated numbers from the start (when he sets down to besiege - or invest, if you prefer - Yorktown, he estimates Johnston has a hundred thousand men plus there - on April 7th or 8th, I believe. Well before everyone has come up.)

On the 8th (ISTR) he revised his estimate from 20,000 to 30,000. It's pretty "on".

 

[NedBaldwin]

.... when he sets down to besiege - or invest, if you prefer - Yorktown, he estimates Johnston has a hundred thousand men plus there - on April 7th or 8th, I believe. ...

Are you sure you dont mean May?

 

[Elennsar]

On the 8th (ISTR) he revised his estimate from 20,000 to 30,000. It's pretty "on".

McClellan refers to sending a telegram on April 7th stating that "It seems clear that I shall have the whole force of the enemy on my hands - probably not less than 100,000 men, and probably more." in his report here:
http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;idno=waro0012;q1=85,000;view=image;seq=29;size=100;page=root

Wool: http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=Yorktown;rgn=full text;idno=waro0014;didno=waro0014;view=image;seq=0078

Are you sure you dont mean May?

Pretty sure. Trying to see what if any estimates were there then.


What baffles me past all reason, though, as relates to the general topic and not Yorktown specifically:

http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=100,000;rgn=full text;idno=waro0012;didno=waro0012;view=image;seq=0177

And yet McClellan sent this wtfbbq nonsense:

http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=responsibility;rgn=full text;idno=waro0012;didno=waro0012;view=image;seq=0069

How in the name of muffin can he seriously state a report on the enemy having 200,000 men (and of course responsibility for a disaster can't possibly fall on the commanding general in the field, oh no, but the issue of his charming personality is another problem) when he knows that it takes a Herculean effort to supply half as many men? I don't know if this speaks of his ignorance of Confederate logistics or his lack of concern for whether or not what he's saying makes sense or both.

Either way. What the strawberry shortcake George. What the strawberry shortcake with whipped cream on top.

All generals most of the time miscalculated enemy numbers and insisted their need for reinforcements was very pressing, but this is why McClellan is on the list of failures. This is not the stuff of a victor.

 

[M E Wolf]

Hmmmm. I think I need to read some more about McClellan. He intrigues me, because he seems to have all the qualifications for greatness but falls flat in the execution of his abilities, except in his own mind.
Any suggestions for good books dealing with McClellan? I would rather stay away from biographies and stay with his career in the war.

Great Administrative and Organization Officer. One has to give him credit, as his 'ways' has had a long life, as I am informed many of McClellan's organization set up are still in practice in the modern Army. He had to get some order and discipline from the small total of the U.S. Regular Army that had mushroomed into thousands of Volunteers, made up of all kinds of units that weren't 'uniformed' in tactics, discipline, clothing and obedience to a higher authority. There weren't enough books published, enough officers to command properly. By unified purpose, organization and using Army smarts learned in his time put the Volunteers out as smartly as the Regulars.

Just my thoughts and opinions,
M. E. Wolf

 

[Elennsar]

M. E. Wolf, do you know if the telegram McClellan mentions having sent on April 7th in his report is shown anywhere in the OR? Or is our only reference to it his report?